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My father provided me with a wonderful approach to life: search for
humor in all things and cling to it with tenacity. Law school has presented a
challenge to that philosophy. After all, what is amusing about the situations we
confront? Attorneys must face the most dire human tragedies. Legal scholars
write articles that chart the way through these perilous straits of emotion. Law
reviews by necessity contain materials that weigh heavily on the soul. Law
does not often lend itself to laughter.
This year in particular has seemed difficult, as we struggle to understand
the issues and implications raised by the Simpson trial. In a timely article,
Professor Leroy Clark critiques Derrick A. Bell's thesis of the permanence of
racism. Bell's emphasis on separatism brings apprehension, and to some, per-
haps even resentment. Before exploring that serious topic, however, I could
not resist my father's advice. Volume 73 begins, therefore, with a lighter
piece, a satirical examination of relational contracts. As some anonymous soul
once remarked, "We do not stop laughing because we grow old; we grow old
because we stop laughing." While we cannot escape the solemn nature of the
subjects we address, I thought we could at least begin with humor.
Finally, the last page in this issue offers words from an old conqueror.
While challenges due to diversity remain, I hope that we can all grow closer
together, not in war, but in love.
Sue Chrisman

THE TRUE MEANING OF RELATIONAL CONTRACTS:
WE DON'T CARE
ABOUT THE MAILBOX RULE,




While standing before an audience of purchasing managers involved in
international sales transactions, the author was humiliated.' After the an-
nouncement of the seminar's coverage (offer, acceptance, consideration, and
damages), one purchasing manager raised his hand and said, "Heck, I haven't
used a contract since 1989. "2 The remaining thirty-nine managers confirmed
this statement. 3 Adapting quickly, the author soon realized that basic contract
law is basically irrelevant.4 If this were a scholarly piece, the premise would
be phrased as follows: Courts (and laws) have failed to comprehend the prob-
lems contracting parties face, ergo parties have resorted to developing relation-
ships with each other in lieu of reliance on the law.5
* Professor of Legal and Ethical Studies, Director, Lincoln Center for Applied Ethics,
College of Business, Arizona State University Tempe, Arizona. The author acknowledges the
assistance of Todd Coleman, a third-year law student at ASU who did a masterful job in research
for this piece but would have preferred not admiting that he knows the author.
1. Please understand that being humiliated while speaking in front of groups is not, in and
of itself, unusual for the author. During the summer of the alleged needles-in-the-Pepsi -can scan-
dal she spoke to the Arizona State Bar Convention, a group consisting mainly of plaintiffs' law-
yers, and suggested that complimentary syringes along with a Pepsi machine in their waiting
rooms might not be a bad way to drum up business.
2. Please note that "Heck" is the way all purchasing managers begin their sentences:
"Heck, I've never had a full warranty."
"Heck, I can buy an Elvis PEZ holder in Beijing for 79 cents."
"Heck, my boss made me come to this seminar."
Speaking generically, but admittedly without Bluebook support, managers are a tough crowd.
3. They said, "Heck, me neither."
4. Cries of joy from first year law students may cause the journal to vibrate- as you read.
(Or Corbin has taken the form of a poltergeist and has returned to see that these purchasing peo-
ple, Marianne Jennings, and those reading this piece suffer Stephen-King-like fright for such blas-
pheme.)
5. The law doesn't help them, so they're making stuff up. Instead of hiring a lawyer to
handle the mailbox rule (see infra note 7) they're hiring, say, Dr. Ruth, to work through their
relationships with them. See infra notes 109-10.
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II. BUYER AND SELLER CONTRACT RELATIONS
A. We Don't Match-Do We Have a Contract?
The author was taught that buyers and sellers are natural enemies in a
contractual relationship.6 Without this basic premise, there really isn't any
need for the mailbox rule.7 Buyers believe sellers exist to take advantage of
buyers' and sellers believe buyers exist to avoid payment.' These mutual bad
faith assumptions allow contract law to exist." ' When the legal profession dis-
covered that these nervy buyers and sellers, also known as merchants," were
6. Without this basic premise, we would never have use for the term caveat emptor. Why
go to law school if you can't come out spouting things such as respondeat superior, quid pro quo,
sina qua non, sui generis, and Louie, Louie, Louie, Lou-l. Note: the author inserted that last itali-
cized, non-Latin term to be certain that the reader had not lost interest after the introduction. Bo-
nus points are available for those who: (1) know what sui generis means and how to say it; and
(2) can name the group that made "Louie, Louie" famous.
7. For those of you who have forgotten, the mailbox rule goes like this: if you sent your
acceptance and used the right method of communication, you have a contract even if the other
guy never receives your acceptance. In practice, here's how it looks:
September 1, 1995 - A mails an offer to B
September 2, 1995 -B receives the offer
September 3, 1995 -A mails a revocation
September 4, 1995 - B mails an acceptance
September 5, 1995 - B receives the revocation
September 6, 1995 - A receives the acceptance
Under the mailbox rule, A and B had a contract on September 4, 1995. Practically speak-
ing, B received the revocation on September 5 and, not knowing or caring to understand the mail-
box rule said, "What a jerk!" and contracted with someone else. In law school, many of us said,
"This is too hard. Let's try consideration instead."
8. See Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co. v. Tree Top, Inc., 831 F.2d 709 (7th Cir. 1987). The
Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co. ("Schulze") made toastettes. Id. at 710. For those of you breakfast
illiterates, these are a lower grade (if this is possible) of the popular Kellogg's Pop-Tart toaster
pastry: a little flour, a little grease, a lot of sugar, and a teensy tiny bit of fruit junk. Schulze con-
tracted to purchase apple powder from Tree Top, Inc. ("Tree Top"). Tree Top, for those of you
juice illiterates, mushes up apples to make apple juice. Schulze needed what's left after the juice is
gone (dried by-products of scrunched up apples) to make strawberry and blueberry Toastettes (go
figure). So, Tree Top agreed to sell its dehydrated apple powder (as opposed to its wet powder) to
Schulze. All was well until Schulze ran the powder through its pastry equipment. Id. Seems the
powder had stems, leaves, and wood splinters. Id. at 711. These kinds of things add good fiber to
the diet, but: (1) folks buying the toastettes are not ioerested in dietary fiber-only the demented
Nutri-Grain bar customers look for fiber in their breakfast pastries; and (2) stems, leaves, and
wood splinters clog up pastry machines. Tree Top said, "Hey, not our fault!" Meanwhile, Schulze
had to shut down to fix its machines all the while muttering, "Sellers exist only to take advantage
of us buyers."
9. See Smith-Scharff Paper Co. v. P.N. Hirsch & Co. Stores, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988). Smith-Scharff sold paper bags to P.N. Hirsch from 1947-1983 with the P.N. Hirsch
logo on them. Id. at 929. In 1983, Dollar General bought the P.N. Hirsch Co. and didn't want
$65,000 worth of bags printed with the P.N. Hirsch logo. Id. at 930. So the customer's bag did
not match the store name-picky, picky, picky. Dollar General left Smith-Scharff holding the bag.
Actually, Smith-Scharff was left holding $65,000 worth of bags and was overheard mumbling,
"Buyers exist only to avoid having to pay."
10. And, accordingly, contract lawyers.
11. Can you believe that in the 20th century we still use the term merchant in a statute?
Somehow I don't think of Target, with its clerks brandishing toe tattoos and plastic parrott stand
earrings, as a "merchant." Now Shylock, the Merchant of Venice, there was a merchant. WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE. And, I might add, he was a man with a good grasp on
how to avoid that whole buyers-exist-to-avoid-paying-philosophy. However, the author is uncertain
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actually conducting business Without clear agreements, 2 we invented section
2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code.'
3
B. Battling Forms--Dueling Merchants
Section 2-207 " was created when we realized merchants were actually
doing business successfully 5 without following the mirror image rule. 6
that Shylock's pound of flesh remedies would be sanctioned under seller's incidental damages in
the Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 2-710 (1991) (Hereinafter all U.C.C. cites are to the
1991 version. I don't want to write (1991) after every U.C.C. section. I've always wanted to press
a button in the weapons control room at the Pentagon and disobey the Bluebook. One wish has
come true.) Further, the full pound of flesh might not be recoverable given the unconscionability
constraints under U.C.C. § 2-302, but there are proposed revisions being examined for Article 2
that may allow recovery of the full pound. Shylock's notion may have its supporters, particularly
among the New York representatives to the drafting committee. While the author is making up the
New York thing (albeit with good cause), she is not spinning yams about the U.C.C. revision. See,
e.g., Zan Hale, UCC Article 2 Drafting Committee Faces Critics, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1994,
at 24. In fact, the revision gang has been working so hard on Article 2 that they even have pro-
ceedings: Richard S. Adams, Proceedings in the Committee of the Whole, UCC Revised Article 2,
Sales, I NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 1 (1995).
12. "Heck, so long as those Elvis PEZ deals arrive from Beijing, who cares?"
13. U.C.C. § 2-207 was drafted for "merchants" because these gutsy folks were not follow-
ing the mirror image rule. The mirror image rule was one of the truly bizarre common law inven-
tions, along with such other tortuous devices as the rack, the stockades, and the English Monar-
chy. The rule provided that offerees could not change one dam thing in their acceptance or they
didn't really have acceptances, but counteroffers. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 60
(1981). This mirror image deal worked in common law England because when you got an offer
you had to decide: is the dam thing I want added important enough to (a) find someone who can
write? and (b) important enough to wait three weeks for them to rewrite it? Three weeks in com-
mon law England could mean your head serf has taken over your castle and you. So, everyone
pretty much said, "Deal," once they got a written contract. For Bluebookites, the mirror image rule
provided that an acceptance "must be 'positive, unconditional, unequivocal and unambiguous, and
must not change, add to, or qualify the terms of the offer."' Wagner v. Rainier Mfg. Co., 371 P.2d
74, 77 (Or. 1962) (quoting Shaw Wholesale Co. v. Hackbarth, 201 P. 1066, 1067 (Or. 1921)).
Note: the serf part is an author embellishment, but, then again, hasn't everything been so far?
14. Here is the precise language of the little devil:
§ 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance of Confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states
terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the con-
tract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given with-
in a unreasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is suffi-
cient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise
establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those
terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms
incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
U.C.C. § 2-207 (1991). O.K. Maybe I will follow some Bluebook rules.
Note: the author had to put this statutory language in for annual review purposes. How well do
you think citing "Louie, Louie" as authority is going to go over with a dean as a means of estab-
lishing ongoing scholarly work?
15. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963), in which a sociologist discovered that business people didn't need
contracts or lawyers. He also spoke to a state bar convention, was humiliated and mutilated, and is
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Worse yet, these so-called merchants were doing business with forms 7 con-
taining unmatching terms without experiencing the accompanying nausea and
fever lawyers warned would result." So, the UCC crowd 9 developed some
nifty rules for the merchants' battle of the forms.2" What happened occasion-
ally was that the buyers and sellers got into disputes2' because their forms
did not agree.22 As a result, their forms battled, or the merchants battled with
their forms.23
Now the battle of the forms and/or merchants is bad enough.24 But, as it
turns out, the courts have waged their own battles over how to resolve the
battle of the forms.25 In fact, the courts have developed categories of form
the dead hero in a yet-to-be-released John Grisham novel entitled The Sociologist. Another guy,
Russell J. Weintraub, also did a similar study in 1992 on contracts that found the same thing
about lawyers' demise, but the name Macaulay makes for a better movie script. Russell J.
Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 Wisc. L. REV. 1.
16. Section 2-207 was not the original statutory proposal when the American Law Institute
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws uncovered Macaulay and
these nervy merchants. The original sanction under § 2-207 for not following the mirror image
rule was the death penalty, but many lawyers felt that the proposal was unconstitutional. See e.g.,
Earl Warren. But see Antonin Scalia.
17. Buyers and sellers love forms-invoices, purchase orders ("POs" or "heck, POs" in
purchasing agent lingo), and receipts. Indeed, a guy in a Harvard Law Review piece says forms
are used in 99% of all contracts. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic
Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971). Why be in business if you
can't have carbonless forms?
18. The so-called "Pepto-Bismol" clause is a little-cited, and often not printed, comment to §
2-207. It provides:
Often the seller's form contains terms different from or additional to those set forth in
the buyer's form. Nevertheless, the parties proceed with the transaction. Shame on them.
Further, the parties may experience nausea, fever, and the wrath of God for proceeding
without matching forms, meeting minds, or seeing a lawyer.
U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (1991).
Okay, so I embellished Comment 1 to § 2-207 a bit.
19. The U.C.C. crowd is the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws.
20. Merchants' Battle of the Forms will be Super Nintendo's next game release. The game is
said to rival the action level and fatal wounding tally of Mortal Kombat. Merchants who attempt
to add conditional terms have pounds of flesh sucked out of them by purchasing agents (the au-
thor is, of course, describing what happens in the Super Nintendo game, not under § 2-207, at
least not under the current version). See supra note 16.
21. Well, perhaps more than occasionally buyers and sellers get into disputes. Contract suits
are 40.8% of all business litigation. Business Cases Clog Courts, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 7, 1995, at Al.
22. There's a lovely piece that confirms the author's suspicions that merchants' forms were
written to create the § 2-207 battle of the forms, thus drumming up loads of legal business. See
John E. Murray, The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms": Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1307
(1986). Now the Japanese took one look at § 2-207 and concluded, "Ignoring this will be our
chance to gain complete competitive advantage over the U.S. It looks like they'll be busy battling
forms." So, the Japanese do business without contracts. If you can believe this, they don't even
agree on a price term; they're flexible: "For example, if a supplier is faced with an unexpected
rise in costs beyond its control, it can often persuade its customers to accept an increase in price
with the understanding that the supplier will return a similar favor later." Thomas Lifson, Manag-
ing Without Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1979, at 30. Ignoring § 2-207 may be why the Japa-
nese have the Lexus and we have the Hornet and Pacer.
23. A pretty picture does not come to mind. Just imagine purchasing managers bludgeoned
to death with invoices while pleading for mercy, "Heck, I didn't write the form."
24. Further, it is the author's understanding that no v-chip has been developed to eliminate
these skirmishes from the workplace.
25. Even White and Summers, the Siskel & Ebert duo of the Uniform Commercial Code,
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battles and their results differ according to categories." Here are the possibil-
ities:27
(1) The parties send forms to each other and the printed forms
don't match;28
(2) The first form has a term in it, and the second form doesn't
have such a term;
29
(3) The second form has a term in it, and the first form doesn't
have such a term;30




(5) The first form provides, "There ain't no contract unless we
do it my way";
32
(6) The parties reached an oral agreement and then thought
some forms would be a good idea;
3
(7) The forms and their terms are completely different;
34
have a split in their thumbs up signals on how to resolve battling forms and merchants. JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 34-36 (3d ed. 1988).
26. At this juncture of the article, you should be saying to yourself, "The Japanese have a
point. Let's not have contracts anymore." Supra note 22.
27. These are only the possibilities to date. Section 2-207 possibilities are like 7-1 us-they
spring up everywhere, seemingly without construction time, and occupy street comers you never
knew existed.
28. An example would be a naive purchasing manager's form reading, "We get full and
complete warranty protection on every used rental car we purchase from you for one year." And
the seller/car rental firm's invoice reads, "These rental cars have been driven into the ground by
travelers who left chewed gum in the glove compartment and used beach sand to fill the radiator.
Needless to say, you're lucky the car still has a chassis. Does the term 'AS IS' ring a bell?"
29. The author has often thought that a good term for a purchasing manager to stick in
would be, "Seller agrees to provide day care for purchasing manager's children on those days
when her children have chicken pox, raging influenza, or head lice so that she can continue to
come to work and purchase away with great zeal." What seller in America, other than maybe the
Ben & Jerry Ice Cream guys, is going to allow a provision for day care of sick children in its in-
voice form? Ben & Jerry's Homemade Inc. holds its annual meeting among the cows on the hills
of Vermont. The agenda goes something like this, "Oh wow, man. Let's hear from the auditors."
Ben & Jerry (who, by the way look like Siskel & Ebert) hired their current CEO after judging
entries submitted in a contest "Why I would be a Great CEO for Ben & Jerry's." See Ellen
Neubome, Salary Cap Thaw, USA TODAY, June 14, 1994, at 2B; see also William M. Bulkeley &
Joann S. Lublin, Ben & Jerry's New CEO Will Face Shrinking Sales and Growing Fears of Fat,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1995, at B1.
30. For example, say a beauty supply store (merchant of hair stuff) placed an order (via
purchase order) with Jos& Eber for 100 sets of his infamous hair extenders. Jose (or more likely
one of his flunkies) ships the order with an invoice that includes the following term:
These hair extension pieces are really a joke. Sure, we've sold a few to the poor souls
watching infomercials at 2:30 A.M., but let's face it, who couldn't tell that you've
clumped a swatch of pony tail onto a frosted shag? So, don't come whining to us when
people start giggling hysterically while looking at your head. You've been warned.
31. This situation is actually the same as situation one. The author was just checking to see
if you were really paying attention. Go back to note 28 for the example. In Bluebookese, supra
note 28.
32. This would be the classic, "Acceptance is limited to these terms," which many purchas-
ing managers slip in. However, they don't read their invoices and act as if a contract exists. Then,
when there's trouble, they whine about their preemptive strike.
33. To wit, "I guess we're not true merchants with a true contract unless we battle over
forms."
34. Two clueless merchants who don't have a contract. See the following example:
19951
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(8) The parties throw caution to the wind, don't use forms and
instead have messages, letters, e-mails, and cocktail napkins
with terms on them;35
(9) The second form provides that there is no acceptance until
the first form person 6 agrees to the new terms.
37
There you have it. Nine different ways to do battle with your forms." In
addition, courts have developed about nine different ways to resolve each of
the nine different battles. Some courts follow the Montessori playground phi-
losophy of who hit first; that is, if there is a term in the offer (purchase order)
and not in the acceptance, the term comes in as part of the contract. 39 In
states where courts follow this "me first" Montessori philosophy, all merchants
possess a strong desire to be an offeror." Other courts follow a "huh-uh, no
PARTY 1: DISNEY
PARTY 2: ABC*
SUBJECT MATTER: TV NETWORK
Terms of Disney's Purchase Order Terms of ABC's Invoice
All on-air talent must be committed No news anchors in the Disney World
to corporate goals electric light parade
We don't have to deal with Roseanne No way; but they can be used
and her husband(s) in the electric light parade
Ted Koppel's hairpiece included All hairpieces
(including Jos& Eber extensions) extra
Seinfield renewed Wrong network, buddy
* Technically speaking, Disney was not buying goods as they are defined under U.C.C. § 2-101,
but really, what could be funnier than Goofy and Sam Donaldson side-by-side?
35. And this is the way, heck, purchasing and sales people do business, except many of
them have only the napkins. See infra notes 72-73 and 82-88.
36. Formee. Offeror. The first guy. The one who sent the first form or fired the first napkin.
You should take a look at Thomas J. McCarthy, An Introduction: The Commercial Irrelevancy of
the "Battle of the Forms", 49 Bus. LAW. 1019 (1994) for more examples of throwing caution to
the wind under § 2-207.
37. Also known as the § 2-207 Microsoft Principle: Hey, either Gates' way or you're not
getting Windows '95. Do it my way or find something other than a computer to work with. See,
e.g., Justice Department.
38. Actually, eight. Remember, situations one and four were the same for purposes of an
attention span test. The author theorizes that there are many statutes similar to this list in that the
same category is listed twice, but we are just confused or too embarrassed to ask, "Say, aren't
these the same?" For example, § 2-501(a) of the U.C.C. provides that identification of goods
occurs when the goods are identified. There you have it.
39. Advantage offeror. However, one could make the argument that it is probably a good
idea to read the offers one receives. Well now, if we adopt that philosophy we aren't going to
need a § 2-207, the purchasing managers won't need lawyers, we'll start working out details and
avoiding lawsuits-it'll be anarchy. Courts following this notion of the offeror did it first are
numerous. See, e.g., Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins Co., 366 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(holding that the seller breached express warranties made in its offer); Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v.
Mark Constr., Inc., 540 P.2d 978 (Haw. 1975) (rejecting the mirror image rule and finding that the
buyer accepted the seller's offer, including a limitation of warranty term).
40. White and Summers part thumbs here. One says (I forget who said what, but I never
knew who was MacNeil and who was Lehrer either, or who was Cagney and who was Lacey, (but
Laverne was the one with the "L," actually "Z,"on all her clothes)) it's silly to give the advantage
to the first guy. The other says the recipient (formee? offeree?) should at least look over the terms
[Vol. 73:1
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sir" philosophy and provide that conflicting terms or terms found in one form
but not in the other, cancel each other out.' Still other courts follow the
"come back when you can agree" philosophy.42 These courts get into the is-
sue of conditional acceptance" and from there dive head-on into the intrica-
cies of section 2-207 and the realization that section 2-207 applies to addition-
al terms, not different terms." Which brings us to another crowd of courts"
that say, "Look, if these folks can't agree and their dang forms conflict, toss
everything out and rewrite the dang contract for them."' The thought of judi-
cial drafting of commercial contracts is perhaps what drove purchasing manag-
ers to the uncharted waters of doing business sans contracts or even cocktail
napkins. 7 But the purchasing managers, along with forty-seven footnotes to
date, make the following point: the complexities of contract law don't help
businesses do business.' In fact, reliance on the law appears to be disappear-
of an offer before responding. Ah, the grueling demands of contracting. WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 25, at 34-35.
41. Please excuse the preposition, but there is support for this proposition and preposition. In
Lea Tai Textile Co. v. Manning Fabrics, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1404, 1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the buyer
and seller had conflicting arbitration terms, so the court said there was no arbitration clause. These
cases remind me of yet another game played on the Montessori playground:
"1 want arbitration."
"Huh-uh ... I want arbitration my way."
"No, sir. Then you can't have any arbitration."
42. The most famous of the "come back when you can agree" cases is Roto-Lith, Ltd. v.
F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962). The case involved the small problem of the
parties' failure to agree on a delivery date. Id. at 498. The court said, "You guys don't have a
contract here. Go get the basic offer and acceptance and then we'll do the § 2-207 bit." (Note: the
author is paraphrasing).
43. Which, as we all know, is a misnomer because a conditional acceptance is really a coun-
teroffer and rejection! RESTATEMEN'r (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 59 (1981). For example, in
Dataserv Equip., Inc. v. Technology Fin. Leasing Corp., 364 N.W.2d 838, 840-41 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985), one party wrote in a cover letter accompanying a form contract that "three changes need to
be made." Well, things didn't work out, the parties ended up in court, and the court said the "so-
called 'acceptance'. . . was without any legal effect whatsoever, except to create a new offer
.... .Id. at 841. Are you like me? Are you thinking, how do we ever get any business done?
PLEASE see supra note 22.
44. Are you like me? Are you thinking if the provision on day care isn't in the first form but
is in the second form, isn't that different? But isn't it also additional? And couldn't there be addi-
tional different terms? By definition if the terms are the same, how can they be additional? And if
a purchase order falls from a desk and no one is in the office, does it make a noise? And if we
are able to show through DNA testing that the purchase order, in fact, was delivered in a White
Bronco by Rosa Lopez to Kato Kaelin,... Sorry, § 2-207 hallucinations caused by too much
exposure to comments, White & Summers, and the Simpson trial.
45. One court among this crowd decided the case of Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741
F.2d 1569 (10th Cir. 1984). There the court just said, "We'll take it from here, boys." (Note:
author is paraphrasing) (again).
46. It is a frightening thought to realize that the same people who found nine ways (okay,
eight) to break down § 2-207 have been rewriting parties' contracts. However, the judicial drafting
of U.S. business contracts could explain several heretofore unexplained natural disasters such as
the cost of Kevin Costner's "Waterworld," the Presley-Jackson marriage, and the success of Regis
and Kathie Lee.
47. "Heck, I can write as good as them guys."
48. See Askco Eng'g Corp. v. Mobil Chem. Corp., 535 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976), in
which Askco and Mobil shipped 166,105 pounds of plastic across Texas, back and forth to each
other, in a dispute over the plastic's suitability for use in manufacturing Hefty trash bags. Very
productive use of time and facilities. Litigation to the appellate level. And Mobil "buried" the
plastic. Id. at 897. The EPA will be entering the fray soon for CERCLA clean-up purposes. See 42
U.S.C. § 9601 (1988). And, although the author has no authority to cite, she has heard from reli-
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ing as businesses develop reliance on relationships-partnerships among buy-
ers and sellers.4'" Part III describes those relationships"' and Part IV offers
suggestions on how parties can minimize legal difficulties."
III. THE NEW LOOK OF BUSINESS: LOOK AT US, WE KIND OF HAVE A
CONTRACT AND WE LIKE EACH OTHER
A. The Paperless/Contractless World
Contract scholars 2 refer to this new business practice of half-heartedly
negotiating a contract, and not really caring, as relational contracts. 3 Lawyers
and economists describe these relational contracts as incomplete.54 The ques-
tion that puzzles economists" is why, when the parties have asymmetric in-
formation,56 are they willing to jump in and do business without a complete
contract. Why does, for example, Wal-Mart say to Procter & Gamble, "We'll
buy as many Luvs diapers as we want?"57 More importantly, why does
able sources that the EPA does not give two hoots about § 2-207 battles causing the burial of
plastic. "Heck, we're the EPA. We don't have to care."
49. It's a lot like the difference between going out when you're dating and going out when
you're married. When you're dating, it matters who pays because you have other opportunities. In
marriage, the movie ticket cost all comes out of the same pot, you both benefit, so, who cares?
50. The clean parts.
51. Lobbying for repeal of § 2-207 would be a start.
52. As opposed to Marianne Jennings, who is more along the lines of a contract goof.
53. Allowing the parties involved to thus have contractual relations.
54. See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete
Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992).
55. Just about everything puzzles economists. Economists take something that occurs in real
life and write about how it shouldn't happen in theory. For example, Nobel economist Gary
Becker once wrote an eight-page article on how dumb it was to stand in line for a table at one
seafood restaurant when another seafood restaurant across the street had plenty of tables, lobster,
butter, and squid. Gary S. Becker, A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social
Influences on Price, 99 J. POL. EcON. 1109 (1991). Gary obviously has not experienced a Planet
Hollywood or Hard Rock Cafe. Denny's has better food and no waiting, but it also has no T-shirts
or tidal-wave producing music sounds. It's not the squid, it's the ambience of potential deafness
and bad food.
56. Now, don't get excited. I'm not cussing in the heart of a law review article. I'm not
going to risk Old Testament curses for swearing, or worse, risk the revenge of the economists. (By
the way, "The Revenge of the Economists" would make an excellent screenplay: take a group of
economists (wardrobe note: tan pants with black belt cinched just below the pectoral muscles and
Hush Puppies) and have them roam the city forcing people to explain marginal cost using graphs.
It's a tale of horror too cruel to describe. The United Nations would be forced to intervene.) After
18 years in academe, I have come to learn that asymmetric information means this: both parties
don't have access to the same information. The seller doesn't tell the buyer (purchasing manager)
everything ("Golly, I can't believe I'm unloading these Elvis PEZ containers from Beijing. This
guy must be an economist.").
57. The author is not singling out P&G. There are other companies that say, "We'll buy as
many - as we need." For example, Intel buys as many math errors as it wants for the
Pentium Chip. IBM, GE, Buick, Eaton, Black & Decker, Westinghouse, John Deere, Harley-
Davidson, and Hugh Grant are all involved in "buy what you want" contract relationships. Buying
just what you need, just-in-time purchasing (JIT) is something we borrowed from the Japanese.
W.E. Deming brought it over along with this caveat, "Here's something that will turn business
upside down if you can get rid of that § 2-207 thing." MASAAKI IMAI, KAIZEN: THE KEY TO
JAPAN'S COMPETITIVE SUCCESS (1986); RICHARD J. SCHONBERGER, JAPANESE MANUFACTURING
TECHNIQUES: NINE HIDDEN LESSONS IN SIMPLICITY (1982) [hereinafter SCHONBERGER, SIMPLICI-
TY]; RICHARD J. SCHONBERGER, WORLD CLASS MANUFACTURING (1986); The Louisville Slugger
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Procter & Gamble, with the look of a stumped "Price is Right" player, say,
"Okey dokey"? 5
The answers to both questions are simple.59 These folks have redefined
contractual relationships. Yes, behind our backs,"' buyers, sellers, merchants,
Hits for JIT, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 18, 1989, at 68. Those of you who are experts in consider-
ation (also known for wearing Hush Puppies) might be saying that buying as many Luvs as you
want might be illusory, particularly when there is no requirement to buy any Luvs at all. But,
again, business people don't seem to care. Consideration just doesn't seem to be a problem in
purchasing anymore, supra note 22. It's a game of delivering it right and on time.
58. The term "Okey dokey" is always indicative of an asymmetric information situation
when used in response to a question such as "Want to contract?" See supra note 56 for the defini-
tion of asymmetric. For a definition of "okey dokey," watch the late night re-runs of "Taxi," an
early 1980s program that included the Reverend Jim Ignatowski, (JI of T), who replied "okey
dokee" to everything because he had no brain cells left after the 60s. A true asymmetric.
59. The answers might be simple, but take a gander at this explanation in a piece on rela-
tional contracts:
Courts also may (and sometimes do) supply terms when contracts apparently lack
gaps. A sale between a manufacturer and a wholesaler illustrates how courts come to
have this discretion. Suppose the wholesaler will face only two states of demand in his
market, high or low. Then consider two possible contracts that the parties could make:
(a) the manufacturer's price for each of five units is $20 if the wholesaler faces a high
demand and $10 per unit for a low demand; (b) the price is $20 per unit for five units.
The second contract apparently is complete; it sets a price and names a quantity. The
wholesaler, however, never has an incentive to breach contract a because the price will
be appropriate to either contingency. In contrast, he has an incentive to breach contract b
if demand turns out to be low: the price then will be too high. This example suggests
that the phrase "incomplete contract" should include more than the gap case.
The definition used here (which is now popular among economists) holds either
that an incomplete contract has a true gap-for example, no price term-or that it parti-
tions future states or potential contracting partners "too coarsely." Regarding the addi-
tional aspect of the definition, parties to sales transactions may face a large number of
possible future states: demand in the wholesaler's market may be extremely high, very
high, moderately high, average, and so forth. The initial contract a is complete under the
definition because (it is assumed) only two contingencies could materialize and the con-
tract has a two-state partition: it sets prices for the high- and low-demand states. Con-
tract b is incomplete because it has a one-state partition in a two-state world: that is, the
contract sets one price and, so, necessarily fails to treat one of the two cases that could
arise.
To understand the relevance of this new definition to legal issues, one must recall
that the wholesaler has an incentive to breach the incomplete contract. If he were to do
so, then he likely would claim in a lawsuit that contract b is only superficially complete:
it does not treat the low-demand state. Contract b nevertheless is sufficiently detailed to
be the basis for a legal remedy: the seller could be awarded the difference between the
contract price and the market price for five units. The court thus has a choice: it can
supply a term that governs when the contract price arguably is inappropriate to the ex
post state, or it can enforce the contract as written. The courts' rhetorical strategies
sometimes conceal the existence of this discretion. A court that wants to excuse the
buyer will supply a term and stress the parties' failure to consider the situation at
hand-that is, the court will stress the contract's incompleteness. A court that prefers to
enforce will give the seller damages and stress the contract's (apparent) completeness;
the judge will recite the maxim that courts do not make contracts for the parties. Recog-
nizing that contract b is incomplete despite what some courts say permits this article to
rephrase the question asked above in a more illuminating way: why do courts complete
some incomplete contracts but not others?
See Schwartz, supra note 54, at 272-73. (footnotes omitted) (with good cause).
Please note, as much as she would like to take credit for the humor of this satirical piece,
the author did not write it. Sadly, it was not written as satire either. Is it any wonder the Federal
Reserve can't fix the economy? It's run by economists who write pieces about theoretical contract
a and theoretical contract b.
60. That would be the collective backs of lawyers and the drafters of § 2-207, if there were
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and purchasing agents got together and discovered you can: (1) have a con-
tract without hating each other;' (2) make some dough;62 and (3) not al-
ways end up in litigation. 3
B. Let's Not Argue over Mailboxes: Let's Be Partners
The newest highfalutin term for all this non-contractual business is "strate-
gic supplier partnering."" Other terms6" have been coined as well,' such
as "proactive procurement" '67 and "reverse marketing." But the "SSP" term
is the biggee and it means that buyers and sellers are working together so that
they both make more dough.69 The formal definition of SSP is: "An ongoing
relationship between buying and supplying firms involving a commitment over
an extended time period, and a mutual sharing of information; it may include
the sharing of the risks and the rewards of the relationship."'
indeed any non-lawyers among them. Can you imagine, though, anyone who is not a lawyer par-
ticipating in a U.C.C. drafting session? Wouldn't it be more fun to go and wait in line at the De-
partment of Motor Vehicles everyday? There would at least be an occasional break in monotony
provided by collecting data each day on how many DMV patrons wore socks.
61. Supra notes 8 and 9.
62. In fact, by redefining contracts, merchants appear to be making more dough. For exam-
ple, Levi Strauss & Co. takes up to a month to get new Levis to stores (buyers). But VF Corp.
(these are the folks who bring us Lee and Wrangler Jeans) have hooked up market-response sys-
tems with their buyers (stores). VF knows immediately via computer when a fellow in Showlow,
Arizona snaps up the only 48W/31L Wranglers in the state at the local Wal-Mart. Within three
days, VF will have the wide-bodied (excuse me, portly, under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990)) jeans back on the shelf in Showlow. Three days is not enough time to
even get warmed up under § 2-207, and VF and Wal-Mart have already had delivery. The result is
VF's market share is up, Levi's is down. VF's sales and net income are up 150% and 200% re-
spectively since 1990. There's no limit to what one can do without a contract. Joseph Weber, Just
Get It to the Stores on Time, BUS. WK., Mar. 6, 1995, at 66-67.
63. If you don't care whether you have additional or different terms, litigation is not a big
issue even in selling big Wranglers.
64. This here is one of them 'thar business school terms that will simply not catch on unless
it is acronymized. Henceforth, therefore and ergo, we will refer to these non-contractual business
relationships as SSPs ("SSP").
65. Additional terms, but not in the § 2-207 sense.
66. Both for descriptive and book-writing purposes. Business school professors are required
to do two things: (1) create new terms and acronyms; and (2) use those terms and acronyms to
write a book. See, e.g., MICHAEL HAMMER & JAMES CHAMPY, REENGINEERING THE CORPORA-
TION: A MANIFESTO FOR BUSINESS REVOLUTION (1993). You must buy the book just to see what
the title means.
67. DAVID N. BURT, PROACTIVE PROCUREMENT: THE KEY TO INCREASED PROFITS, PRODUC-
TIVITY, AND QUALITY (1984). See, this is one of those business books. The standard formula
and/or name for every successful business book is: ACRONYM: NEW TERM FOLLOWED BY
PUFFERY (the type of statement that would be criminal fraud in most states such as: THE KEY TO
WEALTH BEYOND YOUR WILDEST DREAMS).
68. Initially I thought reverse marketing would be defined as ways to be sure no one buys
your product. Michael Jackson staged a brilliant reverse marketing ploy for the Pepsi folks and his
own albums via several young boys. Hertz and its spokesperson, O.J. Simpson, will have some
lovely reverse marketing going for years to come. However, what reverse marketing really means
is that purchasing folks make the decisions about what to buy based on what sells. Tell us what
you want so we're not offering Elvis PEZ holders at 75% off. Heck, that sounds exciting. See
MICHIEL R. LEENDERS & DAVID L. BLENKHORN, REVERSE MARKETING: THE NEW BUYER-SUP-
PLIER RELATIONSHIP (1988).
69. In business lingo: maximize profits ("MP").
70. THOMAS E. HENDRICK & LISA M. ELLRAM, STRATEGIC SUPPLIER PARTNERING: AN
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So, VF Corp. is paired7' with Wal-Mart and J.C. Penney. Each night
Wal-Mart sends VF its sales data, as entered through store scanners.72 The
next morning, VF sends out the replacement jeans for the Wal-Mart in
Kenosha.713 Here is what happens: not only are the jeans back on the shelf,
the jeans the customers are interested in buying are back on the shelf. VF sells
more jeans because Wal-Mart customers tell them what they want,74 and
Wal-Mart isn't stuck trying to sell stuff that customers didn't want at a dis-
count.7" The stuff you want is there when you want it, and you won't get
stuck with Barney backpacks because Barney is out and the white Power
Ranger is in.7"
Actually, there are varying degrees of SSPs-the distinguishing character-
istic between SSPs and contractual relations is that SSP partners share a com-
mon goal.77 The idea behind SSPs is to create a win/win situation: if we
work together we can help each other." Further, it is important to note that
the relationships survive without the benefit of contracts or section 2-207 be-
cause they are, or are intended to be, long-term.79 Longevity contributes to
flexibility in the relationship because either you cooperate or you're out."
INTERNATIONAL STUDY (1993). For those of you still reading to date, you may realize that this
definition defies all notions of contract law and asymmetric information. See also supra note 56.
These SSP partners share information (there goes all the law on fraud and misrepresentation) and
risks (there goes § 2-615 on commercial impracticability) and rewards (If you're both making
more money because of each other, where is the incentive to sue and how do you establish dam-
ages when your profits are up 200%?).
71. Pun intended.
72. Scanners are those things the cashier runs the bar code over so manual price entry is not
required, thus remarkably speeding up check out except for the twenty-two times the clerk must
run the bar code over the scanner. I myself think that three times over the scanner without success
should mean the item's free. Three strikes and it's free. Further, I will be lobbying to have this
scan-it-in-three-or-it's-free provision put into the new Article 2 of the U.C.C. I believe it would fit
nicely under § 2-509, the new "slipped-by" risk of loss.
73. In the author's ongoing effort to emphasize the death of contracts, please note that VF's
shipment is a paperless transaction. No human beings spoke. Nobody said, "Deal." No one even
thought of the mailbox rule. In fact, we're raising an entire generation of purchasing managers
who say, "Mailbox rule? What mailbox rule? Heck, never heard of it. We have scanners."
74. Size 48 Wranglers and all-you-can-drink Diet Coke from the Wal-Mart snack area while
you're shopping. All with a Wal-Mart red and white plastic cup for 79¢. Indeed, as of November,
1994, VF held 30% of the blue jeans market, up from 26% in 1989, while Levi has slipped from
21% to 17%. Weber, supra note 62, at 67.
75. No clearance sales mean higher profits and no annoying Blue Light Specials (or
whatever this K-Mart equivalent is called at Wal-Mart).
76. There's nothing worse for a purchasing manager than to fall victim to the heartless
winds of change in children's heroes. See, e.g., Cabbage Patch dolls.
77. In straight (excuse me, simple) contractual relationships, one cannot assume a common
goal. In ordinary contracts, the seller's goal may be to "Gouge the moron," while the buyer's goal
may be, "Steal him blind."
78. And avoid that gouging and stealing bit altogether. There really is support in the litera-
ture for this statement. Okay, not for the gouging and stealing, but for the win/win bit. See Kate
Bertrand, Crafting 'Win-Win Situations' in Buyer-Supplier Relationships, Bus. 'MKTG., June 1986,
at 42.
79. Breathe a sigh of relief all of you law school deans stuck with two Contracts professors
and one UCC professor, all of whom are tenured. Your professors can still teach limited sections
of contracts for those one-time transactions like mergers, acquisitions, land sales, and marriages in
which gouging and stealing remain as lofty goals.
80. Suppliers are learning to do business as if they depended on retailers, because they do.
Suppliers have key retail accounts and retailers need the precision of just-in-time deliveries from
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There are four types of SSPsY At the very simplest levels, SSPs are
ongoing relationships executed informally over time. Perhaps the single most
important characteristic of this first type of informal relationship is that they
are paperless. This first type of informal relationship may also be called the
office supply relationship.8" A corporation needs paper clips, glue-sticks, and
that awful hard candy in clear wrappers office folks have had sitting around
their offices untouched since the Nixon administration." Rather than faxing
invoices and POs back and forth,84 the corporation has an agreement with an
office supplier 5 and then for a year or so," the corporate folks just use EDI
(electronic document interchange, the net, the information super highway) to
place orders. The office supply folks see the order on the computer and ship
out whatever is listed. They don't seem to give two hoots about negotiation,
nor do the corporate types who do the ordering.87 The price is locked in, the
Post-it notes arrive on time, and all is accomplished without ever uttering a
form!"8
suppliers. Examples of the extent of interdependence:
Gibson Greeting 13% of its sales from Phar-Mor
Gitano 26% of its sales from Wal-Mart
Haggar 22.6% of its sales from J.C. Penney
10% of its sales from Wal-Mart
Hasbro 17% of its sales from Toys "R" Us
Mattel 13% of its sales from Toys "R" Us
Mr. Coffee 21% of its sales from Wal-Mart
10% of its sales from K-Mart
Procter & Gamble 11% of its sales from Wal-Mart
Rubbermaid 11.1% of its sales from Wal-Mart
Zachary Schiller et al., Clout!, Bus. WK., Dec. 21, 1992, at 66.
A group intertwined. If Wal-Mart goes under, all of the Midwest plus Arkansas and Alaska
will find themselves in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. The Orange County fiasco will pale in compari-
son.
81. Actually, I am not all that happy with the SSP acronym. SSP sounds like several of the
immunizations my children got during their first two years of life.
82. A term the author made up and for which she has absolutely no support.
83. On-time delivery is not an issue for office candy. It's one delivery every civil war. Food
for thought: if we're not going to use § 2-207 anymore, will we really need office supplies?
84. Corporation: We need 200 bottles of Liquid Paper White-Out.
Office Supplier: Price is $1 each.
Corporation: That's highway robbery.
Office Supplier: Well, you're the one who insists on doing this merchant battle
deal. This luxurious battle of forms has its costs.
Corporation: OK. Deal.
Office Supplier: Now wait, are we under the Mailbox Rule?
Corporation: I could send a purchase order written on my lunch menu if that
will help.
85. Footnote 84 is eventually resolved.
86. Depending upon when internal audit folks say, "Update that agreement."
87. Some companies have even banded themselves together on the information super high-
way to exchange orders. AT&T is working with Lotus and Novell to develop more interlinks
between companies. These three are actually daring to work against § 2-207 and Bill Gates. Talk
about tilting at windmills!! See Stephen H. Wildstrom, In Search of the Paperless Contract, Bus.
WK., Aug. 29, 1994, at 14. And get this, there is no law governing EDI, and no one cares.
Francoise Gilbert, An Electronic Data Interchange Enables Companies to Purchase from and Sell
to Each Other, but the Enforceability of 'Electronic Contracts' Can Be Problematic, NAT'L L.J.,
May 16, 1994, at B6, B8.
88. Even this very simple SSP form enables both sides to benefit from a monogamous, non-
coercive, non-competitive relationship. It's the marriage thing again. Sure Divine Brown is cheap-
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From monogamous purchasing SSPs, we move to the second type of SSP,
the supplier just-in-time relationships ("JITSSPs"). s9 The desire to have limit-
ed production runs, short set-up times, and quality control create the incentives
for these relationships.'"' What they really do, however, is require the seller,
as opposed to the buyer, to carry the inventory. Now, some of you may be
asking, what is the distinction between the office supply SSP and this one?9'
Well, the difference is Hadley v. Baxendale.92 Yes, it is the same Hadley v.
Baxendale that has been studied in law schools on both sides of the Atlantic
for a century and a half.13 The distinction between office supply SSPs and
JITSSPs is that if an office supplier goofs, the buyer goes without its Vis-a-
Vis overhead projector pens for a few days. If a manufacturer's just-in-time
supplier goofs, factories shut down,94 Chapter 1 1 bankruptcy ensues, towns
er, but Elizabeth Hurley is Ms. Dependable for Hugh Grant.
89. Here's my book title: JITSSPs: THE KEY TO GET-rING RID OF YOUR LAWYER, IF YOU
CAN ONLY PRONOUNCE THAT ACRONYM CORRECTLY.
90. This is the sort of stuff we borrowed from the Japanese. SCHONBERGER, SIMPLICITY,
supra note 57; KIYOSHI SUZAKI, THE NEW MANUFACTURING CHALLENGE: TECHNIQUES FOR CON-
TINUOUS IMPROVEMENT (1987); JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE
WORLD (1990). When the Japanese say JIT, they mean JIT. Here's an excerpt from the Womack
guy (whose name sounds suspiciously like that of the producer of "Welcome Back Kotter"):
On the way back through the plant, we observed yet other differences between this
[Japanese] plant and [the] Framingham [U.S. plant]. There were practically no buffers
between the welding shop and paint booth and between paint and final assembly. And
there were no parts warehouses at all. Instead parts were delivered directly to the line at
hourly intervals from the supplier plants where they had just been made. (Indeed, our
initial plant survey form asked how many days of inventory were in the plant. A Toyota
manager politely asked whether there was an error in translation. Surely we meant min-
utes of inventory.)
Id. at 80.
91. Others of you may be asking, "How is it possible to have 90 footnotes on the premise
we don't need contracts anymore?"
92. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
93. The author apologizes for all the excitement you have built up thinking that you would
not be studying contracts anymore. Now, I am not guilty of true misrepresentation. Fraud, maybe.
All I said was that the mailbox rule, mirror image rule, and consideration were irrelevant. I never
said Hadley v. Baxendale was on the outs. So, even with all these groovy new SSPs, we must still
face Hadley and consequential damages.
94. You may recall that in Hadley, the plaintiffs were flour millers in Gloucester. Hadley,
156 Eng. Rep. at 145. Their mills were run by a steam engine. The crankshaft on their steam
engine broke. Id. It was the little engine that couldn't. So, the millers contacted W. Joyce & Co.
of Greenwich to build a new crankshaft using the old crankshaft as a model. Id. at 146. At this
juncture, two irrelevant points must be made. First, you did not need to know Glouester and
Greenwich. However, those names are difficult to pronounce correctly, and the author enjoys the
thought of readers saying "Glow' Chester" and "Green-witch" instead of "Glowster" and
"Grenitch." Second, the author is grateful for the chance to review the facts in Hadley v.
Baxendale because although she has taught contracts for 18 years, she has reached the point dur-
ing classroom discussions where she is no longer sure which cases are real, which are hypotheti-
cal, and which are author-embellished. For example, when teaching Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.,
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), she is able to work in terrorists, the lovely Donna Karan ensemble Mrs.
Palsgraf was wearing, and the passengers who were cheering to the beat of Queen's "We Will
Rock You" as the idiot with the firecrackers was running to catch the train.
Anyway, back to Hadley. So, the millers (one of them must have been named Hadley or
there just isn't any explanation for the case name) (that's Had'lee) contracted with W. Joyce &
Co. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 146. The shaft was to be delivered (not given) by Pickford & Co., a
common carrier, to W. Joyce & Co. within two days. Id. Now, Baxendale worked for Pickford,
otherwise, again, we're in trouble on the name. Baxendale/Pickford apparently had some troubles.
It is rumored (author's embellishment after 18 years) that they were asking how to get to
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disappear and, most importantly, astronomical damages occur.95
"Astronomical damages" is a lay term for consequential damages: the
same type of consequential damages which the court permitted recovery of in
Hadley96 and which are a strong possibility if 'a JITSSP doesn't work.97
Now, folks since the time of Hadley have differed in their interpretations of
what the case really said.9" So have law reviews and books," so did even
the judges in Hadley itself,"' and, of course, the courts.""
"Greenwitch" and no one knew where they wanted to go until the seventh day when someone
said, "Do you mean Grenitch?" To which Baxendale responded, "Well, wherever W. Joyce & Co.
is located." So, Joyce got the old crankshaft, from which they were to make the new crankshaft,
five days late. Id.
Meanwhile, back at the flour mill in Glowchester, customers were screaming for flour,
employees were sitting around doing nothing and still being paid (and these were pre-union
times), the millers had to buy other flour (i.e., "cover"--see U.C.C. § 2-712, which didn't exist in
England in 1854, but it was what they were doing), and profits plummeted. The millers demanded
£300 as damages. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 146. Baxendale said they would refund the cost of
transportation, which, by the way is the standard FedEx remedy: "Guaranteed by 10:30 A.M. next
day, but, if not, we'll give you a refund. No Hadley v. Baxendale stuff allowed."
95. The author could not find a definition of "astronomical damages" in the literature but
would define it to include those damages that throw the seller into Chapter 11 bankruptcy after the
buyer brings suit for its Chapter II bankruptcy.
96. Well, but not to the tune of the £300: "the loss of the profits here cannot reasonably be
considered such a consequence of the breach of contract as could have been fairly and reasonably
contemplated by both. the parties when they made this contract." Hadley, 146 Eng. Rep. at 151
(i.e., they didn't see the shaft coming).
97. In Hadley the court stated:
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the dam-
ages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should
be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., accord-
ing to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time
they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special
circumstances under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the
plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from
the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the
amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these
special circumstances so known and communicated.
9 Ex. at 354-55, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151 (Note two cites provided in case your library carries both
1854 English reporters!) (Translation: if you could see it coming or should have seen it coming,
you're responsible for their Chapter II bankruptcy.).
98. The pros and cons of Hadley are really beyond the scope of this piece. Are you like me?
Are you thinking, "She's discussed everything from Elvis PEZ holders to Laverne & Shirley and
now she has the nerve to say consequential damage theory is beyond the scope of this piece?"
Okay, suffice it to say consequential damages are a BIG issue in JITSSP relationships. For the
pros and cons on consequential damages in JIT contracts, see Robert B. Bennett, Jr., Just-In-Time
Purchasing and the Problem of Consequential Damages, 26 UCC L.J. 332 (1994).
99. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467-68 (1973);
KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 194-97
(1990); Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 249 (1975); E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1200-10 (1970); L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Inter-
est in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 84-96 (1936); A.W.B. Simpson, Innovation in Nine-
teenth Century Contract Law, 91 LAW Q. REV. 247, 273-78 (1975); Comment, Lost Profits as
Contract Damages: Problems of Proof and Limitations on Recovery, 65 YALE L.J. 992, 997
(1956); Note, Lost Profits and Hadley v. Baxendale, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 488 (1980).
Tell me we haven't overdone the analysis on the misdelivered flour mill crankshaft.
100. Danzig, supra note 99, suggests that the judges in Hadley had conflicts of interest and
thus differed on the results:
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A direct relationship between a manufacturer and retailer characterizes the
third category of SSPs. It is the same type of cooperative/collaborative rela-
tionship described earlier between VF and Wal-Mart. "' 2 VF has access to
Wal-Mart's computers, inventory, and sales information, and ships merchan-
dise to Wal-Mart based upon this direct data. For the purposes of discussion,
we will call this type of SSP the Wal-Mart SSP. The distinction between
JITSSPs and the Wal-Mart SSP is the difference in consequences between a
manufacturer not getting its supplies"" and a size 48W/30L customer in
Showlow going an extra day with a hole in his jeans.
The fourth category of SSPs involves expanded partnerships in which the
buyer and seller work together to develop a product or establish a joint ven-
ture to sell a product." 4 The distinctions between this form of SSP and the
[lit is worth noting that the predisposition of this panel seems clear. Two of the three
Exchequer judges were tied to Pickfords in contexts likely to make them sympathetic to
the company. Baron Martin had represented Pickfords before ascending to the bench,
and Baron Parke's brother had been the managing director of the company before
Baxendale.
Danxig, supra note 99, at 266-67 (citations omitted). This piece was worth reading just for this
tidbit. I'll take Hadley v. Baxendale trivia for $200, Alex.
101. Here's a list of some of the most charming cases:
Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903); Hendricks & Assocs., Inc.
v. Daewoo Corp., 923 F.2d 209 (lst Cir. 1991); Hampton ex rel. Hampton v. Federal Express
Corp., 917 F.2d 1119 (8th Cir. 1990); Rardin v. T & D Mach. Handling, Inc., 890 F.2d 24 (7th
Cir. 1989); Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017
(1982); Hector Martinez & Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 606 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980); Anna Ready Mix, Inc. v. N.E. Pierson Constr. Co., 747 F. Supp.
1299 (S.D. Ill. 1990); Draft Sys., Inc. v. Rimar Mfg., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
affd, 688 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1982); United States ex rel. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Marietta
Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.W. Va. 1972); Oliver-Elec. Mfg. Co. v. 1.0. Teigen Constr. Co.,
177 F. Supp. 572 (D. Minn. 1959); Jacobs v. Thomas, 600 A.2d 1378 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991);
Cricket Alley Corp. v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 732 P.2d 719 (Kan. 1987); Liberty Fin. Mgmt.
Corp. v. Beneficial Data Processing Corp., 670 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Harmon Cable
Communications v. Scope Cable Television, Inc., 468 N.W.2d 350 (Neb. 1991); Conner v. South-
em Nev. Paving, Inc., 741 P.2d 800 (Nev. 1987); Hydraform Prods. Corp. v. American Steel &
Aluminum Corp., 498 A.2d 339 (N.H. 1985); Noye v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc., 570 A.2d 12 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); Glatt v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 383 N.W.2d 473 (N.D. 1986);
Dynagraphics, Inc. v. United States Nat'l Bank, 785 P.2d 760 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); Mead v. John-
son Group, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. 1981); Gaglidari v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 815 P.2d
1362 (Wash. 1991).
102. For a description of this relationship see supra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Ohoud Establishment For Trade & Contracts v. Tri-State Contracting & Trad-
ing Corp., 523 F. Supp. 249, 255 (D.N.J. 1981) (citing POOR RICHARDS ALMANAC (1758)) (cited
and translated liberally).
For want of a nail the shoe was lost;
For want of a shoe the horse was lost;
And for want of a horse the rider was lost;
For the want of a rider the battle was lost;
For the want of the battle the kingdom was lost;
And all for the want of a horseshoe-nail.
Non-delivery of nails can produce Chapter II fiascos. Non-delivery of jeans to a large,
short man (portly) in Showlow may create aesthetic, and perhaps zoning, problems in Showlow,
but both Wal-Mart and Showlow will survive. By the way, please note the Poor Richards deal
was cited in a consequential damage case. I'll take Poor Richards Almanac combined with Hadley
trivia for $400, Alex.
104. An example of an expanded partnership was the development of the Dow Coming breast
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others should be obvious: legal liability, exposure, possible public hatred and
scorn, and a visit by an overzealous Sixty Minutes crew."" These folks may
combine resources (raw materials with production) or distribution (railroads
contracting to get the toys to Toys R Us). They are not just contracting, they
are in business together.
IV. THE KEYS TO SUCCESS WITHOUT CONTRACTS
Now that you know folks are actually doing business without contracts,
perhaps the question in your mind is, "Yes, but does it work or do we all end
up like Hadley and Baxendale, fools written up 140 years ago to be studied by
all smart-mouthed law students?""' We should begin by noting that many
SSPs fail, in the sense that they are terminated" 7 or do not produce the an-
ticipated results.' What, therefore, are the keys to a good SSP relationship?
When SSP participants were asked to rate factors that were or were not impor-
tant in the failure of their relationships, two key factors appeared: lack of trust
and lack of communication. 9 Thus, a key factor in the success of SSPs ap-
implants. I didn't say it was a good example. Litigation, bankruptcy, and national disgrace all
resulted-but see part IV. Dow Corning's Profits Down 84.4% in Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
1992, at D2; see also Tim Smart, This Man Sounded the Silicone Alarm-n 1976, BuS. WK., Jan.
27, 1992, at 34; Tim Smart, Breast Implants: What Did the Industry Know and When?, Bus. WK.,
June 10, 1991, at 94.
105. It is fair to say, however, that there have been some good alliances. Texaco and Subway
are building combination gas station/sandwich shops. Be careful if you say "Hold the oil" in one
of these combination fill-er-up stops. GTE has phones on airplanes. HENDRICK & ELLRAM, supra
note 70, describe the types of SSPs in great detail with nifty charts and graphs. For example, most
SSP supplier relationships (69%) are for made-to-order items. Id. at 19. This is what Hadley want-
ed: a made-to-order crankshaft.
106. Please, supply your own humor here.
107. VF is ousted by Wal-Mart. Or Wal-Mart is abandoned by VF. And Bill Gates quits sell-
ing software. And the check is in the mail. And the divorce will be final next week. These last
four fairy tales were brought to you to emphasize that termination in these SSPs can be terribly
one-sided. Wal-Mart will survive without VF. Can VF survive without Wal-Mart? As parties
abandon contracts, and contract protections (i.e., damages), they should consider their vulnera-
bility.
108. Not making as much dough as everyone thought.
109. Oddly, these are also the key factors in marriage dissolutions. Well, those and Sharon
Stone. A full list of ffs (failure factors) is provided below.
FIGURE 42
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO PARTNERSHIPS THAT HAVE NOT
WORKED OUT OR WERE DISSOLVED
Mean ratings:





a. Lack of our top management support of the partnership 5.30 4.40*
b. Lack of partner firm's top management support 3.89 4.88**
c. Low status of customer's purchasing function
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pears to be prior experience"" with the other party and an ability to com-
municate easily as the relationship evolves."' Interpersonal communication
and skills count more than forms. SSPers say success hinges on the ability to
"work together to identify and solve the problem" if problems arise." Un-
derlying these comments are the "damn lawyer" comments." 3 In short, folks
are not interested in Hadley v. Baxendale damages when they are involved in
an SSP, they are interested in long-term relationships. They're not interested in
d. Lack of strategic direction for the relationship 4.75 5.58**
e. Distance barriers 2.34 2.77
f. Poor up-front planning 4.89 5.21
g. Lack of central coordination of purchasing 3.30 4.19
h. Lack of shared goals 4.72 5.55***
i. Lack of trust 5.19 5.56
i. Poor communication 5.75 5.92
k. Top management differences 3.52 4.01
I. Lack of benefit/risk sharing 4.51 5.18*
m. Too many suppliers for customer to deal with effectively 3.57 3.92
n. Lack of distinctive supplier value-added/benefit 4.88 4.15*
o. Lack of total quality commitment by supplier 5.09 3.18***
p. Corporate culture differences 3.56 3.50
q. Ineffective mechanism for conflict resolution 4.58 5.00
r. Agreement not supportive of a partnering philosophy 4.23 4.79
s. Changes in the market 3.70 3.59
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
p < 0.001
NOTE: please do not ask the author what these mean. Statistics is a field that makes § 2-207
controversies look like a Barney song.
HENDRICK & ELLRAM, supra note 70, at 37.
110. Preferably a good experience (this is generally needed to build trust as opposed to ex-
changing gunfire over mailbox rule controversies, supra note 7). Although, the exchange of gun-
fire over the mirror image rule should not cause one to presume distrust. It is justifiable battery
based upon inane common law contracts.
Ill. Again, some reassurance for all of you that one-time contracts will still require us to
resort to mirror images and form battles. You can't trust someone you don't know, well, you can,
but you may enjoy the fates of Hadley and Baxendale, supra note 94 and text accompanying note
106. For example, Dillard Department Stores contracted to buy Joseph Home Company. Dillard's
began ordering merchandise and scaring off employees. In conducting its due diligence, Dillard's
also found less money in the coffers than expected. Dillard's said, "Whoa!"-or legal words to
that effect-and backed out of the deal. This one-time contact resulted in litigation, and yes,
lawyers' fees. See Michael Schroeder & Wendy Zellner, Hell Hath No Fury Like a Big Store
Scorned, Bus. WK., Sept. 23, 1991, at 39.
112. HENDRICK & ELLRAM (again), supra note 70, at 41.
113. Purchasing folks put it this way, "Heck, it's the damn lawyers screwing things up."
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what section 2-207 allows them for terms, they're interested in making the re-
lationship work. '"
Not to be a killjoy, but these SSPers need to evaluate some basic issues
that trust and communication may not cover. Risk cannot be smoothed over
with silky talk. What if Phar-Mor buys 1 1% of your greeting cards, and Phar-
Mor goes bankrupt? '" In such a tight SSP relationship you may lose 11% of
your business. As the reliance and long-term relationship continue, can you get
out? How do you know you have the best products at the best price?" 6
The mutual dependency of these non-contractual relationships makes it
costly to lose them. It is difficult for the sellers to lose the relationship be-
cause of income losses, and even tougher for the buyer because of its reliance
on a long-term, course-of-dealing contract."7 And there are the logistical is-
sues. If the SSPs are using EDI,'" what forms of security exist for the com-
munications? '" There are also the competition issues. In the manufactur-
er/retailer relationship, the manufacturer has full access to sensitive sales and
revenue information. Who can get the information? Are there restrictions on
its access and use? What happens to the information when the relationship
ends? '2
Perhaps most telling in the SSP relationship evaluations are the comments
made by participants:
"If we get too reliant upon a single partner supplier, how do we know
if we are missing some competitive advantages available from other
suppliers?"' 2'
"The supplier has locked up a long-term guarantee for our business,
and so now they can relax and take us for granted."'22
"Single source partnering is dangerous. What if they shut you
down?"'
23
114. And these SSPers appear to be good at making it work. The average number of years the
respondents in the Hendrick and Ellram survey had supply contracts with the same supplier was
14-16 years. HENDRICK & ELLRAM, supra note 70, at 20. Clearly, purchasing managers outdo
most marriages in terms of longevity.
115. Indeed, Phar-Mor did end up in Chapter 11. Zachary Schiller, Wait A Minute-Phar-Mor
is Still Kicking, Bus. WK., Mar. 8, 1993, at 60-61.
116. In the basic office supply contract, many purchasing managers have resolved this issue
by requiring reevaluation of suppliers. Some permit only a stocking program for one year, with
possible roll over. Others limit contracts to two years. Others require an annual bid. Others have
negotiated a cost-plus contract. HENDRICK & ELLRAM, supra note 70, at 21.
117. See U.C.C. § 1-205. If parties do business for a long time a certain way, it's tough for
either to dump the other. See also supra note 9. (You remember ..."holding the bag.")
118. On the QT and ASAP.
119. Wildstrom, supra note 87, at 14.
120. What the author is inartfully trying to say is that if these SSPs work, then the parties
profit, fall in love, and sneer at lawyers. But if the SSPs fall apart, there are far more issues to
resolve than consequential damages.
121. Competition? Bids go away. So also do the complexities of offers, but this SSPer points
out the down side.
122. If there is no possibility of breach, damages, and all those good things in the 2-600s and
2-700s of Article 2 of the U.C.C.-why worry?
123. It's the Hadley (or is it Baxendale?) problem. If you have one supplier, and they fall
through, the trains won't run on time. Indeed, the trains won't run at all.
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"Watch out. Now that you are their partner, they will expect all of
your business and for you to accept incremental price increases with-
out much question."2'
"Watch out for partnering-the customer will use this as an excuse to
demand annual price reductions even though your margins are already
paper thin." 2 '
"Partnering is great as long as there is an adequate market and rea-
sonable profits, but when things get tight, it's back to survival of the
fittest.'
'12
"All partnering is a fancy marketing tool. It seems every supplier's
sales force wants to become your partner.
'' 27
"All partnering is a sly purchasing tool. All the buyer wants to do is
buddy up to you to see if you will shave your prices.'
28
Emerging from these comments are the standard issues covered by written
agreements: quality, price, changes in conditions, and consideration so that
prices aren't changed willy nilly. These comments tell us that while SSPs are
being used and the formalities of contracts are set aside, we may still need
contract terms because when things go wrong, who ya gonna call?
29
Author's ex post facto notes:
RE: FN6
RE: Sui generis-I have no idea what it means. Say it like
you're calling a hog.
RE: "Louie, Louie,"-it was the Kingsmen. I'll take law
review trivia for $300, Alex. Name the only law review
and author to cite the Kingsmen's song, "Louie, Louie."
RE: FN90
The author stands corrected. It was James Komack. I'll
take bad television show trivia for $200, Alex.
124. Now here's where the concept of consideration would help. You can't get more money
for what you're already obligated to do. But, as we learned from the Japanese, preserving the
relationship may require you to accept price increases. Supra note 22.
125. Id.
126. Duress-that might help here. What you begin to see in the comments of SSPers is that
they could occasionally use some help from the law, but they have abandoned the law as a means
of resolution. Bottomline: these SSPs depend on ethical behavior from both sides. Again, just like
marriage. To the extent one side takes advantage of the other (price increases by a sole source
supplier with a JIT buyer), there is little recourse for the magnitude of the possible damages, so
the buyer is left to pay increases in a locked-in situation. The unethical gain when there are no
contracts, Words to live and battle forms by.
127. It's a lot easier to market when your customers cannot defect. Forced sales.
128. HENDRICK & ELLRAM, supra note 70, at 43. These comments artfully tell us that all is
not well in the land of SSPs. Do not go gently into that EDI. Walk softly and carry big damage
clauses. And we may be back to the initial premise of contract law: do SSPs exist to allow one
side to take advantage of another?
129. Someone who has studied Hadley v. Baxendale supra.
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A CRITIQUE OF PROFESSOR DERRICK A. BELL'S THESIS
OF THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
AND
HIS STRATEGY OF CONFRONTATION
LEROY D. CLARK*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Derrick A. Bell's book, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The
Permanence of Racism,' challenges tenets and ideals deeply held by civil
rights organizations and by the larger liberal-integrationist community. Profes-
sor Bell charges that white society has never relinquished, and more impor-
tantly, will never relinquish, a deep-rooted racism, and that there has been,
even in recent history, no true diminution in racial discrimination.
I will endeavor to counter Professor Bell's claims by examining the his-
torical record and by interpreting current American culture. Critics have yet to
give Professor Bell's claims the fully objective assessment they merit,2 al-
though one can always characterize the dispute as a "glass is half empty or
half full" problem.3 I will therefore confront something quite deeper which is
* Professor of Law, Catholic University Law School. I received excellent research assis-
tance from Ms. Maria Sepulveda while she was a third year student at the Catholic University
Law School. I also appreciate the careful reading and suggestions of Napoleon Williams and Pro-
fessor Harold A. McDougal.
1. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
(1992) [hereinafter FACES].
2. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis in
Antidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1133 (1993) (book review); Tracy E. Higgins, Derrick
Bell's Radical Realism, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 683 (1992) (book review); Stephen Reinhardt,
Guess Who's Not Coming to Dinner!!, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1175 (1993) (book review); Willy E.
Rice, Review of Faces at the Bottom of the Well, 24 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1141 (1993) (book re-
view); Book Note, And We Will Not Be Saved, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1358 (1993). Randall Kennedy
made a limited criticism of what he saw as Professor Bell's moral failing in Faces in not repudi-
ating Louis Farrakhan, head of the Nation of Islam, as an anti-Semite. See Randall Kennedy,
Derrick Bell's Apologia for Minister Farrakhan: An Intellectual and Moral Disaster, 2 RECON-
STRUCTION (No. 1, 1992).
3. 1 appreciate the point made by Richard Delgado, that there may be no "one 'true' under-
standing of meaning or culture." Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Derrick Bell's Chronicle of
the Space Traders: Would the U.S. Sacrifice People of Color if the Price Were Right, 62 U.
COLO. L. REV. 321, 327 (1991). The problem is illustrated very neatly by one of Professor Bell's
own sources, in which Professor Bell relies on ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND
WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 102 (1992) for factual support of his claims that blacks
continue to suffer racial disadvantages. See Derrick Bell, Political Reality Testing, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1033, 1034 (1993). However, Hacker wrote an article the same year his book was published,
entitled The Myths of Racial Division, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 23, 1992, at 21. The table of contents
described it as follows: "Fears of a racially driven America are overblown. The statistics on crime,
the family, affirmative action, and SAT scores show the races are actually converging." Id.
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at stake, something unspoken, but implicit in Faces: its perspective, its attitude
toward the future, and its view of the roles of strategy and law in race rela-
tions.
Fortunately, Professor Bell develops many of the issues from Faces more
explicitly in his latest publication, Confronting Authority: Reflections of an
Ardent Protester,4 and in his many law review articles; thus, I will also focus
on these works. I will not attempt a book review, but rather, a construction of
an alternative vision and approach, drawing largely on my involvement-along
with Professor Bell-in the civil rights movement.
I write this article in ambivalence, but with a sense of urgency. The am-
bivalence comes from criticizing the work of a one-time working colleague,
who gained my sincere respect because of his unquestioned concern for the
black plight. I do not doubt that Professor Bell has written, as he always does,
with honesty. But it is precisely because he is a man of profound integrity, a
man labeled the "founder of Critical Race Theory,"5 that his pronouncements
may have an unprecedented powerful influence, especially on developing
minority scholars.6 Moreover, books and public appearances have made him a
very visible figure who reaches an audience beyond legal academe; his ideas
also impact the views of other critical, black commentators.' The urgency,
therefore, comes from my sense that Professor Bell's work propagates a dam-
aging and dampening message which must be confronted and rejected if we
are to fashion our future creatively.
THE BELL THESIS
Professor Bell's main thesis in Faces is that "racism is an integral, perma-
nent, and indestructible component of this society."8 America ended slavery,
but "the fact of slavery refuses to fade along with the deeply embedded per-
sonal attitudes, and public policy assumptions that supported it for so long."9
Blacks experience poverty at higher levels than whites, and "racial discrimina-
tion in the workplace is as vicious-if less obvious-than it was when em-
ployers posted signs 'no negroes need apply.' '.
4. DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER
(1994) [hereinafter CONFRONTING AUTHORITY].
5. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTrING EDGE 583 (Richard Delgado ed., softback ed.
1995). This is the only book compiling the works of many contributors writing in this vein.
6. See Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories, and Immigration
Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425, 427 (1990).
("People react to Derrick Bell and his storytelling in predictably diverse ways. People of color,
particularly progressive minority scholars, have been drawn to his work .... ").
7. Professor Bell was the first tenured black professor at Harvard Law School, and his
resignation from the law school in protest, written about in CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note
4, was a media event. Toni Morrison, winner of the Nobel Prize for literature, echoed Bell's claim
that blacks may face a holocaust. See Morrison's Prophecy and Paradise, WASH. POST, Mar. 5,
1995, at BI. Professor Harry Edwards, sociologist at the University of California, cites Bell's
"permanent racism" thesis in Playoffs and Payoffs: The African-American Athlete as an Institu-
tional Resource, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 83 (1994).
8. FACES, supra note 1, at ix.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Id. at 5.
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Professor Bell believes blacks ignore history's lesson that the permanent
subordination of blacks to whites is a necessary component of a stable Ameri-
ca. Black efforts are largely irrelevant; whites allow only minimal black prog-
ress, for the exclusive purpose of satisfying white interests." Professor Bell
tries heroically, but I believe futilely, to avoid the despair which he knows
naturally flows from his thesis: that one attains a certain freedom simply from
knowing the truth and deciding to struggle on anyway. Even if illegitimate
white power can never be dislodged, one can, as one of Professor Bell's cli-
ents once stated, live solely to "harass white folks."'2
In Faces, Professor Bell does not prove his thesis through documentation
of historical and contemporaneous facts. Instead, he reverts to the style of one
of his earlier books, 3 creating fictional scenarios designed to predict how
whites might defeat or subordinate black interests. In the chapter, "The
Afrolantica Awakening," a land mass arises off the coast of South Carolina.
Efforts by the U.S. and other governments to occupy the land fail because the
air pressure does not support human life. Miraculously, only African-Ameri-
cans survive in the atmosphere. 4 A debate ensues as to whether all African-
Americans should emigrate to the new "promised" land. Congressional legisla-
tion to provide every black 6migrd with twenty thousand dollars is defeated, in
part because "all [whites] were unnerved" by the prospect of blacks founding
a new nation. 5 In fact, some whites react by violently attacking the black
community." Some blacks, nonetheless, mount an armada of ships to sail to
the new land, but just before they reach the shore, Afrolantica sinks back into
the sea. 7 The blacks are disappointed, yet ultimately overjoyed, because they
looked "for something better."' 8 As they return, they remember the words of
Frederick Douglass that America is their land also, and hope that perhaps,
somewhere in the word "America" is the word "Afrolantica."' 9
11. Professor Bell notes that:
Black people will never gain full equality in this country. Even those herculean
efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary "peaks of progress,"
short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that main-
tain white dominance. This is a hard-to-accept fact that all history verifies.
Id. at 12.
12. Id. at xii.
13. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUS-
TICE (1987).
14. FACES, supra note 1, at 35. "Miraculously" is not used casually, for one black minister
interprets the phenomenon as a gift from God, similar to the Hebrew experience in Exodus 13:21.
Id. Also, God has fully protected African-Americans who migrate by making it physically impos-
sible for whites to pursue them. Id. Professor Bell finds it necessary to make sure that not even a
small number of whites can pursue the blacks, because, as he says in another writing, which am-
plifies Faces, we all know that a minority, like the white one in South Africa, can dominate a
majority. Derrick Bell, The Permanence of Racism, 22 Sw. U. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (1993) [herein-
after Permanence of Racisml.
15. FACES, supra note 1, at 42.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 45.
18. Id. at 42-46.
19. Id.
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Professor Bell's conflicted dream is an old one; he notes the history of
failed efforts, by blacks and whites, to have blacks leave America.0 The
story's end is somewhat ambiguous, since whites don't defeat the "conspiracy"
of blacks to leave America. Rather, some unknown force comes into play.'
The effort alone empowers the blacks, consistent with Professor Bell's thesis
that a group should struggle even when the struggle is futile. They return with
a renewed commitment to find accommodation in the land of their perpetual
bondage.22
A CHALLENGE TO PROFESSOR BELL: WHY NOT ACTIVELY ADVOCATE
EMIGRATION?
Professor Bell lacks the conviction of his dire assessment. If indeed
America is irremediably racist, and blacks in America inevitably are doomed
to a living hell, then Professor Bell should advocate emigration of all blacks.
At a minimum, he should encourage the only other honorable, dignified so-
lution: for blacks to cease having children if they elect to remain in America.
Indeed, advocacy of black emigration is even more imperative in light of
Professor Bell's speculatation that blacks may face a final genocidal attack by
whites.23 Further, Professor Bell hypothesizes that the abuse of blacks is a
prop which keeps society stable; the elimination of the prime vic-
tims-blacks-would lead to ethnic warfare. If so, Professor Bell should re-
joice at the opportunity to prove his theory, and expressly urge blacks to
leave, taking that prop out from under society. Why waste time in a futile
effort to get equal when you could get even?
One reason Professor Bell does not explicitly embrace emigration, but
raises it in the ambivalent disguise of fiction, is the dismal failure of such
efforts in the past. Historically, blacks relocate when they believe it is in their
interest: during the years 1940 to 1960, over three million blacks emigrated
from the South in search of greater freedom.2" Blacks have never generated a
substantial movement to go abroad, functionally stating that America today is
as much their product as anyone's. Unfortunately, Professor Bell did not in-
tend a serious discussion of emigration, since Faces is largely devoid of strate-
gy discussion. "Afrolantica" is merely another note being played in the music
of despair.
THE INTEREST CONVERGENCE DILEMMA
OR THE CHARACTER AND INTELLIGENCE DEFECT IN WHITES
Professor Bell argues that whites, perceiving a benefit for themselves,
control black progress towards equality.25 A corollary to this theme is
20. Id. at 43.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 45-46.
23. See Derrick Bell, The Racism Is Permanent Thesis: Courageous Revelation or Uncon-
scious Denial of Racial Genocide, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 571, 587 (1993).
24. David L. Lewis, The Origins and Causes of the Civil Rights Movement, in THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 3 (Charles W. Eagles ed., 1986).
25. FACES, supra note 1, at 7 ("We are, as I have said, disadvantaged unless whites perceive
[Vol. 73:1
CRITIQUE OF DERRICK A. BELL'S THESIS
"Racism's Secret Bonding": whites, especially poor and working class whites,
ignore their common class interests with poor and working class blacks in
their avid search to bond with other whites against blacks.26
These last notions come together in "The Space Traders."" If "The
Afrolantica Awakening" is Professor Bell's suppressed dream of wholesale
emigration, then "The Space Traders" is his nightmare of wholesale expulsion.
In the story, a strange unrecognizable group from another planet comes to
America and proposes a deal: if all African-Americans are forced on to their
spaceships for a return to their home star, they will provide gold, chemicals to
cleanse the environment, a safe nuclear engine, and fuel. The offer comes
during a conservative administration not supported by blacks (read Reagan-
Bush). The Space Trader's proposal is debated, but exclusively in terms of the
interests of whites. Whites recruit a black conservative professor (Golightly) to
urge blacks to agree to leave. Golightly is promised a personal escape before
the mass expulsion. Golightly urges black leaders to support the proposal as a
trick to get whites to oppose it. The black leaders distrust Golightly and dis-
miss his strategy. Finally, the administration argues that it is blacks' patriotic
duty to leave America for the general welfare, and achieves a constitutional
provision to accommodate the same.
"The Space Traders" is Professor Bell's projection of a future holocaust
for African-Americans. I prefer to relate the story to the American past, and
confront the question of whether, lurking in the wings for blacks, there is an
American version of the Nazi "final solution." From one perspective, the se-
cession of the Southern States from the Union, which precipitated our Civil
War, is as close as America has come to the ominous threat to expel blacks
that Professor Bell creates fictionally in "The Space Traders." Rebellious
white southerners proposed taking black slaves into a separate land-the
plantation. The pay-off to the North was the end of strife and conflict over the
importation of slaves, and the end of a nation divided into territories where
slaves could or could not be owned.
The actual history of this near "holocaust" for blacks contradicts Professor
Bell's predictions. White abolitionists saw the Confederates as the "Space
Traders" of their day, and fought a bloody and costly Civil War to successful-
ly prevent blacks from being carried off into the continued hell of slavery.
None of this history of positive white involvement in ending slavery is recog-
nized in Faces; rather, Professor Bell excoriates "television writers" of Alex
Haley's novel, Roots, for creating "good white folks" who "eased the slaves'
anguish," thus absolving white viewers from "recognizing American slavery as
that nondiscriminatory treatment for us will be a benefit for them."). The theme was also devel-
oped in: Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilem-
ma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (noting that the decision holding governmental racial
segregation unconstitutional was valuable to whites because full access to black talents and partici-
pation would enhance the general economy and present the proper face to emerging independent
African countries).
26. FACES, supra note 1, at 147-57.
27. Id. at 158-94.
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a burden on the nation's history."2 The eminent historian, John Hope Frank-
lin, claimed that many abolitionists were committed to ending slavery out of
moral and religious conviction, without concomitant limited personal self-
interests.29 By contrast, Professor Bell, in an article, asserts that the constitu-
tional amendments freeing the slaves and giving them the vote were designed
to keep the Republican party in office."
Milner Ball, writing, ironically, to defend Professor Bell from criticisms
made by Randall Kennedy, said: "[P]eople possessed by an ideology 'are
simply no longer able to see certain facts.".'3' This statement may well cap-
ture Professor Bell's dilemma. He appears to be operating out of a tightly
wound ideology that most whites cannot be trusted, even-if one is referenc-
ing poor whites-to act in their own best interest-and that whites always
subvert black interests.
This ideology requires Professor Bell to proclaim, and more importantly,
believe, that "[n]obody can free us but ourselves,"32 and that "few whites are
ready to actively promote civil rights for blacks."33 Thus, Faces includes
blacks martyred or exiled during the freedom struggle. 4 There is, however,
28. Id.
29. John Hope Franklin had the following comment on the abolitionists and the Civil War:
The end of the war marked a victory for the abolitionists. At no time in the
nation's history had a "pressure group" done so much to shape public opinion and then
to move opinion to action. For a generation they had labored untiringly, suffering abuse
and even bodily harm. With them, however, it was a moral crusade and they were blind
to personal indignities and insensible to suffering.
JOHN H. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 294-95 (3d ed. 1967). It has been argued that
Lincoln stated that the war was primarily to preserve the Union. Lincoln's public statements were
designed, in part, to deter the four southern states from joining the seven that had already seceded
because that would have made the winning of the Civil War more difficult or impossible. James
McPherson, winner of the Pulitzer prize for his history of the Civil War, BATrLE CRY FOR FREE-
DOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1988), argues that black emancipation required a war, and only Lin-
coln and his party had the state power to raise an army and prosecute such a war. James M.
McPherson, Who Freed the Slaves, 2 RECONSTRUCTION 35, 36-37 (No. 3, 1994).
30. Derrick Bell, White Superiority in America: Its Legal Legacy, Its Economic Costs, 33
VILL. L. REV. 767, 773 (1988) ("When the Civil War ended, the North pushed through constitu-
tional amendments, nominally to grant citizenship rights to former slaves, but actually to protect
its victory.") [hereinafter White Superiority].
31. Milner S. Ball, The Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1855,
1856 (1990) (quoting KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 36 (1968)).
32. Derrick Bell et al., Racial Reflections: Dialogues in the Direction of Liberation, 37
UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1037 (1990) [hereinafter Racial Reflections]. Professor Bell claims that in
teaching a seminar on civil rights one summer, he repeated the phrase so often that those in the
class presented him with a T-Shirt with the phrase emblazoned on it.
33. FACES, supra note 1, at 4.
34. Professor Bell names Nat Turner, Marcus Garvey, Paul Robeson, and W.E.B. Du Bois.
FACES, supra note 1, at 20-21. Professor Bell mistakenly groups Malcom X with Medgar Evers as
"blacks who were killed because they had the gumption to tell the truth about the conditions
blacks live in in this country." Id. at 20. Evers was a martyr (I had been working with him the
day he was assassinated by a white fanatic). See Ronald Smothers, White Supremacist Is Convict-
ed of Slaying Rights Leader in 63', N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1994, at 1. Some speculate that the New
York police were involved in Malcom's assassination. See GEORGE BREITMAN ET AL., THE AS-
SASSINATION OF MALCOM X 294 (3d ed. 1991). The persons convicted of his murder, however,
were black members of the Black Muslims. Id. at 7. There was strong evidence that the Black
Muslims had targeted Malcom as a traitor after he spoke out against their leader, Elijah
Muhammed, and started a rival organization. See KARL EVANZZ, THE JUDAS FACTOR: THE PLOT
TO KILL MALCOLM X 277-79 (1992).
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no mention of the hundreds of white students who joined the civil rights
movement in dangerous areas in the South during the 1960s, or of those like
Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman, who were murdered because of
their involvement. 5 Ostensibly sympathetic white female characters appear in
only two" instances in Faces, and both are stick figures designed to underscore
Professor Bell's themes of black danger, pain, and impending defeat.36
Nowhere in Faces or Confronting Authority is there a recognition of the
long history of effective white cooperation with blacks in ending segregation,
such as the fact that two major civil rights organizations, the NAACP and the
Urban League, originated with whites and blacks acting cooperatively.37 No-
where in either book is there a recognition of white financing of the civil
rights movement. Black lawyers, like Charlie Houston and Thurgood Marshall,
theorized the legal battle to end state-enforced racial segregation, but when
Professor Bell and I were lawyers for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, at
least one third of the lawyers were white."s
Indeed, from the very beginning, some talented and dedicated whites have
been critical actors producing positive results in the black freedom struggle.
That they may only have been the "few" whites that Professor Bell claims
would "actively support civil rights for blacks" does not defeat the point. Most
movements began with a "few." The larger public, white and black, becomes
educated and drawn toward their direction. Those few, however, must possess
special resources; they must, like President Lincoln, occupy a pivotal position,
or must be especially dedicated, strategically smart, and talented.39
35. JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 301-02 (1994).
36. In the chapter, "The Last Black Hero," FACES, supra note 1, a militant black leader (Ja-
son) becomes involved romantically with a white woman (Sheila), but the thrust of the story is the
excruciating sense of rejection and betrayal that a black woman (Neva), also emotionally involved
with Jason, feels when she learns of the interracial relationship. In the chapter, "Divining a Racial
Realism Theory," id. at 89-108, the author meets a white woman who has formed an organization
designed to protect blacks from America's upcoming attempt at racial genocide.
37. W.E.B. Du Bois and other blacks created the Niagara movement in 1905 to begin an
assault on racial segregation. DAVID L. LEWIS, W.E.B. Du Bois: BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE, 1868-
1919, at 315-16 (1993). The group joined with whites to create the NAACP in 1910. Id. at 387.
Du Bois became the director of publicity and research and whites occupied other offices. Id. at
406-07. The National Urban League, created in 1911, had black officers and white philanthropic
financial support. FRANKLIN, supra note 29, at 448-49.
38. See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDU-
CATION, 1925-1950, at 94-96 (1987); see also J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING
OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-1944, at 281 (1993) (referring to Charles H. Houston and
Thurgood Marshall as "the architects of the modem legal civil rights movement"). For data on the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc., see GREENBERG, supra note 35, at 519-22. Many of the white
lawyers were graduates of prestigious law schools who could have entered private practice at a
much higher income.
39. This is not to suggest a "top down" form for seeking social change. Indeed, activists
during the civil rights movement had a bottoms-up style-an effort was made to educate the vic-
tims and get them in motion towards resolution of their problems. As that prime practitioner of the
art of organizing, Bob Moses of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), said,
"The traditional left keeps talking about coalitions and leaders, but always from the top.... The
people don't need spokesmen or decision makers, just the confidence to try to represent them-
selves." TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE MOVEMENT AND THE SIxTIEs 83 (1995). Strategies are needed
today which could have the same effect, but the environment of the 1990s is much more compli-
cated than that of the 1960s.
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One would not expect a heroic, self-sacrificing stance, which is by defini-
tion unique, from the bulk of the white American public. Naturally, the masses
of whites, and their leaders, will embrace a direction more rapidly when their
interests are fostered. That does not, per se, stamp whites as having low char-
acter, for blacks as a group are no different than whites in that regard. Blacks
completely sacrificed their own interests only when they were forced to do
so--during slavery. While black and white interests can diverge, there is no
inherent antagonism when there is a simple demand for racial integration.'
Whites and blacks may benefit in different ways and thus have different moti-
vations for seeking racial equality, but in the long run, both groups will enjoy
a less strife-ridden, more harmonious society.4 Indeed, why bemoan the fact,
as Professor Bell does, that white interests can be fostered while black inter-
ests are served? Blacks should give the highest priority to circumstances which
satisfy mutual interests; those advances will be the most stable and enduring.
Professor Bell's observation about the absence of class consciousness by
whites who objectively share problems with blacks is not a new insight, for
much has been written on the mystery of America's resistance to recognizing
a class structure. 2 Nor do I agree with his implication, in at least one article,
40. 1 do not include all forms of affirmative action as a part of the "simple demand" for
equality and will comment later on this problem. See infra text accompanying notes 107-10. There
is speculation that whites can retreat to the suburbs, finance their needs locally, and reduce federal
government resources for coping with inner city problems through reductions in federal taxation.
See THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION-THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS,
AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 215-55 (1991). Minorities, however, are not easily isolated in
a highly urbanized society, for disabilities in one group can spill over to another. Whites have a
stake in reducing crime emanating from minorities, because they are increasingly the victims of
interracial offenses, like robbery. Cf. Keith D. Harries, Black Crime and Criminal Victimization, in
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND BLACKS 37, 37-49 (Daniel Georges-Abeyie ed., 1984). Cur-
rent approaches to crime (an unprecedented prison building program) are increasingly costly. See
Scott Christianson, Our Black Prisons, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND BLACKS, supra, at
259. Minorities may also constitute a health threat to the surrounding suburbs-minority street
walking prostitutes have a high incidence of AIDS and they service some males from the suburbs.
See Study Says Crack Addicts Selling Sex for Drugs Are Spreading AIDS Virus, WASH. POST,
Nov. 24, 1994, at A24. We have not stemmed the influx of illegal immigrants. Recent proposals
to bar them from education may be unconstitutional and barring them from basic welfare and
social services may only lead to an increase in crime. See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Moreover, there is a stake in educating and upgrading the skills of minorities because they will be
a larger proportion of the available manpower in the future. Id. at 221.
41. Whites, for example, could support the integration of a police force in urban areas after
the 1960s because many race riots of that period were due to friction between white police and
blacks who perceived them as an "alien" occupying force. Whites wanted to avoid riots because
riots increased costs of policing, put an extra burden on the criminal courts, and occasioned losses
to white owned businesses. Blacks could support the integration of urban police forces because
young blacks with less than a college degree got well paid and stable employment. The goal of
both communities were achieved-the police force in many cities were integrated and the only
major race riot since the 1960s was in 1992 in Los Angeles, surrounding the Rodney King inci-
dent. (If there had been at least one black policeperson present during the King incident, it is
unlikely that the brutality, with its racial epitaphs, would have occurred). Race riots may be an
anguished cry from an oppressed community, but they are never an organized, disciplined search
for social change. The white and black communities have profited from the absence of riots over a
20 to 25 year period, albeit in different ways.
42. See, e.g., LEONARD REISSMAN, CLASS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1959). Indeed, one author
says that the idea of classes was so anathema to Americans as to be "America's forbidden
thought." PAUL BLUMBERG, INEQUALITY IN AN AGE OF DECLINE 53 (1980).
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that racism is the paramount factor in the absence of class awareness. 4' Un-
doubtedly other factors like Americans' steady belief-at least until recent-
ly-in the myth of unlimited mobility, the absence of a history of a hereditary
aristocracy, and America's high standard of living after World War II, explain
much of the belief that one's future is not unfairly controlled by one's class
level." However, the absence of class consciousness is not a phenomenon
"owned" exclusively by whites. Despite strong forces compelling racial soli-
darity amongst blacks, such as racial segregation, E. Franklin Frazier, in his
celebrated book, Black Bourgeoisie,45 showed the multifarious and strenuous
ways in which a black elite separated itself from poor and working class
blacks. The black middle class today may be more race-conscious than the
class that Frazier wrote of, but I doubt that they feel a great deal of common
cause with poor or working class whites.
A QUALIFIED LOOK AT THE NEED FOR BLACK LEADERSHIP
If Professor Bell meant that blacks should be the catalysts to furthering
their freedoms, or that they should occupy visible leadership roles, I would
agree. That qualified statement is probably true of any movement to end dis-
crimination and oppression. The victims of oppression first become aware of
the details of their victimization, and then take that knowledge to communities
lacking such experience. Blacks had to assume leadership positions so that
young blacks were not trapped by maligning racial stereotypes that blacks
lacked leadership capacity.' While black leadership and an aroused black
community are necessary conditions for the further realization of freedom, it is
not accurate, historically or strategically, to say it has been, is, or ever will be
a sufficient condition for freedom.47
43. White Superiority, supra note 30 (mentioning no factors, other than racism, to explain
why whites who lack wealth and power accept their circumstances without protest).
44. See BLUMBERG, supra note 42, at 9-64.
45. E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, BLACK BOURGEOISIE (1957). See especially Chapter IX, "Soci-
ety: Status Without Substance." Id. at 195-212.
46. 1 was not privy to the full range of the disaffection between Professor Bell and Jack
Greenberg, a white, who was the Executive Director of the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational
Fund, Inc. for a number of years, but it is my guess that the issue of blacks being in leadership
positions for the reasons stated would have been important to Professor Bell. Jack Greenberg
labeled black student opposition to his teaching a civil rights course at Harvard Law School, and
their demand for a black professor, as "racist" and noted that Professor Bell "counseled and en-
couraged" the black students. GREENBERG, supra note 35, at 502. If that label of "racist" was
meant to apply to Professor Bell, I categorically reject it. Greenberg may have experienced genu-
ine pain over the controversy, given his many years of service, but he undervalued the legitimate
desire of the black students for a role model or to have the Harvard faculty further integrated.
Responses like Greenberg's, unfortunately, only reinforce Professor Bell's suspicions of whites,
even when they are functionally in the posture of an ally.
47. Fortunately, Elaine Jones and Hugh Price, black leaders respectively of the NAACP Le-
gal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. and the Urban League, are unequivocally committed to such
a direction. See Racism Only Part of Problem, New Urban League Head Says, WASH. POST, July
25, 1994, at A8. The article reported that "[Price's] remarks were a departure from the stance of
many other civil fights leaders who have advocated keeping some political distance from whites.
Price emphasized 'racial inclusion."' Id.; see also Nat Hentoff, A Black Response to Black Bigotry,
WASH. POST, July 23, 1994, at A21. Mr. Hentoff lauded Elaine Jones's statement that it was ap-
propriate and necessary for black leaders to denounce any black leader who engaged in anti-Se-
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One need not fear that reality. Despite abundant examples of prejudiced
whites defeating the interests of blacks and other minority groups-for much
of what Professor Bell relies on is historical fact'-this simply means that
there must be a painstaking, careful identification of the whites who should be
recruited, worked with, and most of all, trusted. Intelligence and precision in
selecting trustworthy whites builds effective coalitions. Such racially coopera-
tive coalitions will model a movement's predicted future-one in which differ-
ences are acknowledged and respected, while striving together for cooperative
living.
THE HISTORY OF BLACK PROGRESS
I must now address the thesis that there has been no evolutionary progress
for blacks in America. Professor Bell concludes that blacks improperly read
history if we believe, as Americans in general believe, that progress-racial, in
the case of blacks-is "linear and evolutionary."'49 According to Professor
Bell, the "American dogma of automatic progress" has never applied to
blacks.50 Blacks will never gain full equality, and "[e]ven those herculean ef-
forts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary 'peaks of
progress,' short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance."'
'I
Progress toward reducing racial discrimination and subordination has
never been "automatic," if that refers to some natural and inexorable process
without struggle. Nor has progress ever been strictly "linear" in terms of un-
varying year by year improvement, because the combatants on either side of
the equality struggle have varied over time in their energies, resources, capaci-
ties, and the quality of their plans. Moreover, neither side could predict or
control all of the variables which accompany progress or non-progress; some
factors, like World War II, occurred in the international arena, and were not
exclusively under American control.
With these qualifications, and a long view of history, blacks and their
white allies achieved two profound and qualitatively different leaps forward
toward the goal of equality: the end of slavery, and the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Moreover, despite open and, lately, covert resistance, black progress has
never been shoved back, in a qualitative sense, to the powerlessness and abuse
of periods preceding these leaps forward.52
mitic diatribes. He added: "[Jones] also said it was time for Jews and blacks to again work togeth-
er in projects to try to define the nation's agenda instead of continuing on their separate ways." Id.
48. See, e.g., Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evi-
dence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DuKE L.J. 625 (recounting the defeat of efforts by an
Indian tribe to recover lands protected by federal statute).
49. Permanence of Racism, supra note 14.
50. Professor Bell quotes approvingly from NATHAN HUGGIN, BLACK ODYSSEY, THE AFRO-
AMERICAN ORDEAL IN SLAVERY 244 (1977). FACES, supra note 1, at 197.
51. FACES, supra note 1, at 12.
52. Additionally, many temporary setbacks were ultimately reversed, and when setbacks oc-
curred around some activities or in some geographical areas, progress occurred in other activities
or areas. Some setbacks cannot be ascribed exclusively to some indelible racism in the white
public, but may have been due to legitimate differences about policy directions, the product of
questionable strategy on the part of black leadership and/or their allies, or the product of negative
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THE FIRST QUALITATIVE LEAP
For two-thirds of American history, African-Americans were, as a matter
of law and practice, the property of white slave-holders from birth until death.
Professor Bell commented on the ending of this institution: "Two centuries
after the Constitution's adoption, we did live in a far more enlightened world.
Slavery was no more."5
That must be the most tepid understatement ever about the ending of the
most violent and debasing condition that blacks ever suffered in this country.
Slaves worked six and sometimes seven days a week. Idle slaves could be
flogged, and some were maimed after a failed escape. Families were separat-
ed, and black females were forced into sexual concubinage. Slaves owned
nothing, their movement was strictly circumscribed, and they were kept illiter-
ate as another form of control. 4
Ending this degrading institution was a profound qualitative leap toward
freedom, and it was never reversed. White southerners did regain control of
the legislatures, and imposed racial segregation. Racial segregation, however,
was a far cry from the total domination of slavery. Moreover, blacks seized
the opportunity to take many steps, within the confines of segregation, that
became the seeds of the next great leap forward into freedom in the 1950s and
1960s. The newly freed blacks trekked North and West-not an option under
slavery-and there gained critical political leverage.55 Independent black
churches, possible only after the Civil War, developed a debate between a
conservative wing concerned with the hereafter, and a more progressive wing
that sought to use the church as an agency for ameliorating the constrictions in
black life.56 From the latter, one Martin Luther King sprang forth, galvanizing
blacks and the whole nation for the next leap towards freedom.
During Reconstruction, black legislators established a free public school
system. Even though whites imposed segregation on the public schools, they
did not abolish them. By 1900, 1.5 million black children were overcoming
the illiteracy imposed on their parents and grandparents in slavery.57
Shortly after the imposition of racial segregation, blacks turned to the
United States Supreme Court for relief from its legal strictures. There were
losses at first, the most notable being Plessy v. Ferguson," upholding racial
factors adversely affecting the entire country across racial lines. All of these factors will be ad-
dressed later.
53. FACES, supra note 1, at 2.
54. FRANKLIN, supra note 29, at 192-205.
55. David Levering Lewis argues that the blacks in the North began to be the difference in
Democrats winning over Republicans when the latter party abandoned the racial and economic
interests of the black community. Lewis, supra note 24. This "cumulative impact of balance of
power politics [along with other factors like rising black income and coalitions with organized
labor] primed much of the nation for an end to segregation." Id. at 13.
56. FRANKLIN, supra note 29, at 163, 227, 309-10, 561.
57. Id. at 546-47.
58. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Court initially appeared to be an avenue of relief. In Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), the Court held that it was unconstitutional to bar blacks
from juries. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Court struck down an ordinance
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segregation under the "separate but equal" doctrine. As blacks gained more
organizational sophistication, the Court, gradually but progressively, struck
down segregation in voting,59 in housing,' and in graduate schools.6' The
culmination was Brown v. Board of Education,62 which fully repudiated the
Plessy doctrine and held that state sanctioned racial segregation violated the
14th Amendment.
SECOND QUALITATIVE LEAP FORWARD
The black-led, and white-supported, civil rights movement gathered mo-
mentum in the late 1950s and early 1960s through marches, "sit-ins"-which
breached racial segregation in public establishments-and the development of
legal strategies to provide cover and protection. White Americans were
shocked by the vicious resistance of small pockets of rabid southern racists to
the disciplined non-violent protests of blacks, and public opinion began to
move toward support for racial equality. 6' Key whites in the media, especial-
ly television, influenced this shift in public opinion by portraying black griev-
ances in a sympathetic and appealing light.' The movement culminated in
1960s legislation prohibiting racial segregation and discrimination in public
accommodations, 65 employment, 66 voting rights,67 and housing.' This was
that was intended to prevent Chinese from operating laundries. However, in a number of cases the
Court was not supportive of black interests. In United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875),
the Court held that the 15th Amendment did not confer the right to vote on anyone, but merely
barred the states from giving preference to one citizen over another on the ground of race. Subse-
quently, the Court voided the Civil Rights Act of 1875 on the ground that the 14th Amendment
allowed the federal government to outlaw racially discriminatory acts by a State, but not private
individuals. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
59. The Court declared state provisions which limited voter registration to persons whose
grandfathers were qualified to vote prior to the Civil War unconstitutional. Guinn v. United States,
238 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1915). The Court next invalidated a law which excluded blacks from par-
ticipating in the Democratic primary. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927). It let a
decision stand which held that blacks could not be excluded from even a primary run by private
parties. Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Some southern state legislatures hastened to re-
move the imprimatur of state legislation from all primaries, but the Court still refused to allow
exclusion of blacks. See Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.S.C.), aff d, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
60. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (declaring an ordinance limiting where
blacks could reside unconstitutional).
61. Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
337 (1938).
62. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63. Large groups of whites in southern cities did not actively join the attacks, as had been
the case in some race riots against the black community earlier in the century. See MARTIN LU-
THER KING, JR., WHY CAN'T WE WAIT 106-07 (1964) (commenting on Dr. King's Birmingham
campaign).
64. One commentator called television "the chosen instrument of the black revolution."
Thomas Cripps, Film, in SPLIT IMAGE: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE MASS MEDIA 159 (Jannette
L. Dates & William Barlow eds., 1990).
65. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat. 243 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988)).
66. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988)).
67. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 445 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1988)).
68. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 801, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42
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the next qualitative leap forward, and there has been no massive backsliding
into the rank forms of segregation and discrimination that characterized the
pre- 1960 period.
Professor Bell treats the post-1960s claims of progress as an illusion:
discrimination simply became more covert, but equally efficient. 69 The facts,
however, viewed with a holistic perspective, largely refute this claim.70
The most thorough analysis of black-American status since Gunnar
Myrdal's An American Dilemma in 1944, is A Common Destiny-Blacks and
American Society.7' The report covers the period from 1940 through 1986,
and is more comprehensive than the studies Professor Bell relied on in recent
law review articles.
A Common Destiny answers Professor Bell's central question in Faces:
Contemporary views of the status of black-white relations in America
vary widely. Perspectives range from optimism that the main prob-
lems have been solved, to the view that black progress is largely an
illusion, to assessments that the nation is retrogressing and moving
toward increased racial disparities. To some observers, the present
situation is only another episode in a long history of recurring cycles
of apparent improvement that are followed by new forms of domi-
nance in changed contexts: the level of black status changes, it is
said, but the one constant is blacks' continuing subordinate social
position. To other observers, the opposite is correct: long-run progress
is the dominant trend.72
A Common Destiny, however, concludes that the overwhelming majority
of black-Americans made substantial progress since 1940:
Over the 50-year span covered by this study, the social status of
American blacks has on average improved dramatically, both in abso-
lute terms and relative to whites. The growth of the economy and
public policies-promoting racial equality led to an erosion of segrega-
U.S.C. § 3601 (1988)).
69. CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 4, at 4 (describing the period after slavery and
segregation as "the current mockery of equal opportunity").
70. Here I take issue with the style of Faces-given the sweep of Professor Bell's conclu-
sions. Storytelling may be an excellent device to vividly illuminate insights, and to give voice to
hitherto suppressed or ignored perspectives. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists
and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989). However, the central claims of
Faces cry out for an objective assessment of American history and the sociology of racial inter-
actions. Professor Bell, however, is an able and prolific writer, and I have resorted to his articles
for the factual and historical support for his claims. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24
CONN. L. REV. 363, 374 n.30 (1992) (recounting data showing comparative unemployment and
poverty rates between blacks and whites) [hereinafter Racial Realism]; Racial Reflections, supra
note 32, at 1037-44 (using data to illustrate the erosion of earlier civil rights advances).
71. A COMMON DESTINY-BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin M.
Williams, Jr. eds., 1989) [hereinafter A COMMON DESTINY]. It is the report of a 22-member com-
mittee, which surveyed all research on the status of black-Americans, checked its validity and
interpretations, and did fresh research where needed. See id. at 559-69. The 22 members were
lawyers and academics with impeccable credentials in the social and behavioral sciences. They
were supported by a staff and consultants (amongst whom was Professor Bell). See id. at 586.
72. Id. at xi (emphasis added).
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tion and discrimination, making it possible for a substantial fraction
of blacks to enter the mainstream of American life.73
Just five decades ago, most black Americans could not work, live,
shop, eat, seek entertainment, travel where they chose. Even a quarter
century ago-100 years after the Emancipation Proclamation of
1863-most blacks were effectively denied the right to vote....
Today the situation is very different.74
The Committee acknowledged that "the great gulf that existed between
black and white Americans in 1939 ... has not closed," because one-third of
blacks "still live in households with incomes below the poverty line."75 Yet
the study reported that 92% of blacks lived below the poverty line in 1939.76
A 60% drop in poverty is an astounding improvement, by any measure, and is
an even faster movement out of poverty than that of the white public that was
also suffering from the ravages of the economic depression of the 1930s.77
Some reduction of black poverty occurred when blacks secured higher paying
jobs in defense industries during World War II. But the passage of the 1964
Civil Rights Act brought a significant reduction in racial employment discimi-
nation. By 1984, blacks had $9 billion more per year in real income, adjusted
for inflation, than they would have had if they had remained arrayed through-
out the occupational spectrum as they were before the Act.7" A new black
economic elite developed through movement into higher paying employment
in the private sector and away from employment in government, the clergy,
and civil rights organizations; this new elite should sustain their progress and
finance opportunities for their young.79
The number of black elected officials increased from a few dozen in 1940
to 6,800 by 1988, and the number of black public administrators went from
1% in 1940 to 8% in 1980.80 No white elected official has openly supported
racial segregation since Governor Wallace in the early 1960s, a testament, in
part, to the substantial increases in black voter registration and voting, due to
the Voting Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1965.8
One could also show decreases in racial segregation in education, housing,
and other aspects of American life, coupled with the virtual disappearance of
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id.
76. id. at 27.
77. Sixty-five percent of whites were below the poverty line in 1939. By the time of the
Committee report, the figure was nine percent for whites. Id.
78. Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Law Transmission System and the Southern Jurisprudence of
Employment Discrimination, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 313, 338 (1984).
79. See James P. Smith & Finis R. Welch, Black Economic Progress After Mydal, in EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 179 (Paul Burstein ed., 1994).
80. A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 71, at 15-16.
81. For the history of George Wallace, see MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION, AN
AMERICAN HISTORY 229-38 (1995); see also Richard Saks, Note, Redemption or Exemption?:
Racial Discrimination in Judicial Elections Under the Voting Rights Act, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
245, 251-52 n.33 (1990) (citing a U.S. Commission on Civil Rights report that voter registration
among blacks in seven southern states increased from 29.3% prior to passage of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 to 56.6% by 1972).
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racial exclusion in public accommodations-all due to enforcement of the new
legislation. It is true, racial discrimination has not been totally eradicated.82
But, Peter F. Drucker summarizes:
In the fifty years since the Second World War the economic position
of African-Americans in America has improved faster than that of
any other group in American social history-or in the social history
of any country. Three-fifths of America's blacks rose into middle-
class incomes; before the Second World War the figure was one-
twentieth.83
I doubt that Professor Bell believes that racial discrimination should have
totally disappeared. But what, then, accounts for Professor Bell's statements
that "the civil rights gains, so hard won, are being steadily eroded"; that it has
been "more than a decade of civil rights setbacks in the White House, [and] in
the courts";8 4 and that the civil rights movement is "a movement now brought
to a virtual halt"?85
Professor Bell was not looking at the total sweep of black progress since
the 1960s, but was dismayed by the hostility towards-or lack of support
for-civil rights displayed during the twelve years of the Reagan and Bush
administrations. 8 6 Ex-president Jimmy Carter appointed a record number of
black attorneys to the federal courts.87 Reagan and Bush returned to the old
style, appointing few minorities and women to the federal bench. Further, their
appointees often proved unsympathetic to the arguments of civil rights organi-
zations.88 Reagan and Bush were the only presidents who opposed passage of
82. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whisk, Tonk and United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism
Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1401, 1411 n.38 (1993) (unemployment rates
are significantly higher for African-Americans than for whites); see also A COMMON DESTINY,
supra note 71, at 49-51 (estimating that "in any metropolitan area, one-quarter to one-half of all
rental inquiries by blacks are met with clearly discriminatory responses"); Roberta L. Steele, Note,
All Things Not Being Equal: The Case for Race Separate Schools, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 591,
592 (1993).
83. Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Social Transformation, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1994, at
62.
84. FACES, supra note 1, at 3, 5.
85. Derrick Bell, A Hurdle Too High: Class-Based Roadblocks to Racial Remediation, 33
BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1984).
86. See NORMAN C. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (1988)
(exploring the many ways in which the Reagan administration was hostile to civil rights). One
strong indication that Professor Bell was reacting primarily to Reagan and Bush is that he felt the
need to raise the question of whether his dire predictions about the irremediable racism of the
American public was embarrassed by the election of President Bill Clinton. See Derrick Bell,
Political Reality Testing, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1033 (1993). There he acknowledges that Clinton
had reversed the style of the two previous presidents in that he has made strong statements of a
commitment to equal opportunity for blacks. Professor Bell, however, in his characteristic distrust-
ful stance, charged that Clinton was "silent" on two fronts: he did not address the disproportionate
unemployment of blacks and he did not confront whether general social reform is impeded by
racism. Id. at 1033, 1036. My point, however, is that if racism is as deep and structural as Profes-
sor Bell argues, then the election of one president should not call for an explanatory comment.
87. President Carter tripled the number of black judges from 12 to 38. GREENBERG, supra
note 35, at 472.
88. Id. at 380. Professor Bell and I are particularly critical of President Bush's cynical, indi-
rect attack on affirmative action, by nominating Clarence Thomas, a black, to the United States
Supreme Court and then calling the marginally qualified Thomas, the "best person at the right
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the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the only presidents who vetoed civil rights
legislation in the 20th century.8 9 They also used subtle, and sometimes not so
subtle, "racial codes" to covertly organize whites to break the Democratic
party's hold on the presidency, especially in the South.'
Even given this executive branch hostility to civil rights, the Congress, the
branch of government much more vulnerable to the electorate, consistently and
successfully opposed or reversed actions that undermined civil rights. Congress
amended and improved the Voting Rights Act in 1982. 9' Congress overrode
the veto of one of the most popular presidents in modern times, Reagan, and
passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act in 1986.92 The enforcement machin-
ery of the Fair Housing Act, prohibiting racial discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing, was substantially improved by amendment in 1988. 9" A bill
barring discrimination in employment and public accommodations for the dis-
abled, a disproportionate number of which are blacks, passed in 1990.9'
The major "setbacks," to which Professor Bell refers, were several United
States Supreme Court cases which limited the scope of statutes prohibiting dis-
crimination in employment, or which created proof problems for plaintiffs.95
time," meaning the best "black" attorney in the nation. John E. Yang and Sharon LaFraniere, Bush
Picks Thomas for Supreme Court, WASH. POST, July 2, 1991, at Al; see also CONFRONTING AU-
THORITY, supra note 4, at 160. Thomas' prime credentials were his hostility to civil rights and a
willingness to attack black leadership. See Racial Realism, supra note 70, at 363, 369-74 (observ-
ing that black scholars find Thomas unsupportive of civil rights).
89. See Doug Freelander, The Senate-Bush: The Polls Give Him Excellent Chance, Hous.
POST, Oct. 11, 1964, at § 12; see also David S. Broder, Reagan Attacks the Great Society, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 1966, at 41.
90. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 40, at 137-53, 198-214.
91. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974 (1988).
92. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified
at 20 U.S.C. §§ 706, 794, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6107, 2000d-4a) (Supp. 1990). See SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, CIVIL RIGHTS RESTORATION AcT OF 1987, S. Rep. No. 64,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 3-4. The Senate Report
notes that the purpose of the Restoration Act was to reverse the Supreme Court's decision in
Grove City College v. Professor Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1983), which held that anti-discrimination
laws only applied to specific federally-funded programs and not to the entire institution which
conducts the federal program.
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3616 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 3501 (c), (e) of the Act al-
lowed the Justice Department to sue on behalf of an individual, thus ending the limitation to "pat-
tern and practice" litigation. Section 3612(d)(2) provided that the Department of Housing and
Urban Development could secure an expeditious hearing before an administrative judge. Id.; see
also James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of
Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1088-90 (1989).
94. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Blacks are disproportionately below the poverty line and "[iun addition to increased mortality,
almost every form of disease and disability is more prevalent amongst the poor." A COMMON
DESTINY, supra note 71, at 394. Blindness is higher amongst blacks than whites, and blacks have
less coverage under public or private health insurance than whites (22% vs. 14% non-coverage)
and thus they suffer more from illnesses and diseases which could have been detected and treated
earlier through preventive health care. Id. at 417, 430.
95. The record of the U.S. Supreme Court is mixed. On occasion, it rejected arguments of
the Reagan Justice Department that would have undermined or limited civil rights. See Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (upholding as legal a voluntary affirmative action
plan designed to increase representation of women in areas traditionally underrepresented); United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (holding constitutional a judicially imposed affirmative ac-
tion plan which required 50% of Alabama's state police promotions to go to blacks until a given
rank reached 25% black); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
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Congress passed a bill in 1991 which reversed all of the adverse decisions by
the Court.96 This history of Congressional repudiation of executive and judi-
cial hostility to civil rights and, indeed, the extension of civil rights to new
areas, is not noted in either of Professor Bell's two books.97
Why, if society is as irremediably racist as Professor Bell alleges, can
Congress, which constantly sounds out the public, confidently pass this wide
range of pro-civil rights legislation? The answer is that the overwhelming
majority of white Americans underwent attitude changes in the last thirty
years, generally relinquishing crude or unadulterated racial prejudice. A major-
ity of whites no longer believe in the racial inferiority of blacks, and believe
blacks should not be discriminated against in employment, schools, and access
to public and private accommodations.98 Professor Bell's books contain no
mention of the extensive opinion poll data showing less racial prejudice. In-
deed, his books, especially Confronting Authority, portray the white public as
massively, and often incomprehensibly and stupidly, committed to racism.
A fuller account of Confronting Authority is now appropriate. The book
recounts Harvard Law School's failure-or refusal-to hire a black female for
the faculty, and Professor Bell taking a leave in protest until such a hire was
made. Leaves at the law school are limited to two years; thus, he lost his
tenured position.
Professor Bell acknowledges that, from one point of view, his protest was
a failure; the Harvard Law School did not appoint a black female within the
two year deadline he set. Indeed, the school hired four white males during his
leave-in-protest.' Harvard eventually offered a teaching position to a black
female, but long after Professor Bell's dramatic confrontation had lost its
(1986) (ruling that blacks who were not actual victims of discrimination by a union in the past
may be beneficiaries of an affirmative action plan, rejecting the arguments of Reagan's Solicitor
General to the contrary).
However, later cases were decidedly hostile to civil rights interests. See EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (holding that Title VII, barring employment discrimination,
does not protect American citizens employed abroad by U.S. companies); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989) (opening consent decrees to attack by persons claiming "reverse discrimination"
in employment); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (easing the burden of
proof for employers in responding to plaintiff's development of a prima facie case of employment
discrimination by way of disparate impact); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164
(1989) (refusing to allow suit for claims of racial discrimination on the job on the grounds that §
1981 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act is limited to discrimination in hiring); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (finding that the plaintiff was not the prevailing party and entitled
to attomey fees, even though the employer discriminatorily took gender into account in an em-
ployment decision, when the employer could prove that it would have come to the same adverse
decision regarding the plaintiff).
96. President Bush vetoed a similar bill in 1990 claiming that it would impose unfair quotas.
See Carl Cannon et al., House Passes Civil Rights Bill; But Veto Likely, Senate Favors Law by
Slim Margin, DEr. FREE PRESS, June 6, 1991, at IA; see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(11), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1991. The legislation went further
than repudiating the Supreme Court cases and gave plaintiffs a right to compensatory and punitive
damages which could go as high as $300,000. Id.
97. Professor Bell may have submitted his manuscript of FACES, supra note 1, for publica-
tion before he knew the outcome of the fight over the 1991 legislation. But by the time he was
working on CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 4, he had to have known of its passage.
98. A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 71, at 118-21.
99. CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 4, at 85.
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visibility."° I believe that this intense and bitter fight at Harvard,"" which
Professor Bell felt he lost, coupled with the interregnum of the Reagan-Bush
administration's hostility to civil rights and appointments to the U.S. Supreme
Court, combined to induce a profound pessimism in Professor Bell.
While Professor Bell calls himself a "racial realist," he is really a dedicat-
ed idealist who has had his abiding and total faith in the law and legal institu-
tions deeply disappointed. Professor Bell admits he believed that racial dis-
crimination would largely disappear once the Supreme Court ruled that
governmentally enforced racial segregation was unconstitutional." 2
In this belief, Professor Bell exhibits a characteristically American atti-
tude, nartiely that law and legal institutions can "fix" any problem, no matter
how complex, immediately and simply. Because of this belief, we treat the
Supreme Court as the pinnacle of power in legal institutions, and fight desper-
ately when nominees signal one political direction or another. 3 Gerald N.
Rosenberg, however, argues that the Court is not as powerful an institution as
one might imagine when it comes to changing strongly entrenched societal
behavior."° The Court's coercive powers are minimal, and it functions large-
ly through symbolism. Thus, the racial desegregation of public schools pro-
ceeded at a slow pace under federal court enforcement of constitutional provi-
sions, and accelerated only when Congress gave federal agencies resources and
detailed enforcement power.0 5 Moreover, Rosenberg notes that the dilution
of the reform goals of the Supreme Court also occurred around abortion, envi-
ronmental pollution, reapportionment, and the constitutional rules governing
the processing of criminal defendants. A significant portion of the public dis-
approves of the Supreme Court pronouncements on these subjects; thus, the
Court's rulings are undermined and diminished at the enforcement level.
Lifetime appointment does not wholly immunize the Court from day-to-
day politics."° Members of the Court, aware of their vulnerability to public
100. See Lois Romano, We've Heard That.... WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1995, at E3 (quoting
the Dean of Harvard Law School that an offer had been made to Professor Lani Guinier). I be-
lieved that the Harvard Law School would make an offer to a black female professor, but I also
believed that Professor Bell's style of protest backfired, and delayed the process as administrators
dug in their heels to protect what they would term, "high standards."
101. For an account of a wide range of antagonism and hostility at the time of Professor
Bell's confrontation, see ELEANOR KERLOW, POISONED Ivy: How EGOS, IDEOLOGY, AND POWER
POLITICS ALMOST RUINED HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1994).
102. See Derrick Bell, Legal Storytelling-The Final Report: Harvard's Affirmative Action
Allegory, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2382, 2394 (1989) ("Most of us thought that the 1954 Supreme Court
decision in Brown v. Board of Education would close the book on racial discrimination and open
a new era of opportunity that knew no color line.").
103. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL AP-
POINTMENTS PROCESS 3-22 (1994).
104. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991).
105. Racial desegregation of public schools increased 1% per year from 1955 to 1965 when
the federal courts were enforcing Brown. Desegregation was greatly accelerated after 1965 when
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare began to use new enforcement tools provided
by the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See GREENBERG, supra note 35, at 380-81.
106. See Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1979 (1990) (arguing
that the formal safeguards of life tenure and salary protection for Supreme Court Justices "do little
to ensure judicial independence").
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opinion, exercise restraint when a ruling might confront strong public senti-
ment. ' 7 This may make for decisions that minorities believe disserve their
interests, such as some that Professor Bell has criticized."" But the Court's
posture has also protected minorities. Professor Bell has pessimistically specu-
lated that, by disingenuous argument, the employment discrimination portion
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act could be held unconstitutional." 9 That specula-
tion wholly lacks credibility because simple equal opportunity is a bedrock of
today's political landscape. In the "real world," the Court sustained the consti-
tutionality of the portion of the 1964 Act that prohibited racial discrimination
in public accommodations, relying on the Commerce Clause."' Professor
Bell is not engaged here in serious prognostication about future Supreme
Court developments; it is merely another variation on the theme of unbounded
racial fear.
OTHER FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
Were Professor Bell pursuing an objective assessment, as opposed to
pursuing moral denunciation, he might have compared race discrimination's
progress--or lack of progress-with sex or other forms of discrimination.
White females were never subjected, as were blacks, to the full degradation of
slavery, but sexism is, arguably, as pervasive and resistant to total elimination
as racism. One could forget that white and black females received the right to
vote a half-century after the freed black males.' When Congress considered
outlawing employment discrimination based on race in the 1960s, southern
congressmen added sex discrimination as a ploy to make the legislation seem
wholly unpalatable." 2
107. Spann goes further and argues that the Justices of the Supreme Court perform the institu-
tional role of protecting minority interests weakly because the Justices are likely to be persons
strongly imbued with majoritarian perspectives, either consciously or unconsciously. Id. at 1982-
90.
108. See Racial Realism, supra note 70, at 369-70 (criticizing the Court for failing to adopt
arguments that would have sustained affirmative action plans in Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and Croson v. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. 469 (1989)). It is possi-
ble to argue that in Bakke and Croson the Court appropriately required the development of an ade-
quate record of prior discrimination before a governmental entity could use race as basis for grant-
ing benefits. The Court, however, could not be oblivious to the growing public perception of
affirmative action as "unfair preferences." See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)
(refusing to order busing of children between cities and suburbs at a time when a substantial pub-
lic hostility began to develop around disruption of neighborhood schools).
109. Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Final Civil Rights Act, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 597, 589-90
(1991).
110. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Even Richard Epstein, who questions this
expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, admits that it is "wildly inconceivable" that any
constitutional attack on the anti-discrimination principle would be sustained, because it is so firm-
ly a part of our political and legal culture. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 5-6 (1992). Professor Bell would no doubt refer-
ence the conservatives on the Court invalidating federal gun control legislation in United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), on Commerce Clause grounds, as an opening wedge.
111. The 15th Amendment, granting ex-slaves (males) the right to vote, was adopted in 1870.
The 19th Amendment granting females the right to vote was adopted fifty years later in 1920.
112. See Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431,
441 (1966).
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Twenty-five years after the prohibition of sex discrimination in employ-
ment, the annual income of females was 64% of male income. 113 Indeed,
gender inhibits personal-as opposed to family-income more than race: the
average white female college graduate earns less than the average male high
school graduate." 4 Perhaps "gender-bonding" is stronger than Bell's "racial-
bonding." Black females illustrate the diminution of race as an organizer of
income, and the continued potency of gender. Black females, who earned only
41% of what white females earned in 1939, now approximate the income of
white females."5 Marriage to white males blunts some of the suppression of
white female income, which is underscored by the disproportionate number of
single female parents who fall below the poverty line." 6 However, some fe-
males endure terrible mental and physical abuse in relationships, and it must
be denigrating to many females to know, at an unspoken level, that a society
forces you into what should be an intimate relationship as a mechanism of
economic survival.
Indeed, sexism may resist change more than racism. Sexism, unlike rac-
ism, has existed in practically all societies. Racist slavery in America was a
straight-forward economic exploitation. Sexism, however, may have a more
complex psychological cast since economic resources are often shared, and in-
deed, the giving of financial sustenance and gifts may be a part of the way
that men maintain their dominance over women. Racism, in the past, thrived
on fragile and false stereotypes sustained primarily by keeping blacks and
whites ignorant of one another and separated; thus, the stereotype could be
broken down through increased information, education, and peer-like interac-
tion. Sexism, however, is developed and reinforced in the most intimate of
relationships; thus, interaction alone does not disrupt female subordination.
Gender development dominates personality so that views of the other sex may
not be as episodically developed as one's racial perspectives." 7 A decrease
in sexism may call for a reorganization of personality by both males and fe-
males, which is more difficult to achieve than dissolving racial stereotypes. "'
113. There are a number of variables which account for some of that gap (e.g. males have
greater seniority, or hold more dangerous and better paying jobs), but most analysts agree that
some of the gap is not explained by those non-discriminatory factors. See, e.g., DEBORAH L.
RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 162 (1989).
114. Id. at 163.
115. By 1984, black women's weekly wages were 97% of the wages of white women. A
COMMON DESTINY, supra note 71, at 197.
116. RHODE, supra note 113, at 2 (two thirds of indigent adults are females).
117. One expects conservatives to more readily exhibit attitudes of racism, sexism, and homo-
phobia because embracing the status quo or treating long-standing hierarchial relationships as
"natural" and inevitable are attitudes which support these forms of prejudice. However, Terry H.
Anderson recounts how black and white male civil rights activists, firmly committed to eradicating
race discrimination, treated female activists' calls for inclusion of a feminist agenda in the de-
mands for reform with mockery and derision. ANDERSON, supra note 39, at 313-15.
118. There is a risk here of too broad, and thus inaccurate generalizations, since there is no
uniform "woman's experience" unconditioned by class, race, sexual orientation, and other factors.
See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581
(1990). The fact that these two phenomena have different sources and characteristics must make
the experience of black women especially unique and complex since they experience them simul-
taneously. See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365. Trina Grillo and Stephanie M. Wildman might argue, contrary to
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The point is that blacks have no monopoly on the slowness or incomplete-
ness of anti-discrimination law as a reorganizer of deep and complex social
habits."9 Neither slavery, racial segregation, nor sex discrimination was pro-
duced or maintained exclusively by law. They were contributed to and rein-
forced by practically every societal institution. A reorientation in virtually
every institution is necessary for complete or permanent change: a reorienta-
tion in the way we educate our children in schools and in families with respect
to differences, in the ideas we advance in our media and in our cultural or-
gans, in the way that we relate socially in friendships and in voluntary organi-
zations, and in the way that churches and synagogues carry forth their moral
messages. This is not to suggest that the problem of discrimination is too
massive or wholly unmanageable. Indeed, just the opposite is suggested. Per-
sons can work in small and large ways from wherever they are to reduce the




The major de-stabilizers that blacks face may not be racial discrimination,
but may, indeed, be problems sweeping the whole society that are merely
aggravated for blacks, who have relatively fewer financial and human capital
resources on average. Improvements in the economic status of blacks relative
to whites slowed after the 1970s, but the overall economy also stagnated for
whites after that period.' 2' Professor Bell, in Faces, leaves the impression
that all retardation in improvements of black circumstances is due solely to
racism. At no point does he acknowledge neutral, non-racial forces, like the
condition of the general economy, as determining black prospects.
America now has a shrinking middle class and an increased economic gap
between high-paid and low-paid workers. During the 1980s, middle class
living standards declined, and more Americans fell below the poverty line.
12
my conclusion, that comparisons between racism (or white supremacy) and sexism usually result
in a failure to understand the power and significance of racism in the lives of people of color. See
Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of
Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other -isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397.
119. The covert evasion of the anti-discrimination laws protecting blacks of which Professor
Bell complains also exist with respect to other groups ostensibly protected by the anti -discrimina-
tion laws. Studies show that there is still widespread covert job discrimination against Hispanics.
See Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover and Remedy
Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-skilled, Entry-level Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 403, 404 n.4
(1993) (citing a 1990 study by the Urban Institute).
120. Any white is free to inform a black about an employment, consultant, or business oppor-
tunity and thus break the cycle in which blacks are locked out of opportunities that pass by word
of mouth. Blacks, with some selectivity and psychological risk, are free to explore the possibility
of a closer social relationship with whites who appear receptive. My speculation is that some
whites would welcome such an approach, but are leery of being too aggressive themselves for fear
of appearing patronizing. One would hope that some day the groups would be equal in resources
and power and thus could develop reciprocal relationships more naturally, but one can work to-
ward that end in small and incremental ways.
121. Real weekly earnings (in constant dollars) of all males, on average fell from $488 in
1969 to $414 in 1984. A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 71, at 7. The percentage of all Americans
living in poverty increased from 11.2% in 1974 to 13.5% by 1986. Id. at 8.
122. John C. Boger, Race and the American City: The Kerner Commission in Retrospect-An
Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1290, 1362-64.
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Wealth is now more concentrated at the top: four fifths of the share lost by the
poorest families went to the richest fifth of the population, and the top 1% of
the population's after-tax share of income rose from 7% in 1977 to 11% in
1990.2 White males are a good barometer of the economic climate, since
race and gender do not suppress their income. The median inflation-adjusted
income of white males, who were their families' only breadwinner, fell 22%
between 1976 and 1984.124 We've experienced cyclical recessions, and many
white collar persons experienced unemployment for the first time. An estimat-
ed 37 millions persons have no health insurance.'25 Well-paying blue collar
jobs in mass production industries have disappeared faster than any other jobs,
and blacks who flocked to these industries during World War II are affected
disproportionately.126 College graduates fare better than non-college grad-
uates, but even in the "improving economy" of the last two years, many of the
jobs created are low-paying. Thus, college graduates are forced into sales clerk
positions, and those persons with only sales clerk credentials, like many young
blacks, are forced into unemployment.' 27 Law school graduates today, unlike
the situation twenty or thirty years ago, sometimes cannot find employ-
ment. 28 Even employed persons suffer undue stress and anxiety: two in-
comes are now treated as a necessity, and many persons are severely over-
worked, with little time for family.'29
Professor Bell's sense of futility may arise because our training in civil
rights law does not help answer the two toughest questions America faces.
First, can the economy be organized to reduce polarization in income and
render overall greater economic security? 3' Second, can Americans be made
123. KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR: WEALTH AND THE AMERICAN ELEC-
TORATE IN THE REAGAN AFTERMATH ix (1990).
124. Id. at 18.
125. Eric L. Robinson, The Oregon Basic Health Services Act: A Model for State Reform?, 45
VAND. L. REV. 977, 983 (1992).
126. Drucker, supra note 83, at 53, 62.
127. See Barry Bluestone, The Inequality Express, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Winter, 1995, at 81,
84 ("Most businesses are not introducing technology that requires vastly improved skill. Many are
simply paying less for the same skills they have been using all along while others are hiring better
educated workers at lower wage rates to do the work previously relegated to lesser educated em-
ployees.").
128. William Gifford, Help Not Wanted: Law Students Face Tight Job Market, LEGAL TIMES,
Dec. 31, 1990; see also Laura Blumenfeld, Law of Diminishing Returns: Students Cram for Bar
Exam While Job Rejection Letters Pour In, WASH. POST, July 30, 1991, at CI (describing the job
market for recent law school graduates as "the toughest job market for lawyers in anyone's recent
memory").
129. See generally JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED
DECLINE OF LEISURE (1991) (discussing the emergence of a complex scheme of societal pressures
over the last few decades).
130. In his essay, Political Reality Testing: 1993, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1993),
Professor Bell asks a question about reversing adverse trends in the economy as if there were
absolutely no possible answer:
[President Clinton] has promised to create more jobs, but how do you create un-
skilled and semi-skilled jobs at decent wages in an economy where such jobs are either
disappearing because of technology or export to foreign countries, or are occupied by
the hundreds of thousands of legal and illegal immigrants who are willing to work for
sub-standard wages?
Id. There have been, on the contrary, some excellent proposals, but they are not generated by
lawyers. See, e.g., MARTIN L. WEITZMAN, THE SHARE ECONOMY (1984) (proposing that moving
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politically conscious of questions which may involve recognizing class inter-
ests? Anti-discrimination law alone may be insufficient, given the spectrum of
issues facing the black community. We, as lawyers, must resort to economists,
political scientists, and social psychologists to begin to fashion answers to
those tough questions.
LESSONS FROM THE MOVEMENT: BROAD BASED COALITIONS
The civil rights movement, however, may provide some insights. The
genius of that movement was its openness to involvement by as broad a spec-
trum of the black and white public as wished to make a contribution. Its mes-
sage of mutually beneficial racial harmony changed public attitudes and the
way institutions functioned.
The labor movement of the 1920s and 1930s also had this character. The
New Deal, which realized many labor union goals, eventually was accepted by
a broad base of the public, so much so that Franklin Roosevelt was re-elected
more times than any president who was not constitutionally limited to two
terms. The task is more formidable today because issues are more complex
and multifaceted than the straight forward propositions that blacks were enti-
tled to equal treatment under the law, or that unions should have had a right to
organize. But broad, mass-based organizing and public acceptance are the
main elements needed today, and they must be revived before any significant
reform is possible.
This perspective renders Professor Bell's implicit endorsement of "Black
Power"-the "Nobody will save us but ourselves" philosophy-particularly
dysfunctional, given the current character of problems facing blacks and
American society as a whole. Believing that blacks alone must free themselves
is a sure route to Professor Bell's despair. 3 Solving the massive economic
dislocation described above requires enlisting allegiance and support from a
broad spectrum of the public. Too much emphasis on the interests of one's
own group disrupts the ability to draw the American people into a sense of its
true collective interests.
We, as blacks, have, for many understandable reasons, contributed to the
over-emphasis on black nationalism in the recent past. The Civil Rights Move-
ment, for example, had to throw off condescending, paternalistic white leader-
ship. However, excessive trumpeting of "Black Power," without supporting
resources or strategy, destroyed some organizations, like the Student Non-
Violent Coordinating Committee.'32 Many whites found better things to do
employees from fixed wages to shares in profits would expand employment and restrain inflation).
131. Martin Luther King, Jr., almost as if anticipating the stance now taken by Professor Bell,
said that he could acknowledge the appeal and the psychological value of the call for "Black
Power," but that it was ultimately, a "nihilistic philosophy born out of the conviction that the
Negro can't win. It is, at bottom, the view that American society is so hopelessly corrupt and en-
meshed in evil that there is no possibility of salvation from within." HARVARD SITKOFF, THE
STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY: 1954-1992, at 199 (1993).
132. Id. at 196-203. Sitkoff noted that "[bly 1967, without white support and financial back-
ing, the SNCC [Student Non-Violent Coordination Committee] was bankrupt and reduced to some
two score hard-core militants." Id. at 203.
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with their time and money when they were repeatedly told that they were not
needed and that all of them were, irretrievably, the enemy. We must reverse
that theme, because the right wing has profited-particularly in electoral poli-
tics-from playing out a kind of group counter-attack of "we the hard-work-
ing, family-oriented, (white) Americans" against all those irresponsible, tax-
eating "others.' ' 3  Economic anxiety reinforces racial hoarding of opportuni-
ties and benefits; black progress is keyed to progress in society as a whole to-
ward economic security.
BELL'S CONFRONTATION MODEL
Broad-based, cooperative activity is, however, the antithesis of the model
of the single heroic individual that Professor Bell admires so much in Con-
fronting Authority. Professor Bell cannot advance the solo confrontation as a
superior strategic approach, so he offers the solace of knowing that one acted
with integrity. That is not enough for most of us, and certainly not enough for
blacks as a people. If a situation is truly unfair, discriminatory, or oppressive,
we are obligated to pay careful attention to the strategy for changing it, or we
must accept the fact that our actions are basically futile-however much we
seek to congratulate ourselves for our courage.34
Professor Bell cites Paul Robeson and Martin Luther King, Jr. as exem-
plars of his model for singular courage. From my perspective, they functioned
in almost diametrically opposite fashions. Paul Robeson fits Professor Bell's
model of a man of courage who took on the white society and the "powers
that be" in open confrontation, and in often highly symbolic action. He all but
adopted support of Marxism in a time when anti-communist hysteria was high,
and he sacrificed his profession and career as an artist. One might respect Paul
Robeson, but we must be candid about his strategic failures. He supported a
doctrine which failed in the countries he thought were superior to America, he
was not largely embraced by the black community, and he had no massive
133. This right wing tactic was not simply a response to increased nationalism in the black
community. It is also an affirmative effort to divert the white public from focusing on the true
sources of their economic anxiety by having them believe that the small amounts of federal reve-
nue (relatively) that goes into welfare and other anti-poverty programs is the source of their
disempowerment and lack of economic security. Any effort at building mass support will probably
be met with covert race-baiting tactics. Professor Bell correctly predicted in 1982 that a future
Congress (like the current one) could consider scuttling affirmative action programs out of politi-
cal motives. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Preferential Affirmative Action, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
855 (1982) [hereinafter Preferential Affirmative Action].
134. In Confronting Authority, Professor Bell acknowledges that Professor Laurence Tribe, a
colleague at the Harvard Law School, actively supported greater racial and gender integration of
the faculty. He expresses disappointment, however, that Professor Tribe did not join him in resign-
ing from the faculty. CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 4, at 121-23. Professor Bell admits
that Tribe's resignation might not have "moved the faculty to action," but he suggests that Tribe
missed the "unique feeling" of being a courageous latter day Thoreau. Id. There are two com-
ments: First, a basic tenet of the civil rights movement was that no one has the authority to pre-
scribe for another individual what "heroic" actions he or she should undertake. Secondly, and
more importantly, "heroic" actions, which merely fritter away resources or power, would under-
mine the goal of integrating the Harvard faculty. Professor Tribe and the blacks who remained on
the faculty may have had more of an impact on the offer being made to a black female than Pro-
fessor Bell did in his high-profile resignation.
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impact in terms of changing the institutions that oppressed the black communi-
ty. 13
5
Martin Luther King cannot be described in any of those terms. King al-
ways worked well within the context of the black masses and, indeed, drew
his strength from their allegiance to him. He worked within a spiritual and
religious context that was familiar to and supported by his followers. King
possessed individual courage' 36 and integrity, but he was not a "solo actor."
He was counseled, and actually influenced, by members of his organization
and a few whites outside the organization. 37 He also carefully attended to
strategy and the need to bring persons to a level of action and cooperation.
Both King and Robeson were concerned about the excesses of uncontrolled
capitalism, but only King had the strategic sense and capacity to start a "Poor
People's Campaign." King was not interested in some defiant gesture of rub-
bing the noses of white Americans in their racism. King invited whites to join
in a direction that would do as much for their moral and material welfare as it
would for blacks. Because of his perspective, King developed a viable, active
movement involving a broad spectrum of blacks and whites. King, therefore,
unlike Robeson or anyone who would emulate Bell's singular confrontation
model, achieved a profound change in the level of discrimination and oppres-
sion experienced by blacks.'38
GOALS FOR THE FUTURE
The desirable economic goals are clear. There must be a redistribution of
wealth, by means which the majority of the public see as benefiting them;
thus, race-specific affirmative action plans will play a minor role.'39 We
must reduce poverty and banish unemployment for the unskilled as well as for
professionals. We must retard the loss in real wages, so that a person's income
can fulfill the basic needs for shelter, food, medical care, and education. Very
importantly, we need to enhance dignity in the workplace and remove the
insecurity that employment can be lost precipitously.
135. For a criticism of Robeson's impact, see HAROLD CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO
INTELLECTUAL: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FAILURE OF BLACK LEADERSHIP 285-301
(1967).
136. 1 had been in meetings with King in which he expressed a sense of urgency about mov-
ing forward because he had a sense of his own personal vulnerability. Yet he never, to my
knowledge, called for armed body guards.
137. See DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1953). King's most "intimate confidants" in the
SCLC were Ralph Abernathy, Andrew Young, and Dorothy Cotton. Id. at 584. He also frequently
sought counsel from a white attorney, Stanley D. Levinson. Id. at 116-17, 418-20.
138. 1 have tried to support these claims. See Leroy D. Clark, A Tribute to Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.: A Man of Peace and Wisdom, 2 WIDENER J. OF PUB. L. 431 (1993).
139. 1 do not quarrel with the moral justification for affirmative action programs, for in a
truly superior article, Professor Bell makes a persuasive case. See Preferential Affirmative Action,
supra note 133. However, the most disadvantaged blacks below the poverty line do not have the
credentials to benefit from most affirmative action programs. I agree with Professor William J.
Wilson that the black poor would be benefitted more through universal, non-race-specific pro-
grams (like social security) which are easier to mount and sustain politically. See WILLIAM J.
WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
109-24 (1987).
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How should we pursue these simple, clearly beneficial goals? Many civil
rights lawyers, myself included, are probably closet leftists who were surprised
by the massive collapse of the economies of the major socialist countries. We
must now educate ourselves through the economists and non-lawyers writing
about the prospects for economic justice in a private property economy.
Charles Derber recently outlined a way to pursue the beneficial goals identi-
fied above, because of interesting developments in the business sector."' He
points out, however, that "progressives of all stripes, as well as much of the
population, have been seduced by the politics of the 'cultural wars' and have
left economics to the economists, with the attendant negative consequenc-
es."'' He also notes that black, women's, and other movements have en-
gaged in "a shift from economic and class issues to identity-based cultural
politics," thereby ceding the field of economic restructuring to the business
sector. 1
4 2
Derber claims that American business is moving in two fundamentally
contradictory directions. One is "contingent capitalism," which can "intensify
greed, social dislocation, ugly racial divisions and extreme class inequality."
The other is "cooperative capitalism," which "offers the seeds of a new idea
of community in America and a potential solution to the specters of violence,
family dissolution, poverty, and social breakdown that haunt the nation.' 4 3
In cooperative capitalism, a business creates loyalty in its work force and
customers by a commitment to shared values in the community, which some-
times takes precedent over profits. The business empowers workers, giving
them more autonomy in how work is performed. Organizational decisions are
made jointly by management and labor, thus reducing the need for a tier of
supervisors to engage in surveillance. Various forms of employee-owned busi-
nesses are developing, as an outgrowth and extension of this approach.'"
Derber warns, however, that "contingency capitalism" is a wholly contra-
dictory direction that is competing with cooperative capitalism. Here, business-
es replace permanent workers with contingents who are temporary, part-time,
or designated as "independent contractors"-a designation which allows em-
ployers to avoid paying social security taxes for the worker. Secondly, compa-
nies further reduce the core of permanent employees through downsizing and
contracting out, thus disrupting expectations of continued long-term employ-
ment. Finally, the corporations cut back on long-term, fixed obligations to
employees, and revert to speed-ups and management by stress.
Derber believes that we are at a critical crossroads regarding the structure
of the economy, and that there are legislative measures which can encourage
140. Charles Derber, Clintradictions: Clinton, Cooperation, and the Contradictions of Capi-
talism, TIKKUN, SeptiOct., 1994, at 15-18, 107-08.
141. Id. at 15.
142. Id. at 108.
143. Id. at 15.
144. Derber notes that employees now own over 10% of the average Fortune 1000 company
and have majority ownership in 2,000 firms such as Avis and United Airlines. The prediction is
that within six years employees will own a controlling share (15%) of one quarter of all public
companies. Id. at 16-17.
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and support the cooperative capitalism direction. He believes that President
Clinton's communitarian concerns could be realized through his embracing
cooperative capitalism and informing the American public of these two funda-
mentally different directions facing the nation. Derber concludes that "[tihe
ultimate success of [the black, women's, and other identity movements] and
those of progressive citizens and community groups, depends on coalescing




Despite Professor Bell's prophecy of doom, I believe he would like to
have his analysis proven wrong. However, he desperately leans on a tactic
from the past-laying out the disabilities of the black condition and accusing
whites of not having the moral strength to act fairly. That is the ultimate
theme in both of his books and in much of his law review writing. That tactic
not only lacks full force against today's complex society, it also becomes, for
many whites, an exaggerated claim that racism is the sole cause of black mis-
fortunes." 6 Many whites may feel about the black condition what many of
us may have felt about the homeless: dismayed, but having no clear answer as
to how the problem is to be solved, and feeling individually powerless if the
resolution calls for massive resources that we, personally, lack. Professor
Bell's two books may confirm this sense of powerlessness in whites with a
limited background in this subject, because Professor Bell does not offer a
single programmatic approach toward changing the circumstance of blacks. He
presents only startling, unanalyzed prophecies of doom, which will easily
garner attention from a controversy-hungry media.' 7
It is much harder to exercise imagination to create viable strategies for
change.'" Professor Bell sensed the despair that the average--especially
145. Id. at 108.
146. See, for example, William J. Wilson's development of the non-racial factors which now
influence the fortunes of blacks, especially those in the underclass. WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE
DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS (1978).
147. Harold McDougall notes that
[there is a tendency in] the media to present news in dramatic and personalized form,
focusing on individuals and their personalitites ... rather than on political, economic
and process factors.... This ... encourages the untutored consumer to view events as
carried on by super-personalitites and reinforces his or her own feelings of
powerlessness and disengagement.
Harold A. McDougall, Lawyering and the Public Interest in the 1990's, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 1,
13 (1991) (citations omitted).
148. 1 do not embrace the broad scale attack which Judge Harry Edwards made on non-tradi-
tional legal scholarship emanating from the Critical Legal Studies (CRITS) movement in The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34
(1992). The CRITS have contributed enormously to defining the true power dynamics that under-
lie the law, and Critical Race Theory has been powerful in its exploration of the psychology and
politics of racism. However, it is disappointing that much of what I have read is aimed primarily
at consciousness raising (like Professor Bell's latest work) and rarely advances pragmatic or pro-
grammatic legal strategies that could be used by reform activists in litigation or legislative devel-
opment. See my minor comments in New Directions for the Civil Rights Movement: College Ath-
letics as a Civil Rights Issue, 36 How. L.J. 259 (1993). One wonders: are the demands of day-to-
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average black-reader would experience, so he put forth rhetoric urging an
"unremitting struggle that leaves no room for giving up."'49 His contention is
ultimately hollow, given the total sweep of his work.
At some point it becomes dysfunctional to refuse giving any credit to the
very positive abatements of racism that occurred with white support, and on
occasion, white leadership. Racism thrives in an atmosphere of insecurity,
apprehension about the future, and inter-group resentments. Unrelenting, un-
qualified accusations only add to that negative atmosphere. Empathetic and
more generous responses are possible in an atmosphere of support, security,
and a sense that advancement is possible; the greatest progress of blacks oc-
curred during the 1960s and early 1970s when the economy was expanding.
Professor Bell's "analysis" is really only accusation and "harassing white
folks," and is undermining and destructive. There is no love-except for his
own group---and there is a constricted reach for an understanding of whites.
There is only rage and perplexity. No bridges are built--only righteousness is
being sold.
A people, black or white, are capable only to the extent they believe they
are. Neither I, nor Professor Bell, have a crystal ball, but I do know that cre-
ativity and a drive for change are very much linked to a belief that they are
needed, and to a belief that they can make a difference. The future will be
shaped by past conditions and the actions of those over whom we have no
control. Yet it is not fixed; it will also be shaped by the attitudes and energy
with which we face the future. Writing about race is to engage in a power
struggle. It is a non-neutral political act, and one must take responsibility for
its consequences. Telling whites that they are irremediably racist is not mere
"information"; it is a force that helps create the future it predicts. If whites
believe the message, feelings of futility could overwhelm any further efforts to
seek change. I am encouraged, however, that the motto of the most articulate
black spokesperson alive today, Jesse Jackson, is, "Keep hope alive!" and that
much of the strength of Martin Luther King, Jr. was his capacity to "dream"
us toward a better place.
day litigation incompatible with the long gestation period for most scholarly writing? Are the
problems seen as too massive to be responsive to minor "reform" efforts or "tinkering" with the
law? Richard Delgado says that "Critical Race thought is marked by deep discontent with liberal-
ism, a system of civil rights litigation and activism characterized by incrementalism ... [and]
virtually every essay ... [is] an effort to go beyond the legacy of mainstream civil rights thought
to something better." CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 5, at 1. I ask "beyond" to what? Struc-
tures of oppression and the status quo cannot be changed in any fundamental way by mere con-
sciousness raising. Strategic directions for action are essential. I am perplexed by the paradox of a
substantial increase of progressive scholars and a concomitant absence of concrete assistance to
practicing activists. Others share my concern: See Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1751, 1764 n.12 (1994) ("Critical race scholars have lagged in their analysis of
practice [as opposed to theory]."). John 0. Calmore explains in a memo covering his article,
Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: Hewing a Stone of Hope from a Mountain of
Despair, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233 (1995) that he wrote, "to represent an application of critical
race theory to progressive practice . as at least a footnote in rebuttal to Anthony Alfieri's
claim."
149. FACES, supra note 1, at 200.
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THE JURY SYSTEM AT RISK
FROM COMPLEXITY,
THE NEW MEDIA, AND DEVIANCY
ARTHUR AUSTIN*
One could surmise that 1994 was a propitious time to publish a book on
the jury system. Media-intensive trials ending in discordant verdicts created
tremendous concern about the jury as an "extraordinary institution."' One
could also conclude that 1994 was the worst of times to publish a jury analy-
sis. Kamikaze media coverage so sensationalized the jury process that a book
like Stephen Adler's, The Jury: Trial and Error in the American Courtroom,2
might be ignored as too noncontroversial.3
A plethora of jury scholarship already exists,4 so why add to the pile?5
The justification for Adler's book is angle and range. Adler's angle is that of a
reporter; using his reporter's instincts and experience to interview jurors.6 The
range is in the variety of cases he addresses: two murder trials (one focusing
* Edgar A. Hahn Professor of Jurisprudence, Case Western Reserve University.
1. Benjamin Kaplan, Trial By Jury, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 45, 47 (Harold J.
Berman ed., 1961).
2. STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM
(1994).
3. The book has not been ignored by reviewers. See, e.g., James Andrews, The US Jury
System: Of, by, and for the People, but Does It Work?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 31, 1994,
at 13 (book review); Herb Brown, Indicting Jury System On Suspect Evidence, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, Oct. 30, 1994, at lIIJ (book review); Teresa Burke, The Jury: Trial and Error in the
American Courtroom, VA. LAW., Feb. 1995, at 36 (book review); Gail D. Cox, Law and Disorder,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 13, 1994, at 37 (book review); Richard Grenier, Back in the Good Old Days,
Before Juries Wrecked Justice, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1994, at A17; Linda Himelstein, A System
Found Guilty As Charged, Bus. WK., Nov. 21, 1994, at 16 (book review); Kathleen Kahn, The
Jury's Sad Verdict on State of the Courtroom, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 26, 1994, at E5
(book review); Martin Kimel, Does the Jury System Need Repair, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 30, 1995, at
58 (book review); Richard Lacayo, Questionable Judgment, TIME, Oct. 3, 1994, at 62.
An excerpt from the book was also reviewed by Chief Judge Frank Bullock, Jr., the trial
judge in the Brooke Group case, which will be discussed in more detail infra. Bullock chastised
Adler for not recognizing that the Supreme Court had affirmed his decision. Chief Judge Frank W.
Bullock, Jr., Let the Record Show .... AM. LAW., Dec. 1994, at 23.
4. The best known is the extensive study conducted by Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel at
the University of Chicago. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
5. Also appearing in 1994 was JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM
AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY (1994). Abramson discusses history, selection process, and juror
decisionmaking in arguing for the jury "as a deliberative rather than a representative body. Delib-
eration is a lost virtue in modern democracies; only the jury still regularly calls upon ordinary
citizens to engage each other in a face-to-face process of debate." Id. at 8. It is a provocative book
but, with the exception of a few comments on scientific jury selection, beyond the scope of this
article. For a review, see George P. Fletcher, The Deliberators, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994, § 7, at
14.
6. Adler is the legal editor of The Wall Street Journal and a former writer at The American
Lawyer.
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on sentencing, the other on guilt); a celebrity trial (Imelda Marcos); a complex
commercial litigation trial (antitrust); and two negligence trials (AIDS, deep
pocket recovery). The objective is to describe the jurors' perceptions of a
variety of stimuli-lawyers, judges, witnesses, and other jurors-to ascertain
what really goes on in the jurors' minds over the course of a trial. Ultimately,
Adler concludes that "[w]e sense, rather than know, that the jury isn't working
properly."7
I agree with Adler; problems do exist with the current jury system. How-
ever, Adler, like many others, fails to make an important distinction-there is
a vast difference between the present condition of the civil and criminal jury
systems. While the civil jury system may not be working as effectively as it
should, it is salvageable. The criminal jury system, on the other hand, may be
beyond rehabilitation.
This article uses Adler's book as a frame of reference to flush out the
problems of the two jury systems. Part I scrutinizes the civil jury system,
focusing specifically on the many difficulties that arise when civil juries are
asked to resolve complex litigation disputes. Part II examines the effectiveness
of the criminal jury system and, in particular, the present and future impact of
the "New Media Culture of Deviancy" on the system. Finally, Part III discuss-
es the differences between the two systems, predicting a different future for
each of them.
I. THE CHALLENGE TO THE JURY FROM COMPLEX LITIGATION
I used an interview technique similar to Adler's on four antitrust juries,
and confess an interest and stake in the technique's effectiveness.8 Additional-
ly, we both surveyed the Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.9 antitrust jury. For the most part, our results were consistent.
Brooke Group involved the Robinson-Patman Act;' the Ulysses of anti-
trust." Threatened with extinction in the brand-name cigarette market,
7. ADLER, supra note 2, at 43.
8. 1 conducted two interviews in Cleveland, Ohio (the first trial ended in a hung jury and
was subsequently re-tried). These surveys are discussed in some of my other works. See, e.g.,
ARTHUR D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY
(1984) [hereinafter AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION]; Arthur D. Austin, City of Cleveland v. Cleve-
land Electric Illuminating Co.: Monopolization, Regulation and Natural Monopoly, 13 U. TOL. L.
REV. 609 (1982); Arthur D. Austin, Second Trials, LITIG., Winter 1984, at 34.
I also conducted juror surveys in New Mexico and North Carolina. For the respective trial
court opinions, see New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litig. v. Southern Union Co., 607 F. Supp.
1491 (D. Colo. 1984); Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 1990-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 69,182 (M.D. N.C. 1990). The New Mexico case ended in a hung jury but eventually
settled for over $100 million. Jonathan Dahl, Consumers Gain Unlikely Victory in Antitrust Action
in New Mexico, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1984, at 37.
For a more in-depth discussion of the New Mexico and North Carolina surveys, see Arthur
D. Austin, The Truth-and-Consequences of 'Juror Bonding', N.J. L.J., Oct. 4, 1993, at 26 [herein-
after Austin, Juror Bonding]; Arthur D. Austin, Another Viewpoint on Juries, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 22,
1993, at 15; Arthur Austin, How the Dominant Juror Dominates, 21 TRIAL LAW. Q. 23, 23-24
(1991) [hereinafter Austin, Dominant Juror].
9. 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1994).
11. For a more detailed discussion of the Robinson-Patman Act, see F.M. SCHERER, INDUS-
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Liggett 2 entered the generic market and immediately diverted customers
from brand-name cigarette producers. 3 As brand-name prices increased,
Liggett dropped its generic prices and successfully enhanced its sales. 4
Brown & Williamson (B&W) responded to Liggett's success by also
entering the generic market. Liggett alleged that B&W violated the Robinson-
Patman Act when it entered the market and began selling its generics below
cost." Liggett claimed it lost business as a result of B&W's entry into the
generic market. 6 Liggett insisted that B&W's only purpose in entering the
generic market was to take away Liggett's customers and force Liggett to
make up its losses by raising generic prices. 7 B&W's predatory plan, accord-
ing to Liggett, was to reduce the price difference between brands and generics
and thereby entice customers back to brands. 8 The linchpin of the complaint
was that B&W would recoup its losses from below-cost-pricing by joining its
other rivals in a conscious parallelism conspiracy to charge supracompetitive
prices for brands. 9
By making a favorable impression on the jurors, Adler made my survey
easier.2" My client was a law firm that was using a well-known expert econo-
mist in a pending case involving the same allegations. Adler and I pursued a
similar objective: getting into the jurors' minds to trace their perceptions from
voir dire to the judgment.
TRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 504 (1970) ("The Robinson-Patman
Act has on occasion been called a jungle, a hodgepodge of inconsistencies, and worse. The appel-
lations are well deserved."); see also DONALD DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 196
(1959) ("In short, the Robinson-Patman Act, on its face, outlaws all bargaining as the process is
understood in the business world."); A.D. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 468 (2d ed. 1970) ("It is interesting that its case law is the richest in muddle and
anomaly.").
12. Liggett is the former corporate name of Brooke Group Ltd., and is the name the Court
and the parties use to refer to the entity. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2582.
13. Id. at 2583.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2584.
16. Id. at 2592.
17. Id.
18. The result would be that
higher list prices to consumers would shrink the percentage gap in retail price between
generic and branded cigarettes; and this narrowing of the gap would make generics less
appealing to the consumer, thus slowing the growth of the economy segment and reduc-
ing cannibalizations of branded sales and their associated supracompetitive profits.
Id.
19. Brooke Group "posed a new and controversial theory of oligopolistic predatory recoup-
ment. It was a hotly contested and high-profile lawsuit in which the litigants were assisted by
highly skilled attorneys and economists." Kathryn M. Fenton, Editor's Note, Symposium: Predato-
ry Pricing After Brooke Group, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (1994). For other commentary, see Ste-
phen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity than Ever,
62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 377-402 (1994); Daniel J. Gifford, Predatory Pricing Analysis in the Su-
preme Court, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 431 (1994); The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 144, 322-31 (1993).
20. A juror told me that Adler had preceded me by approximately three months. The juror
also indicated that he had been interviewed by representatives for the litigants. Interview with
Cleo Stanley, jury member, in Durham, N.C. (July 9, 1990). The Interview Notes are quotes from
taped interviews that I used to summarize material relevant to my survey conclusions. Both the
tapes and notes are on file with the author.
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We came to the same conclusion: the jurors were overwhelmed, frustrat-
ed, and confused by testimony well beyond their comprehension. I concluded
that at no time did any juror grasp-even at the margins-the law, the eco-
nomics, or any other testimony relating to the allegations or defense. When
Adler noted that "[viocabulary was a particular problem,"'" he was correct.
This jury was no different than any other jury I have surveyed; at no time
have I ever encountered a juror who had the foggiest notion of what oligopoly,
market power, or average variable costs meant, much less how they applied to
the case. Typical is the response I received when I asked a juror whether he
remembered average variable cost. The juror replied, "Yes, explain it to me. I
still don't know what it means."22
When jurors tune out substantive testimony, serious consequences follow.
Adler observed, "Rocky and the others often found themselves focusing on
more concrete matters. Foster wore his suits too tight; another lawyer picked
his nose."23 He is right-the irrelevant becomes relevant, and often amusing.
A juror told me that one of the attorneys came into court with his fly open,
ruining his carefully developed image as a sharp dresser.24 On the other hand,
lawyer lapses, such as nodding off or writing a letter to Mom during the trial,
can antagonize jurors.25 In their constant audience gazing, jurors invariably
look to see who supports the plaintiff or defendant.26
More importantly, critical testimony can be trumped by subjective reac-
tions. For example, when B&W's attorney, during an aggressive cross-exami-
nation, pressed one of Liggett's witnesses (a tobacco wholesaler) to admit to
his lack of education, the jury responded with resentment, thereby elevating
the impact on the jury of the wholesaler's testimony regarding below-cost-
pricing.27 Adler correctly noted that the jury saw it as an "elitist attack.""
Dianne was still steaming when Adler interviewed her.2 In fact, she was still
steaming when I got to her, claiming that the lawyer was "a smart aleck."30
Another juror expressed a similar sentiment, saying, "I [will] never forget
it ... they belittled him."'"
21. ADLER, supra note 2, at 132.
22. Interview with Polly Hurley, jury member, in Durham, N.C. (July 9, 1990).
23. ADLER, supra note 2, at 126. Another juror noted, "Mr. Barker wore the same suit every
day, he was sloppy." Interview with Dianne Goodman, jury member, in Durham, N.C. (July 8,
1990).
24. Interview with Cleo Stanley, jury member, in Durham, N.C. (July 9, 1990).
25. See AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 8, at 89 (describing such an incident and
explaining how it diminished the lawyer's credibility).
26. A New Mexico juror told me that both sides were stacking the audience and that neither
side fooled anyone. Arthur D. Austin, New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation Jury Survey
(1984) (unpublished survey, on file with the Denver University Law Review). During the simulated
deliberation that I conducted, all the jurors remembered with great interest and amusement the ap-
pearance of a young woman in a red dress. Id. They could not figure out if she was a plaintiff or
defendant "plant" to divert their attention. Id. The plaintiff's lawyers denied any knowledge of the
"lady in red." Id.
27. ADLER, supra note 2, at 135. It was also a stupid attack because several of the jurors had
a similar educational background.
28. Id.
29. Id. Dianne remarked about Liggett's witness, "[t]hat man worked for what he got." Id.
30. Interview with Polly Hurley, jury member, in Durham, N.C. (July 9, 1990).
31. Interview with Darlene Hall, jury member, in Durham, N.C. (July 10, 1990).
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The verdict was sealed when Judge Bullock finished reading the instruc-
tions and the plaintiff moved, with the defendant's approval, to merge the
three alternates with the six regular jurors to create a jury of nine.32 While
Adler mentioned this switch, he failed to note the staggering consequences that
resulted from it. The switch changed the course of deliberation: an early poll
taken during the jury's deliberation revealed that the original jury lined up
four to two in favor of B&W.33 In their study, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel
note that "with very few exceptions, the first ballot determines the outcome of
the verdict.""4 Moreover, the four jurors who sided with B&W included
Rocky, who became a dominant factor in deliberation, and three other strong-
willed people who sided with Rocky until the very end.35 In other words,
with this strong-willed group, a B&W verdict would have been virtually cer-
tain. With the addition of the three alternates, however, the vote went five to
four in favor of Liggett.36 The key to the ultimate verdict was the addition of
Cleo, who was also a dominant juror.37
A dominant juror uses an amalgam of persuasion, education, and manage-
ment skills to guide fellow jurors to a verdict. 8 Other jurors are attracted by
the dominant juror's sincerity, lack of temperment, and ability to keep the
discussion focused.39 Because both Cleo and Rocky fit the dominant juror
profile, a face-off between the two was destined. Their conflict is illustrative
of what really takes place in the juryroom during a complex antitrust trial.'4
It also shows why the verdict was not, as Adler asserts, "illogical."'"
The legal and economic issues of antitrust force jurors to make ideological
judgments. Stripped of its legal and lawyerly fluff, the argument at trial is
about the acceptable types of competitive conduct and the level of tolerance
for enterprise size. On the spectrum of possibilities, Cleo and Rocky were at
extreme opposite ends. Cleo, a classic Southern populist, explained, "B&W
got too greedy. All of them [big businesses] are crooks. 42 Conversely,
Rocky, a strong advocate of competition, stated, "[t]his [case] don't even
belong in a courtroom, it belongs in a supermarket."43
32. ADLER, supra note 2, at 131.
33. Id.
34. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 488 (emphasis in original); see also JEFFREY T.
FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN JURY 286-87 (1987) (stating that the "final
decision can be predicted fairly by knowing the initial distribution of verdict preferences at the
start of deliberations").
35. ADLER, supra note 2, at 133.
36. According to Cleo, Rocky initiated the poll by saying, "let's see where we stand." Inter-
view with Cleo Stanley, jury member, in Durham, N.C. (July 9, 1990).
37. ADLER, supra note 2, at 133.
38. See Austin, Dominant Juror, supra note 8, at 25-26.
39. The second Cleveland trial produced the paradigmatic dominant juror. As foreman, he
convened the jury as a committee, avoided a poll that would have hardened positions, and pro-
ceeded to let each juror give a general impression of what they thought about the case, saying,
"let's take it step by step. You tell me what you find wrong and then we [will] dig up the evi-
dence and prove it ...." AUSTIN, COMPLEX LMGATION, supra note 8, at 53.
40. I have described this as "What Happens when a Dominant Juror Meets a Dominant Ju-
ror?" Austin, Dominant Juror, supra note 8, at 26.
41. ADLER, supra note 2, at 143.
42. Interview with Cleo Stanley, jury member, in Durham, N.C. (July 9, 1990).
43. Interview with Rocky Phillips, jury member, in Durham, N.C. (July 8, 1990).
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Dominant jurors intuitively know that the issue is ideology and gravitate
toward evidence which supports their vision. Cleo's primary weapon was
something antitrust lawyers dread, a "smoking gun" document in which B&W
executives made comments like "bury them" and "put a lid on Liggett.""
Cleo repeatedly told his colleagues that the document proved the evil
intent of B&W, a corporate giant.45 He said, the "[p]lanning papers got me
going-then I started looking for things on B&W's part. They did what their
intent was. They intended to do it and did ... [the] document[s] spoke for
themselves."' Rocky countered with wisdom from Adam Smith, "Every
businessman dreams to become number one. If me and you are competing, I
want to be first."47 A Rocky supporter was more practical, "In any bull ses-
sion, people [will] say get rid of them ... no one is going to say let's help
them across the street."8
The irony of expert testimony is that while no one can comprehend the
message, experts nevertheless play a critical role in the result. Jurors pick over
their testimony like buzzards on roadkill, trying to find some word or sentence
to support an ideology. Cleo had an advantage in William Burnett, the
plaintiff's economist expert who testified about a "study" of the tobacco indus-
try which he had compiled to support his theory of predatory pricing and
recoupment.49 Kenneth Elzinger, B&W's expert, rebutted Burnett's testimony
by arguing that his conclusions were inconsistent with accepted economic
theory.5" Cleo was not deterred. Burnett's message was an ideal cover for
Cleo's populism, and Burnett's premise, that fact always trumps theory, ap-
peals to most people, especially jurors with a high school education. Cleo
remarked, "Burnett was practical ... he done hi§ homework.... Elzinger was
just giving his theory without any research on it .... Burnett had the facts,
Elzinger had his philosophy."'"
How did they avoid a hung jury? Rocky struck me as a tough young man
who would not back away from a fight. To Adler, the "breakthrough" to a
compromise came when Cleo conceded to cutting $35 million for the trade-
mark allegation and $5 million for another claim.52 While I agree that Cleo's
concession was a factor, it was not the factor. What ultimately caused Rocky
and Polly to fold was a phenomenon known as "bonding."
Jury bonding is an imperceptible process that develops during long, com-
plex trials.53 It results in a group mindset on every aspect of the trial.5 Per-
44. ADLER, supra note 2, at 133.
45. Id.
46. Interview with Cleo Stanley, jury member, in Durham, N.C. (July 9, 1990).
47. Interview with Rocky Phillips, jury member, in Durham, N.C. (July 8, 1990).
48. Interview with Polly Hurley, jury member, in Durham, N.C. (July 9, 1990).
49. ADLER, supra note 2, at 134-35.
50. Id.
51. Interview with Cleo Stanley, jury member, in Durham, N.C. (July 9, 1990).
52. ADLER, supra note 2, at 138-39. It was a good ploy since only one juror took the trade-
mark claim seriously. Id.
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sonality differences fade into tolerance and friendships as the trial progress-
es.5 Rocky and Cicero, the only African-American juror, became drinking
buddies.56 The women counseled Rocky during his divorce. Most importantly,
the group developed a family mentality, which became a critical factor in de-
liberation.57
There was, after eight months of bonding, a group commitment to doing
what they were sworn to do, bring in a verdict. A hung jury would be a rejec-
tion of the family ethos nurtured by everyone. Rocky explained, "[m]e and
Cleo sat there and argued and argued and that's not me."' 8 Rocky knew that
a hung jury by a younger man would have hurt Cleo's pride. Rocky capitulat-
ed. "A lot of people were tired. It was hell, I respect my elders, I loved
them."' 9
Was the verdict "illogical" as Adler concludes? Suppose a jury of nine
lawyers and economists, all experienced in antitrust, were convened for the
Brooke Group case. Would we get a reasoned and "logical" verdict? Would
we get a more rational deliberation? No, we would probably get wild argu-
ment and a hung jury.
There are three distinct positions on the role of antitrust. First, there are
populists like Cleo who are suspicious of corporate size and assume evil intent
from every medium to large firm.' The fight song is attack 'em, break 'em
up. Then there are people like Rocky, from the Chicago School of Economics,
who argue that the market will cure most defaults and that antitrust is a last
resort in only the most blatant cases.6 In between are the moderates, who
tolerate some imperfections and rely on antitrust to promote workable compe-
tition.62 Like the jury, each group has its biases and filters out antagonistic
static from rival camps. The difference is that Rocky compromised. Econo-
mists and lawyers, on the other hand, have never agreed on anything.63
55. Id.
56. ADLER, supra note 2, at 137.
57. See NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 18.09 (Elissa
Krauss & Beth Bonora eds., 2d ed. 1983) ("Particularly in long trials, jurors tend to see
themselves as families. The social leaders in a jury often feel that the family harmony must be
maintained at all costs, so they jump right into the negotiator role.").
58. Interview with Rocky Phillips, jury member, in Durham, N.C. (July 8, 1990).
59. Id.
60. The Sherman Act and state antitrust laws were inspired by populist aspirations. "The
Populist's bugles called for a Pickett's charge on Wall Street." Will Wilson, The State Antitrust
Laws, 47 A.B.A. J. 160, 160 (1961). Populism endures in the anti-corporate activities of people
like Ralph Nader. See Paul Reidinger, Separating Powers, Nominating Judges, 75 A.B.A. J. 60,
60 (1989) ("Public Citizen means Ralph Nader-and that means populist rhetoric tending toward
the left and an ongoing legal guerilla war against various establishment enemies.").
61. The Chicago School of Economics teaches that in enforcing the antitrust laws, the first
priority is efficiency, not "legal rules designed to move the economy closer to a model of atomis-
tic competition ...." Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696,
1698 (1986); see also Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925 (1979) (discussing the development of the Chicago School of antitrust analysis, and the
erosion of the distinction between the Chicago and Harvard positions on antitrust policy).
62. For a description of workable competition see CARL KAYsEN & DONALD F. TURNER,
ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1965).
63. Both Rocky and Cleo would have a problem with an economist who says, "You can't
argue about what's inside my black box (i.e. economic model) because I made it. The God's truth
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In fact, Rocky and Cleo may have anticipated the Supreme Court's rea-
soning on appeal. After positing that a "reasonable jury" is presumed to know
the law, the facts of the case, and the "realities of the market," the Supreme
Court concluded that since the plaintiff could not prove that B&W had a "rea-
sonable prospect" at.recoupment, the case should not have been submitted to a
jury.64 Rocky, in his own Mayberry style, said the same thing. He discounted
the significance of the planning document and the relevance of intent, stating,
"I used common sense ... [they were] competing . . . [everyone] wants to get
all the business."65 Moreover, like the Supreme Court, Rocky said the case
did not belong in court-he felt it belonged in the competitive arena of a su-
permarket.'
In a sharp criticism of the majority, Justice Stevens, writing for the dis-
sent,67 vindicated Cleo's reliance on the planning documents, explaining that
"the jury would surely be entitled to infer that B&W's predatory plan, in
which it invested millions of dollars for the purpose of achieving admittedly
anticompetitive results, carried a 'reasonable possibility' of injuring competi-
tion.""
In other words, the jury system, at least in antitrust, is not as faulty as
Adler suggests. Instead, the problem stems from the Supreme Court's inability
to compose a consistent, rational, and workable antitrust policy to guide law-
yers and jurors. Comparable to the evolutionary process of a constitutional
provision,' the antitrust laws were supposed to produce a series of decisions
charting a vision for an efficient and productive competitive system. The fail-
ure of the Court to achieve this objective is confirmed by the string of anti-
trust decisions that have left a blurred vision of contradiction, confusion, and
waffling ideology.7"
isn't in the black box, I am the God's truth." But Ceteris Are Never Paribus, FORBES, Dec. 15,
1974, at 22, 23 (remark attributed to an economist).
64. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2598
(1993).
65. Interview with Rocky Phillips, jury member, in Durham, N.C. (July 8, 1990).
66. Id.
67. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2604 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained that
contrary to the judgment of the jury, the majority's "conclusion rests on a hodgepodge of legal,
factual, and economic propositions that are insufficient, alone or together, to overcome the jury's
assessment of the evidence." Id.
68. Id. at 2606.
69. The Supreme Court has said that the antitrust laws possess a "generality and adaptability
comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions." Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United
States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936).
70. One court noted:
[A] District Judge knows that he cannot give any authoritative reconciliation of opinions
rendered by appellate courts. And [in connection with the Sherman Act], it is delusive to
treat opinions written by different judges at different times as pieces of a jigsaw puzzle
which can be, by effort, fitted correctly into a single pattern.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
Professor Arthur analogizes Supreme Court antitrust opinions to the split personality hero-
ine in Thigpen and Cleckley's book the three faces of Eve. He concludes that the Court wears
three faces: sometimes it follows precedent, sometimes it follows economic theory, and sometimes
it engages in "policymaking." Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the
Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263, 309-10 (1986).
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Jurors cannot be expected to cope with the blurred vision of antitrust.
When the Supreme Court reforms antitrust law by drafting consistent opinions
aimed at the real world of the market place, jurors, business people, and law-
yers will be able to speak the same language."1
Despite the serious failures flushed out in his case studies, Adler endorses
the jury as necessary to sustain the nation's "democratic vision.' 72 He con-
cludes, "[t]here's disorder in the court but not despair."" His solution is to
"empower" jurors by giving them the opportunity for greater participation;
they should be allowed to take notes, ask questions, and be given pre-trial
instructions followed by periodic mini-instructions.74
Adler's proposed remedies, however, are in no way unique.75 Critics
have long recognized the defects that result from the one-sided linear flow of
information directed to passive jurors.76 An increasing number of courts now
allow note taking,77 and others even permit questions from jurors. 6 Addi-
tionally, many lawyers and judges now use readability experts79 in order to
help jurors comprehend the jury instructions. Finally, all parties give high
priority to improving the management of exhibits and witnesses."
71. Brooke Group continues the Court's "blurred vision." Professor Calkins calls it "a chal-
lenge to interpret .... Calkins, supra note 19, at 378. Participants in a symposium on the deci-
sion:
differ[ed] not only in their views on the likely impact of Brooke Group on future preda-
tory pricing claims, but also on the opinion's possible implications for broader antitrust
issues, such as the ascendancy of post-Chicago economics and the relative roles of the
judge and jury in dealing with economic issues in antitrust litigation.
Fenton, supra note 19, at 538.
72. ADLER, supra note 2, at 242.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 226-40.
75. See H. Lee Sarokin & G. Thomas Munsterman, Recent Innovations in Civil Jury Trial
Procedures, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 378 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
76. See, e.g., Arthur D. Austin, Why Jurors Don't Heed the Trial, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12,
1985, at 15 (discussing possible reforms of the jury system aimed at making the juror a more ac-
tive, and thus, more informed, participant); Robert F. Forston, Sense and Non-sense: Jury Trial
Communication, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 601 (presenting two empirical studies illustrating jury con-
fusion and suggesting areas in which communication could be improved); William W. Schwarzer,
Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CAL. L. REV. 731 (1981) (proposing a
variety of ways to improve jury instructions).
77. Arthur D. Austin, Research Supports Note-Taking by Jurors, CLEV. B.J., Dec. 1984, at
46; David Ranii, Judges Push Increased Jury Role, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 16, 1982, at 1.
78. Several federal judges who have allowed juror questions indicate that the main problems
are controlling the substance of the questions and filtering out irrelevant inquiries. Second Annual
Alvin B. Rubin Federal Law Symposium, The Role of the Jury in Modern Litigation, New Or-
leans, La., Feb. 1, 1994.
79. One of the more promising techniques for improving readability is psycholinguistics,
which identifies linguistic factors that cause comprehension difficulties. See Robert P. Charrow &
Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury In-
structions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979).
80. One of the most successful exhibits I have encountered was a flow chart developed by
the plaintiffs in the New Mexico litigation. The exhibit charted what the plaintiff intended to cover
each day. As the days went by, the jurors could see where they had been and where they were
going. A juror told me, "[ilt was one heck of tool that got everything together." Arthur Austin,
What Jurors Like-And Dislike About Exhibits, in PRODUCTS LIABILITY: COMMENTARY & CASES
8-9 (May, 1986).
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Despite these efforts, serious problems of comprehension persist. The
reason is obvious--complex litigation is complex. And it is complex for every-
one involved."' The only question is whether we can tolerate comprehension
problems as the price for maintaining jury participation in resolving conflicts.
I agree with Adler that it is a price we must pay. Moreover, with continued
fine-tuning of trial management, the price can be reduced. Two of Adler's
suggestions could have a positive impact: (1) no jury service exemptions for
individuals such as professionals who can best handle complicated testimony;
and (2) the elimination of peremptory challenges."2
Adler can be faulted, however, for not giving more attention to the differ-
ences between the problems confronting civil and criminal juries. Civil juries
are challenged by problems that can be moderated. Moreover, the legal system
could tolerate the elimination of the civil jury in complex litigation cases. 3
Criminal juries, however, whose elimination could not be tolerated, are under
siege by destructive pressures. The threat comes from the cumulative effects
of events and institutional changes that embarrass, trivialize, and subvert the
ability of the jury to produce results consistent with its symbolic function.
II. THE CRIMINAL JURY IN THE NEW MEDIA CULTURE OF DEVIANCY
The O.J. Simpson case was a historical event in criminal law, comparable
to the Leopold and Loeb case. 4 The difference is that the Leopold and Loeb
case was a singular event. California v. Simpson, on the other hand, was the
showcase in an unprecedented cluster of bizarre trials. The "cluster cases," that
include the trials of Bernhard Goetz, William Kennedy Smith, Lorena Bobbitt,
Rodney King, the Reginald Denny assailants, Heidi Fleiss, and the Menendez
brothers, 5 involved the most volatile issues of the century: race, gender, poli-
81. Judges who lack an understanding of complicated material may "pass the buck and let a
jury decide." They "also may allow lawyers to offer evidence to juries in ways that can't help but
confuse." Junda Woo, New Guide for Judges Tries to Clarify Scientific Issues, WALL ST. J., Dec.
14, 1994, at B1. Private programs to educate federal judges to the subtleties of economics have
been attacked as efforts to promote biased perspectives. See Institute's Analysis of Privately Fund-
ed Judicial Seminars, LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Sept. 15, 1980, at 19.
82. ADLER, supra note 2, at 219-24.
83. Many firms avoid the challenge and cost of trying complex cases before a jury by in-
cluding clauses in agreements that require arbitration or mediation of disagreements by experts.
See BERTHOLD H. HOENIGER, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION HANDBOOK § 1.01 (1991).
Professor Calkins suggests that as a result of Brooke Group, "[slome judges may follow the
Court's lead and begin reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting jury verdicts with new
vigor." Calkins, supra note 19, at 393.
84. The Leopold and Loeb case involved two brilliant teenage students (from the Univer-
sities of Chicago and Michigan), who committed what they thought was the "perfect crime"
(murder), admittedly "for the sake of a thrill." ATrORNEY FOR THE DAMNED 16-88 (Arthur
Weinberg ed., 1957). Clarence Darrow defended them, arguing that they lacked the mental state
required to support a murder conviction. Id. The court sentenced them to life imprisonment. Id.
85. Trial conclusion dates: Bernhard Goetz, June 16, 1987 (conviction); William Kennedy
Smith, Dec. 11, 1991 (acquittal); Lorena Bobbitt, Jan. 21, 1994 (acquitted, temporarily insane);
Rodney King Number 1, Apr. 30, 1992 (four police officers acquitted); Rodney King Number 2,
Apr. 17, 1993 (United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal. 1993)) (conviction); Reginald
Denny assailants, Oct. 19, 1993 (attackers of Denny acquitted of serious charges); Heidi Fleiss,
Dec. 3, 1994 (convicted on three counts of pandering); Erik Menendez, Jan. 14, 1994 (mistrial);
Lyle Menendez, Jan. 29, 1994 (mistrial).
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tics, sexual abuse, urban violence, and police brutality. These "cluster cases"
were influential in shaping what I term the "new media." In turn, the "new
media" is playing a major role in subverting the symbolic value and effec-
tiveness of the criminal jury.
Before the new media, "snoots" 6 such as the New York Times, dominat-
ed criminal trial coverage. These "snoots" emphasized quality with the motto,
"All The News That's Fit to Print." Edward R. Murrow set a similar tone in
TV news journalism. Gossip was anathema while objectivity (albeit with a
liberal skew) was exulted. The "dirtballs" who operated across the tracks
thrived on sex and scandal, as tabloid competed with TV talk shows for the
trailerpark audience."
Then came CNN, followed by news with a soap opera spin. CNN rede-
fined and diverted the news "toward the specialized form of garbage collection
known as gossip.""s The networks responded with TV magazine programs,
thereby blurring the distinction between "hard" news, "soft" news, and gos-
sip.89 The "new media" finally crystallized when the Star ran its expose of
the Flowers-Clinton tapes.9' To the public, the alleged scandal was news, a
perception that forced the "snoots" into competition with the gossip indus-
try.9' Simultaneously, deviancy joined the new media-talk show hosts such
as Sally Jessy Raphael, Donahue, and Geraldo titillated their audiences with
topics like, "Mom's Ashamed of Stripper Daughters," "Gigolos," and "Women
Who Kill and Use Abuse as a Motive."92 By commingling the work of the
Times and The Enquirer,93 the O.J. case solidified the existence of the new
86. The "snoots" designates the traditional hard news press while "dirtballs" describes the
tabloids. Jon Katz, Getting Juiced, NEW YORK, Oct. 3, 1994, at 20.
87. A Geraldo producer, in describing the show's audience, stated, "[o]ut there ... people
live in trailers and work at the 7-Eleven, and they don't watch my shows for entertainment.
They're looking at their lives." Cherie Bums, Next on Geraldo, NEW YORK, Dec. 5, 1994, at 100,
108.
88. A.M. Rosenthal, On My Mind; Journalists As Performers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1995, at
A19; see also Dan Rather, Call It Courage: Act On Your Knowledge, Address Honoring Media
Reporter Edward R. Murrow Before the Radio and Television News Directors Association Annual
Convention (Sept. 29, 1993), in VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Nov. 15, 1993, at 78, 80 (com-
plaining that "they've got us putting more and more fuzz and wuzz on the air, cop-shop stuff, so
as to compete not with other news programs but with entertainment programs (including those
posing as news programs) for dead bodies, mayhem, and lurid tales").
89. With the emergence of generation X, the blurring between "hard news" (reality) and
MTV (deconstruction) will get worse. Gen-Xers, the core audience of MTV, are being conditioned
by "Liquid Television ... a whole new cartoon anesthetic. Gone are linear story lines or, for that
matter, narrative structure. The operative style is anarchy, a barrage of chaotic, disconnected im-
ages for a generation raised on equally chaotic videogames (and ready to zap the instant an image
begins to bore)." Harry F. Waters & Trent Gegax, Beyond Beavis and Butt-Head, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 19, 1994, at 74, 75.
90. Marion Collins, My 12-Year Affair with Bill Clinton, STAR, Feb. 4, 1992, at 24.
91. The N.Y. Times reported, "Gov. Bill Clinton of Arkansas today denounced as 'not true' a
second wave of accusations of marital infidelity published by the tabloid newspaper Star." Clinton
Denounces New Report of Affair, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1992, at A14.
92. Titles of Sally Jessy Raphael, Donahue, and Geraldo talk shows listed in USA Today.
USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 1994, at 8D; USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 1994, at 8D.
93. Writing about The Enquirer, a New York Times reporter stated, "[iln a story made for the
tabloids, it stands head and shoulders above them all for aggressiveness and accuracy." David
Margolick, The Enquirer: Required Reading in Simpson Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1994, at A12.
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media,94  and consequently, "after years of hostility, the snoots and
dirtballs ... [took] notes side by side in the L.A. courtroom." 5
The subversive effects of the new media on the jury are cumulative; it
starts with lawyer "expert" commentators trivializing the jury process. With "a
full menu of experts, pontificators and secondguessers,"96 the new media has
turned trials into soap operas. The president of the American Bar Association
criticized these legal experts, calling them "$2 hookers" who "pimp their
dubious talents and hustle the public" with their observations.97 Invariably,
the "expert" commentary focuses on jury selection or juror reaction, as was
often the case in the Menendez trial. One lawyer, who refuses to do commen-
tary because of the- overreaching and second-guessing, explained, "[y]ou're
forced to fill up dead time and what you end up doing is babbling. And when
you don't know the answer to a question, you can't say, 'I don't know the an-
swer,' because you look like an idiot."'9 The theme that emerges is that ju-
rors are sitting ducks for various psychological ploys.
An even more influential player in the media blitz is the jury consul-
tant." While the lawyer commentator uses intuition and experience, the con-
sultant impresses the new media audience with the psychobabble of the social
scientist. They analyze body language, facial expressions, and clothes, as clues
to juror bias."°° The buzzword is demographics. According to jury consul-
tants, a jury's demographics-race, age, gender, ethnicity, education, etc.-will
often determine the verdict.''
Another favorite tool of the jury consultant is the "shadow jury," a group
of mock "jurors" who are fed the highlights of a case and then asked to
94. "[T]he tide is running in the direction of lowest-common-denominator journalism, and
that is very sad." Elizabeth Gleick, Leader of the Pack; The National Enquirer's Aggressive OJ.
Simpson Coverage Raises Legal and Ethical Questions, TIME, Jan. 9, 1995, at 62, 62 (quoting
Marvin Kalb, director of the Shorenstein Center on Press and Politics at Harvard University).
95. Katz, supra note 86, at 20.
96. David Margolick, New Television Stars in the O.J. Simpson Case Galaxy: The Lawyer-
Commentators, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1994, at A32.
97. Gail D. Cox, Bushnell: O.J. Commentators are '$2 Hookers', NAT'L L.J., June 12, 1995,
at A4.
98. Id.
99. Litigators, who are by nature insecure, will use anything that the client will subsidize. A
veteran litigator told me, "I hire them to cover my ass. If I lost the case without them my client
would give me hell. Besides, they are good for laughs." Arthur D. Austin, The Jury System as a
Bat, CLEV. DAILY LEGAL NEWS, July 16, 1994, at 1.
100. Counsel should also pay attention to purses; a woman clutching her purse under her arm
indicates "habits born of suspicion, nervousness, unsafe neighborhoods, feeling old and vul-
nerable." SONYA HAMLIN, WHAT MAKES JURIES LISTEN 73 (1985); see also NATIONAL JURY
PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES, supra note 57, § 18.08 (discussing observations
of nonverbal communication in the courtroom); V. HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY
SELECTION: AN ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO JURY LAW AND METHODS (2d ed. 1993) (discussing non-
verbal communication and its implications in the courtroom); DONALD E. VINSON, JURY TRIALS:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WINNING STRATEGY (1986) (discussing nonverbal communication and juror
assessment during voir dire).
101. See Barbara Franklin, Gender Myths Still Play a Role in Jury Selection, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
22, 1994, at Al, A25; Andrea Gerlin, Jury Pickers Rely Too Much on Demographics, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 16, 1994, at BI.
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"deliberate."'".2 Lawyers use insights from the mock deliberations to identify
problem areas and supply clues on jury selection." 3
The consultants produce marketable new media copy. For example, audi-
ences savored authoritative speculation by experts on the reactions of the
Simpson jury-composed of eight women (who supposedly could identify
with Nicole) and eight African-Americans (who supposedly would favor
O.J.).04 Ratings are assured from conducting shadow juries on TV, as was
done in the Simpson case." 5
While these gimmicks help ratings, they poison the legal process by dehu-
manizing jurors. The new media informs its audience, people likely to serve as
jurors, that a juror is the target of manipulation, vulnerable to sophisticated
techniques that can deduce the juror's deepest thoughts by reference to seem-
ingly innocuous behavior like glancing at the ceiling.'" Prospective jurors
now know they are under the consultant's microscope.' 7 Thus, within a
short period of time, jury consultants, with the help of the media, have trans-
formed jurors from factfinders into, as Adler says, disillusioned puppets."°
The consulting industry's use of race, however, has had an even more
divisive impact on the jury system. To consultants, race is an inevitable pre-
dictor, achieving a "privileged status in popular accounts of why verdicts turn
out as they do . '. ..""As a result, this notion of race as an inevitable pre-
dictor, once considered a myth, is rapidly becoming a reality.
Despite the new media's spin, however, the infallibility of scientific jury
selection remains a myth. The most obvious problem is what Professor
Abramson calls "fluid group dynamics," in which group interaction, personali-
ty collision, or other static, make it impossible to predict verdicts."0 My re-
search supports his point. For example, how could a consultant predict the
shift that occurred in the Brooke Group trial when the alternates were allowed
to participate in the deliberations?." Additionally, since there are no certifi-
102. For a more detailed discussion of shadow juries, see Jeremy W. Barber, Note, The Jury
Is Still Out: The Role of Jury Science in the Modern American Courtroom, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
1225, 1238-39 (1994).
103. See id.
104. Sally A. Stewart, Simpson Trial Jury Selection Aids Both Sides, USA TODAY, Nov. 4,
1994, at 8A.
105. In commenting on the Simpson shadow jury, USA Today reported, ','[t]he jury, drawn
from the audience, was presented with a taped rundown of the crime and evidence already made
public. They also heard from a detective, a defense lawyer, and experts on spousal abuse and
racial aspects of the case. Guests from two tabloids also furnished information." Mock Jury: OJ.
'Not Guilty', USA TODAY, Sept. 8, 1994, at 10A.
106. It is, according to Hamlin, "a sign of thinking, searching the brain for a deeper truth."
HAMLIN, supra note 100, at 75. However, my interviews indicate that when a juror is looking up
at the ceiling it is a sure sign of boredom-the juror is probably counting light bulbs or paneling.
107. Larry Glenn, Under Analysis: What Are We Doing to Our Jurors?, CLEV. DAILY LEGAL
NEWS, Oct. 25, 1994, at 1. He says that "[slome prospective jurors may dress or act in a way
designed to achieve a desired result-inclusion or exclusion on the jury." Id.
108. ADLER, supra note 2, at 114. Adler also surmises that "many well-qualified individuals
become disappointed in a system that, despite its promise of inclusion, rejects them as jurors pre-
cisely because they would be fair and thoughtful decision makers." Id.
109. ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 144.
110. Id. at 171.
111. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. Another example of "fluid dynamics"
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cation barriers, regulations, or codes of ethics covering the field,"2 even a
cabbie" '3 or a former juror can be an expert."4 Nevertheless, the infallibili-
ty myth continues to permeate the new media and is "responsible for a declin-
ing faith in the jury and the rise of cynicism about the possibility of achieving
justice across group lines.""' 5
Juror ego and greed also impugn the system. It is "the juror as celebrity,"
conducting press interviews, selling personal accounts of deliberation, and
appearing on Oprah and Donahue." 6 Jurors are no match for people who are
after stories of confrontation and titillating gossip. Much of what comes out is
self-serving and petty." 7 What kind of impression does the public get when
jurors who supported the Menendez brothers appear for press interviews at
Erik's attorney's home as part of a second trial strategy?" 8 When it comes
to celebrity juror exploitation, however, no one can top Geraldo. His most re-
cent coup involved squeezing out an admission by the Heidi Fleiss foreman
that she compromised on the verdict without knowing that Fleiss would re-
ceive a three-year sentence. She then alleged that the verdict was defective
because "some jurors agreed to charges that ignored the evidence.""' 9 The
USA Today headline read, "Fleiss Jurors' Loose Lips Could Sink Convic-
tion." 1
20
occurred in the first Cleveland trial. The jury was composed of people who were expected to favor
the city utility (plaintiff) against the larger private utility (defendant). They were blue collar, work-
ing class people, several of whom were retired and living on fixed incomes. During the trial they
were openly receptive to plaintiff's lawyers and witnesses and equally disdainful of the defense.
The unanticipated occurred when the only person with previous jury experience was not
elected foreman as she expected; instead the position went to a younger (26 years old) woman
who got the job because she sat in the "first chair" throughout the trial. From the first discussion,
the older woman resisted the authoritarian style of the young foreman, leading to a bitter personal-
ity clash. After 13 days of wrangling, the judge declared a mistrial. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LrrIGA-
TION, supra note 8, at 39-42.
112. Helen Lucaitis, Use of Jury Consultants Increasing, but Many Lawyers Prefer Old-Fash-
ioned Instinct, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 29, 1992, at 3; see also Robert Gordon, Setting Parame-
ters for Trial Science, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 6, 1995, at 34 (proposing a list of ethical standards for
trial scientists).
113. Lucaitis, supra note 112, at 3.
114. George Gombossy, Ex-Juror Retained As Trial Consultant, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 30, 1985 -
Jan. 6, 1986, at 3, 3.
115. ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 146.
116. For example, a juror from the John Hinckley trial said, "I did just about every radio
show there is. I didn't know there were so many of them." Bennett H. Beach, The Juror As Celeb-
rity, TIME, Aug. 16, 1982, at 42, 42.
117. Wade Lambert, After the Verdict: Will Juror Interviews Skew the Deliberations in Future
Trials?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1993, at BI.
118. One Mendendez attorney organized a media event:
Barely pausing for breath after the six-month case ended in a mistrial with deadlocked
jurors, lawyer, Leslie Abramson, has arranged for what she calls 'my jurors' to dine in
her home, speak on the phone to her client ... and give reporters striking accounts of
their deliberations and of their support for her client.
Seth Mydans, Menendez Lawyer Enlists Sympathetic Jurors to Defend Client, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1994, at A10.
119. Jill Smolowe, A High Price to Pay, TIME, Dec. 19, 1994, at 59, 59.
120. Haya El Nasser, Fleiss Jurors' Loose Lips Could Sink Conviction, USA TODAY, Dec. 13,
1994, at 3A.
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An even more trivializing consequence results when a juror plays huckster
and sells his "inside" version of deliberation to the highest bidder.'2' While
books get big advances,'22 tabloids often provide the quickest source of in-
come.'23 Juror hucksterism can make even used car salesmen look good. The
National Law Journal recently reported a case in which, "[a]fter a three-month
trial, and while the jury was in its 12th day of deliberation, Nina Krauss, the
forewoman of the jury, sought to sell her diary to the highest newspaper bid-
der in town."' 24 The O.J. trial is the obvious paradigm for juror capitalism,
with allegations that three jurors were dismissed on suspicion that they were
writing books about the case.'25 One of these jurors, Michael Knox, was dis-
charged from the jury in March and produced a book that went on the market
in June.'26
The juror as celebrity or huckster has serious implications. Professor
Hazard argues that going public encourages second-guessing) 27 Other con-
cers include: (1) the fear that public disclosure could inhibit free discussions
in deliberation; 28 (2) the potential manipulation of the jury to reach a mar-
ketable and dramatic verdict; 29 and (3) the fear that jurors will "audition"
during jury selection in order to get on the jury and make money. 3 But the
most serious damage to the criminal jury system comes from the emerging
public impression of the jury as a soap opera, in which the public equates the
jurors with the other dysfunctional guests that travel the new media circuit.
121. Kenneth Jost, The Dawn of Big-Bucks Juror Journalism, LEGAL TIMES, July 20, 1987, at
15.
122. A juror in the Westmoreland case got a $15,000 advance. Id. Other juror books include:
MARK LESLY & CHARLES SHIJTTLEWORTH, SUBWAY GUNMAN: A JUROR'S ACCOUNT OF THE
BERNHARD GOETZ TRIAL (1988); M. PATRICIA ROTH, THE JUROR AND THE GENERAL (1986) (dis-
cussing Westmoreland v. C.B.S.); JAMES SHANNON, TEXACO AND THE $10 BILLION JURY (1988)
(discussing Penzoil v. Texaco).
123. Another juror in the Goetz case got $2500 for a front page article in The Daily News.
See Michael Freitag, In the Right Case, Jury Duty Can Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1987, at E9.
124. Marcia Chambers, Little Room on Juries for Profit Motive, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 25, 1988, at
13. Then there is Wayne Gaston, who served on the Chambers jury. His pitch had an "extra sell-
ing point: for the price of the diary, he'll throw in a song he wrote about the trial. 'It's kind of a
folk song,' he said, refusing to disclose the title or lyrics without the promise of payment." Shaun
Assael, No Bidders for Diary of Chambers Juror, MANHATTAN LAW., April 5-11, 1988, at 7. For
a more elaborate discussion of jurors as authors, see Marcy Strauss, Juror Journalism, 12 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 389 (1994).
125. See Tony Mauro, Simpson Jurors: Not by the Book, USA TODAY, May 31, 1995, at 2A.
126. MICHAEL KNOX & MICHAEL WALKER, THE PRIVATE DIARY OF AN O.J. JUROR (1995).
Knox stated that he was dismissed for failing to report that he had once been charged with kid-
napping. Id. at 241. He also noted that on the day he got home from the jury he "had spoken
directly to Ted Koppel, Katie Couric, Connie Chung, and producers for God knows how many
other famous TV and radio shows. Katie Couric insisted on giving me her home phone number."
Id. at 248. Knox then stated, "when I finally walked outside my house, there must have been
about thirty-five reporters and TV cameramen. It was unbelievable. They were all trying to talk to
me, to get an interview." Id.
127. See Beach, supra note 116, at 43 (noting that juror hucksterism "invites a case to be
tried once in the courtroom and once in public").
128. See Assael, supra note 124, at 14; Jost, supra note 121, at 15; Lambert, supra note 117,
at B1.
129. Freitag notes that "a juror/author could be tempted to opt for a dramatic resolution be-
cause it might draw attention." Freitag, supra note 123, at E9 (attributing this view to Professor
George Fletcher of Columbia Law School).
130. See id. (attributing this view to Professor Hans Zeisel of the University of Chicago).
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III. CONCLUSION
Compared to the criminal jury, the civil jury has only modest problems.
With attention and continued work, it will survive. The criminal jury, howev-
er, is teetering on the brink of illegitimacy. It can be argued that the "cluster
cases," capped by the O.J. Simpson case, are aberrations whose effects and
influences will never trickle down to the everyday case and in time will be
footnotes of history-like the Loeb and Leopold drama. However, in the tab-
loid age of the new media, it is quite possible that these aberrational cases will
become the norm. Moreover, an additional tension will likely exacerbate and
universalize the problems discussed above.
The jury is a prisoner of the prevailing culture of redefined deviancy.
Deviant behavior is now "normal,"' 3 ' and normal is now "deviant."'32 A
forceful contributor to the deviancy culture is new media TV. As one profes-
sor has noted, "[t]elevision emphasizes the deviant so that it becomes normal.
If you really are normal, no one cares."'33 Our culture has been transformed
131. Senator Patrick Moynihan has noted that
the amount of deviant behavior in American society has increased beyond the levels the
community can 'afford to recognize' and that, accordingly, we have been re-defining
deviancy so as to exempt much conduct previously stigmatized, and also quietly raising
the 'normal' level in categories where behavior is now abnormal by any earlier standard.
Daniel P. Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, 62 AM. SCHOLAR 17, 19 (1993).
132. Charles Krauthammer, in discussing Senator Moynihan's comments about deviancy in
society, comments:
Moynihan is right. But it is only half the story. There is a complementary social phe-
nomenon that goes with defining deviancy down. As part of the vast social project of
moral leveling, it is not enough for the deviant to be normalized. The normal must be
found to be deviant. Therefore, while for the criminals and the crazies deviancy has been
defined down (the bar defining normality has been lowered), for the ordinary bourgeois
deviancy has been defined up (the bar defining normality has been raised).
Charles Krauthammer, Defining Deviancy Up, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 22, 1993, at 20.
133. Shari Roan, Next! When Abnormal Becomes Normal, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1994, at El
(quoting Penn State Professor Vicki Abt). This sentiment is echoed by John Leo:
The daily parade of bizarre creatures on 'Oprah' and 'Geraldo' has a long-term effect.
It erases judgment and induces a generic tolerance for any kind of dysfunctional behav-
ior. Weirdness goes mainstream every afternoon. In highly publicized trials now, the de-
fense attorney has the same function as 'Oprah'-to create and enlarge pools of sympa-
thy for the beleaguered and allegedly victimized underdog.
John Leo, Watching 'As the Jury Turns Turns', U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 14, 1994, at 17.
Comparing Oprah and 60 Minutes, two sociologists observed:
Despite differences, it is no accident that both shows are exposes. Inexorably, they focus
on the pathological and bizarre. One can only imagine what this constant attention to the
fringes of society, to those who break rules, is doing to our society's ability to define
and constrain deviance. One thing seems fairly certain: law abiding, privacy-loving,
ordinary people who have had reasonably happy childhoods and are satisfied with their
lives, probably won't get to tell their stories to Phil, Sally, or Oprah. But if they did get
on a television talk show, they would have to highlight the problematic aspects of their
lives. Television talk shows are not interested in adequately reflecting or representing
social reality, but in highlighting and trivializing its underside for fun and profit.
Vicki Abt & Mel Seesholtz, The Shameless World of Phil, Sally and Oprah: Television Talk
Shows and the Deconstructing of Society, J. OF POPULAR CULTURE 171, 187 (1994).
Alan Dershowitz says, "Ujurors who watch this stuff begin to believe it, despite its status
as junk science." ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE 5 (1994).
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into a politically correct vision of a "postmodern phenomenon," leveling hier-
archies to the point where Doonesberry is equated with William Faulkner.'34
The themes are oppression, victimization, and dysfunction.'35 These themes
combine to produce 'rights inflation,' which sociologist Amital Etzioni attrib-
utes to the "rights industry"; namely, "that whole railing mass of lawyers,
lobbyists, and special interest groups who swarm over courts and legislatures
with their grievances and demands for recognition of an astonishing array of
new rights ... ."36
A culture of deviancy impacts on the criminal justice system by challeng-
ing jurors to factor in bizarre victimization defenses, either explicitly, or as
part of other defenses such as temporary insanity.'37 As one author notes,
"[r]iot used to be an offense. Now it's a defense."'38 Alan Dershowitz, who
compiled a "Glossary of Abuse Excuses,"' 39 concludes that more and more
defense lawyers are employing abuse excuses, and more and more jurors are
buying them." The Lorena Bobbitt, Reginald Denny, and Menendez juries
are perfect examples. Jurors, in ever increasing numbers, are being asked to
forsake their role as fact-finder to play social worker. Consequently, so long as
the new media, particularly television, continues to redefine deviancy, we will
continue to get more Bobbitt, Denny, and Menendez juries, and we will con-
tinue to get this nullification barrier to reasoned justice at every level of the
system.
For a description of what a Geraldo producer looks for in guests, see Bums, supra note 87,
at 100. "It's not enough to have a husband and the wife he cheated on.... You've got to have
the mistress, maybe her boyfriend. You take things as far as they'll go." Id. at 103.
Perhaps the ultimate in deviancy occurred when a guest on the Jenny Jones show thought
that he was to meet a female secret admirer and was confronted with a male admirer. Several days
later he shot and killed his admirer. Columbia University professor Stephen lsaacs, in discussing
the incident, noted, "[w]hat this says is that the media chaos is now total and that the
sleazification that has been sweeping the land and the media for the last half dozen years produces
bizarre events that no one could possibly imagine." Peter Johnson, Guest's Death Leaves Talk
Show World Abuzz, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 1995, at A30.
134. See STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES OF
THE CONTEMPORARY (1989); JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A RE-
PORT ON KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984).
135. Sykes cites an expert who "insists that as many as 96 percent of American families are
dysfunctional in one way or another." CHARLES J. SYKES, A NATION OF VICTIMS: THE DECAY OF
THE AMERICAN CHARACTER 142 (1992).
136. John Taylor, Don't Blame Me!: The New Culture of Victimization, NEW YORK, June 3,
1991, at 26, 29.
137. They are headlined in new media vehicles like USA Today. See, e.g., Robert Davis, We
Live In Age of Exotic Defenses, USA TODAY, Nov. 22, 1994, at IA; Tony Mauro, Abuse as An
Excuse Raises Public Outcry, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 1994, at IA.
138. Paul Robinson, Riot Responsibility, 66 N.Y. ST. B.J. 6, 6 (1994); see Note, Feasibility
and Admissibility of Mob Mentality Defenses, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1111 (1995).
139. It includes Antisocial Personality Disorder, Attention Deficit Disorder, Black Rage De-
fense, Chronic Lateness Syndrome, Nice-Lady Syndrome, Rock and Roll Defense, and UFO
Survivor Syndrome. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 133, at 321-41.




TOWARD A SPEAKER-ORIENTED THEORY
ELIOT F. KRIEGER*
INTRODUCTION
This article argues for a very simple point: When analyzing what consti-
tutes protected expression, the only approach that is philosophically coherent is
one that looks to the speaker, not the listener. Although this may seem too
obvious to be disputed, many theorists and many Supreme Court opinions, ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly, assume that in determining the criteria for protect-
ed expression the speaker's perspective is irrelevant and the listener's perspec-
tive is pivotal. I will use a Wittgensteinian analysis to show the incoherence of
a listener-focused theory for the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech
Clause.'
This listener-focused category of theory often hinges on what has been
termed the expression/conduct distinction.2 Although legal theorists have criti-
* Assistant U.S. Attorney, Central District of California. Former law clerk to the Honor-
able Stephen S. Trott, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; B.A., U.C.L.A., 1981; M.A.,
Ph.D. (Philosophy), Johns Hopkins University, 1986, 1988; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1991.
1. By "Wittgensteinian analysis," I mean that my critique of listener-focused theories relies
on the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Wittgenstein was born in Vienna, although he
spent most of the last 22 years of his life at Cambridge University in England. The primary con-
cern in his works is the nature of language and meaning. His two major works are Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus (completed in 1918) and Philosophical Investigations (published after his
death, Part I written between 1936-1945 and Part II written between 1947-1949). To a large ex-
tent, the Philosophical Investigations was an attack on Wittgenstein's own earlier theory set out in
the Tractatus. This article will only concern itself with the later Wittgenstein of Philosophical
Investigations. LUDWIG WITFGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1968).
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein rejects grand metaphysical theory-making. He
holds that philosophy cannot uncover Platonic truths (which he considers nonsense). Much of
Wittgenstein's work in Philosophical Investigations is a critique of the typical fallacies found in
theories about meaning and language. Among Wittgenstein's targets are those theories of meaning
that propose a private inner object in the mind, a popular concept for many philosophers.
The private inner object derives from the Cartesian impulse to separate the mind from the
body. It is called private because it can only be understood from the first-person perspective.
Some examples Wittgenstein discusses are mental images, pain, various emotional states, and
linguistic meaning.
In my discussion, infra, I show that courts and theorists who try to define protected ex-
pression often make fallacious assumptions positing private inner objects.
2. "Expression" is just that, protected expression. By "conduct," those who use the distinc-
tion refer to actions that are not expression, and are therefore outside the realm of protected
speech. For example, as I will discuss infra, Frederick Schauer argues that literature is protected
expression, but obscenity is not protected because it is closer to conduct than expression-there is
no attempt to communicate and create a "cognitive content in the listener." Instead, Schauer says
obscenity is more like physical conduct, its only point is to affect the audience physically. See
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cized simple versions of this distinction in the past,3 more sophisticated ver-
sions continue to be popular among scholars and in Supreme Court opinions.4
I will show that any such distinction, whether simple or ornately complex, is
in fact philosophical nonsense.
But exposing this distinction's incoherence leads to a serious dilemma: if
we abandon the expression/conduct distinction, we may also sacrifice a "re-
flective equilibrium"5 with our pre-theoretical thoughts on how to distinguish
protected from unprotected speech. I will argue, however, that moving the
emphasis from the listener to the speaker in First Amendment jurisprudence
results in a broader definition of "expression," thereby allowing other princi-
ples to limit the category of protected expression. In the last two sections of
this article, I will show how this theory ultimately yields a Kantian justifica-
tion as opposed to a utilitarian justification for protecting individuals' freedom
of conscience.
Jurists often invoke the expression/conduct distinction in obscenity and
nude dancing cases.6 Anti-pornography advocates also attempt to justify prohi-
discussion infra part I.
3. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-7, at 825-32 (2d
ed. 1988); Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21
UCLA. L. REV. 29, 38-57 (1973).
4. 1 will skip any exegesis on Supreme Court jurisprudence except to say that the Court, as
recently as 1991, utilized the expression/conduct distinction. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560 (1991) (addressing the issue of whether nude dancing deserved First Amendment protec-
tion); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408 (1989) (utilizing an "expression-action" dis-
tinction in ruling on the constitutionality of a Texas flag-burning statute).
In Barnes, Justice Scalia used the conduct/expression distinction to remove nude dancing
from the area of protected activity by declaring that the State was regulating conduct, not expres-
sion. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring). Even though Scalia was the only Justice to
explicitly apply the expression/conduct distinction, in fact, both Scalia and the plurality opinion
made similar assumptions. Instead of a straightforward conduct/expression distinction, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, made a conduct/message distinction. He assumed that the
conduct of the dance was distinguishable from the message of the dance. Nudity can be banned,
but expression is protected. See id. at 570-71. Although one may doubt the intellectual honesty of
this opinion, an underlying assumption in the decision is the separation of conduct and mes-
sage-or of conduct and expression. Though separate from Justice Scalia's expression/conduct dis-
tinction, it derives from the same dualistic metaphysical assumptions.
Some commentators have argued that to call nude dancing non-expressive is simply a fac-
tual error. See, e.g., Zachary T. Fardon, Recent Developments, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.: Nude
Dancing and the First Amendment Question, 45 VAND. L. REV. 237, 265-68 (1992). I will attack
these theories by arguing that to separate conduct and expression is to rely on an incoherent phi-
losophy of mind.
5. This term was first used by John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-51
(1971). A good definition appears in a later work:
Reflective equilibrium is a test that measures how well the view as a whole meshes with
and articulates our more firm considered convictions, at all levels of generality, after due
examination, once all adjustments and revisions that seem compelling have been made.
A doctrine that meets this criterion is the doctrine that, so far as we can now ascertain,
is the most reasonable for us.
John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 534 (1980).
6. I am not concerned with those theorists who justify the prohibition of pornography on
moral grounds. For example, one theory justifying censorship "relies on an analysis of the histori-
cal and structural roots of the first amendment, and finds that the amendment was never intended
to protect nonpolitical expression of any sort.... [This] theory fully and explicitly embraces the
morality principle ...." Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Por-
[Vol. 73:1
SPEAKER-ORIENTED EXPRESSION
bition of pornography on the grounds that it constitutes non-speech and there-
fore should not be protected speech.' The way "conduct" is defined as op-
posed to "expression" reveals the theory's implicit focus on the message
receiver's cognitive stimulation, as opposed to mere physical stimulation (in
conduct). I will show that this distinction assumes an incoherent philosophy of
mind.
I. METAPHYSICAL DUALISM IN FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
First Amendment jurisprudence has been dogged since its inception by a
definitional difficulty. The Constitution states, "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech," but what constitutes "speech?"' In
defining speech, the two possible focal points are the speaker and the audi-
ence. Some case law seems to focus on one, some on the other.9 I will argue
nography as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564, 1581 (1988). Interestingly, Robert Bork, an
adherent to this view, has stated that "constitutionally, art and pornography are on a par with
industry and smoke pollution." Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 29 (1971); see also Miller v. Civil City, 904 F.2d 1081, 1126 (7th Cir.
1990) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (stating that "[b]arroom displays are to ballet as white noise is
to music"), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). Both Easterbrook
and Bork reveal through their statements that, at bottom, they view such expression as basically
worthless, and therefore not worthy of protection.
7. There is a large amount of literature on this topic, and many distinguished scholars have
supported the expression/conduct distinction. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILO-
SOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); John M. Finnis, "Reason and Passion": The Constitutional Dialectic
of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 222 (1968); Frederick Schauer, Speech and
"Speech"--Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Lan-
guage, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979) [hereinafter Speech and Obscenity]; Cass R. Sunstein, Pornogra-
phy and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589. While Sunstein argues that the expres-
sion/conduct distinction should be used to justify the prohibition of pornography, Schauer claims
that the distinction, in fact, underlies the Supreme Court's decisions on obscenity. Id. at 627 n.88
(citing Schauer, Speech and Obscenity, supra, at 932).
As noted above, the Supreme Court has adopted some of this methodology. See Paris Adult
Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67-68 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973).
This article will not deal specifically with what constitutes obscenity. I will only be concerned
with arguments that claim obscenity is (or, for that matter, that pornography should be) outside the
realm of protected expression because it constitutes conduct rather than expression.
8. It has long been established, however, that "speech" includes non-verbal expression. See
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (declaring invalid statutes prohibiting display
of any flag, badge, banner, or device "as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized
government").
9. One can find both in Supreme Court cases. In First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978), for example, Justice White argued that the goal of the First Amendment is "self-realiza-
tion" and "communications emanating from individuals." Id. at 804 (White, J., dissenting). How-
ever, in Virginia St. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976), the Court held that society has a strong interest in the free flow of information, and that
the goal of the First Amendment is to enlighten public decision-making. Id. at 757; see also Bates
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (stating that the First Amendment creates reliable decision-
making).
Some cases acknowledge the importance of both perspectives. See, e.g., Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that the defendant's conduct, wearing a jacket bearing the words
"Fuck the draft," was protected by the First Amendment). In Cohen, the Court noted that one of
the goals of the First Amendment is "to produce a more capable citizenry." Id. at 24. This criteri-
on refers to the listeners of the communication. However, the Court also stated that the freedom
must "comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system
rests." Id. The second criterion focuses on the individual dignity given to the speakers of the com-
munication. See discussion, infra part VI.
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that there is a methodology at work here: those decisions that rely on the
expression/conduct distinction implicitly focus on the listener to determine
when an expression fails to comprise an "essential part of any exposition of
ideas."
This assumption is evident in the writings of Frederick Schauer.
Espousing a listener-focused theory, Schauer believes that "what the Court
really had in mind, or should have had in mind, [in its obscenity cases] is the
communication of a mental stimulus, an attempt by a speaker or writer or
artist to influence his audience in a particular fashion."" He argues that "the
refusal to treat pornography as speech is grounded in the assumption that the
prototypical pornographic item on closer analysis shares more of the character-
istics of sexual activity than of communicative process."'2 Schauer regards
pornography "as a purely physical, rather than a mental experience."' 3 This is
an experience of the listener. A great deal of Schauer's discussion concerns
the physical arousal of an audience. However, in some cases, such as with
D.H. Lawrence's banned novel, Lady Chatterley's Lover, First Amendment
protection is extended, according to Schauer, because "[tihe sexual stimu-
lus . . . is only a side effect."' 4
Schauer invokes the conduct/expression distinction to justify the prohibi-
tion of obscenity, claiming that because language can be used in non-commu-
nicative ways, not all that may seem to be speech actually is speech. He notes,
"[t]here are as many different meanings as there are different uses."' 5 Ulti-
mately, Schauer posits that sexually explicit expression is equivalent to con-
duct such as murder or rape and does not constitute a form of speech.'6 To
assume that obscenity is speech just because our ordinary conception of
speech may encompass it, Schauer argues, is to grant speech too broad a
10. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)). An expression/conduct theory must be audience-focused because to
focus on the speaker would mean granting the status of protected expression to every action that is
intended by the speaker to be an expression. The expression/conduct distinction, by its very na-
ture, claims that some intended expressions are, in fact, not expressions, but conduct, and that
determination is made by looking not to the speaker's intentions, but to the audience.
11. Schauer, Speech and Obscenity, supra note 7, at 921.
12. Id. at 922.
13. Id. at 923.
14. Id. at 925. Steven Gey correctly notes that this admission indicates the weakness of
Schauer's theory. See Gey, supra note 6, at 1594-95 n.141. Gey asks, "[clould it not be argued
that since its publication the book has made a much larger splash as a sexual stimulus than as a
piece of literature?" Id. This might argue for censorship. Gey is correct in pointing out this weak-
ness, but these are not the grounds upon which I will criticize Schauer's theory. Instead, I will
attack Schauer on the ground that he posits an incoherent philosophy of mind, focusing on the
listener instead of the speaker's intention to communicate.
15. Schauer, Speech and Obscenity, supra note 7, at 908.
16. See id. at 903.
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definition. 7 The Supreme Court, in employing the expression/conduct distinc-
tion, appears to be making the same assumptions. 8
In fact, this expression/conduct distinction provides a convenient formula
for demarcating an area of protection for the First Amendment. Schauer de-
fines expression as activity that produces a "cognitive content" in the listen-
er. "'9 According to Schauer, it is this activity that must be protected.2" He
makes cognitive content, as opposed to conduct, the distinguishing feature of
protected expression. If it is speech, then it is something that stimulates cogni-
tive content in the listener rather than, say, a purely physical reaction. Schauer
is correct in noting that if one is going to use the expression/conduct distinc-
tion, one necessarily must assume the existence of this cognitive content for
protected speech. However, as I will show, the notion of cognitive content is
meaningless, and despite Schauer's claims to the contrary, is explicitly anti-
Wittgensteinian.2'
Cass Sunstein takes a position similar to Schauer's, arguing that "[tihe
term 'cognitive' has a philosophical meaning restricting it to the propositional
and distinguishing it from the emotive .... To react cognitively is to react
mentally."22 Although Sunstein claims that his view is not purely Cartesian,
he argues that for First Amendment jurisprudence it is necessary to maintain
the distinction between the cognitive and the non-cognitive." Like Schauer,
Sunstein uses an inner cognitive content to define what constitutes speech.
Obviously, not all action is speech. The trick for any theorist is to deter-
mine what constitutes speech without crossing the line leading to an incoherent
philosophy of mind. Sunstein complains that without a distinction between
speech and non-speech, it is impossible "to identify the distinctive characteris-
17. See id. Steven Gey criticizes Schauer:
This deft sleight of hand owes more to Humpty Dumpty than to Wittgenstein: the word
"speech" means just what Schauer chooses it to mean-neither more nor less. Schauer
does not challenge the notion of objective meaning, as did Wittgenstein, rather, Schauer
seeks to interpret the word "speech" in the context of the first amendment by replacing
one objective meaning-that of ordinary usage-with another--communication with
cognitive content.
Gey, supra note 6, at 1590. Gey's point is well taken and correct. However, the problem is more
complex than he realizes. The problem is not merely that Schauer replaces one definition with an-
other. Schauer, in fact, makes several mistakes that are common parts of any expression/conduct
theory.
18. As Schauer notes, "[i]mplicit in the Court's reasoning is the notion that hardcore pomog-
raphy is designed to produce a purely physical effect." Schauer, Speech and Obscenity, supra note
7, at 922; see also Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1966) (making reference to
"erotically arousing," "titillation," and "sexual stimulation").
19. Schauer, Speech and Obscenity, supra note 7, at 922.
20. Id. Schauer claims that this is the only way to make sense of the Supreme Court's ob-
scenity doctrine and exclusion of obscenity from protected speech. Id. Although Schauer is correct
that implicit in the expression/conduct assumption is the notion of a cognitive content in the lis-
tener, I will argue that any theory that espouses this kind of private inner object is incoherent.
21. Schauer attempts to use Wittgenstein's conception of "meaning as use" to support his
theory. Below, I will argue that Wittgenstein's concept of expression is very different from
Schauer's.
22. Paul Chevigny, Pornography and Cognition: A Reply to Cass Sunstein, 1989 DUKE L.J.
420, 421.
23. See Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment and Cognition: A Response, 1989 DUKE L.
433.
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tics entitling 'speech,' and not other forms of human experience, to consti-
tutional protection.24
Schauer also states that "[if freedom of speech is in fact synonymous
with freedom of expression---encompassing communication as well as other
forms of self-expression-speech is virtually indistinguishable from other
action. '25 The problem that Schauer and Sunstein are wrestling with is that a
21great many actions may be self-expression, such as owning a Ferrari, yet
are not protected speech. Schauer and Sunstein are correct in observing that
freedom of expression is not co-extensive with freedom of action. However,
the distinction upon which they wish to pin the First Amendment is incoher-
ent.
As I will explain below, expression/conduct distinction theories assume
that with certain speech, a private inner object (the cognitive content) is
formed in the listener, and that with other kinds of speech, it is not formed.
The only protected speech, then, is the type that breeds private inner objects.
This is an inherently incoherent position, and a position that Wittgenstein
spent a good portion of his writings trying to refute.
II. STEPPING BACK TO PHILOSOPHY
Sunstein and Schauer claim that expressions are those things that at least
have the potential of successful transmission. That is, they cause "something"
to happen in the listener. Judicial opinions that rely on the expression/conduct
distinction implicitly make the same assumption. This something would seem
to be a private mental event in the mind of the listener.
Sunstein and Schauer's notion of language and communication (and the
notion implicit in case law that uses the conduct/expression distinction) is
similar to the notion Wittgenstein tries to combat. In the following passage,
the flawed theory of the mind that Wittgenstein describes is, ultimately,
Sunstein and Schauer's theory:
[W]e are so accustomed to communication through language, in con-
versation, that it looks to us as if the whole point of communication
lay in this: someone else grasps the sense of my words-which is
something mental: he as it were takes it into his own mind. If he then
does something further with it as well, that is no part of the immedi-
ate purpose of language.27
Wittgenstein's point is that one would like to assume that something mental
goes on with communication-that when the communication is understood, the
listener takes it into his own mind. But this is a conceptual trap, one that
Schauer and Sunstein blithely fall into.28
24. Id. at 436.
25. Schauer, Speech and Obscenity, supra note 7, at 912.
26. Id.
27. WITrGENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 363.
28. The Schauer and Sunstein view is close to C.L. Stevenson's notion that expression takes
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In order for expression and communication to take place, what counts is
the entire public context, not a private mental event in the listener.29 "Make
the following experiment: say 'It's cold in here' and mean 'It's warm in here'.
Can you do it?-And what are you doing as you do it? And is there only one
way of doing it?"3" The experiment shows the incoherence of a private def-
inition. One can say, "It's cold in here" when it is above 80 degrees Fahren-
heit and refer to the warmth, if society has defined "cold" as meaning over 80
degrees. However, one cannot say, "It's cold in here," and actually mean the
sentence, "It's warm in here." Such a statement is incoherent. A private inner
definition is meaningless and certainly does not qualify as the distinction be-
tween expression and conduct. What makes the expression, "It's cold in here,"
meaningful is the public context in which it is spoken, not some private inner
event (or "cognitive content") occurring in the hearer. The only criterion that
can determine what constitutes an expression is the public context in which it
is spoken.
Of course, as the Supreme Court has recognized, expressions are not just
linguistic." For example, a cry can be an expression: "Can I not say: a cry, a
laugh, are full of meaning? And that means, roughly: much can be gathered
from them." 2 Indeed, laughing and crying can be forms of communication,
just as the statement, "I am sad." There are times when our "words can be
wrung from us, like a cry,"3 the words being a mere replacement for the
crying.34
place where the speaker "must have (roughly) a tendency to produce in an audience some attitude
(cognitive or otherwise) and a tendency, in the case of a speaker, to be produced by that attitude,
these tendencies being dependent on 'an elaborate process of conditioning which has attended the
sign's use in communication."' CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE 57 (1944).
29. An audience-focused expression/conduct theory will generally make the mentalist as-
sumptions of Schauer and Sunstein. However, one might ask whether the determination of what is
"conduct" versus what is "expression" could be made using public criteria-without postulating
private inner mental events. The reason Schauer's cognitive content is a private mental event is
that once the theorist turns the focus away from the speaker's intention to the audience, the theo-
rist looks for something in the audience to limit the category of the speaker's expression. An
obvious thing to look for, as Schauer does, is a special kind of inner mental event in the audience
that takes place when the audience is perceiving First Amendment expression, but does not take
place when perceiving pornography. Schauer states: "[Tjhe use of pornography may be treated
conceptually as a purely physical rather than a mental experience." Schauer, Speech and Obsceni-
ty, supra note 7, at 923. Although he admits that the formulation is too simple in that nothing is
purely one or the other, Schauer states that with pornography, even if something mental is in-
volved, it has "none of the characteristics of the intellectual process constituting the core of the
constitutional definition of speech." Id. This intellectual process-the cognitive content-is some
inner event that occurs with some communication, but not others. What then is this internal "men-
tal element" that is missing when one reads pornography as opposed to protected fiction? I will
argue that there is no such internal mental event.
30. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 510.
31. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505, 514 (1969)
(upholding the right of high school students to wear black arm bands in protest of the Vietnam
war as a symbolic act within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment).
32. WIrTGENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 543.
33. Id. § 546.
34. Wittgenstein observes, "A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to
him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behavior."
Wittgenstein's interlocutor then asks, "So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means cry-
ing?" Wittgenstein responds, "On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and
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Words and non-verbal expressions communicate in a context, and a sole
mental event (or some cognitive content in the -listener) cannot determine an
expression's meaning or determine when an action is an expression. In another
example, Wittgenstein shows how a mental event like "hope" only makes
sense in the context of a public language. Looking at a purely isolated private
mental event is an incoherent exercise:
Now suppose I sit in my room and hope that N.N. will come and
bring me some money, and suppose one minute of this state could be
isolated, cut out of its context; would what happened in it then not be
hope? Think, for example, of the words which you perhaps utter in
this space of time. They are no longer part of this language. And in
different surroundings the institution of money doesn't exist either. 5
In Wittgenstein's example, "hope" cannot simply be an inner mental event that
distinguishes the "hope" state from another mental state, but includes the
context, i.e., money, rooms, the fact that N.N. exists and may come. A private
mental event out of the public context is incoherent. Similarly, an expression
is shaped by the context of the speaker. In determining what constitutes ex-
pression, the entire array of publicly accessible facts and events must come
into play. Schauer and Sunstein seem to assume that when actual, cognitive
communication occurs, a private, distinguishable, internal mental event occurs.
This, for them, distinguishes certain kinds of pornography, which they claim
produce only a physical effect, from protected expression, which spurs a
private cognition experience in the listener.
Take the following example of a non-verbal expression: a woman wants
to go across town, walks to a street comer and raises her hand instinctively (to
hail a taxi). A cab driver might just as instinctively pull over in reaction to the
gesture. The outstretched arm waving for a taxi would be protected expression
but not because of anything going on in the mind of the cab driver. There may
be nothing! What constitutes the expression is the entire context of the action:
the fact that the woman decided to take a taxi; the fact that in our culture,
putting one's hand up as a taxi approaches signals to the driver that he should
stop; and the very fact that our society has taxi cabs. A complete explanation
of the expression in this case will include these factors, but there is no need to
posit a specific inner mechanism in the cab driver that only is triggered when
he is at the receiving end of a protected expression.
The raising of one's hand is taught by seeing others use the same signal
to hail a cab. We learn the technique of hailing cabs, and this technique is
what we call the "expression" of an intention (namely the intention to travel
by taxi). To propose that it signifies the presence of a cognitive event in the
receiver of the signal, as Schauer does, makes no sense if one recognizes that
expressions are simply the learning of a technique.
does not describe it." Id. § 244.
35. Id. § 584.
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In fact, many of our activities may be triggered by expressions to which
we respond "automatically" once we learn the technique. Some might want to
posit a cognitive mechanism even in these situations. However, this position is
problematic. In the case of an "automatic" response, the only kind of intellec-
tual internal mechanism possible is one that works very quickly. Once the
theorist invokes such fleeting cognitive mechanisms to distinguish protected
from unprotected expression, he or she is on very shaky ground. How many
nano-seconds of cognitive activity in an audience are sufficient to keep a
pornographer out of prison? Certainly no such inner mechanism should be the
basis for deciding what constitutes protected expression in First Amendment
jurisprudence. Moreover, one may wonder whether such a fleeting inner mech-
anism even exists.
Once we rid ourselves of the notion that something mental must occur in
the hearer for there to be protected expression, we still face the dilemma of
determining what types of actions are protected by the First Amendment.
The Schauer/Sunstein theories are flawed because it is incoherent to look
in the audience's mind for something to happen when the audience perceives
First Amendment expression. This dilemma can be expressed as follows:
(1) There is no mental inner object to distinguish conduct from ex-
pression.
(2) All "expression" can be characterized as conduct. For
Wittgenstein, expression is conduct.
(3) But for legal purposes, not all conduct is protected speech.
The error lies in the misplaced focus on listeners rather than speakers. The
Supreme Court, and many theorists, have been looking at the wrong end of the
problem. Instead of looking to the reaction of the listener-that is, whether it
is purely physical or cognitive-why not examine the speaker's intention to
determine what kind of expression is protected?
III. GRICE'S INTENTIONS
Let us begin with Paul Grice's definition of what constitutes expression:
A must intend to induce by x a belief in an audience, and he must
also intend his utterance to be recognized as so intended. But these
intentions are not independent; the recognition is intended by A to
play its part in inducing the belief, and if it does not do so something
will have gone wrong with the fulfillment of A's intentions.36
This definition will allow one to distinguish some cases of expression
from mere action. For example, "I have a very avaricious man in my room,
and I want him to go; so I throw a pound note out of the window."37 In this
36. H.P. Grice, Meaning, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 436, 441 (Jay F.
Rosenberg & Charles Travis eds., 1971).
37. Id.
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case, "I did not intend his recognition of my purpose to be in any way effec-
tive in getting him to go,""5 and there was no expression.
Grice points out, however, that the speaker's intention need not be openly
stated or even expressible to be present:
Explicitly formulated linguistic (or quasi-linguistic) intentions are no
doubt comparatively rare. In their absence we would seem to rely on
very much the same kinds of criteria as we do in the case of
nonlinguistic intentions where there is a general usage. An utterer is
held to intend to convey what is normally conveyed (or normally
intended to be conveyed), and we require a good reason for accepting
that a particular use diverges from the general usage ... 9
Grice correctly notes that often when one asks about a speaker's intention in
expressing something, "the answer is not based on what he remembers but is
more like a decision, a decision about how what he said is to be taken."' We
do not now want to make the mistake of assuming an inner mental act in the
speaker.'
Therefore, from Grice, we can identify the following attributes of expres-
sion:
(1) In communicating, the speaker must be attempting (intending) to
communicate something to the hearer.'2
(2) The speaker is trying to make the hearer recognize that intention.
(3) The communication is successful when the hearer recognizes that
intention.43
Grice's theory has been correctly criticized as a theory of meaning for reasons
I will explain below. We are not concerned, however, with developing a theo-
ry of meaning, but a workable rule for First Amendment jurisprudence. Fortu-
nately, the very ways in which Grice fails to account for certain elements in a
theory of meaning make his theory suitable for a theory of First Amendment
expression. Grice fails to account for just the sort of things in meaning that the
38. Id.
39. Id. at 443.
40. Id. at 444. John Searle summarizes Grice's theory: "[tio say that a speaker S meant
something by X is to say that S intended the utterance of X to produce some effect in a hearer H
by means of the recognition of the intention." JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 43 (1970) (citing
H.P. Grice, Meaning, 1957 PHIL. REV. 377, 377-88, reprinted in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LANGUAGE 436 (Jay F. Rosenberg & Charles Travis eds., 1971)).
41. See infra text accompanying note 50.
42. Without this criterion, all action would be speech. For the First Amendment to have any
teeth, there must be some subcategory of communication that is protected. See Schauer, Speech
and Obscenity, supra note 7, at 912-13.
43. Grice states, with respect to what I label the third part, that "the intended effect must be
something which in some sense is within the control of the audience, or that in some sense of
'reason' the recognition of the intention behind x is for the audience a reason and not merely a
cause." Grice, supra note 36, at 442. This begins to sound like the theory that requires expression
to cognitively move its audience. Below, however, I reject this third part of Grice's thesis as prob-
lematic and unnecessary for a theory of what constitutes expression-although it might be neces-
sary for a theory of meaning, which is Grice's concern but not mine.
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Supreme Court has stated should not matter in a theory of First Amendment
"expression."
John Searle criticizes Grice's account of meaning because it "does not
show the connection between one's meaning something by what one says, and
what that which one says actually means in the language."" Basically, Searle
objects to the fact that Grice's theory fails as a theory of meaning. There are
times when we might, in saying one thing, mean something else:
Suppose that I am an American soldier in the Second World War and
that I am captured by Italian troops. And suppose also that I wish to
get these troops to believe that I am a German soldier in order to get
them to release me. [Suppose I don't know enough German or Italian
to do that] ... Let us suppose I know only one line of German which
I remember from a poem I had to memorize in a high school German
course. Therefore, I, a captured American, address my Italian captors
with the following sentence: Kennst du das Land wo die Zitronen
bliihen?"
By Grice's definition, because the speaker in the example intends to make the
soldier believe he is German, the meaning of the German sentence would have
to be, "I am a German soldier."' This is clearly wrong as a theory of mean-
ing. To understand how meaning works in this example, you need more con-
text. "Meaning is more than a matter of intention, it is also at least sometimes
a matter of convention. One might say that on Grice's account it would seem
that any sentence can be uttered with any meaning whatever, given that the
circumstances make possible the appropriate intentions."47
Grice's definition may, however, be a good theory of what counts as a
meaningful expression, even if it is not a good theory of meaning. Even in
Searle's absurd hypothetical, there is an intentional expression attempted to be
communicated.
Searle also complains that in his hypothetical, Grice's analysis fails from
the hearer's perspective. In other words, it does not achieve what I labeled
proposition (3) above. We need not be concerned with this because in an
analysis of First Amendment expression, we can ignore (3). What constitutes
successful communication is irrelevant for determining what constitutes ex-
pression. First Amendment protection should cover speech, whether or not it is
successfully communicated. A meeting of nuclear physicists may, to me,
sound like mere babbling; however, the expressions at such a meeting would
have First Amendment protection. What matters is that the communication
have some public meaning whereby the expression could potentially be suc-
cessful, even if a particular audience could not understand its meaning.
Still, we must modify the success criterion to prevent real babble expres-
sions from counting as expressions:
44. See SEARLE, supra note 40, at 43-48.
45. Id. at 44.
46. See id. at 45.
47. Id.
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(3)(a) The audience must potentially be able to recognize the com-
municated intention.
With criterion (3)(a) in place, our theory of expression can now accommodate
the role of public meaning.' Any speech that does not fit into our public lan-
guage game is not an expression. Protection for such babble is unnecessary.
Criterion (3)(a) ensures that purely private utterances are not taken to be
expressions.'
Grice's theory may be deficient as a theory of meaning, but it is an ade-
quate theory of expression because it makes a pivotal distinction: it places the
focus on the speaker's perspective. It is when a speaker intends or attempts to
put meaning into an expression, whether verbal or not, that the expression
should be protected.
If the speaker's intention is the crux of what constitutes protected expres-
sion, then we must be careful in defining the term "intention." As indicated
above,5" intention is a very complex philosophical issue. However, by shifting
the emphasis away from the listener to the speaker, I do not intend to transfer
the "inner cognitive content" to the speaker and simply label it intention.
Clearly, in either case the conception of a cognitive content is incoherent.
For a theory of expression, I believe it is necessary to add a (1)(a) to the
above three criteria in order to flesh out what is meant by intention:
(1)(a) When the speaker intends to communicate something, that
intention is determined by the public context of the speaker
(as opposed to determining intention by some inner event in
the speaker).5'
What allows the audience to potentially grasp the speaker's intention is the
fact that it must be an intention to communicate a public meaning (as laid out
in (3)(a)). An intention is, generally, a disposition to action, a readiness to do
or to try to do things that will achieve an intended state of affairs. In this case,
the intention is to communicate something. But in order for the speaker to
have an intention, it must be expressible in a public language. Therefore, it is
48. The Supreme Court has recognized this criterion. In deciding whether particular conduct
possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, the Court
examines whether "[an intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)
(attaching a peace sign to a flag held to demonstrate requisite intent)).
49. While ultimately, one may not care whether babble receives First Amendment protection,
clearly what is being protected is expression, not meaningless babble.
50. See supra text accompanying note 41.
51. See discussion, supra note 29, on why theories that espouse the expression/conduct dis-
tinction will generally make the mentalist assumptions that are not necessary when looking to
speaker's intentions. Again, the speaker's intentions will involve, very broadly, the entire context.
With the expression/conduct distinction, one looks to the mind of the audience in an attempt to
find something mentally different in the case of watching pornography from the case of watching
the movie STAR WARS (Twentieth Century-Fox, 1977). Looking at the context involved in a
speaker's intention broadens the category of expression-something the expression/conduct theo-
rist explicitly does not want to do.
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the public aspect of the intention and of the language with which the intention
is expressed that constitutes the criteria for the intention.
When discussing the mental event of shame, Wittgenstein notes, "'I am
not ashamed of what I did then, but of the intention which I had.'-And did-
n't the intention lie also in what I did? What justifies the shame? The whole
history of the incident."52 Wittgenstein's point is that what constitutes the
criteria for determining the intention is the whole incident, not some
identifiable mental event.
For the speaker to have an intention, we need not posit some mental event
occurring either in the listener or in the speaker himself. The example of hail-
ing a cab is apt: if someone sees a cab go by and, without thinking, raises her
hand (because she wants a cab), it makes no sense to call this an inner inten-
tion with cognitive content. The intention in that action is contained in the
entire public context of that action. As stated above, this includes the fact that
the agent decided to take a cab; the fact that in our culture, putting one's hand
up as a cab passes by signals to the driver that he has a customer; and the
very fact that our society has taxi cabs, uses money, has streets, etc. A com-
plete expression of the agent's intention in this case will include these factors,
but no specific inner cognition is lodged within the cab driver's mind that
distinguishes an intentional mental event from other non-intentional mental
events. The disposition to attempt to communicate is determined by the entire
context. This, then, is protected communication because:
(1) The communicator is attempting (intending) to communicate
to the passing cab driver that she needs a ride.
(1)(a) This intention to communicate is composed of the entire
context of the situation (this signal is used to get cabs; our
society has cabs, etc.).
(2) The communicator is attempting to convey her intention to
the hearer.
(3) The communication would be successful if a cab driver
recognized the intention.
(3)(a) The hearers are potentially able to understand this signal (the
signal is in a public language and is accepted as communica-
tion signifying a desire for a ride).
These criteria for determining what expression is protected do have some
limits. Pornography and obscenity, however, would both appear to be protect-
ed, for in both:
(1) The communicator is attempting (intending) to communicate
to the reader the idea of sexuality, albeit graphically.
(1)(a) This intention to communicate is composed of the entire
context of the situation (what constitutes sexuality in our
society; what are considered taboos; the fact that our society
has magazines, etc.).
52. WI'rrGENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 644.
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(2) The communicator is attempting to convey that intention to
the reader.
(3) The communication would be successful if the reader of the
pornography recognized that intention (it would be unsuc-
cessful to a reader who would simply take offense or be
disgusted).
(3)(a) Even if a specific reader might be disgusted, there are read-
ers potentially able to understand the communication.
Although some may want to regulate obscenity for reasons of content,53 or
find justifiable reasons for regulating pornography even under the strict scruti-
ny standard, it would fall under the basic criterion for protection. However, the
above outlined criteria based solely on the intention of the speaker does have
its limits. It assumes that the First Amendment only protects speech where
there is an intention to communicate that intention. Without that intention,
then, there is no expression. Sleeping outdoors while on holiday would not be
expression, unless in the particular context there is an. attempt to communicate
something by that action, such as calling attention to the plight of the home-
less.54 Without this intention, there is no expression and no communication.
Limitations deriving from content, however, such as pornography or obscenity,
would have to be struck down as unconstitutional unless they passed strict
scrutiny.
It is now necessary to test this new theory to determine whether it defines
expression too broadly. After all, if the necessary criterion for an "intention to
communicate" is not limited to some mental event in the listener, but rather,
involves the broad context of the speaker, more actions will be "intentional"
communications. Using a private mental event to distinguish protected expres-
sion from unprotected action seems easy (albeit incoherent), but it poses a
danger that any alternative will make the definition of "expression" too all-
encompassing.
IV. THE LIMITS ON PROTECTED EXPRESSION
The harsh reality of a philosophically coherent theory of expression which
looks at the speaker's intention to communicate is that it will define intention
rather broadly. Although certain actions will not be expressive ones, such as
those without the requisite speaker's intention, the vast majority of actions will
53. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973).
54. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). In this case,
involving protestors sleeping in Lafayette Park (across from the White House) in order to call
attention to the plight of the homeless, the Supreme Court upheld National Park Service regula-
tions that forbade all sleeping in the park. Id. at 289, 298. The court in Clark, by failing to look to
the speaker's intention, judged the activity to be pure conduct of the sort that can be regulated by
neutral regulations. In my scheme, this would be considered protected expression because, clearly,
the purpose of sleeping in the park was to protest. Compare this to camping out in a national park
while on holiday. This activity contains no expressive intention on the camper's part and would
not be protected expression.
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qualify as expression. This is because much of what we do has an intentional
element of communication. Thus, limits on freedom of expression will have to
come from concepts outside the definition of expression. Indeed, there are
limiting principles that may override the right to free speech. The difficult task
will be determining when they come into effect.
Although some civil libertarians would like the speech right to be abso-
lute, there are no absolutes. As Justice Holmes noted:
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would
justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States constitution-
ally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a
clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain
substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to
prevent."
Justice Brandeis observed that "the rights of free speech and assembly are
fundamental, [but] they are not in their nature absolute."56
The attempt to make the right to free speech, or any right, absolute, will
necessarily lead to an absurd conclusion. For example, a political assassination
would have to be categorized as a form of communication, just like a political
speech. However, the sanction against criminal acts such as murder outweighs
any right to free speech. The key to curbing such activity is not to strip it of
the status of expression, but to admit that other principles may impose limits
on free expression. 7
Justice Black, in his desire to be an absolutist, was forced to fall back
onto the conduct/expression distinction: "I do not believe, for example, that it
would invalidate laws resting upon the present that where speech is an integral
part of unlawful conduct that is going on at the time, the speech can be used
to illustrate, emphasize and establish the unlawful conduct."58
The problem with an absolutist theory is that it relies on the con-
duct/expression distinction because expressions will be limited by those actions
that are pure conduct (or "unlawful conduct"). Certainly, we need limiting
principles, but as I have shown, the conduct/expression distinction is inade-
quate for the task. Because it falsely implies that all expression is to be pro-
tected and is immune from regulation, it has to impose some artificial distinc-
tion to justify exclusion of non-protected expression; namely, to relabel unde-
sirable expression "conduct."
The proper response to any absolutist like Justice Black is to assert that
freedom of speech is a fundamental right, but concede that all rights must be
balanced against others' liberty interests. Although Black insisted that it should
be a complete and unconditional right for an American to express his views to
his neighbors, he was mistaken. No right can ever be absolute. Expression
cannot be immune from all regulation. What drives some theorists and some
55. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
56. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
57. The determination of when other rights override the right to freedom of expression is
well beyond the purview of this article.
58. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 64 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
19951
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court Justices to make the conduct/expression distinction is the false
belief that expression is immune from regulation. Once one abandons this sim-
plistic belief, broadening the conception of expression becomes less problemat-
ic. You cannot, for example, express your views to your neighbor with a 120
decibel bullhorn at 2:00 A.M. There are always limits. The issue is not an
absolute right-for-free-speech approach versus a balancing approach. While
Justice Black was using a form of balancing, he was simply using the philo-
sophically incoherent notion of "conduct" to balance against "expression."59
For those theorists who use the expression/conduct distinction to deny
protection to pornography, the disconcerting reality is that there is no philo-
sophical distinction between pornography and any other kind of speech. What-
ever distinctions exist between it and other speech has nothing to do with its
being a form of communication. While other aspects of pornography may
require regulation, even under strict scrutiny, one cannot make any fundamen-
tal or philosophical distinction between different kinds of human expression.'
V. FREE SPEECH AS SELF-EXPRESSION:
THE CONSEQUENCE OF A SPEAKER-ORIENTED THEORY
I have been assuming throughout this article that if something counts as
expression, once we determine what that is, then it should be protected by the
First Amendment. Once we see that the expression/conduct distinction fails as
outlined in some Supreme Court decisions and by some theorists, it is neces-
sary to see why there is any value in allowing all expression, broadly defined,
the protection of the First Amendment.
Clearly in a First Amendment analysis, we must look to whether the
speaker deserves constitutional protection. This can be derived from the ana-
lytic deduction of what constitutes expression as described above. However,
this also leads to the more esoteric question of why expression should be pro-
tected at all.
Ronald Dworkin points out that there are two kinds of justification for
free speech: an instrumental justification, where free speech is important "not
because people have any intrinsic moral right to say what they wish, but be-
cause allowing them to do so will produce good effects for the rest of us;"6
and a constitutive justification, which "supposes that freedom of speech is
valuable, not just in virtue of the consequences it has, but because it is an
essential and 'constitutive' feature of a just political society that government
59. Robert McKay suggests that the most important notion is that of the "preferred position"
expressed by Justice Black, even if Black's absolutist position is unsatisfactory. Robert B. McKay,
The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182, 1182-85, 1195 (1959).
60. Of course commercial speech may lead to a difficult problem. While this analysis shows
the incoherence of positing a mental event in either the listener or the speaker, it will be difficult
to determine what constitutes an intention on the part of a commercial enterprise. This investiga-
tion is beyond the scope of this article.
61. Ronald Dworkin, The Coming Battles over Free Speech, N.Y. REV. BooKs 55, 56 (June
11, 1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Battles].
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treat all its adult members, except those who are incompetent, as responsible
moral agents."62
The constitutive justification asserts that
morally responsible people insist on making up their own minds
about what is good or bad in life or in politics .... Government in-
sults its citizens, and denies their moral responsibility, when it de-
crees that they cannot be trusted to hear opinions that might persuade
them to dangerous or offensive convictions. We retain our dignity, as
individuals, only by insisting that no one-no official and no majori-
ty-has the right to withhold opinion from us on the ground that we
are not fit to hear and consider it.63
The expression/conduct distinction hinges on the assumption that some kinds
of communications are "dangerous and offensive." Theorists who claim that
pornography and other "conduct" (i.e., expression that does not produce a
cognitive content in the listener) are not expression have the instrumental goal
of keeping this material away from the populace.
Dworkin basically proposes to place in opposition a Kantian and a utili-
tarian vision of the First Amendment. In the utilitarian form, free speech is
used for an ultimate end, to create a better society of one type or another. The
Kantian vision acknowledges and respects the freedom of the speaker, not the
protection of the listener.
Dworkin's view is similar to that of Charles Fried, who has written,
[f]reedom of expression is properly based on autonomy: the Kantian
right of each individual to be treated as an end in himself, an equal
sovereign citizen of the kingdom of ends with a right to the greatest
liberty compatible with the like liberties of all others. Autonomy is
the foundation of all basic liberties, including liberty of expression.' 4
Another way to view this dichotomy is to see the instrumentalist theory as one
that concentrates too much on the listener. The audience of an expression is
the society, those other than the speaker. It is they whom the instrumentalist
view protects. When one incoherently holds that the philosophical notion of
expression focuses on the mental events of the audience, one is tending toward
the instrumentalist view, a view that looks to the good of the audience. Once
expression is viewed as a concept bound in the speaker, one can come to
accept the Kantian view.
VI. SELF-EXPRESSION IN SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
The concept of the First Amendment protecting the speaker's right to self-
expression can also be found in some Supreme Court jurisprudence. Generally,
62. Id.
63. Id. at 56-57.
64. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 225, 233 (1992) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MOR-
ALS (Lewis W. Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1959 (1785)); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSI-
CAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE, (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965 (1797))).
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however, the Supreme Court tends to look at the listener. In the nude dancing
cases, for example, the Court appears to be concerned not with what the danc-
er may be trying to express, but instead with whether the listener's response is
merely that of a physical manifestation.65 This is the same mistake that
Schauer and Sunstein make. Both look for something to happen in the listener,
some cognitive machine that turns when "real" communication takes place.
This is looking at the wrong end of the puzzle.
Justice White, however, in First National Bank v. Bellotti,66 noted that
speaker focused self-expression should be the grounding for the First Amend-
ment. In his dissent he stated:
Indeed, what some have considered to be the principal function of the
First Amendment, [is] the use of communication as a means of self-
expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment .... It is clear that the
communications of profitmaking corporations are not "an integral part
of the development of ideas, of mental exploration, and of the affir-
mation of self." They do not represent a manifestation of individual'
freedom or choice.67
In assessing how corporate speech should be protected, Justice White discusses
whether and when a profit-making corporation furthers "the self-expression or
self-fulfillment of its shareholders in the way that expenditures from them as
individuals would. '6' For Justice White, the object of First Amendment guar-
antees is to protect the self-expression of the communicator. Although Justice
White admits that the right to receive information is also a goal, Justice Harlan
speaks of an approach to the First Amendment freedom of expression clause
that "comport[s] with the premise of individual dignity."'
Justice White's grounding principle of self-expression is consistent with
the earlier emphasis in this article on speakers' intentions. When the emphasis
of a First Amendment theory is on the audience, it looks for something special
to happen within the listener. Such a theory of First Amendment predictions of
expression falsely assumes that somehow it is possible to locate some private
attribute in listeners. A theory of self-expression is absolutely consistent with
the rejection of the expression/conduct distinction.
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, ° Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated that "[tihis Court has recognized that natural persons
enjoy negative free speech fights because of their interest in self-expression;
an individual's right not to speak or to associate with the speech of others is a
component of the broader constitutional interest of natural persons in freedom
65. See discussion supra note 2.
66. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
67. First National, 435 U.S. at 804-05 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting T. EMERSON, TO-
WARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1966)); see also Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.2 (1980) (noting that "[f]reedom of speech also
protects the individual's interest in self-expression").
68. First National, 435 U.S. at 806 (White, J., dissenting).
69. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
70. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
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of conscience."7 The implication is that the First Amendment is meant to
protect "the individual freedom of conscience."7 Chief Justice Rehnquist rec-
ognizes that there is a strong First Amendment interest in "freedom of thought
and expression"'3 as being an expression of individual conscience, whether it
be to speak or not to speak.74
Dissenting in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.," Jus-
tice Brennan stressed both the protection of the speaker and the protection of
the audience. Recognizing the importance of the role of the speaker, he stated
that "[t]he free speech guarantee gives each citizen an equal right to self-ex-
pression and to participation in self-government."76 Yet, Brennan also stated
that this guarantee protects the rights of listeners to "the widest possible dis-
semination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources."77
As discussed above, the protection of individuals' self-expression makes
philosophical sense. What is protected is not something for which we must go
digging in the mind of the listener. On the contrary, we should look to the
outward manifestation of the speaker, the intention of the expression itself. By
doing so, we acknowledge and respect all humans and all aspects of commu-
nication that humans desire to express, no matter how some other sections of
the population may view it. In the nude dancing cases, there is no lack of a
private inner object. A person's response to a stimulating speech or his re-
sponse to a nude dance are not categorically different. Both are in some sense
intellectual, and in some sense emotional. The expression should be protected
unless and until some other overriding interest trumps that right.78
CONCLUSION
In the end, there is nothing inherently different about flag burning, ob-
scenity, pornography, nude dancing and other protected expression, such as
political speech or erotic art. The Supreme Court was treading a misguided
path when it embraced the theory that "[certain] utterances comprise no es-
sential part of any exposition of ideas ' 79 and are not expressions (and there-
71. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 33.
73. Id. at 32 (quoting Harper and Row Publisher, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 524,
559 (1985)).
74. Of course there are cases in which the Supreme Court stresses the utilitarian justification
for the First Amendment. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976). In Bates,
the Court stated that the goal of the First Amendment is to enlighten public decision-making. This
is an example of the utilitarian justification of the First Amendment. Id.; see also supra note 8.
75. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
76. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 783 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 459-63 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring)).
77. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 783 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
78. Again, this determination is beyond this article. However, I would note that the right to
freedom of expression should be considered a primary right that can rarely be overridden.
79. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).
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fore not protected). If the Supreme Court wants to regulate certain categories
of "idealess utterances" ''1 or "conduct," it must do so by relying on overriding
principles that supersede the right of free speech."' To call them non-expres-
sion and mere physical conduct is at best incoherent and at worst, cynically
disingenuous.
80. Schauer, Speech and Obscenity, supra note 7, at 920.
81. It is worth noting, as Steven Gey does, that Schauer believes pornography may be sup-
pressed because it lacks "a certain kind of value." Gey, supra note 6, at 1595 (quoting Schauer,
Speech and Obscenity, supra note 7, at 927 (emphasis omitted)). Therefore, in Schauer's theory,
pornography should not only be denied First Amendment protection because it is not expression,
but there also lurks the utilitarian aim of not granting pornography such protection because it
promotes the wrong kind of social value.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1967, the United States House of Representatives refused to seat Con-
gressman-elect Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. for alleged misappropriation of funds
during the previous Congress. Powell took his case to the Supreme Court,
which held that a single house of Congress, under its power to judge the quali-
fications of its members, could not impose qualifications in addition to those
contained in the Qualifications Clauses of the Constitution, Article I, Section
2, Clause 2, and Section 3, Clause 3. In reaching its conclusion, the Court
surveyed the historical record and determined that the Qualifications Clauses
were intended to be exclusive.'
Between 1990 and 1994, twenty-two states imposed a term limit, or
length-of-service qualification, of one form or another on their representatives
in Congress.3 A handful of state and lower federal courts found such efforts
unconstitutional, citing the Powell Court's conclusion about the exclusivity of
the Qualifications Clauses.' Indeed, the Nevada Supreme Court refused even
to let that state's measure on the ballot; it was, according to the court, "palpa-
bly" unconstitutional under Powell.' This past term, the United States Su-
preme Court agreed in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, a split 5-4 decision,
invalidating an Arkansas term limits provision because it effectively imposed a
qualification for office and, according to the Court's reading of the "historical
and textual evidence,"..."neither Congress nor the States ... possess the
power to supplement the exclusive qualifications set forth in the text of the
Constitution."6 In Term Limits, the Court relied heavily on the historical as-
sessment made by the Powell Court.' The purpose of this article is to review
and assess some of the history upon which the Powell Court relied by looking
at the four principal debates in Congress over contested elections in which a
state-imposed qualification was at issue.
1. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969).
2. Id. at 522-48.
3. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Rethinking Term Limits for Federal Legislators in Light of the
Structure of the Constitution, 73 OR. L. REV. 561, 561 & n.3 (1994) (citing Direct Voice, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 10, 1994, at A7.).
4. E.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 356 (Ark. 1994), affd sub nom.
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995); Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp.
1068, 1076 (W.D. Wash.), affd sub nom. Thorsted v. Munro, Nos. 94-35222 etc., 1996 WL 4397
(9th Cir. Jan. 4, 1996).
5. Stumpf v. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 122 (Nev. 1992).
6. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1866. This article was prepared prior to the Court's ruling in
Term Limits. Its assessment of the historical record nevertheless remains valid; I have incorporated
references to the Term Limits opinion where appropriate.
7. See id. at 1848-52.
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I. THE CONTESTED ELECTION CASES
A. Barney v. McCreery (1807)
The Powell Court's treatment of the first of these debates, the 1807 con-
tested election case of Barney v. McCreery, was faulty, citing for its conclu-
sion a Committee of Elections report that was rejected by the whole House.8
William McCreery's election was challenged for his alleged failure to meet a
city residency requirement imposed by Maryland law.9 The U.S. Constitution
requires that a representative be an inhabitant of the state," and the House
Committee of Elections expressed the view that the Maryland law was uncon-
stitutional because it imposed an additional qualification.' Citing the report
of the Committee of Elections, the Powell Court concluded that it was then
settled "that the States have not a right to require qualifications from mem-
bers, different from, or in addition to, those prescribed in the constitution.""
The actual record of the debates, however, shows that the basis of the
House's decision was much less clear than the Powell Court suggested. 3 A
lengthy debate arose over the report proffered by the Committee of Elections,
which had claimed that, since the Article I qualifications were exclusive, the
additional restriction imposed by the Maryland law was unconstitutional and
McCreery was therefore entitled to his seat. During the debate, several mem-
bers of the House argued that McCreery was eligible to represent Baltimore
because he was a resident of the city of Baltimore, as required by the Mary-
land law; 4 indeed, the report of the Elections Committee was recommitted so
that the Committee could take additional evidence as to McCreery's actual
8. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 542-43 (1969) (quoting from 17 ANNALS OF
CONG. 871 (1807)). The Term Limits Court compounded the error made by the Powell Court.
While the Powell Court merely relied on a report by the Committee on Elections that was rejected
by the House, the Term Limits Court stated affirmatively and erroneously that "[t]he whole
House ... did not vote on the Committee's report." Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1861.
9. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 871 (1807). An act passed by the Maryland legislature in Novem-
ber 1802 gave the Baltimore district two representatives; it also required that one be a resident of
the County of Baltimore, the other of the City of Baltimore. Id. (Report of the House Committee
of Elections).
10. "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty
five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected,
be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (empha-
sis added).
11. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 871 (1807). Most of the debate is also reprinted in M. ST. CLAIR
CLARKE & DAVID A. HALL, CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, FROM THE YEAR
1789 TO 1834, at 167-221 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834).
12. CLARKE & HALL, supra note 11, at 171; see Powell, 395 U.S. at 542-43.
13. See 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 870-920; 1231-38 (1807). Indeed, the Term Limits majority
conceded that "the House Debate may be inconclusive." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115
S. Ct. 1842, 1861 (1995). Oddly, the majority attempted to minimize the inconclusive nature of
the McCreery debates by citing an 1814 letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Cabell for the
proposition that "commentators at the time apparently viewed the seating of McCreery as confir-
mation of the States' lack of power to add qualifications." Id. Jefferson's position in the letter
which the majority cited, however, was that the States have power to impose additional qualifica-
tions. See infra text accompanying note 246.
14. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 890 (1807) (Rep. Montgomery); id. at 905 (Rep. Bibb).
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residence. 5 Others were uncertain whether the Maryland law required a
twelve-month residency in the city, or merely residency at the time of the
election. 6 Concerns were also expressed that it was only McCreery's mem-
bership in the previous Congress that prevented him from residing in the city
of Baltimore, and hence, that the purpose of the residency law was not violat-
ed. 7 Still others suggested that, although the Maryland legislature could not
add qualifications, the people of Maryland, by way of an amendment to the
Maryland constitution, could.'
The House ultimately seated McCreery by a vote of 89 to 18, but only
after severing the resolution from the Committee of Elections' reported ratio-
nale.' 9 The resolution to seat McCreery was originally reported by the Com-
mittee as follows: "Resolved, That William McCreery [having the greatest
number of votes and being duly qualified, agreeably to the Constitution of the
United States,] is entitled to his seat in this House."2 The bracketed words
were struck in the Committee of the Whole, however, and the House approved
the deletion by a decisive vote of 70 to 37.2
John Randolph of Virginia then moved to amend the resolution so as to
read, "Resolved, That William McCreery, not being qualified according to the
law of Maryland, is not entitled to his seat in this House. 22 When
Randolph's motion was ruled out of order, he moved instead to insert the
phrase, "being duly qualified by the law of Maryland," in lieu of the previous-
ly deleted clause in order "to bring the question of the constitutionality of the
law of Maryland before the House."23 Randolph's motion did not accomplish
his purpose, however, for it did not squarely present the constitutional issue,
and the confusion it engendered would render any conclusion on the constitu-
tional question suspect. Francis Gardner of New Hampshire, for example,
stated that he "found himself considerably perplexed" by the amendment,
which he thought required him to vote to seat McCreery on principles other
than those he supported, lest a negative vote deprive McCreery of his seat
altogether. 24 Randolph himself voted against the amendment,25 although the
15. Id. at 898 (Rep. Randolph).
16. Id. at 890, 905 (Rep. Bibb). By an act passed in November 1790, Maryland required that
representatives be residents of their district for twelve months prior to election. Id. at 871. It was
unclear whether the 1802 Act, discussed supra note 9, retained the twelve-month residency re-
quirement.
17. Id. at 905 (Rep. Bibb). McCreery had a summer home in Baltimore County, and a winter
residence in Baltimore City, which he apparently ceased to occupy during the Ninth Congress
when he and his family took up residence in Washington, D.C. Id. at 871.
18. Id. at 897 (Rep. Johnson). Representative Findley, the chairman of the Committee of
Elections, made a similar argument, although he also argued that the Article I list of qualifications
was exclusive. Id. at 876.
19. Id. at 1238.
20. Id. at 1231.
21. Id. at 1231-32. The record of votes only identifies 69 members in support of the resolu-
tion. See id. at 1232. It is unclear, therefore, whether one member voting in favor was not listed,
or whether the number was miscounted.
22. Id. at 1233.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1237.
25. Id.
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proper course of action suggested by his statements during the debate would
have been to vote for the amendment, then against the resolution as amend-
ed.26 Randolph's amendment failed by a vote of 8 to 92, after which a vote
on the unencumbered resolution simply stating that McCreery was entitled to
his seat was approved 89 to 18.27
It is possible to dissect the final vote a little further. The eighteen mem-
bers who voted against seating McCreery must have thought him ineligible
under a constitutionally valid Maryland law, since no other rationale was of-
fered.2" Of the eighty-nine members who voted to seat McCreery, fifty had
also voted to strike the Election Committee's rationale from the resolution,
while only twenty-five had voted to retain it.29 We can safely assume that
most, if not all, of the latter twenty-five thought the Qualifications Clauses
exclusive; all eleven from that group who participated in the debate so ar-
gued."0
The group of fifty who voted to seat McCreery and voted to strike the
Committee rationale is more difficult to assess, however. Only six members of
this group spoke during the debate; three clearly thought the states had the
right to impose additional qualifications3 and a fourth implied as much,32
but the other two expressed the desire to avoid deciding the constitutional
issue if at all possible. 3 Significantly, not a single member who spoke in
favor of the exclusivity of the Qualifications Clauses voted to strike the
Committee's rationale.34 If we could extrapolate the views of the debate par-
ticipants to this entire group of fifty, we might estimate that two-thirds, or
thirty-three members, voted to seat McCreery because he was qualified under
a constitutionally valid Maryland law, while one-third, or seventeen members,
voted to seat him because he was so qualified, whether or not the law was
constitutional, an issue which they wanted to avoid deciding. That would leave
26. See id. at 882-86, 888-89, 1233, 1236 (Rep. Randolph's statements made during the
debates). Compare Randolph's vote with that of Lemuel Sawyer of North Carolina, who argued
for the states' right to add qualifications, id. at 880-81, who thought McCreery unqualified on that
ground, id. at 881, and who voted for Randolph's amendment. Id. at 1237.
27. Id.
28. Of these 18, only Randolph spoke during the debate, and he argued that McCreery was
not eligible under Maryland law. Id. at 1236. Neither party affiliation, state of residence, or region
of the country correlate to the vote in a way that would provide an alternate explanation.
29. The remaining 14 members who voted to seat McCreery had not voted on the initial
amendment to strike the Committee's rationale. Id. at 1232, 1237-38.
30. Randolph also voted against the initial amendment to strike the Committee rationale. Id.
at 1232. He is not among this group of 25 because he voted against the final resolution, id. at
1238, but his vote is nonetheless anomalous with his stated position. See id. at 882-86, 888-89,
1233, 1236 (Rep. Randolph's statements during the debates). Two possible explanations suggest
themselves: (I) Randolph may have thought an affirmative vote would suggest he believed
McCreery was entitled to his seat (an assumption he seems to have made regarding his own
amendment); or (2) he may have voted to retain the initial language because he believed it was
correct, though not complete. McCreery was, after all, eligible under the constitutional qualifica-
tions. It was his state law eligibility that Randolph thought infirm. Id. at 1236.
31. See id. at 904-05 (Rep. Bibb); id. at 899-902 (Rep. Love); id. at 1232 (Rep. Sloan).
32. Representative Montgomery of Maryland argued that McCreery had been a resident of
Baltimore City since 1803, id. at 890, but also that he would never consent to the House of Rep-
resentatives judging the constitutionality of a state law. Id. at 1233.
33. Id. at 904 (Rep. Gardenier); id. at 1232 (Rep. Rhea).
34. See id. at 870-920, 1231-38.
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fifty-one who thought the states had power to add qualifications (eighteen who
voted not to seat McCreery, plus an estimated thirty-three who voted to seat
him), as compared to forty-two who either thought the Qualifications Clauses
exclusive or who wanted to avoid deciding the constitutional issue.
Of course, any such extrapolation is highly speculative. 5 The only thing
one can assert with any confidence is that twenty-two members thought the
states could add qualifications (the eighteen who voted against McCreery plus
the four debate participants who voted both to seat McCreery and to delete the
Election Committee's rationale),36 while twenty-eight thought the states could
not add qualifications (the twenty-five who voted both to seat McCreery and
to retain the Election Committee's rationale, plus three debate participants who
expressed the view that the Qualifications Clauses were exclusive but who did
not cast a vote when the Election Committee's rationale was deleted)) 7 The
views of the remaining fifty-seven members" who voted to seat McCreery
are impossible to ascertain from the debates. To the extent their views and
votes correlate with the views and votes of those who did speak, however, the
debates at least suggest that there may have been a majority in the House who
believed the states did have the power to impose additional qualifications on
their representatives to Congress.
B. Lyman Trumbull (1855)
The next major debate to occur in Congress over the power of states to
add qualifications to those enumerated in the Constitution occurred in the
Senate in 1856. The Illinois Constitution of 1848 contained the following
clause:
The judges of the supreme and circuit courts shall not be eligible to
any other office or public trust, of profit, in this State, or the United
States, during the term for which they are elected, nor for one year
thereafter. All votes for either of them for any elective office, (except
35. There obviously need not be a correlation between the views of those who spoke during
the debate and those who did not; the 4:2 ratio need not hold, therefore, over the whole group of
50. Some evidence suggests that the ratio was even higher: the only other member who spoke
during the debate and who voted to strike the Committee rationale, Lemuel Sawyer of North Caro-
lina, clearly supported the right of states to add qualifications. Id. at 879-82. Other plausible ex-
planations for voting to delete the Election Committee's rationale would suggest the ratio was
lower: some members who thought the Qualifications Clauses were exclusive might have voted to
strike the Election Committee's rationale either to accommodate the concerns of their colleagues
or because they thought it superfluous. Without a more comprehensive review of the views of
non-speaking members, however, the extrapolation from those who did speak is at least as
plausible as any other mechanism by which we might ascertain the views of the non-speaking
members.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 31-32.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30, 34.
38. This number includes 46 from the group of 50 who voted to seat McCreery and to delete
the Election Committee's rationale (the remaining four having spoken in favor of the state's right
to add qualifications), see supra text accompanying notes 29, 31-32, plus 11 of the 14 who voted
to seat McCreery but who did not vote on the amendment deleting the Election Committee's ratio-
nale (the other three having spoken for reading the Qualifications Clauses as exclusive).
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that of judge of the supreme or circuit court,) given by the general
assembly, or the people, shall be void."
In November 1854, former judges Lyman Trumbull and Samuel Marshall were
elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. Both of their elections were con-
tested as in violation of the Illinois constitutional provision, but after a very
brief debate, the challenges were rebuffed by a vote of 125 to 5, approving a
Committee of Elections report finding the Illinois provision unconstitutional
because the Qualifications Clauses were exclusive.' In the interim, however,
Lyman Trumbull was elected by the Illinois General Assembly to a seat in the
U.S. Senate, and a more substantial debate as to the constitutionality of the
provision arose there.
Trumbull was ultimately seated by a vote of 35 to 8, but as in the
McCreery case, the rationale on which the vote was based is a mixed one."
The case was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, which reported back
after more than two months that the members of the committee were too di-
vided in their opinions to reach a decision on the matter.42 Senator John
Crittenden of Kentucky then offered the following resolution during floor
debate:
Resolved, That Lyman Trumbull is entitled to a seat in this body as a
Senator, elected by the Legislature of the State of Illinois, for the
term of six years from the 4th of March, 1855." 3
The resolution does not squarely present the constitutional issue, as Crittenden
himself recognized, since it enabled Senators to vote to seat Trumbull either
because he was qualified pursuant to the Illinois Constitution, or because the
Illinois provision was unconstitutional and therefore void." Crittenden argued
vigorously that Trumbull was entitled to his seat under both rationales.45
39. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. V, § 10, reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND
COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 999 (Francis N.
Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter THORPE].
40. See CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, FROM 1834 TO 1865, at 166-68 (D.
W. Bartlett ed., Washington, GPO 1865) [hereinafter CONTESTED ELECTIONS]. The Committee
Report relied principally on the constitutional commentaries of Chancellor Kent and Joseph Story.
Id. at 167-68.
41. D. W. Bartlett, the Clerk to the Committee of Elections and editor of the 1865 volume of
Cases of Contested Elections in Congress, states that "[tihe argument in favor of Mr. Trumbull's
fight to the seat proceeded upon the ground that the people of Illinois could not add to the qualifi-
cations of a senator as prescribed in the Constitution of the United States." CONTESTED ELEC-
TIONS, supra note 40, at 621. As described below, Bartlett's summary is erroneous.
42. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 514 (1856) (Sen. Butler) ("The result of the discus-
sion [in Committee] has been such a division of opinion as to render it proper, in the opinion of
the committee, that the case should be referred to the Senate .
43. Id. at 515.
44. Id. at 549.
45. Id. at 547-48. Crittenden asserted:
The fast question ... that presents itself is, whether upon ... a proper construction of
the constitution of the State of Illinois, [Trumbull] is entitled to his seat.... I con-
tend ... that, according to the fair and rational construction of this instrument, it does
not apply to the case of an officer who resigned more than twelve months before his
election to the Senate.
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Trumbull himself argued primarily that he was in conformity with the Illinois
constitutional provision, having resigned more than eighteen months prior to
his election,' although he also argued that the Illinois provision was void,
that the Senate should defer to the state legislature's interpretation of the
provision, and that the provision was intended only to apply to state offi-
cers.
47
Significantly, Senators Stephen Adams of Mississippi and John Hale of
New Hampshire both argued that the power of the Senate under Article I,
Section 5 to judge the elections of its members was limited to judging the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution itself, but that "the State tribunals
are the exclusive judges of the qualifications required by their own constitu-
tion."' How extensive was the support for this position cannot be ascer-
tained, although more than half (five out of nine) of the Senators speaking in
favor of seating Trumbull found him eligible under the Illinois provision,
either because they had ascertained for themselves that it did not cover
Trumbull's case, or because they deferred to the implicit finding of the Illinois
General Assembly to that effect. 9 A late attempt by Charles Stuart of Michi-
gan to amend Crittenden's resolution so as to clarify the rationale on which it
was passed, "for the purpose of providing for future reference," was ruled out
of order, and the matter was dropped." The grounds upon which Trumbull
was seated thus cannot be determined with any certainty."
Id. at 548. He further maintained that "[tihe very enumeration [in the U.S. Constitution) of these
qualifications excludes the idea that [the Framers] intended any other qualifications."
Id. Senator Foot (R-VT) also made both arguments. Id. at 579-82.
46. Id. at 58, 343, 467.
47. Id. at 467-68.
48. Id. at 582.
49. Three of the five also argued, at least in part, that the Qualifications Clauses in the Con-
stitution were exclusive.
50. Id. at 583-84. Senator Stuart's amendment read: "For the reason that the said Lyman
Trumbull, having resigned the office of judge more than one year previous to his election as Sena-
tor, is, in the opinion of the Senate, thereby relieved from the inhibition contained in the constitu-
tion of the State of Illinois." Id. at 583. The reporter states that "[e]xpressions of dissent were
heard all round the Chamber." Id. Senator Stuart himself stated that he did not wish to pursue the
matter because "the sense of the Senate seems to be against the proposition," but it cannot be
determined from the recorded debate whether the Senate was against Stuart's amendment because
it thought the Illinois provision unconstitutional, or because it wished to avoid the constitutional
issue. See id. at 584.
51. Another complication, not raised during the debate, was that the second-place finisher,
Illinois Governor Joal A. Matteson, was also disqualified under another provision of the 1848
Illinois Constitution. Matteson received 47 votes to Trumbull's 51, with one vote cast for a third
candidate, Archibald Williams. CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1855). The Illinois Consti-
tution of 1848 provided that "the governor ... shall not be eligible ... to any other office until
after the expiration of the term for which he was elected." ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. 1II, § 3, re-
printed in 2 THORPE, supra note 39, at 995. Although it might be argued that this disqualification
only applied to state offices, a similar provision clearly rendered members of the Illinois General
Assembly ineligible to the United States Senate:
No person elected to the general assembly shall receive any civil appointment within
this State, or to the senate of the United States, from the governor, the governor and
senate, or from the general assembly, during the term for which he shall have been
elected; and all such appointments, and all votes given for any such member for any
such office or appointment, shall be void.
ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. III, § 7, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 39, at 987 (emphasis added).
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C. Wood v. Peters (1884)
Five years after the decision to seat Senator Trumbull, Kansas was admit-
ted to the Union with a constitutional provision nearly identical to the Illinois
provision at issue in Trumbull's case.52 As was common, the enabling act for
Kansas required that its constitution be in conformity with the U.S. Constitu-
tion, and the Kansas Constitution was carefully scrutinized before Congress
admitted the state into the Union. 3
In the November 1882 election, however, a sitting state district court
judge, Samuel Peters, was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives as one
of four members elected by the state on a general ticket.54 Samuel Wood,
who placed fifth in the general election (more than 16,000 votes behind Pe-
ters), challenged Peters's eligibility under the Kansas Constitution.5 The
Committee of Elections reported a resolution as follows:
Resolved, That S. R. Peters was duly elected a member of Congress
from the State of Kansas, and is entitled to his seat.56
Representative Risden Bennett of North Carolina proposed a substitute resolu-
tion on behalf of the minority of the Committee, as follows:
Resolved, That Samuel R. Peters, of Kansas, is ineligible to the seat
in the House of Representatives of the Forty-eighth Congress now
held by him.
Resolved, That Samuel N. Wood, of Kansas, is entitled to said
seat. 7
A short debate occurred in which the principal interlocutors were Wood
and Peters themselves and two members of the Election Committee, Repre-
sentatives Mortimer Elliott of Pennsylvania and Risden Bennett of North Caro-
lina. The entire debate occupies less than seven pages in the Congressional
Record, although Wood's two-hour speech occupies an additional twenty-two
pages in the Appendix.58 Bennett's substitute resolution was ultimately divid-
ed, with a separate vote taken on each of the two clauses. The first clause
declaring Peters ineligible failed by a vote of more than five to one.59 The
52. The Kansas Constitution of 1859 disqualified judges and justices from holding "any
other office of profit or trust under the authority of the state, or the United States, during the term
of office for which said justices and judges shall be elected .... " KAN. CONST. of 1859, art. III,
§ 13, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 39, at 1249-50.
53. Indeed, three prior Kansas constitutions had been rejected (the Topeka Constitution of
1855, the Lecompton Constitution of 1857, and the Leavenworth Constitution of 1858) because of
the intensity of the dispute over slavery. See 2 THORPE, supra note 39, at 1179-241 (reprinting the
Kansas constitutions).




58. See id at 3296-303. Bennett's speech is not reprinted in the main body of the Congres-
sional Record, but a reference to the Appendix is made. Id. at 3301. The Appendix, however, does
not contain a speech by Bennett on the subject.
59. 106 noes to 20 ayes. Id. at 3303.
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second vote failed by an almost unanimous vote, with only two members
voting to seat Wood.6'
The original committee resolution was then approved on a voice vote,
Bennett's call for a recorded vote having failed. Although Peters suggested
that he had not violated the spirit of the Kansas constitutional provision, and
further that the constitutional provision was hortatory only,6' those claims
were relatively weak and the principal argument for seating Peters made by
both Peters and Elliott was that the Kansas provision was unconstitutional. The
House's decision to seat Peters seems to rest, therefore, unambiguously on the
ground that the states do not have power to impose additional qualifications on
members of Congress.
D. Brigham Roberts (1899)
Despite the unambiguous nature of the decision by the Forty-eighth Con-
gress to seat Judge Peters, the Fifty-sixth Congress afforded that decision no
precedential weight a mere fifteen years later when it overwhelmingly refused
to seat Brigham Roberts, the representative-elect from Utah. 62 Roberts was a
polygamist, and the House appointed a special committee to address Roberts's
"statutory disqualification, created by the Edmunds law,63 and for higher and
graver and quite as sound reasons."64 The report by the majority of the spe-
cial committee recommended against seating Roberts6" and its recommenda-
tion was approved by the House by a vote of 268 to 50.' The majority's
position rested on three alternative grounds: (1) The House has an inherent
power to exclude a "defiant violator of law" and Roberts was thus ineligible
because of his violation of Utah law against polygamy; 67 (2) Roberts was dis-
qualified under the Edmunds Law, which specifically made polygamy a dis-
qualification for office;' and (3) The people of Utah, in electing Roberts, had
violated the understanding regarding the anti-polygamy condition under which
they were admitted to the union.69
60. Id. (The "nay" votes were not taken).
61. Id. at 3300.
62. 33 CONG. REC. 1072-104, 1123-49, 1175-217 (1899). The majority report, the minority
report, and the debate participants failed to even mention the Peters case, although nearly every
other Congressional precedent was cited. See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-2.
63. Act of Mar. 22, 1882, ch. 47, § 8, 22 Stat. 30, 31-32 (Congressional act outlawing po-
lygamy in United States territories).
64. 33 CONG. REC. 5 (1899) (statement of Rep. Taylor).
65. H. R. REP. No. 85, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1900). Much of the House report is
reprinted in I ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 474-480 (1907).
66. 33 CONG. REC. 1217 (1899); 1 HINDS, supra note 65, § 480, at 560.
67. 1 HINDS, supra note 65, § 479, at 557.
68. 1 id. § 478, at 550.
69. 1 id. § 480, at 558 ("His election as Representative is an explicit and most offensive
violation of the understanding by which Utah was admitted as a State."); see also I id. § 480, at
559 (statement of Sen. Rawlins) ("[l]t is in the last degree a violation of the agreement or under-
standing when that State sends to Congress a man who is himself engaged in the persistent prac-
tice of the very thing the abandonment of which was the condition precedent to its admission
... .").
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These three propositions can be recharacterized to address the Qualifica-
tions Clause issues directly, as follows: (1) whether a single house of Con-
gress, exercising its power to judge the qualifications of its members,7" can
create qualifications for office in addition to those in the Qualifications Claus-
es; (2) whether Congress as a whole can, by statute, create additional qualifi-
cations; and (3) whether a state, either by law or constitutional provision, can
add qualifications.
The Roberts debate turned principally on the first proposition. The majori-
ty thought it could exclude Roberts from Congress before he took the oath of
office, thus effectively creating an ad hoc disqualification under the House's
power to judge the qualifications of its members.7' The minority, on the other
hand, insisted that the House, acting alone, had power only to judge, not to
create, qualifications,72 although it believed that the House did have the pow-
er to expel Roberts under Article I, Section 5, Clause 2." Significantly, sev-
eral members who supported the minority report thought that the Congress as
a whole could probably impose additional qualifications,74 but that Congress
had not done so with the Edmunds Act, which applied only to territories.75
70. "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. I (emphasis added).
71. 33 CONG. REC. 1123 (1899).
72. See, e.g., id. at 1084 (Rep. Littlefield).
73. Id. at 1084, 1123. The Constitution provides: "Each House may determine the Rules of
its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two
thirds, expel a Member." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. Some members of the majority thought the
minority's argument for expulsion was merely a ruse, because House precedents suggested that a
member could only be expelled for acts committed while he was a member. See, e.g., 33 CONG.
REC. 1123 (1899) (statement of Rep. Powers) ("[lt is a universal rule ... that you can not expel
a member from the House for any offense committed prior to his election .... "). However, the
Supreme Court's decision in Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 43 (1885), finding polygamy to be
an ongoing "state and condition" rather than a prior act, gives credence to the minority position.
74. See 33 CONG. REC. 1085 (1899) (statement of Rep. Littlefield) (describing the problem
with the exclusion of John Wilkes from the British House of Commons as having been effected
"by a mere resolution of the House, and without the concurrence of the other branches of the
legislature"); id. at 1136 (statement of Rep. Lacey) (the proper remedy is expulsion "unless by law
or by the Constitution express ineligibility had been created for [polygamy)") (emphasis added);
id. at 1176 (Rep. Sims); id. at 1177 (Rep. Johnston). At least one member supporting the minority
report, however, thought that neither a single house nor Congress could add qualifications. Id. at
1147 (Rep. Wilson).
75. Act of Mar. 22, 1882, ch. 47, § 8, 22 Stat. 30, 30; see also 33 CONG. REC. 1096 (1899)
(Rep. Littlefield). In 1882, the House had refused to seat delegate George Q. Cannon, from the
Territory of Utah, for violating the Edmunds Act. I HINDS, supra note 65, § 473, at 503.
Cannon's election had also been challenged in 1873, but the anti-polygamy statute in force at the
time did not contain a disqualification clause. Id. § 469, at 494. While the House was considering
the 1873 case, Congress passed a law adding polygamy to the list of disqualifications for dele-
gates to Congress. Act of June 16, 1874, H.R. 3679, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. (1874), reprinted in I
HINDS, supra note 65, § 469, at 498-99. The House Committee on Elections then found Cannon
ineligible, but the House voted not to consider the report. I HINDS, supra note 65, § 469, at 499-
500. In both cases, the House assumed that its power to judge the qualifications of a delegate was
the same as its power to judge the qualifications of a member. Representative Tayler of Ohio, on
the other hand, argued that since the Edmunds Act applied to United States territories, including
the District of Columbia, Roberts was ineligible when he arrived in Washington to take his seat in
Congress. 33 CONG. REC. 1081 (1899). But see id. at 1096 (Rep. Littlefield) (finding Taylor's
suggestion laughable).
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More significantly, the debate over the majority's third proposition im-
plied that both the majority and minority thought a state could add qualifica-
tions. Representative Tayler of Ohio, speaking for the majority, argued that the
ban on polygamy in the Utah Constitution" operated as a disqualification on
Utah's representatives to Congress." Tayler argued in addition that because
Congress had explicitly required the ban as a condition for admission to state-
hood, it was irrevocable without the concurrence of Congress.7" Representa-
tive Littlefield of Maine, speaking for the minority, argued instead that neither
the Utah Constitution nor Utah law actually made polygamy a disqualification
for office."
The ban on polygamy in the Utah Constitution of 1895 did not expressly
impose a disqualification for office,"' and the dispute between the majority
and minority was over the true intent of the clause, not whether the clause was
constitutional if it did impose such a disqualification."' In fact, the Utah Con-
stitution contained two other disqualifications: Article IV, section 6, rendering
"idiot[s], insane person[s], or person[s] convicted of treason or crime against
the elective franchise ... [in]eligible to hold office in this State"; and Arti-
cle VII, section 23, making the governor ineligible "for election to the Senate
of the United States during the term for which he shall have been elected
governor.' '" Although the Article IV provision, viewed in isolation, might
reasonably be interpreted as applying only to officials in state government, and
not to members of Congress, 4 the Article VII provision is an express dis-
qualification for a member of Congress. Nor can the latter clause be rational-
ized as merely a resign to run provision, for the governor is ineligible not just
while he is governor, but "during the term for which he shall have been elect-
ed governor." 5
As in the case of Kansas discussed above, the Utah Enabling Act required
that the forthcoming Utah Constitution "not be repugnant to the Constitution
76. "Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed. No inhabitant of this State shall
ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship; but
polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited." UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. I1l, reprinted
in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at 3705 (emphasis added).
77. 33 CONG. REc. 1081 (1899).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1095; see also UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. 11I, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note
39, at 3705 (prohibiting polygamy forever); I HINDS, supra note 65, § 478, at 554 (citing Laws of
Utah, 1892, ch. VII, pg. 5, made applicable after statehood by UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. XXIV,
§ 2, which provided that all territorial laws were continued in force unless contrary to the new
constitution).
80. See UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. III, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at 3705.
81. Only Representative Snodgrass, a supporter of the minority report, suggested that a state
could not add qualifications: "[The organic laws of Utah] impose no disqualification for office;
and if they did, a single State thus operating alone can not effect an amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States." 33 CONG. REC. 1126 (1899). Snodgrass also stated, however, that mem-
bers of Congress were state officers, thus implying that they are subject to state control. Id.
82. UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. IV, § 6, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at 3705.
83. UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. VII, § 23, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at 3714.
84. This interpretation cannot be sustained when the clause is viewed in context, however,
since the Utah Constitution elsewhere defines state officers as including Representatives to Con-
gress. UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. XXIV, § 12, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at 3733.
85. UTAH CONST. of 1895, art. VII, § 23, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at 3714.
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of the United States." 6 The Utah Constitution was expressly so found in the
proclamation by President Grover Cleveland admitting Utah to the union. 7
Thus, both by proclamation of the President and the decision of the House in
the Roberts case, the clauses of the Utah Constitution imposing additional
qualifications on members of Congress were treated as constitutional. Signifi-
cantly, the majority report in the House found that Roberts met all three quali-
fications contained in Article I, Section 2, but nevertheless held him ineligible
because "the language of the constitutional provision, the history of its framing
in the Constitutional Convention, and its context clearly show that it can not
be construed to prevent disqualification for crime." 8
While the Roberts case might be distinguished from the McCreery,
Trumbull, and Peters cases because it alone involved a disqualification for
crime, 9 the arguments made in the three earlier cases by those who would
hold additional qualifications unconstitutional made no such distinction, and
most of the arguments made by the Roberts majority are equally applicable to
the earlier cases. Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century the congressional
precedents are inconclusive. The decisions in both the McCreery case and the
Trumbull case were inconclusive on the constitutional issue of the states'
power to impose additional qualifications, and while the constitutional issue
was decisively decided in the Peters case, the House reversed itself fifteen
years later in the Roberts case when it recognized that not only states, but a
single house of Congress, could impose additional qualifications.
Although the outcomes in the four cases are inconsistent or ambiguous,
the debates that occurred are nevertheless useful for our purposes, since every
important argument both in support of and in opposition to the states having
power to impose additional qualifications was made and responded to at length
during the course of the debates. It is to the strength of those arguments that
we next turn.
86. Act of July 16, 1894, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at
3693-94.
87. "Whereas the constitution and government of said proposed State are republican in form,
[and] said constitution is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and the Declara-
tion of Independence ... [it is hereby admitted to the union]." Proclamation of President Grover
Cleveland, January 4, 1896, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at 3700 (emphasis added).
Although the President's generalized finding might not be accorded great weight under normal
circumstances, given the intensity of the dispute over polygamy in Utah, and the explicit ban on
polygamy in the Utah Enabling Act enacted by Congress, it is probably safe to assume that partic-
ular attention was paid to the polygamy provision.
88.' 1 HINDS, supra note 65, § 476, at 522.
89. Indeed, the majority report stressed that feature of the case. See I id. § 476, at 522; 33
CONG. REC. 39-40 (1899) (Rep. Taylor). But see 33 CONG. REC. 1087 (1899) (statement of Rep.
Littlefield) (arguing that the distinction between a disqualification for crime and other disqualifica-
tions "is purely arbitrary and gratuitous").
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II. ARGUMENTS FOR INTERPRETING THE QUALIFICATIONS CLAUSES AS AN
EXCLUSIVE LIST OF QUALIFICATIONS
A. The Expressio Unius Principle of Interpretation
The most straightforward argument for treating the Qualifications Clauses
as exclusive derives from a common maxim of statutory interpretation:
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or, the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another. During the McCreery debate, Representative Lewis
Sturges of Connecticut stated the principle as follows: "[W]hen the Framers of
the Constitution undertook deliberately to enumerate the qualifications [in
Article I, Section 2, Clause 2], it was presumable they meant that no others
should be necessary. '"' Representative Mortimer Elliott of Pennsylvania
stated the principle even more clearly during the Peters debate:
The Constitution of the United States by this section prescribes
certain qualifications for the office of Representative in Congress,
and, having exercised the power, it has been exhausted, and neither
Congress nor the States can add other qualifications. It comes within
a well-settled rule of construction that the enumeration of certain
requisites of qualification is equivalent to a prohibition of authority to
impose others.9'
Moreover, as Representative Elliott pointed out, the expressio unius prin-
ciple was in the minds of the Framers during the federal convention.92 In re-
sponse to a motion by James Mason giving Congress the power to impose a
property qualification, John Dickinson stated, "I am against any recital of
qualifications in the Constitution. It is impossible to make a complete one, and
a partial one would by implication tie up the hands of the legislature from
supplying omissions."" Since the Constitution as finally adopted did contain
such a recital of qualifications, Dickinson's statement would seem to suggest
that the list "by implication" excludes all others.
There is a problem with this interpretation, however; Mason's proposal
was to give Congress the power to impose a property qualification.94 Appli-
cation of the expressio unius principle to his proposed clause would thus have
operated to limit Congress's ability to impose other qualifications,95 but
90. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 877 (1807); see also 33 CONG. REC. 1144 (1899) (Rep.
Crumpacker); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 548 (1856) (Sen. Crittenden); id. at 579 (Sen.
Mason); id. at 580 (Sen. Foot); id. at 583 (Sen. Butler); 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 203 (Rep. Quincy).
91. 15 CONG. REC. 3297 (1884).
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing 5 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION As RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN
1787, at 371 (Jonathan Elliot ed., New York, Burt Franklin 1888) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DE-
BATES)).
94. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 93, at 370.
95. Indeed, one member of the convention sought to amend the proposal by giving Congress
the power to impose all needed qualifications precisely because of concerns like Dickinson's. Id.
(statement of Mr. Gorham).
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would have provided no limitation on the states, which do not derive their
authority from the U.S. Constitution.
Dickinson also raised an expressio unius concern to the clause regulating
age and citizenship qualifications. Because that clause, which ultimately be-
came the Article I Qualifications Clauses, was not a grant of power to Con-
gress but rather a list of standing qualifications, application of the expressio
unius principle to it would operate to exclude the imposition of other qual-
ifications, whether imposed by Congress or by the states.96 Dickinson's com-
ments were addressed to the initial version of the clause, however, which was
phrased positively.97 It may therefore be a sufficient answer to the expressio
unius concern that the clause was rephrased in the negative form finally in-
cluded in Article L"H As the Roberts majority report stated, "the conclusion
seems reasonable, if not absolutely irresistible, that the change from the af-
firmative to the negative form was intentionally made and with the very pur-
pose of obviating such objections."
Even if the Qualifications Clauses are read as a positive list, it is not at all
clear that the expressio unius principle is properly applied so as to exclude all
other qualifications. Joseph Story, in his highly regarded Commentaries on the
Constitution, cautioned against the misapplication of the expressio unius prin-
ciple in constitutional interpretation."° Because of the importance of the doc-
trine, and because Story himself thought the doctrine applicable to the Qual-
ifications Clauses,' I cite Story's description of the expressio unius princi-
ple in its entirety:
Another rule of interpretation deserves consideration in regard to the
constitution. There are certain maxims, which have found their way,
96. A point made by the Term Limits Court. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct.
1842, 1850 n.9 (1995).
97. It read as follows:
Every member of the House of Representatives shall be of the age of twenty five years
at least; shall have been a citizen of [in] the United States for at least three years before
his election, and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State in which he
shall be chosen.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 178 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) [herein-
after FARRAND].
98. See infra part III.B. The Term Limits majority summarily rejected the negative phrasing
argument. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1849 n.8. Justice Thomas, in dissent, agreed "that the 'nega-
tive phrasing' of these Clauses has little relevance." Id. at 1885 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas, however, distinguished between the clause as originally phrased and the clause as finally
adopted on the one hand, and a clause that conveyed an exclusive formulation, on the other. As an
example of the latter, he gave: "Every Person who shall have attained to the age of twenty five
Years ... shall be eligible to be a Representative." Id. The former formulation, whether positively
or negatively phrased, established for Thomas only minimum qualifications. Id.
99. 1 HINDS, supra note 65, § 477, at 530.
100. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 448,
at 433 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833).
101. 2 id. § 625, at 101. Many of the contemporary opponents of term limits view Story's
reading of the Qualifications Clauses as dispositive. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his Term
Limits dissent, the Supreme Court has often found Story's views "more nationalist than the Con-
stitution warrants." Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1880 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (contrasting 2 STORY,
supra note 100, §§ 1063-1069 with Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851),
on whether the Commerce Clause gives exclusive power to Congress).
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not only into judicial discussions, but into the business of common
life, as founded in common sense and common convenience. Thus, it
is often said, that in an instrument a specification of particulars is an
exclusion of generals; or the expression of one thing is the exclusion
of another. Lord Bacon's remark, "that, as exception strengthens the
force of a law in cases not excepted, so enumeration weakens it in
cases not enumerated," has been perpetually referred to, as a fine
illustration. These maxims, rightly understood, and rightly applied,
undoubtedly furnish safe guides to assist us in the task of exposition.
But they are susceptible of being applied, and indeed are often inge-
niously applied, to the subversion of the text, and the objects of the
instrument. Thus, it has been suggested, that an affirmative provision
in a particular case excludes the existence of the like provision in
every other case; and a negative provision in a particular case admits
the existence of the same thing in every other case. Both of these
deductions are, or rather may be, unfounded in solid reasoning. Thus,
it was objected to the constitution, that, having provided for the trial
by jury in criminal cases, there was an implied exclusion of it in civil
cases. As if there was not an essential difference between silence and
abolition, between a positive adoption of it in one class of cases, and
a discretionary right (it being clearly within the reach of the judicial
powers confided to the Union) to adopt, or reject it in all or any other
cases. One might with just as much propriety hold, that, because
congress has power "to declare war," but no power is expressly given
to make peace, the latter is excluded; or that, because it is declared,
that "no bill of attainder, or ex post facto law shall be passed" by
congress, therefore congress possess in all other cases the right to
pass any laws. The truth is, that in order to ascertain, how far an
affirmative or negative provision excludes, or implies others, we must
look to the nature of the provision, the subject matter, the objects,
and the scope of the instrument. These, and these only, can properly
determine the rule of construction. There can be no doubt, that an
affirmative grant of powers in many cases will imply an exclusion of
all others. As, for instance, the constitution declares, that the powers
of congress shall extend to certain enumerated cases. This specifi-
cation of particulars evidently excludes all pretensions to a general
legislative authority. Why? Because an affirmative grant of special
powers would be absurd, as well as useless, if a general authority
were intended. In relation, then, to such a subject as a constitution,
the natural and obvious sense of its provisions, apart from any techni-
cal or artificial rules, is the true criterion of construction.
°0 2
Thus, as Story himself recognized, the expressio unius principle is not to be
applied as a technical or artificial rule of constitutional interpretation, but
rather should be applied only if the nature and purpose of the particular provi-
102. 1 STORY, supra note 100, § 448, at 433-35 (footnotes omitted).
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sion admits of such a construction. "" This qualification seems to have been
recognized as well by Senator Crittenden, who, during the Trumbull debate,
stated:
The very enumeration of these qualifications [in Article I, Section 3,
Clause 3] excludes the idea that they intended any other qualifica-
tions. That is the plain rule of ordinary construction; but, for a reason
above all technical considerations, it is applicable here. The object of
the Federal Constitution was to have a body framed by a uniform rule
throughout the United States ...."'
It is then to the nature and objects of the Qualifications Clauses that the pro-
ponents of exclusivity next turned.
B. The Nature of the Qualifications Clauses
The nature of the Qualifications Clauses, as viewed by the proponents of
an exclusive reading, was most succinctly stated during the McCreery debate
by Representative William Findley of Pennsylvania, Chairman of the Commit-
tee of Elections in the Tenth Congress:
The qualifications of the National Legislature are of a national
character, and as such must be uniform throughout the nation, and
prescribed by the authority of the nation, and by it exclusively; but no
State Legislature is vested with national authority, they cannot make
citizens for the nation, nor prescribe qualifications either for citizens
or for Executive officers of the nation, much less can they prescribe
qualifications for the National Legislature, other than the nation itself
has prescribed, nor abridge the Constitutional power of Congress to
decide on the qualifications of its own members, agreeably to the
rules prescribed by the Constitution; that authority, expressly vested
by the whole, cannot be abridged or changed by a part-by a seven-
teenth part of the nation."5
In Findley's view, both the national character of the Congress and the need for
uniformity of qualifications among its members rendered the nature of the
clause susceptible to the expressio unius principle." 6 Justice Story agreed,
103. 1 Id.
104. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 548 (1856) (emphasis added).
105. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 873 (1807).
106. Id. The Term Limits majority relied heavily on this argument, finding that "[tihe Consti-
tution ... creates a uniform national body representing the interests of a single people." U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1864 (1995). The Court went on to state that al-
lowing individual States to set qualifications would "undermin[e] the uniformity and the national
character that the Framers envisioned and sought to ensure." Id. The Term Limits majority treats
the issue as an all-or-nothing proposition, however: "The Congress of the United States ... is not
a confederation of nations in which separate sovereigns are represented by appointed delegates,
but is instead a body composed of representatives of the people." Id. at 1863. The majority's
formulation ignored the distinction between "state people" and "national people," see infra text
accompanying notes 125-28, and thus ignored the possibility that the nature of the system estab-
lished in 1787 is partly national, partly confederal.
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and both seem on first glance to be fully supported on the uniformity point by
James Madison's important statement in Federalist 52:
The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and proper-
ly defined by the State constitutions [than those of the electors], and
being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been
very properly considered and regulated by the convention. A repre-
sentative of the United States must be of the age of twenty-five years;
must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; must, at
the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State he is to repre-
sent; and, during the time of his service, must be in no office under
the United States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this
part of the federal government is open to merit of every description,
whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard
to property or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious
faith. 0 7
Madison's statement is not as unambiguous as it first appears, however; if one
considers that the setting of certain minimum qualifications only, such as age,
citizenship, and inhabitancy, was "susceptible of uniformity," the statement
takes on a different character. In fact, other qualifications were not only not
susceptible of uniformity, but were regulated in vastly different ways in the
existing state constitutions. Virginia, for example, jealously guarded her prop-
erty qualification, and the several states had different definitions even for the
uniform qualification of "inhabitancy."
That the Framers intended to establish only uniform minimum qualifica-
tions is implicit in an exchange that occurred in the Massachusetts Ratifying
Convention between General Thompson and Rufus King, a leading Federalist
and, like Madison, a member of the Federal Convention's Committee of Style.
Thompson asked why old age had not been made a disqualification for office.
King responded:
[I]t would not extend to all parts of the continent alike. Life ... in a
great measure, depends on climate. What in the Southern States
would be accounted long life, would be but the meridian in the
Northern; what here is the time of ripened judgment is old age there.
Therefore the want of such a disqualification cannot be made an ob-
jection to the Constitution."8
Thus, according to King, a maximum age was not made a national qualifica-
tion because, unlike the minimum age contained in the Qualifications Clauses,
it was not susceptible to uniformity. King did not deny that the states individu-
ally could add a maximum age qualification; in fact, his statement implied a
general understanding that they could."9
107. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
108. Debate in Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 93, at 36.
109. The last sentence of the passage from No. 52 of The Federalist suggests that Madison
may have held a contrary view. "Under [the] reasonable limitations [on age, citizenship, and state
residency] the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description
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Representative Findley also claimed during the McCreery debate that the
Qualifications Clauses were exclusive because of the national character of the
Congress." '" It was on this point that the most passionate arguments were
made on both sides, because not only the character of the Congress, but that
of the states as well, was implicated by Findley's claim. Representative John
Rowan of Kentucky, siding with Findley on the issue, stated that "the States
were to the Union what counties were to a State," or, in other words, that the
states were mere administrative divisions of a consolidated national govern-
ment.' To the strong states' rights men of Virginia, such statements were
so surprising as to warrant little argument in reply. Representative Love pro-
vided this brief response:
To gentlemen who hold these principles, who contended that this is a
great consolidated Government, possessing all the powers of legisla-
tion, extended as its empire is over a territory of various climates,
leading to various pursuits among its inhabitants, he could address no
argument, but had the consolation to believe that the day was past
when such doctrines could have their effect on the people of this
country.'"
Representative Philip Key of Maryland stated a more prudent version of
Rowan's argument, as follows: "Shall a portion of the people of the United
States, claiming their Representative under the Constitution of the United
States, be restricted in their choice by a State law?"'" For Key, members of
the House of Representatives represented not "the people of any particular
State, but the people of the United States generally."'"' Key's rationale, how-
ever, would allow the states to impose qualifications on its Senators, who
much more clearly represented particular states; ' 5 it is to that extent incon-
sistent because a parallel clause in the Constitution sets qualifications for
Senators." 6 His analysis is, moreover, hard to sustain even as applied to the
House, and is based on an erroneous reading of the Constitution. Key stated
that Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 provides that "the House of Representatives
shall consist of members chosen every second year by the people of the
.... "suggests that the qualifications were not only to be uniform but exclusive. THE FEDERALIST
No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Of course, the voters of a particular
state could effectively create an old age or property qualification merely by refusing, election after
election, to vote for anyone with the unwanted characteristics, thus causing a lack of uniformity in
Congress on those additional grounds. It is hard to see how a decision by the people of a particu-
lar state to bind themselves to such qualifications in advance of the election in any way decreases
uniformity. Madison's statement is important on the question of the objects of the Qualifications
Clauses, not their uniformity. Accordingly, it is further addressed below. See infra part II.C.
110. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 873 (1807).
111. Id. at 894.
112. Id. at 938.
113. Id. at 910.
114. Id. at 913.
115. During the Trumbull debate, Senator Pugh of Ohio argued that "[t]he House of Repre-
sentatives is a body which owes its existence to the Federal Constitution; but the Senate is only
the Congress of the Confederation remodeled." CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 550 (1856).
116. "No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years,
and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhab-
itant of that State for which he shall be chosen." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
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United States,""' 7 when in fact the clause actually provides for election by
the people of the several States."8
As Representative John Randolph of Virginia pointed out, Article I, Sec-
tion 2, Clause 1 is not the only clause of the Constitution which treats mem-
bers of the House as representatives of the people of particular states rather
than of the people as a whole:
The gentleman affirmed that in the Senate alone was to be found
any feature of a confederated Government. Did he forget, that in one
of its most important acts, the election of a President, the House of
Representatives voted by States? That at every session, they were
called over and sworn in by States; and it would be more in the spirit
of the Constitution, that the yeas and nays should be taken by
States."9
Randolph could have included two other provisions: "Representatives ... shall
be apportioned among the several States,"'' 20 and members of the House of
Representatives are to be chosen "by the People of the several States."''
Even today, despite the Supreme Court's "one man, one vote," holding in
Reynolds v. Sims,122 members of Congress represent vastly different numbers
of people because state lines are not crossed in the drawing of congressional
districts.
Representative Quincy countered by accusing Randolph of thinking that
the Constitution was a mere confederacy of the states, and pointed out that
"the language of the Constitution was not we the States, but we the people of
those states."' 23 If Randolph's views are susceptible to such a reading, 2 4
Quincy and Key give too little recognition to the states and fail to recognize a
crucial feature of the American system-that the people operate in two differ-
ent capacities, one as the people of a partly-sovereign state, the other as a
117. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 910 (1807) (emphasis added).
118. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. I (emphasis added). Although not misciting the clause, the
Term Limits majority makes a similar error, for it cites the clause to support the proposition that
Members of the House of Representatives are "chosen directly, not by the States, but by the peo-
ple," with the national people clearly implied. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct.
1842, 1863 (1995).
119. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 943 (1807). In his Term Limits concurrence, Justice Kennedy
recognized these clauses in which "the Constitution is solicitous of the prerogatives of the States,"
but denied that they "support[] the idea of state interference with the most basic relation between
the National Government and its citizens, the selection of legislative representatives." Term Limits,
115 S. Ct. at 1873.
120. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
121. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
122. 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964). The holding in Reynolds v. Sims applied only to the states,
but presumably would apply to federal reapportionments as well under the implied equal protec-
tion component of the Fifth Amendment, see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), were it not
for the explicit constitutional provisions to the contrary. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1; U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
123. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 907 (1807) (emphasis in original).
124. Randolph did not actually claim the constitution was a confederacy, in so many words,
nor did his argument depend on such a claim, but his view of states' rights was certainly elaborat-
ed upon, and perhaps expanded, twenty years later by the nullification theorists, especially John C.
Calhoun.
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portion of the United States. As James Wilson stated during the Pennsylvania
Ratifying Convention:
I consider the people of the United States as forming one great
community, and I consider the people of the different States as form-
ing communities again on a lesser scale. From this great division of
the people into distinct communities it will be found necessary that
different proportions of legislative powers should be given to the
governments, according to the nature, number and magnitude of their
objects.
Unless the people are considered in these two views, we shall
never be able to understand the principle on which this system was
constructed. I view the States as made for the people as well as by
them, and not the people as made for the States. The people, there-
fore, have a right, whilst enjoying the undeniable powers of society,
to form either a general government, or state governments, in what
manner they please; or to accommodate them to one another, and by
this means preserve them all. This, I say, is the inherent and unalien-
able right of the people, and as an illustration of it, I beg to read a
few words from the Declaration of Independence ....
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . 1..."-25
The dual nature of the people, and hence of their representatives, was clearly
described by Senator Pugh of Ohio during the Trumbull debate:
I agree that no State can dispense with, or subtract from, the
requisites prescribed in the Federal Constitution; but I can see no
pretense for asserting that the States may not superadd any qualifica-
tion which is consistent with those requisites. A Senator is an officer
of the Federal Government; he is, also, an officer of his own State.
He is elected to represent the people of the State, in an aggregate and
organized capacity, as one of the sovereign parties to our Federal
compact.... Whilst the Federal Constitution might prescribe certain
requisites, therefore, in order to secure the interests of the Federal
Government, the rights of the citizens of all the States, and the wel-
fare of the whole Union; whilst it might well do this, and bind each
State to an observance of such requisites, no reason can be assigned
why the people of a State-whose peculiar representative and officer
in equal degree their Senator is-might not prescribe other qualifica-
tions, in addition, for the purpose of protecting their separate inter-
ests, rights, and welfare.'26
125. James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, 4 Dec. 1787, reprinted in 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUION 62 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987) (added by Wilson).
126. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 550 (1856). Justice Thomas made the identical
argument in his Term Limits dissent: "[Tlhe fact that the Constitution specifies certain qualifica-
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Senator Foot rejected Pugh's characterization, arguing that "the Senate of the
United States is the creation and its members the creatures of the Federal
Constitution," and that
the office of Senator or Representative in Congress is a United States
office, and not a State office; that it is created by the United States
Constitution, and not by the State constitution; that all its functions
are derived from the Federal Constitution, and not from the constitu-
tion or any original right of the State.'27
Senator Pugh, like James Wilson before him, makes the stronger argument.
Thus, although Senator Foot and Representatives Key and Quincy were correct
in asserting that the House of Representatives has a national character, they
were wrong in ignoring the fact that it also has a confederal character in
which the states, as states, are constitutionally guaranteed a role. As Represen-
tative Charles Snodgrass of Tennessee stated during the Roberts debate:
I take the position that [a member of the House of Representatives] is
a State officer, elected by the people of his State to represent them in
Congress, which body is composed of the sum total of the number
elected in all the States. It is true that the effects of such representa-
tion may become national in character, but nevertheless the choice of
office is locally controlled. His resignation is made to the governor,
and his place can not be filled except at the pleasure of the State
authorities.'28
The arguments about the partly national character of the Congress do not,
therefore, provide an adequate rationale for reading the Qualifications Clauses
exclusively so as to prohibit the states from imposing other qualifications
suitable to protecting the partly confederal character of Congress.
C. The Object of the Qualifications Clauses
The proponents of an exclusive reading also argued that the object, or
purpose, of the Qualifications Clauses was to protect the people's right to vote
for whomever they chose, subject only to a very few fundamental limitations.
Representative Findley clearly articulated this position during the McCreery
debate: "It is the natural right of all men to choose whom they please, without
regard to age, residence, &c., to represent and advocate their interests," and
the imposition of qualifications for office is an infringement of that right.
2 9
In stating the position, Findley echoed the statements by a number of the
participants in the state conventions which ratified the Constitution, 30 state-
tions that the Framers deemed necessary to protect the competence of the National Legislature
does not imply that it strips the people of the individual States of the power to protect their own
interests by adding other requirements for their own representatives." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1886-87 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
127. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 579-80 (1856).
128. 33 CONG. REC. 1126 (1899).
129. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 873 (1807).
130. See id. at 872-77.
[Vol. 73:1
OPEN TO MERIT OF EVERY DESCRIPTION?
ments which the Supreme Court cited in both Powell v. McCormack3' and
Term Limits.'32 Alexander Hamilton, for example, argued during the New
York ratifying convention that "the true principle of a republic is, that the peo-
ple should choose whom they please to govern them. Representation is imper-
fect in proportion as the current of popular favor is checked. This great source
of free government, popular election, should be perfectly pure, and the most
unbounded liberty allowed."'33 Similarly, Robert Livingston argued during
the Virginia ratifying convention that "[tihe people are the best judges who
ought to represent them. To dictate and control them, to tell them whom they
shall not elect, is to abridge their natural rights." '34
The position articulated by Findley and several of the founders may prove
too much for the present inquiry, however, for under such a rationale even the
minimal qualifications listed in the Constitution would be an infringement on
the natural rights of the people. The question then, is not whether the right of
suffrage can be infringed, but by whom. Findley attempted an answer:
[I]t is necessary for the protection of society that this right be
abridged, but it ought to be no further abridged than is absolutely
necessary for the safety of the society, and of this the society itself
are the only competent and authoritative judges; and in the United
States the society have decided on this principle by their general and
ratifying conventions, and they have delegated no authority even to
Congress, much less to States, to alter or add to or diminish these
qualifications. "'
Findley's response fails to take account of the parallel societies-state and
national-that operate in the American regime. It therefore provides no re-
sponse to the position articulated by Senator Pugh above, that the people in
their individual state capacities as well as the people in their national capacity
have interests, the protection of which might require the infringement of "the
natural right of all men to choose whom they please" to represent them.'36
As Findley himself recognized: "The right of prescribing new or additional
qualifications of members of Congress, is not a question between the Federal
and State Governments; it rests between the State Legislature and the peo-
ple."'37 Findley appears to have been speaking only of the people in their
national capacity, but once the people are also recognized in their state capaci-
ties, Findley's analysis would seem to require that those lesser societies could
also seek to protect their societal interests by imposing additional qualifica-
tions. Indeed, Representative Johnson suggested during the McCreery debate
that the problem with the Maryland provision was that it was enacted by the
131. See 395 U.S. 486, 532-41 (1969).
132. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1849-51, 1856-71 (1995).
133. Powell, 395 U.S. at 540-41 (citing 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 93, at 257); see also
Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1851.
134. Powell, 395 U.S. at 541 (citing 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 93, at 292-93); see also
Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1851.
135. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 873-74 (1807).
136. See supra text accompanying note 126.
137. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 874 (1807).
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state legislature, not by the state people.'38 After repeating Findley's natural
rights argument, he stated: "Would any power less than a convention of the
State of Maryland assume the right of adding a disqualification?"'
3 9
There is a possible answer to Findley's conundrum, one suggested by
Senators Seward and Foot during the Trumbull debate: Article VI of the Con-
stitution provides that the Constitution "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."'' " Thus, if the Qualifications Clauses insure the right of individual
citizens to vote for anyone who is constitutionally qualified, additional qualifi-
cations imposed by a state legislature or by the people would be an in-
fringement of that constitutionally protected right, and hence must give way to
the higher authority. To the extent that the sovereignty of a state's people is
also recognized and protected by the national Constitution, however, as de-
scribed above,'4 ' the people's right to prescribe certain limitations on them-
selves in the choosing of representatives rests on the same constitutional plane
as the individual's right to choose whom he will. The Supremacy Clause does
not tilt the scale toward one side or the other when both rights are constitu-
tionally recognized. 42
Nor is Findley's purpose the only possible purpose of the Qualifications
Clauses. Given the history of representation under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, it is at least plausible that the clauses were intended merely to prevent
states from sending underage representatives, or those just recently naturalized.
As Representative John Randolph stated during the McCreery debate:
[Sbo far from fixing the qualifications of members of [the] House, the
constitution merely enumerated a few disqualifications within which
the States were left to act. It said to the States, you have been in the
habit of electing young men barely of age; you shall send us none but
such as are five and twenty: some of you have elected persons just
naturalized; you shall not elect any to this House who have not been
seven years citizens of the United States. Sometimes mere sojourners
and transient persons have been clothed with legislative authority; you
shall elect none whom your laws do not consider as inhabitants. Thus
guarding against too great laxity in the State regulations, by general
and negative provisions, leaving them, however, within the limits of
138. See id. at 896-98.
139. Id. at 897. Representative Rowan also asked, "[hiad the Legislature of the State of Mary-
land the power of thus contracting the choice of the people?" Id. at 892. Elsewhere, however, he
clearly implied that not even the people of the state could impose qualifications in addition to
those enumerated by the people of the whole. See id. at 896-98.
140. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 343, 579 (1856) (statements of Sen. Seward and
Sen. Foot, respectively) (referring to U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
141. See supra text accompanying note 119-22.
142. The Term Limits majority also suggested at one point that the clauses embody "an egali-
tarian ideal-that election to the National Legislature should be open to all people of merit .... "
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1862 (1995). As Justice Thomas pointed out,
"the majority apparently would read the Qualifications Clauses to create a personal right to be a
candidate for Congress," id. at 1891 (Thomas, J., dissenting), although the majority denied that its
statement had such implications. Id. at 1851 n. 11.
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those restrictions, to act for themselves; to consult the genius, habits,
and, if you will, the prejudices of their people.'43
Representative Robert Miers of Indiana made a similar argument during the
Roberts debate, although he focused more on the citizenship qualification:
We all know that in England the people had been in the habit of
sending to their lawmaking power young men, minors who were not
matured, minors who were not capable of comprehending the Gov-
ernment and legislating for its best interests. They had not only been
doing that, but nonresidents, alien citizens, had been sent to Parlia-
ment for the purpose of making laws. I believe, and take it not only
from my judgment, but from the reasonings on that occasion and
from the debates, that the real purpose of the founders in enacting the
Constitution was to make a concise statement and guard against the
possibility of foreigners controlling the Republic. I believe the reason
of that fixed limit upon citizenship was in order that aliens and non-
residents might be shut out from the great American House of Con-
gress for a period of time until they should become Americanized and
catch the spirit of the Republic.'"
Thus, in this view, the Qualifications Clauses were intended to protect certain
national interests against state folly; they said nothing about the ability of the
states to impose additional qualifications to protect their own interests.
At first glance, it is hard to reconcile Randolph's statement of purpose
and his corollary view that the states could impose additional qualifications
with the passages from the ratifying conventions cited above.' 5 Furthermore,
three important passages from the Federalist papers lend even more credence
to the Findley claim that the purpose of the Qualifications Clauses was to
protect the natural right of the people to choose whomever they wished. In
Federalist 52, Madison wrote:
Under [the] reasonable limitations [of age, citizenship, and residency],
the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of
every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old,
and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profes-
sion of religious faith."4
Similarly, in Federalist 57, Madison wrote:
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen
whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of
his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or
of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint
the inclination of the people.'47
143. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 883-84 (1807).
144. 33 CONG. REC. 1138 (1899).
145. See supra text accompanying note 133-34.
146. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
147. Id. No. 57, at 351.
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Finally, Hamilton wrote in Federalist 60:
The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich the prefer-
ence apprehended but by prescribing qualifications of property either
for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the
power to be conferred upon the national government. Its authority
would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the plac-
es, and the manner of elections. The qualifications of the persons who
may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occa-
sions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable
by the legislature."
These passages are clearly sweeping, and strongly suggest, standing alone, that
the Qualifications Clauses set forth an exclusive list of qualifications. Before
we can be certain of such a conclusion, however, we must place the passages
in context, remembering that Madison and Hamilton were writing during a
particular political controversy and responding to particular concerns raised by
the "Anti-Federalist" opponents of the national constitution.'49
Foremost among the concerns of the Anti-Federalists was that the national
government was given too much power under the proposed constitution.5
Anti-Federalists were concerned, for example, that the preemptive regulatory
power given to Congress over the times, places, and manner of elections 5'
would enable it to impose a property qualification and thereby create an oli-
garchic national government. Hamilton's statement in Federalist 60 is a direct
response to this concern. Placed in this context, Hamilton's statement is mere-
ly a rebuttal to the charge that Congress could impose a property (or other)
qualification, not that the states were similarly limited. When combined with
the fact that the states do not derive their power from the U.S. Constitution, it
is at least plausible that the sweeping last sentence of the passage, describing
the Constitutional qualifications as "fixed," meant only that Congress could
not add qualifications because the Time, Place and Manner Clause conferred
upon it no such authority, not that the Qualifications Clauses themselves set
forth an exclusive list of qualifications.
Anti-Federalists also argued that the terms of office for Representatives
(two years) and especially Senators (six years) were too long, since under the
Articles of Confederation, members of the Continental Congress were elected
annually, and were subject to recall by their states.'52 The following is from
the minority report of the Pennsylvania ratifying convention:
148. Id. No. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton).
149. In a similar vein, the Supreme Court has long recognized that "general expressions, in
every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used."
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821).
150. J.R. Pole, Introduction to THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION FOR AND AGAINST 17 (J.R.
Pole ed., 1987).
151. "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by
Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
152. ART. OF CONFED. art. V, reprinted in I THORPE, supra note 39, at 11.
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The permanency of the appointments of senators and representatives,
and the controul the congress have over their election, will place
them independent of the sentiments and resentment of the people, and
the administration having a greater interest in the government than in
the community, there will be no consideration to restrain them from
oppression and tyranny.'53
Anti-Federalists also objected to the fact that the new Constitution did not
mandate rotation in office:
[11n a government consisting of but a few members, elected for long
periods, and far removed from the observation of the people, but few
changes in the ordinary course of elections take place among the
members; they become in some measure a fixed body, and often inat-
tentive to the public good, callous, selfish, and the fountain of corrup-
tion. To prevent these evils, and to force a principle of pure anima-
tion into the federal government .... and to produce attention, activi-
ty, and a diffusion of knowledge in the community, we ought to
establish among others the principle of rotation. Even good men in
office, in time, imperceptibly lose sight of the people, and gradually
fall into measures prejudicial to them. 5'
Madison responded to both of these concerns. In Federalist 52, after rec-
ognizing that it was "essential to liberty that the government in general should
have a common interest with the people" and that it was "particularly essen-
tial" that the House of Representatives "should have an immediate dependence
on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people,"'' 51 Madison argued that bien-
nial elections were sufficient to insure the necessary commonality of interest
between representatives and the people. Similarly, in Federalist 57, Madison
spoke of the importance of frequent elections:
[T]he House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the
members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people.
Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their
elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be com-
153. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention in Pennsylvania
to Their Constituents, 18 Dec. 1787, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST § 11, at 48-
50 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
154. Letter from a Federal Farmer, Jan. 10, 1788 (attributed to Richard Henry Lee), reprinted
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 153, § 8, at 286, 290-91. The Term Limits
majority made much of the fact that supporters of the Constitution never countered such argu-
ments by responding that the states could individually impose a rotation requirement on their
members of Congress. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1859-60 (1995). "If
the participants in the debate had believed that the States retained the authority to impose term
limits, it is inconceivable that the Federalists would not have made this obvious response to the
arguments of the pro-rotation forces." Id. at 1860. It is at least as inconceivable, however, that the
opponents of the Constitution would not have raised the issue if a restriction on state power was
understood. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent, "The recorded ratification debates also
contain no affirmative statement that the States cannot supplement the constitutional qualifica-
tions .... If the Federal Constitution had been understood to deprive the States of this significant
power, one might well have expected its opponents to seize on this point in arguing against ratifi-
cation." Id. at 1901 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
155. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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pelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when
their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to
the level from which they were raised; there forever to remain unless
a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a
renewal of it. 56
It was also in response to such concerns of the Anti-Federalists that Madi-
son argued in Federalist 51 that "[a] dependence on the people is, no doubt,
the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the
necessity of auxiliary precautions."' 57 The principal auxiliary precaution
Madison described was the system of checks and balances contained in the
Constitution. Significantly, though, Madison thought that was not enough:
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power
of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority
necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to
divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by
different modes of election and different principles of action, as little
connected with each other as the nature of their common functions
and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even
be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still fur-
ther precautions.5 '
It was in this context of answering Anti-Federalist charges against the
"oligarchic[ ]" features of the new government'59 that Madison argued that
under the reasonable limitations of the Qualifications Clauses, the door of
Congress was "open to merit of every description'"' and that "[n]o qualifi-
cation of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted
to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people."'' It was
in the context of demonstrating the numerous ways in which the national
government would remain subject to the people's will that Madison even
addressed the Qualifications Clauses. But in such a context, Madison's broad
language must be understood as applicable to the national government only;
the issue of state power was not at issue.'62
Moreover, Madison stated that "[iut may even be necessary to guard
against dangerous encroachments [by the Congress] by still further precau-
tions."'6 3 What was to be the source of such further precautions? Given the
important role Congress plays in the Constitutional amendment process, it is
hard to envision the amendment process as a ready mechanism.6" The states
156. Id. No. 57, at 352.
157. Id. No. 51, at 322.
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. See id. No. 57, at 350.
160. Id. No. 52, at 326.
161. Id. No. 57 at 351.
162. As Justice Thomas argued in his Term Limits dissent, "[o]ne should not lightly assume
that Madison and his colleagues, who were attempting to win support at the state level for the new
Constitution, were proclaiming the inability of the people of the States or their state legislatures to
prescribe any eligibility requirements for their own Representatives or Senators." U.S. Term Lim-
its, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1892 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
163. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
164. Article V, of course, provides that Congress may propose amendments whenever two
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are a much more likely source for such precautions and if, in the judgment or
inclination of the people of a state, additional precautions become neces-
sary, 6*5 the context in which Madison was writing would suggest that the
constitution he was defending provided no barrier. Reading the Qualifications
Clauses as setting a minimal limitation on state power rather than setting forth
an exclusive list of qualifications is in accord with such concerns. As Justice
Thomas wrote in his Term Limits dissent: "[w]hen the people of a State them-
selves decide to restrict the field of candidates whom they are willing to send
to Washington as their representatives, they simply have not violated the prin-
ciple that 'the people should choose whom they please to govern them.""'
D. An Unrepublican Parade of Horribles
The proponents of the exclusive interpretation also argued that it was an
important principle of republican government that the qualifications of elected
officials should be fixed,'67 and that if the states were free to impose addi-
tional qualifications, true republican government would be at an end. During
the McCreery debate, Representative Sturges rattled off the following qual-
ifications that might be imposed if the principle of state power over the sub-
ject were established:
Will gentlemen attend to the consequences of the doctrine they
contend for against the acceptance of the [Election Committee's]
report? If the States had a right to superadd, why might they not say,
by law, that the candidate should have an income of $10,000 per
year? Why not, if they should think it expedient, apportion the num-
ber of Representatives to which they are entitled, among the different
professions of the community? Why not say that a certain number
should be physicians, a certain number lawyers, and a certain number
clergymen? Why not say that the candidate should be an inhabitant of
the particular State any number of years he pleases-say twelve, or
any other number-although, by the Constitution, a residence of
thirds of both Houses deem it necessary. U.S. CONST. art. V. Even the alternate route by which a
convention can propose amendments requires that Congress call the convention after application
by two thirds of the state legislatures. Id.
165. Such as the district residency requirement at issue in McCreery. See supra part I.A.; see
also infra part 1l.D.
166. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1891 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 93, at 257 (remarks of Alexander Hamilton at the
New York convention)).
167. See, e.g., Representative Smilie during the McCreery debate: "[Tihere was a principle in
a Republican Government of as much importance as any other, as respected the safety of the Gov-
ernment, that the qualifications of the people elected should be firm, steady, and unalterable." 17
ANNALS OF CONG. 887 (1807). James Madison had argued that the qualifications of both the
electors and the elected should be, and were, fixed by the national constitution. The qualifications
of the electors were clearly not "fixed" by the national constitution, however, but were tied to
whatever qualifications the several states imposed upon their own electors. Thus, the issue is not
whether qualifications should be fixed, but whether they could be fixed in state constitutions as
well as the national constitution. Moreover, because of the different nature of the authority granted
to at least some of the state governments-all powers were given except those specifically re-
served, whereas only specifically granted powers were given to the national govemment--quali-
fications might also be "fixed" by state legislatures and still conform to Madison's analysis.
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seven years within the United States is sufficient? Why not say he
should profess certain political principles? Why not that he should
possess certain moral qualifications? Or, to come more nearly to the
particular case now under consideration, if they had a right to restrict
the residence to a particular town in the district, why not to a par-
ticular street in that town, or even to a particular house? Were gentle-
men prepared to admit these consequences?'
Representative Rowan echoed Sturges's concerns and suggested that such
qualifications would run afoul of the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution. 69
In so doing, he suggested an answer to his own concerns. Some qualifications,
such as owning a large landed estate, would undermine republicanism and
verge toward aristocracy, and thus might be checked by Congress as necessary
and proper to effect the guarantee of Article IV, Section 4.170 Other
qualifications, however, such as residency within the district, were representa-
tion enhancing and thus were compatible with the Guarantee Clause. As John
Randolph stated, "residence within the body of the county or district [is] of the
very essence of representation.
The Fourteenth Amendment, and by it the incorporation of the First
Amendment as applicable to the states, have afforded modem courts additional
tools with which to check the imposition of unrepublican qualifications, but
those opposed to an exclusive interpretation of the Qualifications Clauses had
an answer to such concerns even prior to the Fourteenth Amendment. As John
Randolph argued during the McCreery debate:
The most violent suppositions were pressed into service to show that
the States cannot be trusted. He might as well suppose that the States
168. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 878 (1807) (Rep. Sturges); see also 15 CONG. REC. 3297, 3300-01
(1884) (Representatives Elliott and Peters discussing fixed qualifications for members of Congress
during the Peters debate).
169. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 892-93 (1807) (Rep. Rowan). "The United States shall guarantee
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government ...." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
170. The Supreme Court stated in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42-43 (1849), that
some issues arising under the Guarantee Clause are political questions not justiciable by the
courts, thus depriving the clause of much of its power. See also Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 149-50 (1912) (holding that whether a state ceased to be republican in
form because it adopted initiative and referendum procedures was a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion). Enforcement of the clause by Congress remained a possibility because, as the Luther Court
implied, Congress might refuse admission to members from states that imposed unrepublican
qualifications. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42.
171. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 885 (1807). Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that
"no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the
United States," might also have provided a limitation on the states. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
Senator Foot argued during the Trumbull debate, however, that if a state could add disqualifica-
tions on judges, "it has equal power to impose the same disability upon those professing the Ro-
man Catholic faith, or the Jewish faith, or the Calvinistic faith," CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st
Sess. 580 (1856), despite the express ban on religious qualifications contained in Article VI. The
two kinds of disqualifications were indistinguishable, according to Foot, because "the State has
just as much power to impose tests of qualification for office under the United States, which are
expressly prohibited by the Federal Constitution, and quite as much power to take away or abro-
gate those tests of qualification which it expressly prescribes, as it has to superadd other tests
which are clearly excluded by implication." Id. Senator Pugh countered by stating it was sufficient
to say that religious tests were expressly prohibited. Id. at 583.
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might require five millions of acres of land as a qualification neces-
sary to entitle a man to vote; and then most of the States would be
wholly unrepresented; indeed none but Yazoo men could vote.'
There would be an end of the Government. No quorum of that House
would ever assemble. Such monstrous cases might amuse, but could
never convince. The Constitution had confided to the States, State
interests. If they were not safe there let them adopt this report, do
away all State rights, and then we should have that consolidated
government which the gentleman from Kentucky so much admired,
but which he from his very soul detested and abhorred.'73
Senator Pugh made a similar observation during the Trumbull debate: "Why
should we fear that the people of the States, either through their conventions
or through their Legislatures, will abuse this power more than we should abuse
it? Has all wisdom departed from the people?"
74
While such arguments may carry little weight in the twentieth century,
when most Americans tend to view the national government as the defender of
individual rights against unrepublican and discriminatory state practices, the
opposite was true in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, when the
states were seen as a bulwark against encroachments on liberty by the central
government. '
E. The Constitution Affords the States No Power to Add Qualifications
The final argument made by the proponents of exclusive interpretation
was that the Constitution nowhere gives the states power to impose additional
qualifications for members of Congress. Essentially, this argument is a deriva-
tive of the argument made earlier; because Congress is a creation of the na-
tional Constitution, the states have no power over congressional elections
except that which the same Constitution gives them. The exponents of this
argument view the Time, Place and Manner Clause of Article I, Section 4, as
the sole grant of power to the states over the subject of congressional elec-
tions,'76 and since the power to add qualifications for members of Congress
is not a regulation of time, place, or manner, it is not included within the
clause.'77 As Representative Quincy remarked during the McCreery debate,
172. The Term Limits majority made a similar argument. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1858 (1995) ("[U]nder the dissent's approach, the States could achieve
exactly the same result [as not holding elections] by simply setting qualifications for federal office
sufficiently high that no one could meet those qualifications."). Randolph's answer to his 1807
opponents is equally applicable to the Term Limits majority.
173. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 944 (1807).
174. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 583 (1856).
175. Even a property qualification, which immediately suggests oligarchic motives to the
twentieth century observer, was seen as enhancing representation in the largely agrarian society of
the eighteenth century by requiring that the representative have a stake in the community he was
to represent.
176. Or one of two powers granted to the states, the other being the indirect power under
Article I, Section 2, Clause I to set the qualifications for electors. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
177. The Term Limits majority correctly pointed out that if the states had power to impose
qualifications under this clause, "Congress itself would have the power to 'make or alter' [qualifi-
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"[i]t must be remembered, that if the power of fixing qualifications be not
given in this clause, it was given nowhere; there was no delegation of it to the
people, or to the States."'
7 8
There are two problems with Quincy's argument: first, the states do not
derive their powers from the national Constitution, but from the people of the
several states via the several state constitutions. The national Constitution acts
rather by way of prohibition on state powers, and the states are presumed to
have powers not delegated to the national government nor prohibited to them,
as the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution makes clear." 9 As Samuel
Wood argued during the Peters debate:
The Federal Convention was not delegating rights or powers to the
States, as the majority report seems to assume, or to the people; it
was the States in convention delegating powers to the General Gov-
ernment, and imposing certain restrictions upon the States, restrictions
upon the powers already possessed by the States. And it should not
be forgotten that the States surrendered no right not expressly named,
and they gave us no power not specifically delegated in the Constitu-
tion of the United States. Among the powers possessed by the States
before the Federal Constitution was formed was that of prescribing
the qualifications of their agents or representatives in Congress. The
right to fix other qualifications, in addition to those enumerated in the
Constitution, was retained by the States along with that mass of pow-
ers not specifically delegated.8
In response to this problem, Representative Elliott argued:
From whence do the States derive power to prescribe qualifica-
tions for members of Congress? The power is not delegated to them
by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. The office
is essentially a Federal one, and it is clear to me that unless some
section of the Constitution of the United States can be pointed out
which gives the States the power to prescribe qualifications for Rep-
resentatives in the Congress of the National Government no such
power exists."'
cations]." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1869 (1995). Attributing such a
result to the Framers would be "unfathomable," since, as the Term Limits majority and the Powell
Court before it correctly realized, the Framers clearly intended that Congress should not have the
power to control the qualifications of its own members. Id. at 1852; Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 540 (1969).
178. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 908 (1807); see also id. at 912 (statement of Rep. Key) ("I lay it
down as a political truth, that the States, in their sovereign capacities, have no power, right, or
authority to interfere with the elections of Representatives to Congress, except so far as the Con-
stitution of the United States [Art. I, § 4.] gives them special power so to do.").
179. U.S. CONST. amend X; see also infra part III.D.
180. 15 CONG. REC. app. at 76 (1884).
181. 15 CONG. REC. 3297 (1884); see also CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 467 (1856)
(statement of Sen. Trumbull) ("Where did the Legislature of Illinois get the power to elect whom-
soever it pleased to the Senate? ... The power to elect a Senator is not inherent in a State; it is
derivative from the Constitution of the United States.").
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Elliott's response merely collapses into the question about the nature of the
national legislature discussed above,'82 however, and does not address the
dual nature of representatives in Congress. Moreover, it does not respond to
the second half of Wood's argument, that the states had prescribed qualifica-
tions for their representatives to the Continental Congress prior to the Federal
Convention.
The second problem with Quincy's argument is that it turns on a reading
of Article I, Section 4 as a grant of power to the states,' but even a cursory
examination of the text of the clause does not readily support such a reading.
Article I, Section 4 provides: "[tihe Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof, but the Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of chusing Senators."'8 14 The
states legislatures shall prescribe such regulations, but Congress may make or
alter them. The clause is not a grant of power to the states, but a mandate to
them, with a preemptive power given to Congress.'85 As John Randolph ar-
gued during the McCreery debate:
The gentleman had undertaken to find a denial of the power of a
State to superadd qualifications to a Representative, in a grant of
power to the States "to regulate the time, place, and manner of hold-
ing elections," and had contended, with great propriety, that in every
grant of [power,] the powers not enumerated, and not necessary to
carry the enumerated powers into effect, were denied. Mr. R. said
that, at the first blush, the clause in question might appear to contain
a grant of power to the States, but look at it for a moment with a
steady eye and its complexion varied. It was in fact a grant of power
to Congress, with a mere permission.to the States to exercise that
power until Congress should choose to take it out of their hands. The
Government could not have been called into existence, without the in-
tervention of this power, and as it must be lodged somewhere, the
States were permitted to exercise it at the sufferance of Congress.
This clause, then, being a grant of powers to Congress and not to the
States contained a denial to Congress, and not to the States, of the
powers not enumerated in it.8 6
The importance of this distinction is that, if valid, it undermines the argument
that the Constitution has comprehensively regulated congressional elections,
and thus that the states have only that power over the subject which the
182. See supra part ll.B.
183. The Term Limits majority also read the Time, Place and Manner Clause as a grant of
authority to the states. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1869 (1995)
("The Framers intended the Elections clause to grant States authority to create procedural regula-
tions .... ") (emphasis added); id. at 1873 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[The clause) grants States
certain powers over the times, places, and manner of federal elections .. ) (emphasis added).
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
185. Justice Thomas recognized this distinction in his Term Limits dissent: "Contrary to the
majority's assumption .... this Clause does not delegate any authority to the States. Instead, it
simply imposes a duty upon them." Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1883 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
186. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 942 (1807) (emphasis added).
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Constitution gives them. The state legislatures would thus have a power to
regulate the time, place, and manner of elections that exists outside of the
Constitution, subject to the preemptive power given by the Constitution to
Congress. Similarly, Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 would recognize that the
people of the several states have a power to choose their own representatives
to Congress that exists prior to the Constitution; that same clause would then
merely mandate that they do so "every second Year" by electors having the
same qualifications as "Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature."' 8 7 Under such an interpretation, the Qualifications Clauses
would serve merely to provide an additional restriction on the recognized
power of the people of the several states; they cannot send someone who has
not attained the age of twenty-five, or been seven years a citizen, or who was
not at the time of his election an inhabitant of the state.
The problem with such an interpretation is that it is also possible that the
several elections clauses, taken together, comprehensively regulate the election
of members of Congress, thus implying that the states are prohibited from
exercising any preexisting power over the subject except that which is specifi-
cally granted. The crucial issue, then, is not whether the Constitution grants
the people of the several states 8 ' the power to impose qualifications,'89 but
whether the several elections clauses should be read to imply a prohibition on
their power. From what has been argued thus far, the clauses themselves do
not dispositively settle the question. We turn, therefore, to the arguments for
interpreting the Qualifications Clauses as a list of minimum qualifications.
187. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
188. I say "people of the several states" in order to take account of the legitimate concern
raised by Representative Findley during the McCreery debate. He observed:
[Tihe power of prescribing additional qualifications has not by the people in their con-
ventions been granted to Congress, nor does Congress claim or pretend to exercise it.
They have not, either by the federal ratifying conventions or by the State constitutions,
vested that power in the State Legislatures. Whence then did the State Legislatures de-
rive this right of making supplements to the qualifications prescribed by the Federal
Constitution? Not from the people, in any known manner.
17 ANNALS OF CONG. 876 (1807) (emphasis added). By including the language about state consti-
tutions, Findley implicitly recognized that the people of a state might grant such a power to their
state legislature. When one considers, however, that many of the state legislatures are given by
their state constitutions a general grant of legislative power subject only to certain prohibitions,
rather than a limited grant of power, such as was given to Congress, the distinction between the
state and the people of the state becomes less important.
189. Both sides of the debate generally agreed that setting qualifications was not a time,
place, or manner regulation, and the fact that qualifications were listed in a separate clause strong-
ly supports this conclusion, despite the opinion by Justice Black in Oregon v. Mitchell to the
contrary. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1972). The Illinois provision disqualifying
judges that was at issue in the Trumbull case, however, also specified that "[a]ll votes for [judges
or justices], for any elective office, (except that of judge of the supreme or circuit court,) given by
the General Assembly or the people, shall be void." ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. V, § 10, reprinted
in 2 THORPE, supra note 39, at 999. As Senator Pugh argued, the provision was thus not simply a
disqualification, but a manner of election regulation as well, because it specified the manner in
which the disqualification was to be enforced. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 550 (1856).
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III. THE ARGUMENTS FOR INTERPRETING THE QUALIFICATIONS CLAUSES AS
A LIST OF MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS
A. Some Additional Qualifications Are Compatible with the Constitutional
Qualifications
The first argument made by defenders of the states' right to impose addi-
tional qualifications was that some qualifications, such as the district residency
requirement at issue in McCreery, were compatible with the Qualifications
Clauses of the Constitution, and hence were permissible. Thus, Representative
Sawyer argued:
An inclusion [in the Constitution] of a condition of residency in a
State was not an exclusion of a residency in a district; and a State, by
annexing the latter condition to the former, did not in any respect
affect the full operation of that clause of the Constitution, according
to its sense, expressed or implied. There was no necessity, under the
most liberal construction of this article, to suppose that a residency in
a State should supersede the necessity of a residency in a district. So
far from the views which the Framers of the Constitution had being
thwarted by a construction of the kind he contended for, it would be
the means of more completely carrying them into effect, unless it
could be supposed that a person's being better qualified than the
Constitution required should disqualify him altogether; for undoubted-
ly the surest, and in fact the only way of becoming a resident of a
State, was to become a resident of a district-for every State was
composed of districts.'
The district residency requirement at issue in McCreery was an addition to the
residency requirement contained in the Constitution, and it might be argued in
response to Sawyer that at least in the three fields of age, citizenship, and
residency specified in the Constitution, the states could not alter the qualifica-
tions because the constitutional clause had occupied the field. Thus, as Senator
Foot later argued in the Trumbull case, a state could not require that a Senator
be forty years old instead of thirty, or twenty-one years a citizen instead of
nine, despite the fact that "[tihese tests of qualification are not expressly pro-
hibited in the Federal Constitution; nor are they in direct conflict or contraven-
tion of those expressly prescribed in that instrument.""'
The question whether stricter qualifications of the same type as those
specified in the Constitution are compatible with the Constitution cannot be
answered, of course, without assessing the nature of the Qualifications Clauses
themselves. If state inhabitancy was meant to be the exclusive residency re-
quirement, then the additional requirement of district residency would be in-
compatible with the constitutional requirement; but if state residency at a mini-
mum was intended, the additional qualification of district residency is perfectly
190. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 880 (1807).
191. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 580 (1856).
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compatible with the constitutional requirement.'92 While there is some evi-
dence to suggest that the Framers were concerned with representatives having
a certain set of minimum qualifications,'93 calling the additional qualifica-
tions compatible merely begs the question of the nature of the Qualifications
Clauses themselves.
The analysis is slightly different with respect to additional qualifications
that do not deal with age, citizenship, or residency, but the question about
their compatibility is the same. One might argue that because the Constitution
says nothing about property qualifications, or about ineligibility for state offi-
cers, a state's imposition of such qualifications is not in conflict with the age,
citizenship, or inhabitancy requirements of the Qualifications Clauses. Senator
Pugh, during the Trumbull debate, conceded that "no State can dispense with,
or subtract from, the requisites prescribed in the Federal Constitution," but he
saw "no pretense for asserting that the States may not superadd any qualifica-
tion which is consistent with those requirements," no reason why a state
"might not prescribe other qualifications, in addition, for the purpose of pro-
tecting their separate interests, rights, and welfare."'94
Again, though, calling a property qualification or the judicial ineligibility
provision at issue in the Trumbull case compatible with the Qualifications
Clauses begs the question about the nature of those clauses. They are compati-
ble if the clauses were intended to occupy the qualifications field with respect
only to age, citizenship, and residency requirements, but incompatible if the
clauses were intended to occupy the entire qualifications field. As Senator
Pugh recognized, "such additional requisites must not only be consistent with
those specified in the Constitution of the United States, but with the whole
spirit and tenor of that instrument."'95 Thus, the essential inquiry is not com-
patibility, but the nature and object of both the Qualifications Clauses and the
entire Constitution of which they are a part.
B. Negative Phrasing of the Qualifications Clauses
Several of the proponents of state power argued that because the Qualifi-
cations Clauses were phrased negatively, the Framers intended them to set
forth minimum, not exclusive, qualifications. John Randolph framed the argu-
ment during the McCreery debate as follows:
Mark the distinctions between the first and second paragraphs [of
Article I, Section 2]. The first is affirmative and positive. "They shall
have the qualifications necessary to the electors of the most numerous
branch of the State Legislature." The second merely negative. "No
person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained the age
of twenty-five years," &c. No man could be a member without these
requisites; but it did not follow that he who had them was entitled to
192. The same inquiry is necessary for the age and citizenship qualifications as well.
193. See supra text accompanying note 146.
194. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 550 (1856).
195. Id.
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set at naught such other requisites as the several States might think
proper to demand. If the Constitution had meant (as was contended)
to have settled the qualification of members, its words would have
naturally ran thus: "Every person who has attained the age of twenty-
five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and
who shall, when elected, be an inhabitant of the State from which he
shall be chosen, shall be eligible to a seat in the House of Represen-
tatives." But so far from fixing the qualifications of members of that
House, the Constitution merely enumerated a few disqualifications
within which the States were left to act.
96
Representative Bibb echoed Randolph's argument, and pointed out that "[t]he
language was not such, according to legal construction, as to induce the House
to say that the State authorities might not require other qualifications."' 97
More importantly, as has already been described,'98 John Randolph argued
that the Framers were concerned lest the states send unqualified representa-
tives to Congress:
[The Constitution] said to the States, you have been in the habit of
electing young men barely of age; you shall send us none but such as
are five and twenty: some of you have elected persons just natural-
ized; you shall not elect any to this House who have not been seven
years citizens of the United States. Sometimes mere sojourners and
transient persons have been clothed with legislative authority; you
shall elect none whom your laws do not consider as inhabitants. Thus
guarding against too great laxity in the State regulations, by general
and negative provisions, leaving them, however, within the limits of
those restrictions, to act for themselves; to consult the genius, habits,
and, if you will, the prejudices of their people.'"
Reading the clauses as setting forth only minimum qualifications addresses
those concerns.
There are two criticisms of the negative phrasing argument. The first is
that, by the same reasoning, states could add qualifications to the office of
President, since the clause describing presidential qualifications is also phrased
196. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 883 (1807) (emphasis in original).
197. Id. at 890. Bibb was no doubt referring to the expressio unius principle of interpretation
which, in its common usage, applied to positively-phrased recitations, not negatively-phrased ones.
See supra part II.A.; see also 33 CONG. REc. 39 (1899) (statement of Rep. Taylor) ("the language
providing for the age, and so on, is negative in its character"); 15 CONG. REC. app. at 75 (1884)
(statement of Rep. Wood) ("[The clause] is not a grant of power. It does not attempt to prescribe
the qualifications of members of Congress. These provisions are negative and limitations on the
States."); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 549 (1856) (statement of Sen. Pugh) ("Its language
is that of exclusion, and not of qualification.").
198. See supra text accompanying note 143.
199. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 883-84 (1807).
1995l
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
in negative terms.2"' As Representative Key pointed out during the McCreery
debate:
The expressions used in [Article II] are in negative terms, in the same
manner as those used with respect to qualifications of Representa-
tives; and does any reasonable man, and does any friend of the Con-
stitution, say that the States can superinduce or add any other qualifi-
cation to the President than those designated by the Constitution? If
negative expressions apply to one case, so they do to the other.2"'
It is perhaps a sufficient response to Key's argument that the President is a
national officer in a way that neither Representatives nor Senators are, 20 2 but
another response is also possible. The states do not elect Presidents; presiden-
tial electors do, and the Constitution also contains a negatively-phrased Quali-
fications Clause for them: "no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an
Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elec-
tor."2 3 As Samuel Wood pointed out during the Peters debate:
If [the clause fixed the qualifications of electors], then foreigners,
non-residents, minors, persons convicted of crimes, &c., may be
appointed Presidential electors. Most of the States, if not all of them,
have fixed other qualifications as to age, residence, &c. Maryland
required, at one time, that six should be residents of the Western and
four of the Eastern Shore. Other States were divided into districts,
and electors were required to live in their districts. If States can add
to these negative inhibitions as to the qualifications of Presidential
electors, they certainly can do the same as to members of Con-
gress.2"
State practice is not necessarily a guide to constitutionality, however, as will
be discussed below, and the distinction between the qualifications for President
and those for presidential electors is a weak response to Key's criticism. The
qualifications for members of Congress are simply much more like those for
the President than those for presidential electors; any distinction between the
200. Article II, Section 1 provides:
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States at the time of
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall
any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-
five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
201. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 914 (1807); see also id. at 918 (statement of Rep. Howard) (point-
ing out that the Qualifications Clauses for both the President and Senators were negatively
phrased).
202. Representative Key, of course, responded that the members of Congress, who can declare
war for or levy taxes on the whole nation, are no less national representatives than the President.
Id. at 914. That argument, however, returns us to the nature of the Congress, discussed above. See
supra part II.B.
203. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
204. 15 CONG. REC. app. at 76 (1884). Justice Thomas made a similar argument in his Term
Limits dissent: "We have long understood that [the States] do have the power ... to set qualifica-
tions for their Presidential electors." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1883
(1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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two must therefore be based on the nature and object of the clauses rather than
the fact that they are negatively phrased. To repeat Joseph Story's admonition:
The truth is, that, in order to ascertain how far an affirmative or
negative provision excludes or implies others, we must look to the
nature of the provision, the subject-matter, the objects, and the scope
of the instrument. These, and these only, can properly determine the
rule of construction.2 5
The second criticism of Randolph's negative phrasing argument is one
recognized by the Supreme Court in Powell v. McCormack"° and summarily
accepted by the Term Limits majority.2"7 The Qualifications Clauses, as re-
ported to the Convention by the Committee of Detail, were originally phrased
positively. 2 8 The Committee of Style, which was appointed only "to revise
the stile of and arrange the articles which had been agreed to, 219 "had no
authority from the Convention to make alterations of substance in the Consti-
tution."2 ' Constitutional scholar Charles Warren thus treated the negatively-
phrased final clause and the positively-phrased draft clause as synony-
mous.21' As the Supreme Court subsequently recognized in Nixon v. United
States,2 2 however, "we must presume that the [Committee of Style's] re-
organization or rephrasing accurately captured what the Framers meant in their
unadorned language. ' 21 3 Thus, another explanation is at least equally plau-
sible: the Committee of Style changed the clause from positive to negative
phrasing because the negative phrasing more accurately reflected the intention
of the convention. The expressio unius concerns expressed by John Dickinson
in response to the positively phrased original version of the clause2 4 suggest
that the change was made deliberately, but it is impossible to tell from the
debates whether the other delegates to the convention agreed that the expressio
unius principle was implicated, and if so, whether such implication was a
cause for concern or an intended effect.
C. State Practice
The proponents of state power also argued that the common practice of
several of the states since the ratification of the Constitution was to impose
additional qualifications of one sort or another. Representative John Randolph
stated during the McCreery debate that such "was so obvious and natural" a
construction of the Qualifications Clauses "that it had been adopted by the
States, and acted upon from the commencement of the Government, without
205. 1 STORY, supra note 100, § 448, at 434.
206. 395 U.S. 486, 536 (1969).
207. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1849 n.8.
208. Powell, 395 U.S. at 536 (citing 2 Farrand, supra note 97, at 249-50).
209. Id. at 538 (quoting 2 FARRAND, supra note 97, at 553).
210. Id. at 539 (quoting CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 422 n.1
(1929)).
211. WARREN, supra note 210, at 422 n. I.
212. 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
213. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 737.
214. See supra text accompanying note 96.
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any man dreaming of, or starting an objection to it." 2 ' Representative Love
pointed out that "[iln perhaps every State in the Union, have laws been enact-
ed of a similar nature to" the district residency requirement at issue in
McCreery.2"6 Even Representative Alston pointed out that his own state of
North Carolina imposed a twelve-month district residency requirement,- al-
though "he had always believed that had the people of one district chosen to
elect a man from another district, possessing other qualifications as required
by the Constitution, he would be entitled to his seat."2"7
Similarly, during the Trumbull debate, Senator Toombs recognized "that
the constitutions of [perhaps] half the States in the Union have provisions in
them which may be declared void" if the Senate found that the Kansas provi-
sion at issue in the case was void,2 ' and Senator Mason recognized "that
there are many of the States in this Union who have considered themselves as
retaining a power to place qualifications or disqualifications upon the office of
Senator," though he himself thought the clauses exclusive.2 9 Samuel Wood,
during the Peters debate, presented a comprehensive listing of state-imposed
qualifications22  and cited the Supreme Court's statement in Stuart v.
Laird2' that "[a] contemporary exposition of the Constitution, practiced un-
der and acquiesced in for a period of years, fixes its construction. 222
There are two criticisms that can be made of this argument, and a recon-
ciling explanation. First, a number of the state constitutional provisions cited
do not actually impose additional qualifications on members of Congress.
Some clearly apply only to officers under the state constitution, and thus do
not include representatives to Congress. 29 Others are resign-to-run provi-
sions, and have the effect of rendering the state office vacant, not of disquali-
fying the state officer from Congress. 2 4 The answer to this criticism is that a
sufficient number of state constitutions 2 5 and state statutes 26 expressly
215. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 884 (1807).
216. Id. at 902.
217. Id. at 891.
218. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 466 (1856); see also id. at 550 (statement of Sen.
Pugh) (listing the state provisions).
219. Id. at 579-80.
220. 15 CONG. REC. app. at 78-81 (1884).
221. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 299 (1803).
222. 15 CONG. REC. 78 (1884) (quoting Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803));
see also Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 229 (1952) (arguing that the "[llong-continued" practice of
depriving presidential electors of the independence the Constitution designed "weigh[ed] heavily
in considering the constitutionality" of a Democrat Party requirement that electors pledge to sup-
port nominees of the Democratic Party).
223. See, e.g., TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. IX, § 3, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at
3421 (imposing a two-year ineligibility for office of "any person" bribing an elector); R.I. CONST.
of 1842, art. II, § 1, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 39, at 3224-25 (setting property require-
ment and one-year residency requirement for voting); R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 1, reprinted in 6
THORPE, supra note 39, at 3231 ("No person shall be eligible to any civil office ... unless he be
a qualified elector for such office.").
224. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 8, reprinted in I THORPE, supra note 39, at
573 ("No member of Congress ... shall at any time hold or exercise the office of judge."); N.H.
CONST. of 1784, pt. 2, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 39, at 2469 ("No president or judge of
the supreme court shall hold ... any place or office ... from any other State, government, or
power whatever.").
225. See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1798, art. I, § 11, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 39, at 792
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imposed additional qualifications on members of Congress to suggest that state
legislators, at least, thought the practice constitutional.2
The second criticism is that frequent violations of the Constitution do not
make the practice any less unconstitutional. 28 As Representative Key stated
during the McCreery debate, "[v]iolations of the Constitution, by some of the
States, are now cited as precedents from which destructive conclusions are
drawn., 229 This criticism is all the more compelling when one considers, as
Key pointed out, that because residence in a district of a state was also neces-
sarily residence in the state itself, such state constitutional provisions could
never be judicially challenged in the House as long as they were complied
with. 2"1 But Key's criticism misses the point of Randolph's argument; it is
not that unconstitutional actions become constitutional by a sort of adverse
possession, 21 but that actions by the states, taken in many instances by the
very same people who drafted and/or ratified the Constitution, are strong evi-
dence of the intended meaning of the Constitution itself.
21 2
Finally, there is also an explanation of these state provisions that renders
them ineffectual, though not unconstitutional. As Senator Foot argued in the
Trumbull case, disqualifications "in the constitutions of several of the States
[are] regarded simply as the expression of a rule of policy or expediency for
the action of the Legislature or of the people, and merely advisory to them,
and not [as] having the force of a binding obligation., 233 To be sure, said
Foot, a disqualification clause "is entitled to respectful consideration, and
should have its proper degree of influence upon the action of the elective
power," but the clause is hortatory only, and the Senate would infringe the
(No member of the General Assembly shall, "after having taken his seat, be eligible to any [office
under this state or the United States] during the time for which he shall have been elected.").
226. See, e.g., Ga. Act of Feb. 11, 1799, setting a three-year state residency requirement on
members of Congress.
227. The Term Limits majority observed that "the number of state-imposed qualifications
[was] remarkably small," with only "one instance of a state-imposed property qualification ...
and five instances of district residency requirements." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S.
Ct. 1842, 1866 n.41 (1995). While 6 out of 50 might be "remarkably small," the majority seems
to forget that 6 instances of qualifications at the time of the founding amounts to nearly 50% of
the 13 State constitutions in effect at the time.
228. See, e.g., id. at 1864 ("One may properly question the extent to which the States' own
practice is a reliable indicator of the contours of restrictions that the Constitution imposed on
States .... ).
229. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 914 (1807).
230. Id.
231. Randolph's statement is susceptible to such an interpretation, however. Id. at 889 (state-
ment of Rep. Randolph) ("[Plractice, long established practice, under the Constitution, was the
best evidence what the Constitution was. Powers indisputably exercised by the States ever since its
adoption, were as much departed from the General Government, and imparted to the States, as if
especially delegated by the Constitution itself.").
232. The Supreme Court has recognized that the actions of the early Congresses are more
persuasive evidence of the Framers' intent than those of early state legislatures. As I have shown
above, however, in the only action of an early Congress on this subject, the McCreery case, Con-
gress deliberately avoided deciding the constitutional question. See supra part I.A. Other early
congressional actions, however, support the power of the states. As new states entered the union
with constitutional provisions establishing additional qualifications, Congress approved their state
constitutions as being in conformity with the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, by its own actions,
Congress gave its tacit approval to such provisions.
233. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 581 (1856).
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will of the people, not follow it, by following such a clause.234 While the
clauses to which Foot was pointing do not read as advisory clauses, his expla-
nation is a plausible one. More importantly, he points to an important problem
with Congress's refusing to seat a member who arrives with an otherwise
valid election certificate demonstrating the support of a majority of voters.235
That problem is addressed in more detail below.236
D. The Tenth Amendment as a Rule of Interpretation
Given the ambiguity surrounding the Qualifications Clauses described
above, the proponents of state power argued most vigorously that the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution required that the ambiguity be resolved in
favor of the states. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegat-
ed to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." '237  The
Amendment's implication on the qualifications issue was hotly contested in
each of the debates. Moreover, several different interpretations of the amend-
ment were suggested on both sides of the debates. I shall first attempt to sum-
marize the various interpretations and then suggest the one that I find most
persuasive.
First and foremost, the proponents of state power argued that the Tenth
Amendment established a rule of constitutional interpretation. Thus Represen-
tative Sawyer argued during the McCreery debate:
But even supposing that [members of Congress] should be im-
peded in their progress [of interpreting the Qualifications Clauses] by
the difficulty which a construction either way would produce, in
rendering a negative injury to the Constitution, or a positive one to
the States, still their doubts would be dispelled and their progress
made easy by another clause in the Constitution, and which was
added for the express purpose of clearing up all doubts that might
arise under its interpretation. It was this: whatever powers and author-
ities are not expressly238 delegated by the Constitution to the United
States, or necessarily arising under it, shall be reserved to the States
themselves, or to the people. Now, he hoped that a mere commence-
ment to exercise a certain power under the Constitution was not to be
considered as a complete termination of it, with regard to the States.
A right could not be said to be delegated absolutely, which may be
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See infra text accompanying note 265.
237. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
238. The language of the Tenth Amendment, of course, is "the powers not delegated," not
"the powers not expressly delegated." U.S. CONST. amend. X. A similar clause in the Articles of
Confederation included "expressly," but the word was deliberately dropped by Congress before
submitting the Tenth Amendment to the states for ratification. Compare ART. OF CONFED. of
1777, art. II, reprinted in I THORPE, supra note 39, at 10 with U.S. CONST. amend. X. Sawyer's
reading is not limited to powers "expressly delegated," however, but includes those powers "nec-
essarily arising" under the Constitution. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 880-81 (1807).
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exercised conjointly. He thought, therefore, that he could lay it down
as an undeniable rule, that the right which each State had to require a
person to become a resident of the district for which he may be elect-
ed, was not delegated expressly by the Constitution, for there were no
words in it to that effect, neither did it flow from a necessary opera-
tion of any of its provisions; therefore, it must belong to the States
themselves, or to the people." 9
Sawyer's interpretation of the Tenth Amendment to some extent begs the
question about the nature and purpose of the Qualifications Clauses. As the
proponents of an exclusive interpretation argued, the clauses comprehensively
regulated qualifications for members of Congress," ' and thereby, by neces-
sary implication, prohibited the states from entering the field themselves.
Therefore, the Tenth Amendment was not relevant.2 41 Anticipating Sawyer's
argument, Representative Sturges stated:
It was not by any means a necessary, but, as . . . [I] conceive[], a
forced application, that, because the States were not prohibited in
express terms, they did possess the right. The implication was, in his
opinion, directly the reverse. But it had been, and would undoubtedly
be urged, though it had not yet been stated in the debate, that whatev-
er powers were not expressly denied in the Constitution to the States,
or, in other words, what had not expressly been granted by the States
to the General Government, was retained by the States. He acceded to
the correctness of the position generally. But a distinction was to be
observed in those cases where, from the nature of the subject, there
was no incompatibility; where there was no clashing in the concurrent
exercise of powers by the General and the State Governments, the
principle would apply; but in those cases where, from the nature of
the subject, there would be an incompatibility, the principle could not,
and ought not to apply. For instance, in attending to the legislative
powers granted to the General Government by the eighth section of
the first article of the Constitution, they found that Congress had the
power "to lay and collect taxes." In this clause the same power was
not denied to the States, and it was retained by them. But why? Be-
cause, from the nature of the subject, there would, in its exercise, be
no interference with the General Government. In the seventh clause
of the same section and article, Congress have the power "to establish
post offices and post roads." A power over the same subject was not
in express terms denied to the States. But had the States a right to
establish post offices and post roads? He answered, no. Why not? For
the reason and on account of the distinction he had men-
tioned-because, from the nature of the subject, were they to exercise
239. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 880-81 (1807).
240. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 548 (1856) (statement of Sen. Crittenden)
("The Constitution of the United States decides upon the whole matter .... ").
241. The Term Limits majority made a similar point: "The Qualifications Clauses were in-
tended to preclude the States from exercising any such power and to fix as exclusive the qualifica-
tions in the Constitution." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1856 (1995).
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the power, there would be an interference with the powers of Con-
gress; and there would be a serious inconvenience, for it was desir-
able, and, indeed, indispensable, that there should be a uniformity in
the laws regulating post offices and post roads. So in the case now
before the Committee. Should the States be allowed the power to
determine the qualifications of the elected, more especially where
they have the right to superadd, after the Constitution had enumerated
certain qualifications, that incompatibility, that interference of powers
which he had mentioned would exist.
42
Of course, Sturges's position also begs the question about the nature of the
Qualifications Clauses. Significantly, though, the examples he cited involve
express delegations of power to Congress. The Qualifications Clauses do not
read as a delegation of power at all, either to Congress or to the States;
243
rather, they read as a limitation on power, and since no power over the subject
is granted to Congress, either expressly or by necessary implication, the power
that the clauses 'limit must be a state power.2" The Tenth Amendment does
not help answer how far the limitation on state power should extend, but the
Supreme Court has stated that implied prohibitions on state power are
disfavored. 245 That rule, when combined with the Tenth Amendment, sug-
gests that the limitation, or prohibition, on state power is not to be expanded
beyond that actually required by the constitutional text. As Thomas Jefferson
wrote in 1814:
Had the Constitution been silent nobody can doubt but that the right
to prescribe all the qualifications and disqualifications of those they
would send to represent them would have belonged to the State. So,
also, the Constitution might have prescribed the whole and excluded
all others. It seems to have preferred the middle way. It has exercised
the power in part by declaring some disqualifications .... But it
does not declare itself that the member shall not be a lunatic, a pau-
242. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 877-78 (1807).
243. Cf supra text accompanying note 185.
244. As discussed above, the proponents of an exclusive interpretation rejected this under-
standing of state power. See supra part II.E. Thus, Representative Alston argued during the
McCreery debate that because "[tlhe Constitution, in speaking of Representatives, had neither said
the States should assign qualifications, nor that they might," the states had no power to impose
qualifications, and anyone meeting the constitutional list was eligible to a seat in Congress. 17
ANNALS OF CONG. 892 (1807) (emphasis added). Similarly, Representative Rowan stated that
"[nlo power had been given to the State sovereignties to superadd qualifications .... " Id. at 894.
The fallacy of this argument is that it treats the states as creatures of the Constitution. Rowan him-
self stated, "that, as to the purpose of electing members to the lower House of Congress, the
States were to the Union what counties were to a State," id., a proposition vigorously rejected by
Representative Randolph. Id. Representative Key offered a less extreme version of the same argu-
ment that implicitly relied on the nature of a power over congressional elections: "I lay it down as
a political truth, that the States, in their sovereign capacities, have no power, right, or authority to
interfere with the elections of Representatives to Congress, except so far as the Constitution of the
United States gives them special powers so to do." Id. at 912. Because the only grant of state
power, according to Key, was the Article 1, Section 4 Time, Place and Manner Clause, the states
had no power to superadd qualifications. Id.
245. As Justice Thomas noted in his Term Limits dissent, the Court is reluctant "to read con-
stitutional provisions to preclude state power by negative implication." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1887 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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per, a convict of treason, of murder, of felony, or other infamous
crime, or non-resident of his district. Nor does it prohibit to the State
the power of declaring these or any other disqualifications which its
particular circumstances may call for; and these may be different in
different States. Of course, then, by the tenth amendment, the power
is reserved to the State.2"
A second counter to Sawyer's view of the Tenth Amendment as a rule of
interpretation recognizes that the reserved powers clause of the Tenth Amend-
ment is bifurcated; powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to
the States, are reserved to the States or to the people.247 The opponents of
state power to add qualifications interpreted the bifurcation in two slightly dif-
ferent ways, but both interpretations operate in their view to deprive the states
of the power to add qualifications.
First, as Representative Quincy argued during the McCreery debate, power
is reserved either to the states or to the people depending on the nature of the
power:
As to rights reserved, now came in the tenth amendment to the Con-
stitution, cited by the gentleman from Virginia on his right, which
speaks of rights reserved to the States, or to the people. What rights?
When the whole right of voting was the subject of consideration, as it
was at the formation of the Constitution, the exclusion of a part was
the inclusion of the remainder. The Constitution had said that certain
persons should not have a fight to be elected members of this House:
was not this a declaration that all others might? This was a fight then
which was reserved to the people, and not to the States.
24
Representative Key made a similar argument, and specified precisely how the
people were to exercise their reserved rights:
To form a correct idea of this subject, and of the true meaning of
the article of reserved powers, it is only necessary to trace with preci-
sion in what body the power was originally lodged; to that body it is
reserved. If it was lodged in the States as sovereignties, then the
reservation is to the States in that capacity; but if it was a power in
the people, and such as the States in their sovereign capacity never
had exercised or could exercise, (as in the present case,) then it was
reserved to the people, to be used or controlled by them in the man-
ner prescribed by the Constitution.249
There are two problems with Quincy and Key's argument. First, it fails to
recognize that "the people" might be either the people of the state or the
people of the whole United States. Second, in treating "the people" as only the
people of the whole United States, the argument, especially as articulated by
246. Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell, quoied in 15 CONG. REC. app. at 84 (1884) (Rep.
Wood).
247. U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
248. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 908 (1807).
249. Id. at 917.
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Key, makes the clause redundant; it says, in effect, that the people have a
reserved power to amend the Constitution, the same power to amend already
prescribed in Article V.25
The second interpretation of the bifurcation of reserved powers rests on a
temporal view of the clause. Thus, as Representative Howard stated during the
McCreery debate, "no power could be imparted by the States to the General
Government, or reserved from it, which was not previously possessed by
them."25' Joseph Story offers a similar interpretation in his Commentaries on
the Constitution,252 and Representative Elliott elaborated on the interpretation
during the Peters debate:
Congress such as we now have under the Constitution is a crea-
ture of that instrument, and the States did not prior to the birth of the
National Government possess the right to send representatives to a
congress which had no existence; and it is seemingly clear that they
did not possess the power to prescribe qualifications for representa-
tives to a body unknown to the world until the adoption of the Feder-
al Constitution. I think it is very plain that article 10 of the amend-
ments to the Constitution can have no application to the question
involved in this case. The right of the people of the States to send
Representatives to the Congress of the United States is not a right
growing out of the sovereignty of the respective States. The right to
elect Representatives to Congress does not spring from the State
governments, but is a right growing out of the formation of the Na-
tional Government. The States could not have reserved powers they
did not possess.253
Samuel Wood countered, however, that the states did have the power to
choose their representatives to the national government prior to 1787:
250. Justice Thomas made the same point in his Term Limits dissent: "To be sure, when the
Tenth Amendment uses the phrase 'the people,' it does not specify whether it is referring to the
people of each State or the people of the Nation as a whole. But the latter interpretation would
make the Amendment pointless .... U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1876
(1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
251. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 919 (1807) (emphasis added). The Term Limits majority relied
heavily on this argument. "[T]he power to add qualifications is not part of the original powers of
sovereignty that the Tenth Amendment reserved to the States .... [T]hat Amendment could only
,reserve' that which existed before." Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1854. "With respect to setting
qualifications for service in Congress, no such ight existed before the Constitution was ratified."
Id. at 1855. "[E]lecting representatives to the National Legislature was a new right, arising from
the Constitution itself." Id. at 1856. Apart from the fact that the states did have power to impose
qualifications on the representatives to the national legislature under the Articles of Confederation,
a fact which the Term Limits majority ignored, the majority misconstrues the Tenth Amendment.
As Justice Thomas correctly asserted:
[Ilt was not the state governments that were doing the reserving. The Constitution de-
rives its authority instead from the consent of the people of the States. Given the fun-
damental principle that all governmental powers stem from the people of the States, it
would simply be incoherent to assert that the people of the States could not reserve any
powers that they had not previously controlled.
Id. at 1878 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
252. 2 STORY, supra note 100, §§ 626-627, at 101-03.
253. 15 CONG. REC. 3297 (1884).
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When the Constitution of the United States was formed the right of
each State to be represented in Congress existed under the Confedera-
tion, and was reserved with certain limitations. It would be nonsense
to say that the Constitution of the United States delegates to the State
the right to send Representatives to Congress. It was sovereign States,
which had just secured their independence, that met in convention for
the purpose of forming "a more perfect Union.
254
Congress was not the creature of the Constitution, asserted Wood, because, as
the Supreme Court recognized in Lane County v. Oregon,2" "Both the States
and the United States existed before the Constitution."2"6 As Wood elaborat-
ed:
If the States and the United States existed before the Constitution,
then representation, as stated by Judge Story, is not, as I have said, a
creature of the Constitution, but existed prior to its adoption, and the
article I have quoted is an inhibition on the States and not a grant of
power."'
Similarly, Senator Pugh stated during the Trumbull debate:
It is suggested, however, that the Legislatures of the States derive
their power of electing Senators from the Constitution of the United
States, and not from their respective State constitutions. But this, if
admitted to its full extent, will be found immaterial. It is not a power
conferred on any Legislature as a matter of gift or permission from
the Federal Government, but as a matter of right-and because the
Legislature represents the people, and acts only as an agent for the
people ....
. . . [T]he Senate is only the Congress of the Confederation re-
modeled. Hence, pursuing a usage even older than the Declaration of
Independence, the power of electing Senators is not conferred on the
State Legislatures by the Constitution of the United States, but is
recognized as existing in them, previously, as the agents of State
sovereignty and the impersonations of State independence.258
The best counter to both aspects of the bifurcation argument was given by
John Randolph during the McCreery debate. He argued that a proper under-
standing of the Tenth Amendment
lay in a dexterous use of the word "States." In geography, it implied
a portion of country within certain limits. In politics, it might mean
the government of that portion of country, or the people inhabiting it,
as socially and politically connected. The Framers of the Constitution
well knew that in some States, as in Connecticut, the power of the
Government was commensurate with that of the people in their origi-
254. Id. app. at 87.
255. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1865).
256. 15 CONG. REC. app. at 75 (citing Lane County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 76).
257. Id. app. at 76-77.
258. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 550 (1856).
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nal sovereign capacity; that in others, as in Virginia, it was very
limited. When therefore the Constitution makes a reservation of pow-
er "to the States, or to the people," it merely declares that the State
Government shall possess the power where not forbidden by its own
peculiar constitution; but where not allowed to exercise such a power
by its own constitution, it shall remain with the people.259
Thus, when one takes to heart James Wilson's admonition to remember that
the people operate in a dual capacity, the Tenth Amendment does provide the
rule of interpretation that answers the inquiry. Since the people of the whole
United States, via the Constitution, have neither delegated the power of adding
qualifications to the United States, either expressly or by necessary implica-
tion, nor prohibited the power to the states, again either expressly2" or by
necessary implication, the power is reserved to the states, or to the people of
the states, as the people of each state determine according to their own consti-
tutions. The people of the whole, of course, also have a reserved power to
alter this allocation of power, but their reserved power is found in the Article
V amendment clause, not in the Tenth Amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court stated in Powell v. McCormack that, by its decision to
seat Representative McCreery in 1807, the House of Representatives had de-
termined that the Constitution prevented the States from imposing additional
qualifications on members of Congress.26" ' The Court erroneously relied upon
an Elections Committee report that was rejected by the House, however, and
the House seemed deliberately to avoid deciding the constitutional issue when
it voted to seat McCreery. The subsequent decision by the Senate in 1856 to
seat Lyman Trumbull was equally ambiguous on the constitutional issue.
Moreover, although the decision by the House to seat Representative Peters in
1884 unambiguously found such action by states to be unconstitutional, the
decision by the House just fifteen years later in refusing a seat to Brigham
Roberts renders the 1884 decision at least suspect, and may overturn it entire-
ly.
Given such ambiguity in the congressional precedents, I have explored the
strength of the arguments, pro and con, made during the debates. I have tried
to convey each argument in the words of its strongest proponent, and also
have offered the various counters to each of the arguments made by the partic-
ipants of the several debates. In the end, the arguments against the exclusive
interpretation of the Qualifications Clauses, and in favor of the power of states
to superadd to the qualifications listed in them, are stronger and more consis-
tent, both logically and with the historical record and the nature of the Ameri-
can regime. Such an interpretation leaves the states free to impose all sorts of
qualifications, however, perhaps even some that are unrepublican in nature.
259. 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 943 (1807).
260. Compare the express prohibitions on state power contained in U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
261. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 543 (1969); see supra part I.A.
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Although the Fourteenth Amendment has provided the courts with numerous
tools by which to counter such abuses, Senator Pugh offered the definitive pre-
Fourteenth Amendment response to those who warned of such abuses:
I revere the Constitution of the United States and the Union
established by it as sincerely and as devotedly as any Senator upon
this floor, and I would go as far as any Senator to maintain them to
the full extent of all the powers which have been delegated by the
people of the States. But, sir, although I regard it as a Constitution
appropriate for our Federal form of Government, it never occurs to
me that it is by implication to be carried further, and to the destruc-
tion and overthrow of the State constitutions and governments. When
the people of the States meet in their conventions, to frame their own
constitutions, they have some little modicum of wisdom left to them.
They are able to provide wise restrictions. They have the experience
and the whole history of this Government down to the present time to
guide them. It seems to me that all arguments addressed to our fears,
that the States may affix unworthy restrictions or improper restric-
tions can safely be answered by declaring that the people are not only
the source of authority, but the source of wisdom. 62
Ultimately, any experiment in self-government, and especially the American
experiment, which is based on that principle more than any other regime, has
to depend upon the wisdom of the people if it is to succeed.
I have postponed until now the discussion of one problem this interpreta-
tion raises, however; that of enforcement. Article I, Section 5 of the Constitu-
tion provides, "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members.""26 If, by this clause, each House of
Congress is empowered to judge all such qualifications, including those added
by the states, two problems immediately arise. First, as Senator Foot pointed
out during the Trumbull debate, the Congress would have to consult "the con-
stitutions and laws of [every State in the Union] in order to determine the
constitutional right to a seat . . . of its own members. ' 26 This power to
judge the qualifications would thus make Congress the final interpreter of state
constitutions and laws. In other words, the clause would give to the represen-
tatives of the whole nation the power to alter or nullify state constitutional
provisions of particular states, not because they were not in conformity with
the national constitution, but by the power to interpret.
2 65
262. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 583 (1856).
263. U.S. CONST. art I, § 5 (emphasis added).
264. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 581 (1856).
265. Of course, Congress also has the power to judge election returns. Most such cases, how-
ever, involve allegations of vote fraud; Congress is thus judging questions of fact rather than ques-
tions of law, a power that is much less intrusive on state authority. Some state laws might be
implicated by Congress's power to judge elections, however, such as the Illinois constitutional
provision at issue in the Trumbull case, which provided that all votes cast for an ineligible judge
were void. See ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. V, § 10, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 39, at 999.
The potential conflict with state authority is no less in such a case than in the case of Congress
judging state qualifications. The Term Limits majority, therefore, made too much of the issue
when it states, "[t]he Constitution's provision for each House to be the judge of its own qualifica-
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Second, even assuming that Congress was up to the task of being the final
interpreter of State constitutions and laws, it would, if it refused to seat a
member for being disqualified under a state constitutional provision, be placed
in the awkward position of rejecting the interpretation the people and/or the
legislature of the state had placed on its own constitution and worse, depriving
the majority will expressed in the particular election of any force.
One answer to these concerns is to interpret the Article I, Section 5 power
to judge qualifications as a power to judge only the constitutionally mandated
qualifications. Such a solution does a disservice to the language of the clause,
however, and it may afford a political minority in a particular state little reme-
dy for occasional abuses. Representative Peters was clearly unqualified under
the Kansas Constitution; his election therefore clearly violated the express and
deliberate will of the people of Kansas, as articulated in that Constitution.2
Depriving the House of the power to judge the Kansas qualification would
undermine the power of the people of the several states to fix certain restric-
tions upon themselves.
A second answer to such concerns is for the state to regulate the manner
of enforcement as well as the qualifications. As we have seen, the Illinois
Constitution of 1848, by declaring that all votes cast for an ineligible candi-
date were void, attempted (unsuccessfully) to do just that.267 The Illinois en-
forcement provision did nothing to address the majority rule concern, however,
and when the Senate chose not to enforce the provision itself, it proved of
little value. The Arkansas term limit initiative invalidated in Term Limits
would have taken the Illinois solution one step further. It did not impose an
absolute disqualification, but merely denied a place on the ballot to those
candidates the people of the state wanted to disqualify. Because such candi-
dates could still have run as write-in candidates, and could have served if
elected, the will of a majority in the face of even the disqualification would
not necessarily have been thwarted. 6" More importantly, because of the na-
ture of a ballot access restriction, any dispute over the qualification would
never have reached the Congress; the Article I, Section 5 power to judge
qualifications would thus not have been infringed.
The Arkansas solution had one additional benefit. It took advantage of the
states as laboratories in self-government, a feature of the American federal
system of government praised by such prominent commentators as Alexis de
Tocqueville and Justice Louis Brandeis. As the pressure to reform government
may ultimately find its way into a constitutional amendment limiting the terms
of members of Congress, state experimentation would have increased the
tions thus provides further evidence that the Framers believed that the primary source of those
qualifications would be federal law." U.S. Term Limits, Inc, v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1859
(1995) (emphasis added).
266. See supra part I.C.
267. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. V, § 10, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 39, at 999.
268. Opponents of the Arkansas measure pointed out that write-in campaigns are rarely won,
and thus that such a provision is really no option at all. The history of write-in campaigns has
typically not involved incumbents, however, so a write-in option might well be more viable than
the success rate of past write-in campaigns would suggest.
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likelihood that the qualifications ultimately agreed upon would be the best that
could be devised; errors at the state level are simply more easily corrected





THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF TRIBAL RECOGNITION
CHRISTOPHER A. FORD*
INTRODUCTION
When is an Indian tribe an Indian tribe? Just as importantly, who may
make this decision? Jurisprudentially, such questions are quite significant,
since Native American tribal institutions occupy a unique place in American
jurisprudence. When an Indian' group is declared to be an Indian tribe for
purposes of federal law, dramatic legal consequences result: the group receives
certain important powers of self-government within a defined territory, the
group is brought within the reach of an enormously far-reaching federal super-
visory power, and members of that group and the territory they inhabit can be
withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the state in which they are located. The
federal government's powers over Indian affairs are predicated upon this rec-
ognition function.
At present, this recognition function is carried out through an ordinary
administrative process authorized by congressional statute. Congress has given
the President the power to "prescribe such regulations as he may think fit for
carrying into effect the various provisions of any act relating to Indian af-
fairs." 2 Pursuant to these provisions, the President, through the Secretary of
Interior has promulgated rules to control the federal government's
"acknowledg[ment] that certain American Indian groups exist as tribes."3 Fed-
eral acknowledgment "is a prerequisite to the protection, services, and benefits
of the federal government available to Indian tribes by virtue of their status as
tribes."4
* Associate, Shea & Gardner, Washington, D.C.; A.B., Harvard, 1989; Ph.D. (Philosophy),
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1. This article will use the ancient misnomer "Indian" to refer to Native Americans, both
for reasons of convenience and because the use of this term in United States legal contexts-e.g.,
court holdings and federal legislation-remains as yet unsupplanted by more accurate phrasing.
2. 25 U.S.C. § 9 (1988).
3. 25 C.F.R. § 83.2 (1995).
4. Id.
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If a group wishes to have itself acknowledged as an Indian "tribe" for
purposes of federal Indian law, it must overcome a series of administrative
obstacles, beginning with the filing of a letter of intent to achieve tribal status
with the Department of the Interior5 and culminating in a formal petition de-
tailing their claim to such status and marshaling evidence for it.6 If, after a
formal administrative notice-and-comment period,7 elaborate procedures for
hearings and the publication of proposed findings,' and formal reconsideration
of adverse determinations,9 the Assistant Secretary of the Interior determines
that the group "satisfies all of the [specified] criteria" for tribal status, he or
she is obliged to declare the group a tribe."'
The standards for tribal acknowledgment, as set out in the relevant federal
regulations, require the candidate group to meet seven basic criteria. The
group must have been "identified as an American Indian entity on a substan-
tially continuous basis since 1900,"" and "[a] predominant portion of the
petitioning group [must comprise] a distinct community [that] has existed as a
community from historical times until the present."' 2 The group must also
have "maintained political influence or authority over its members as an au-
tonomous entity from historical times until the present,"" must provide the
Department of the Interior with a copy of its "governing document" or "a
statement describing in full its membership criteria and current governing
procedures,"' 4 and demonstrate that its "membership consists of individuals
who descend from a historical Indian tribe or from historical Indian tribes
which combined and functioned as a single autonomous political entity."' 5
5. Id. § 83.4.
6. Id. § 83.6(a). The regulations, however, note that evaluation of such petitions "shall take
into account historical situations and time periods for which evidence is demonstrably limited or
not available. The limitations inherent in demonstrating the historical existence of community and
political influence or authority shall also be taken into account." Id. § 83.6(e).
7. Id. § 89.3.
8. Id. § 83.10.
9. Id. § 83.10-.11.
10. Id. § 83.10(m).
11. Id. § 83.7(a). Sub-sections 83.7(a)(l)-(6) list a series of ways in which this identification
may have taken place-such as identification as an Indian entity by anthropologists and historians,
§ 83.7(a)(4), or a course of dealing with a county, parish or other local government on a basis
predicated upon the group's Indian identity, § 83.7(a)(3)--any one or combination of which will
allow the petitioner group to meet the "identification" criterion of § 83.7(a).
12. Id. § 83.7(b); see also id. § 83.7(b)(l)-(2) (giving examples of how continuous existence
might be shown). For these purposes, incidently, "historical times" means "dating from first sus-
tained contact [of the group] with non-Indians." See Id. § 83.1.
13. Id. § 83.7(c); see also id. § 83.7(c)(l)-(2) (giving examples of ways to show such main-
tenance of political influence or authority).
14. Id. § 83.7(d).
15. Id. § 83.7(e). The petitioner group must also provide "an official membership list, sepa-
rately certified by the group's governing body, of all known current members of the group." Id. §
83.7(e)(2). These regulations are poorly drafted. Since "tribe" is defined simply as any Indian
community "that the Secretary of the Interior presently acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe,"
id., § 83.7(e) might seem to require that the petitioner group consist of persons descended from an
Indian community presently recognized by the Department of the Interior. This seemingly restric-
tive condition may not be rigidly applied in practice. Moreover, because "historical" is defined as
"dating from [the] first sustained contact with non-Indians," id. § 83.1, the rule might seem even
to require candidate groups be descended from those so recognized from the time of the first
Indian-European contacts-long before there was a Department of the Interior.
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Finally, neither the petitioner group nor its members can be "the subject of
congressional legislation that has expressly terminated or forbidden" federal
relations with that group as an Indian tribe. 6
The administrative process of Indian acknowledgment is conducted by the
executive branch pursuant to a statute enacted by a legislature given the con-
stitutional power "[t]o regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes."' 7 This
is the federal government's means of designating the groups that form the
focus of its power to regulate Indian affairs. It may be, however, that this
process is not the only way tribal acknowledgment can come about.
Despite the legislature's general preeminence in Indian affairs under the
so-called Indian Commerce Clause, the federal government's Indian authority
is not wholly monopolized by Congress. Rather, the doctrine of tribal sover-
eignty and the government-to-government character of federal relations with
Indian tribes-principles that necessarily underpin the entire corpus of Indian-
affairs jurisprudence-suggest also an important role for the executive branch,
particularly with respect to matters of tribal recognition. Despite the seeming
assumption by generations of courts and commentators that federal power over
Indian affairs is left entirely in the hands of Congress, there also exists an
important independent presidential power. That is, the fundamentally political
nature of the federal-Indian relationship implicates the same constitutionally-
given executive power involved in the recognition of sovereign governments in
foreign relations.
In order to explain the origins of this power and to examine its parame-
ters, this article examines the fundamental doctrines of tribal sovereignty and
political relations that underlie federal Indian law, explores the necessary
dependence of all Indian law upon this doctrine, and outlines the constitutional
division of Indian-affairs powers that flows from this understanding. The arti-
cle concludes that the President possesses a power of tribal recognition (or
acknowledgment) entirely independent of legislative enactment. While this
conclusion might conceivably lead to judicially-insoluble political conflicts
with Congress, it is the inexorable result of the political character of federal-
Indian relations.
I. THE BACKDROP OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
The doctrine of Native American tribal sovereignty has its root in three
seminal Supreme Court cases from the early nineteenth century, Johnson v.
M'Intosh, s Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,'9 and Worcester v. Georgia,2" all
written by Chief Justice John Marshall. Together, these decisions set forth the
16. Id. § 83.7(g); see also id. § 83.3(e) ("[G]roups which are, or the members of which are,
subject to congressional legislation terminating or forbidding the Federal relationship may not be
acknowledged under this part.").
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
18. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
19. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
20. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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theoretical groundwork for the entirety of federal Indian law: the doctrine of
tribal sovereignty. Only against this backdrop can the importance of govern-
ment-to-government relations between tribes and the United States be under-
stood, and the centrality of the recognition power in federal Indian law be
explained.
A. Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine
As recounted by Chief Justice Marshall, Indian sovereignty is largely a
story of conquest. Before the coming of Europeans to the eastern shores of
North America,2 the continent was:
held, occupied, and possessed, in full sovereignty, by various inde-
pendent tribes or nations of Indians, who were the sovereigns of their
respective portions of the territory, and the absolute owners and pro-
prietors of the soil; and who neither acknowledged nor owed any
allegiance or obedience to any European sovereign or state whatev-
er.
22
Chief Justice Marshall recognized that the Indians of North America formed
"a distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other and
of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, and governing them-
selves by their own laws."23 These tribes were sovereign nations, even if
Europeans might not have recognized them as such.
The arrival of European explorers, traders and settlers on the shores of
this "new" continent, however, sharply abridged this original sovereignty.
Keen to seize as much as possible of the New World for themselves, but not
wishing to become embroiled in endless wars for the adjustment of colonial
boundaries, the Europeans arrived at a territorial modus vivendi by which "the
nation making the discovery [of a particular area received] the sole right of
acquiring the soil from the natives"24 in that area-by any means the "discov-
ering" power found to be appropriate.
[A]s they were all in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was neces-
sary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war
with each other, to establish a principle, which all should acknowl-
edge as the law by which the right of acquisition, which they all
asserted, should be regulated as between themselves. This principle
was, that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or
by whose authority, it was made, against all other European govern-
ments, which title might be consummated by possession. 5
21. Chief Justice Marshall restricted his consideration of Indian sovereignty, in these cases,
to those portions of North America claimed at various points by Dutch, English, and French au-
thorities. Of the Native American populations further south, such as the Aztec empire crushed by
Cortez, and the Incas conquered by Francisco Pizarro shortly thereafter, the Chief Justice had
nothing to say.
22. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 545.
23. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 542-43.
24. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573.
25. Id.; see also Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 544 (discussing how "[tlhis principle, [was]
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The simple act of "discovery," then, was deemed to give "an exclusive right to
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest."26
The roots of this Discovery Doctrine lay solely in the vast power differen-
tial between the technologically advanced Europeans and the Indians inhabit-
ing North America. Chief Justice Marshall made no pretense that this was at
all a just result. He appears, in fact, to have felt it quite unjust, and may have
perceived himself to be steering a middle course more solicitous of Indian
interests than many of his white countrymen would have preferred." Indeed,
he noted the doctrine'was not followed by Europeans venturing elsewhere in
the world.2" This was a doctrine imposed by force with which Marshall
seemed deeply uneasy, but it was one which he felt unable, at that late date of
1823, to question.
However this restriction may be opposed to natural right, and to the
usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system
under which the country has been settled, and be adapted to the actu-
al condition of the two people, it may, perhaps, be supported by
reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by Courts of justice. 9
"Conquest," he wrote, "gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot
deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be,
acknowledged by all Europeans, because it was the interest of all to acknowledge it, [and] gave to
the nation making the discovery, as its inevitable consequence, the sole right of acquiring the soil
and of making settlements on it").
26. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587.
27. See generally DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 78 (3d ed. 1993) ("In
concluding that discovery gave the United States the exclusive right to extinguish the original
tribal right of possession 'by purchase or conquest,' Marshall avoided the two logical extremes:
that discovery erased all Indian title and that Indians had fee title unaffected by discovery."); Felix
S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 48 (1948) (noting that two logical extreme
positions "produced a cruel dilemma" by offering alternatives of absolute extinguishment and
absolute Indian land rights). To insist upon the latter alternative was, even by 1823, practically
impossible, but Marshall appears to have felt the former morally impermissible. In 1832, he wrote
it would be difficult:
to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter of the globe could
have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or over the
lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other should give the discov-
erer rights in the country discovered, which annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient
possessors.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 543. To suggest that the "feeble settlements made on the sea
coast... acquired legitimate power by them to govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea
to sea, did not enter the mind of any man" and was an "extravagant and absurd idea." Id. at 544-
45.
28. Justice Johnson, concurring in Cherokee Nation, observed, for example:
When the populous and civilized nations beyond the Cape of Good Hope [i.e., in South
Asia and the Orient] were visited [by Europeans), the right of discovery was made the
ground of an exclusive right to their trade, and confined to that limit. When the eastern
coast of this continent, and especially the part we inhabit, was discovered, finding it
occupied by a race of hunters, connected in society by scarcely a semblance of organic
government; the right was extended to the absolute appropriation of the territory, the
annexation of it to the domain of the discoverer.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 22 (Johnson, J., concurring).
29. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591-92.
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respecting the original justice of the claim which has been successfully assert-
ed."'.. The Discovery Doctrine, therefore, was a rule derived less from the
dictates of any abstract justice than from "the actual state of things.'
One of the most significant legal effects of this doctrine was to afford
European "discoverers" the so-called right of preemption or of extinguish-
ment, 2 allowing them to exclude other European powers," and to appropri-
ate Indian lands.3' The Indian occupants of these lands retained a usufructu-
ary right of possession and use-"a legal as well as just claim to retain pos-
session of [the soil], and to use it according to their own discretion" 3 -but
the tribe possessed no power to dispose of actual title. 6
Under the so-called Doctrine of Discovery ... the discovering na-
tions held fee title to Indian land, subject to the Indians' right of
occupancy and use. This distinction between fee title and the Indians'
right of occupancy and use, sometimes called Indian title or aborigi-
nal title, gave rise to a corresponding distinction between the rights to
affect fee title and Indian title. The right to extinguish Indian title,
30. Id. at 588. Justice Marshall felt bound, he averred, to consider "not singly those princi-
ples of abstract justice, which the Creator of all things has impressed on the mind of his creature
man ... but those principles also which our own government has adopted in the particular case,
and given us as the rule for our decision." Id. at 572. Marshall suggested that principles of "hu-
manity" required "as a general rule, that the conquered shall not be wantonly oppressed, and that
their condition shall remain as eligible as is compatible with the objects of the conquest." Id. at
589. He viewed the ultimate object of Indian policy, however, as the complete assimilation of the
Indians:
When the conquest is complete, and the conquered inhabitants can be blended with the
conquerors, or safely governed as a distinct people, public opinion, which not even the
conqueror can disregard, imposes these restraints upon him; and he cannot neglect them
without injury to his fame, and hazard to his power.
Id. at 589-90. In such circumstances,
humanity demands, and a wise policy requires, that the rights of the conquered to prop-
erty should remain unimpaired; that the new subjects should be governed as equitably as
the old, and that confidence in their security should gradually banish the painful sense of
being separated from their ancient connexions, and united by force to strangers.
Id. at 589. Even here, however, he added an ominous note, suggesting that the American Indians
had been too warlike for this to work properly-with the result that humane governance was too
often "incapable of application to a people under such circumstances" and recourse had to be had
to relations "better adapted to the actual state of things." Id. at 591.
31. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 543. "The title by conquest is acquired and maintained by
force. The conqueror prescribes its limits." Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 589.
32. Oneida Nation v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1150 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
871 (1989).
33. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573.
34. Interestingly, in Worcester, Justice M'Lean's concurrence advocated the position that
Europeans had a right under "[tihe law of nature, which is paramount to all other laws" to take
possession of land necessary for agricultural survival "without negotiation or purchase from the
native Indians" inhabiting it. See Worchester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 579 (M'Lean, J., concurring).
35. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574; see also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,
414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974) (establishing that although Indians did not hold title to land, they never-
theless possessed a recognized right of occupancy which could be extinguished only by the federal
government); Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 339 (1945)
(explaining that Indians possessed a quasi ight of occupancy termed "Indian title").
36. See CONFERENCE OF WESTERN AT-rORNEY GENERALS, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
DESKBOOK 3 (Julie Wrend & Clay Smith eds., 1993) [hereinafter DESKBOOK] ("The right to occu-
py was therefore deemed usufructuary in nature and vested no ownership interest in a tribe that
the tribe could alienate.").
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sometimes called a right of extinguishment, was held by the sover-
eign--Great Britain in the period prior to the American Revolu-
tion .... Since the adoption of the Constitution, there has been broad
agreement that the right of extinguishment belongs to the national
government."
Lacking the power "to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever
they pleased,"3 the Indians' "discovery" by Europeans ceded to those Euro-
peans the claim "to the complete ultimate title [of land], charged with [a] right
of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right."39
The powers of the discovering sovereign were not only exclusive vis-c6-vis
every other European power,' but were also lodged exclusively in the United
States government itself, rather than its constituent states. This left these states
no power over the Indians except that which might be exercised with federal
consent. An Indian tribe was:
a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of [a state] can have no force,
and which the citizens of [that state] have no right to enter, but with
the assent of the [Indians] themselves, or in conformity with treaties,
and with the acts of congress. The whole intercourse between the
United States and this [Indian] nation, is, by our constitution and
laws, vested in the government of the United States.4'
The discoverer's rights possessed by the British Crown had passed directly to
the federal authorities with the treaty that ended the Revolutionary War in 1781.42
37. Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1150 (citations omitted).
38. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
39. Id. at 603.
40. "Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives, were to be
regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose
between them." Id. at 573.
41. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. This case arose out of an attempt by the state of
Georgia to completely dissolve the Cherokee tribal government and absorb tribal lands into the
ordinary jurisdiction and control of state authorities. State laws in 1829 and 1830 banned all tribal
acts of legislation and judicial proceedings, prohibited whites from residing in Indian areas
without a permit from the state (a license which required the swearing of an oath of loyalty to
Georgia), divided the Cherokee lands among five Georgia counties, and extended state laws to
cover all Cherokee affairs within the state's boundaries. The case arose out of the prosecution of
Worcester, a missionary from Vermont, and several others for living in Cherokee country without
the requisite license. Id. at 525-28.
42. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 584; see also Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 544 (stating
that "[tlhe United States succeeded to all the claims of Great Britain, both territorial and politi-
cal"); id. at 557 (observing that treaties with Indians provide that "the Indian territory [wasl com-
pletely separated from that of the states; and . . . that all intercourse with them shall be carried on
exclusively by the government of the union").
Since then no legal transfer of Indian title is possible unless the United States itself has
been party to the proceeding. See, e.g., Oneida, 414 U.S. at 670 (holding that "[tihe rudimentary
propositions that Indian title is a matter of federal law and can be extinguished only with federal
consent apply in all of the States"); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 443 (1926) (ex-
plaining that as wards of the federal government, Indians "hold their lands subject to the restric-
tion that [their lands] cannot be alienated" without the consent of the federal government); see
also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 245 (1985) (noting that the Nonin-
tercourse Act of 1793 "merely codified the principle that a sovereign act was required to extin-
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The theory of Indian sovereignty underlies the unique relationship be-
tween the tribes and the United States government, one "unlike that of any
other two people[s] in existence . . . [and] marked by peculiar and cardinal
distinctions which exist no where else. '4' As Justice Marshall famously
phrased it in Cherokee Nation:
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and,
heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that
right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government;
yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within
the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict
accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly,
perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a
territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which
must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession
ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to
the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian."
Indian tribes were considered neither states of the union nor "foreign" powers
within the meaning of the United States Constitution, but an odd hybrid of the
two, born of Justice Marshall's attempt to square "the actual state of things"45
with the dictates of legal principle.
The status of Indian tribes as both "distinct, independent political commu-
nities ... [and] 'a people distinct from others"'" gave them a unique consti-
tutional status. As "quasi-sovereign nations," the federal constitution "applies
to Indian nations only to the extent it expressly binds them or is made binding
on them by treaty or Act of Congress. 47 "As separate sovereigns pre-existing
guish aboriginal title and thus that a conveyance without the sovereign's consent was void ab
initio"); Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1159 (quoting PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF INDIAN AF-
FAIRS 166 n.1 (Hough ed., 1861) and 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 19 (Andrew A.
Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., 1903) to demonstrate George Washington and Thomas
Jefferson's understanding of this principle). Nor, it was held, could Indian tribes be "removed"
from existing reservations to locations further west-a process that occurred repeatedly as areas of
white settlement expanded-except by federal authority. Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 366, 371 (1856).
As Worcester showed, state criminal laws could not reach within a tribal reservation absent
an express congressional enactment to the contrary. Worchester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. However,
"Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to non-discrimina-
tory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State." Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973). Nor did states have the power, for example, to tax Indian reserva-
tion lands or income derived from activity thereupon. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 165 (1973).
43. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15.
44. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). In Cherokee Nation, the issue before the Supreme Court was
whether the Cherokees should be considered a "foreign nation" for purposes of federal diversity
jurisdiction. Id. at 20; see U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. I ("The judicial Power shall extend ... to
Controversies ... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Sub-
jects."). The tribe did not, for some reason, assert federal question jurisdiction under the United
States Constitution which states "[tihe judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority .... See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20; see also
DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 2 n.5.
45. See supra text accompanying note 3 1.
46. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
47. Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1971) (footnotes omitted); see also
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the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by
those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or
state authority." '
As extraconstitutional political bodies, [tribes] are not subject to the
constraints imposed upon the federal government and the states by the
Bill of Rights, and maintain broad powers over internal tribal matters.
They further possess common-law immunity from suit for reserva-
tion-based transactions absent express congressional or tribal consent
or implied waiver. 9
Since 1968, the tribes have indeed been made subject to much of the federal
Bill of Rights."' However, this was only by express congressional enactment,
and these guarantees are not at all coextensive with those which operate
against the federal government in the original Bill of Rights" and against the
states by virtue of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 The Equal
Protection Clause of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)53 is narrower than
its federal constitutional analogue54 because it seeks to balance the right of
individuals to be free from discrimination against the interest of the tribe itself
in self-government."
Trans-Canada Enters. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 634 F.2d 474, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating
that "[c]onstitutional guarantees ... are not applicable to the exercise of governmental powers by
an Indian tribe except to the extent that [these guarantees] are made explicitly binding by the
Constitution or are imposed by Congress"); Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1102-03 (9th Cir.
1976) (citing several decisions "finding the Constitution inapplicable to Indian tribes, Indian courts
and Indians on the reservation").
48. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
49. DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 5 (footnotes omitted). As the Supreme Court explained in
Santa Clara Pueblo, Indian tribes were immune to suit without their consent absent "congressional
authorization"-which could only be accomplished with clear and unambiguous statutory intent.
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58.
50. This was accomplished by the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341
(1988 & Supp. V 1993), which provided that "[nlo Indian tribe in exercising the powers of self-
government" shall: (1) make any law abridging the freedom of religion, speech, press or assembly;
(2) conduct unreasonable searches or make unreasonable seizures; (3) subject persons to double
jeopardy; (4) compel witness or defendant self-incrimination; (5) take private property without
providing just compensation; (6) deny defendants speedy and public trials or the ability to exercise
their right to counsel or their right to be informed of charges levied against them; (7) require
excessive bail; (8) deny equal protection or due process; (9) adopt any bill of attainder or ex post
facto law; or (10) deny a jury, of at least six persons, to any defendant accused of an offense
punishable by imprisonment who requests a jury trial. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988).
51. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
52. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.").
53. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1988).
54. See Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079, 1082
(8th Cir. 1975).
55. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the Court, explicitly noted this tension, conclud-
ing that the ICRA had not adopted the full federal Bill of Rights in order to accommodate "the
unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments." Santa Clara Pueblo, 436
U.S. at 62-63. He adopted the district court's original finding that sex discrimination in tribal
membership rules that reinforced "traditional values of patriarchy"-the Pueblo had adopted a rule
which denied tribal membership to the children of tribal women and non-members--"were basic
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The practical impact of Chief Justice Marshall's tribal sovereignty doc-
trine has changed somewhat over time, as federal laws have intruded increas-
ingly upon areas of tribal self-government which had been left to the Indi-
ans.56 The jurisprudential wall Marshall constructed between state law and
tribal self-government in Worcester v. Georgia57 has also been undermined.
Today, the ability of a state to extend its jurisdiction over Indian affairs is
judged according to the extent to which this would "undermine the authority
of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence ... infringe on the right
of the Indians to govern themselves.""8
The conceptual clarity of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view in
Worcester v. Georgia has given way to more individualized treatment
of particular treaties and specific federal statutes, including statehood
enabling legislation, as they, taken together, affect the respective
rights of States, Indians, and the Federal Government. The upshot has
been the repeated statements of this Court to the effect that, even on
reservations, state laws may be applied unless such application would
interfere with reservation self-government or would impair a right
granted or reserved by federal law.59
Nevertheless, while the contours of tribal sovereignty have been modified by
the exercise of federal power, the doctrine still serves as the core of federal
Indian law, and the foundation of everything that makes it distinctive and
distinguishes the legal status of Indians from that of all other persons within
the reach of the United States Constitution. It is the centrality of this doctrine
that ultimately leads us to the importance of the recognition power in Indian
affairs.
B. The Trust Responsibility
The peculiarities of tribal status under federal Indian law go beyond mere-
ly the "sovereign" character of tribal political authority. It has long been rec-
ognized that the legacy of discovery and conquest imposes a duty upon the
United States deriving from the "paternal superintendence of the government"
over Indian tribes,' a trust responsibility which Chief Justice Marshall
to the tribe's survival as a cultural and economic entity." Id. at 53-54.
56. See Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988) (extending certain provisions of
the Bill of Rights to tribal govemments); Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994) (extending
federal criminal jurisdiction to encompass "[alny Indian who commits against the person or prop-
erty of another Indian or other person" any of a number of specified federal crimes).
57. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832) (recognizing that "Itlhe treaties and laws of the United
States contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states; and provide
that all intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the govemment of the union");
see also supra text accompanying note 41.
58. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
59. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (citations omitted); see also
Eastem Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 588 F.2d 75, 77
(4th Cir. 1978) (holding that "[q]uestions of conflicting tribal-state jurisdiction are no longer re-
solved by automatic application of the tribal sovereignty doctrine enunciated by Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia, and most controversies are settled by reliance on federal pre-
emption principles") (citation omitted), cert. dismissed, 446 U.S. 960 (1980).
60. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 588 (M'Lean, J., concurring); see also Red Fox v. Red
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likened to the relationship between a guardian and a ward.6 The relationship
between the sovereign power of the United States and the sovereign power of
each Indian tribe was said to be "that of a nation claiming and receiving the
protection of one more powerful" against "lawless and injurious intrusions,"
rather than "that of individuals abandoning their national character, and sub-
mitting as subjects to the laws of a master."" In the somewhat condescending
phrasing that characterizes so much of federal Indian jurisprudence, the Su-
preme Court has declared that:
Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regu-
late commerce with the Indian tribes, but long continued legislative
and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions
have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation
the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection
over all dependent Indian communities within its borders ... .63
Deriving in part from express treaty provisions64 and in part, apparently from
the dictates of "humanity,"65 the federal government has been deemed to have
"assum[ed] the duty of protection, and ... pledg[ed] the faith of the United
States for that protection."'
This trust responsibility places some limitations upon the federal
government's ability to exercise its power as discoverer, conqueror, and guard-
ian to regulate Indian affairs. The courts have imposed certain procedural
constraints upon the exercise of federal Indian powers in the form of canons
of construction governing the interpretation of treaties with Indians:67 "[Alm-
biguous expressions must be resolved in favor of the Indian parties concerned;
Indian treaties must be interpreted as the Indians themselves would have
understood them; and Indian treaties must be liberally construed in favor of
the Indians."'  Similar canons of construction operate in non-treaty contexts,
Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 365 (9th Cir. 1977) (describing "[tihe relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the American Indian" as that of a "guardian and his ward, thereby placing the Indian in
a peculiar and protected status") (citing United States v. Kabinto, 456 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972)).
61. See supra text accompanying note 44; cf. supra note 30.
62. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 555. Chief Justice Marshall declared that the United States
government had inherited the relationship the British Crown had enjoyed with the Indian
tribes-one which bound the tribes to it "as a dependent ally, claiming the protection of a power-
ful friend and neighbour, and receiving the advantages of that protection." Id. at 552.
63. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-46 (1913).
64. See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 555 (noting that British and United States trea-
ties with the Cherokees have assigned the Crown and the federal government, respectively, the
duty of protector of Indian interests).
65. See supra note 30.
66. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 556.
67. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221-25 (Rennard Strickland
et al. eds., 1982) (discussing canons of construction as procedural obstacles to federal Indian pow-
er).
68. Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation:
"As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows upon the Earth"-l-ow Long a Time Is That?, 63
CAL. L. REv. 601, 617 (1975) (footnotes omitted); see also Oneida, 470 U.S. at 247-48 (holding
that "it is well established that treaties should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with
ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit") (citations omitted).
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such as Indian affairs legislation, for example, where the intent of Congress to
extinguish Indian title or to abrogate treaty rights must be plain and unambigu-
ous.
69
The courts have suggested that "[s]ubstantive limit[s] on [the federal
government's Indian affairs] power.., do exist by virtue of the just compen-
sation provision of the Fifth Amendment."7" Though the Supreme Court has
declared Congress to "possess[] a paramount power over the property of the
Indians, by reason of its exercise of guardianship over their interests,"7' this
power has also been found "not [to] extend so far as to enable the government
'to give the tribal lands to others, or to appropriate them to its own purposes,
without rendering, or assuming an obligation to render, just compensation.'
72
Courts assessing allegations of a federal "taking" of tribal land, for example,
have tried to distinguish between congressional assertion of its eminent do-
main powers and the legislature's exercise of its trusteeship power over Indian
property. A Fifth Amendment violation may therefore be found where "a
thoroughgoing and impartial examination of the historical record"73 reveals
that Congress has not made "a good faith effort to give the Indians the full
value of the land [in] . . . transmut[ing] the property from land to money ...
[in order to effect a] substitution of assets or change of form ... [while acting
in the] traditional function of a trustee."7 As the Supreme Court declared,
"[tihe power of Congress over Indian affairs may be of a plenary nature; but it
is not absolute. 75
These canons of treaty construction date back to the seminal trilogy of Indian cases decided
by the Supreme Court during Chief Justice Marshall's tenure. In Worcester, for example, Marshall
argued that it would be wrong to hold fine distinctions in treaty language against Indians "who
could not write, and most probably could not read, [and] who certainly were not critical judges of
our language." Worchester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 552. Justice M'Lean discussed how
[tlhe language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their preju-
dice. If words be made use of which are susceptible of a more extended meaning than
their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should be considered
as used only in the latter sense.
Id. at 582 (M'Lean, J., concurring). Such canons have received endorsement from the Court ever
since, and have become an accepted part of federal Indian jurisprudence. See McClanahan v. State
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631
(1970); see also Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Tulee v. Wash-
ington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938);
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Starr v. Long Jim, 227 U.S. 613, 622-23 (1913);
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
69. See Oneida, 470 U.S. at 247-48 (declaring that "'[a]bsent explicit statutory language,'
this Court accordingly has refused to find that Congress has abrogated Indian treaty rights" and
explaining the requirement of "plain and unambiguous" title extinguishment) (citation omitted).
70. DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 7 (footnote omitted).
71. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
72. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497 (1937) (quoting United States v.
Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935)). This idea also has antecedents in the seminal early
Indian case law. See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 588 (M'Lean, J., concurring) (stating that
"[nleither Georgia, nor the United States ... contemplated that force should be used in the ex-
tinguishment of the Indian title; nor that it should be procured on terms that are not reasonable").
73. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 416 (1980).
74. Three Affiliated Tribes v. United States, 390 F.2d 686, 691 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (quoted by
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 409).
75. Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (quoting United
States v. Alcea Band of Tillamnooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946) (plurality opinion)).
[Vol. 73:1
19951 INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE: TRIBAL RECOGNITION 153
The Court has suggested, further, that there might be some limit on
Congress's ability to enact legislation controlling Indian affairs such that legis-
lation "beyond what is reasonably essential to [the tribes'] protection" will be
disallowed.76 Legislative decisions regarding what is in the best interest of
Indians will ordinarily not be second-guessed, but they may be questioned if
"the special treatment [cannot] be tied rationally to the fulfillment of
Congress's unique obligation toward the Indians."" Thus, this "tied rational-
ly" standard suggests that the government's trust responsibility toward the
tribes places some substantive limit on federal authorities' otherwise plenary
power to regulate Indian affairs.78
Apart from the Fifth Amendment obligation to give just compensation for
tribal lands appropriated by legislative fiat,79 it is not entirely clear what this
theoretical substantive limit actually means. Traditionally, "[pilenary authority
over the tribal relations ... has been exercised by Congress ... and [this]
power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by
the judicial department of the government...... Although it is presumed Con-
gress will exercise its powers in good faith,8 this old view held that in the
event of congressional bad faith, relief had to be "sought by an appeal to that
body ... and not to the courts."82 The "tied rationally" standard would in-
deed seem to represent a modification of this doctrine, but although the execu-
tive branch "has sometimes been subjected to ... enforcement of its trust
responsibilities" in the administration of Indian affairs entrusted to it by Con-
gress,83 courts have been extremely reluctant actually to impose the fiduciary
duties of which they have sometimes spoken.84 This led one commentator to
conclude, for example, that "[i]n the case of Congress, then, the duty is essen-
tially a moral or political obligation."85 Moreover, even if invoked, the more
modem "tied rationally" standard seems to mean no more than the "rational
basis test" of ordinary equal protection jurisprudence: a test conspicuous for
the ease with which enactments survive its scrutiny. 6
76. Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478, 486 (1914).
77. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974); see also Delaware Tribal, 430 U.S. at 85
(using the "tied rationally" standard of review for special treatment).
78. COHEN, supra note 67, at 221. As the Supreme Court has said, after all, the protective
relationship of the federal government with the Indian tribes "necessarily implies" a duty to en-
courage "among the arts of civilized life, which it was the very purpose of all these arrangements
to introduce and naturalize among [the Indians]," tribal "self-government, the regulation by them-
selves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own mem-
bers by the administration of their own laws and customs." Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556,
568 (1883).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
80. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565.
81. Id. at 566.
82. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 414 (discussing the Lone Wolf doctrine).
83. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 33 (1981).
84. Id. ("While it has been stated on several occasions that Congress owes a fiduciary duty
to the tribes, no court has ever enforced such a duty.").
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 532-33 (2d ed. 1991)
(noting that statutes subjected to rational basis review "are usually upheld"); id. at 538 ("[T]he
judicial application of the rationality test has generally ... led to validation of statutory classifica-
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Nevertheless, it is at least theoretically true that the federal government's
trust or guardian relationship with the Indian tribes imposes some substantive
limit upon the plenary power of federal law to regulate Indian affairs. Even
less well understood is how the underlying foundational doctrine of tribal
sovereignty ensures that the extent to which the exercise of any federal Indian
powers must be predicated upon the existence of a government-to-government
relationship between the United States and a recognized Indian tribe.
C. The Importance of Intergovernmental Relations
It has long been accepted as a fundamental component of Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence that most statutory racial classifications are strongly
suspect and must therefore be subjected to the most rigid constitutional scruti-
ny," a test which leaves laws stricken in its wake with the same frequency
that rational basis analysis upholds them.88 Since it is not just race-specific
classifications disadvantaging a particular racial group that are to some degree
suspect but all race-based classifications, federal Indian law flirts with race-
specific legislation at its peril. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena89 makes clear that all laws based on race
are now subject to "strict" scrutiny. Though the Court has emphasized that
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause need not invariably be fatal
to a race-based classification, 9 equal protection challenges to Indian-
classificatory statutes would present grave challenges. It would be difficult to
demonstrate that all, or even most, of the vast corpus of federal Indian law is
sufficiently narrowly-tailored to meet strict scrutiny standards.
It has so far been possible to avoid such equal protection concerns in
Indian law by pointing to the "political" character of Indian identity within the
venerable tradition of tribal sovereignty.9' Indeed, this is what the Supreme
Court did in Morton v. Mancari,92 when faced with a challenge to a series of
employment preferences for Indians, adopted by the Bureau for Indian Affairs.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, found this preference to be permissi-
tions.").
87. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding that "all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect ... [and]
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny"). Even laws which merely have a "disparate
impact" upon a particular racial group may be challenged. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (permitting prima facie case of employment discrimination to be shown by
statistical evidence that employment practice had a disproportionately adverse impact upon par-
ticular racial group irrespective of discriminatory intent). In recent years, however, the Supreme
Court has required an increasingly detailed "factual predicate" in order to substantiate allegations
of discriminatory impact. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651-52
(1989) (finding statistical evidence alone insufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate
impact).
88. In fact, Korematsu "is frequently said to mark the last occasion on which the Supreme
Court has upheld a race-specific statute disadvantaging a racial minority." STONE ET AL., supra
note 86, at 572.
89. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
90. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
91. See Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-
Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1263-67 (1994).
92. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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ble in part because the designation of "Indian" was a political classification
rather than a dangerously suspect racial one: "The preference is not directed
towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to
members of 'federally-recognized' tribes. This operates to exclude many indi-
viduals who are racially to be classified as 'Indians.' In this sense, the prefer-
ence is political rather than racial in nature."93 Thus, "[t]he status of Indian
tribes as quasi-independent entities .. . has allowed Indian case law to escape
both constitutional 'strict scrutiny' and many of the conceptual ambiguities"
that result from the problematic objective character of racial identity.94
The distinctive character of Indian law derives from this political dimen-
sion, from the fact that the federal-tribal relationship has for the better part of
two centuries been considered a relationship between sovereigns. Indeed, our
present body of Indian law would not make sense if viewed through a solely
racial prism, and would be neither doctrinally justifiable nor constitutionally
sustainable.
A principled adherence to the "domestic dependent nation" theory of
Indian jurisprudence would thus appear to be vital to federal Indian law. Given
the extent to which federal Indian legislation and case law throughout this
country's history have been built upon stereotyped and often racist notions of
indelibly "Indian" characteristics," a real effort to apply the Supreme Court's
previous intermediate scrutiny standard for race classifications96  would
93. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) preference was also
found to be properly within Congress's power to regulate Indian affairs and appropriately related
to the legislative intent "to promote economic and political self-determination for the Indian." Id.
at 543 n. 15.
Within the present system of federal tribal "acknowledgment" pursuant to administrative
regulation, tribal membership largely follows Mancari and defines a tribe member as:
an individual who meets the membership requirements of the tribe as set forth in its
governing document or, absent such a document, has been recognized as a member
collectively by those persons comprising the tribal governing body, and has consistently
maintained tribal relations with the tribe or is listed on the tribal rolls of that tribe as a
member, if such rolls are kept.
25 C.F.R. § 83.1 (1995).
94. Ford, supra note 91, at 1265.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1926) (upholding congres-
sional intent to designate Pueblo Indians a "tribe" because "[allthough sedentary, industrious, and
disposed to peace, they are Indians in race, customs, and domestic government, always have lived
in isolated communities, and are a simple, uninformed people, ill-prepared to cope with the intelli-
gence and greed of other races"); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913) (describing
federal guardianship role over Indians as being rooted in their "isolated and communal life, primi-
tive customs and limited civilization").
96. Before Adarand, a plurality of the Supreme Court had for some years felt that the stan-
dard for review of race classification under the Equal Protection Clause was that of "strict scruti-
ny" even for benign classifications. See Wygant v. Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). For a time, however, the Court appeared to
endorse a two-tiered scheme of equal protection review-with state and local race classifications
reviewed "strictly" and Congressional enactments viewed with only "intermediate" scrutiny. In
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547, 548 (1990), over-
ruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), for example, a majority of
the Court held that "[blenign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress" were permissible if
"they serve important governmental objectives." State and local classifications were permissible,
however, only if they could survive strict scrutiny. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 520.
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undoubtedly prove unsettling.
In the wake of Adarand, the "political" status of Indian classifications
may be the only component capable of sustaining much of Indian law in the
face of post-Adarand equal protection challenges.9 7 Ultimately, the basic doc-
trines of federal Indian jurisprudence suggest that the sole basis of Indian law
must be a political one: the case law gives no intelligible support for, and the
underlying principles of tribal sovereignty do not permit, a federal-Indian
relationship based upon anything other than a political foundation.
D. The Centrality of Tribal Recognition
1. The Problematic Nature of Non-Political Indian Status
Ethnologically speaking, the "real" existence of a distinct "tribe" seems to
be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of legally-recognized "tribal"
status. Federal policy toward the recognition of Indian tribes has been by no
means consistent with "real" ethnological principles: Congress has frequently
consolidated previously distinct groups into a single tribe for recognition pur-
poses, or has divided an individual tribe into two or more groups, recognizing
each in turn as a "different" Indian "nation." '98 Congress has also occasionally
"terminated" tribes' federal recognition," in some cases only to "restore" it
thereafter,"°° and has given the Secretary of the Interior the authority to
adjust tribal membership rolls at his own discretion.' °2
As one commentator has observed, "[iut is apparent that the question of
whether a tribe has been recognized is resolved without reference to the factu-
al, ethnological characteristics, at the time of decision, of the Indian group
97. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Adarand, apparently recognized the dangers strict scrutiny
posed to Indian law. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. See COHEN, supra note 67, at 6 (giving examples of such "consolidations" and divi-
sions).
99. In 1953, hoping to bring about the gradual cultural assimilation of American Indians,
Congress adopted a policy of seeking the progressive "termination" of many Indian groups' "trib-
al" status. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953) (enacted).
Such statutory "termination" was to end these groups' special relationship with the federal govern-
ment, and subject Indians and Indian lands to state jurisdiction. Between 1954 and 1964, 14 acts
were passed in this respect, leading to the revocation of federally-recognized tribal status for 109
Indian tribes and bands, prominent among them the Klamath of Oregon and the Menominee of
Wisconsin. All in all, between 1955 and 1970, termination affected 3.2% of all federally-recog-
nized Indians and a similar proportion of Indian trust land. This congressional termination policy
was abandoned in the late 1960s. See generally CANBY, supra note 83, at 25-28, 50; and
DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 24-25, 34.
100. The Menominee, for example, were restored to federally-recognized "tribal" status by
Pub. L. No. 93-197, 87 Stat. 770 (1973) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 903-903f (1988)). Many statu-
tory "terminations" were ultimately repealed, but as of 1993 some 40 Indian groups have not had
their status restored. DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 34.
101. See 43 U.S.C. § 1457 (1988) (giving the Secretary of the Interior the power of "supervi-
sion of public business relating to ... Indians").
102. See, e.g., Stookey v. Wilbur, 58 F.2d 522, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (upholding the power of
the Secretary to correct membership rolls for "fraud" by refusing to enroll children and grandchil-
dren of member/non-member marriages into Gros Ventre tribe); United States ex rel. West v.
Hitchcock, 205 U.S. 80, 85 (1907) (permitting Secretary of the Interior to disallow involvement in
Indian land transaction of white man accepted through marriage into Wichita tribe on grounds that
man was not really tribal member).
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involved."" 3 To suppose, in such an environment, that Chief Justice
Marshall's doctrine of tribal sovereignty invariably connects contemporary fed-
erally-recognized tribal governments by some historical umbilical cord to the
actual pre-discovery "independent tribes or nations of Indians, who were the
sovereigns of their respective portions of the territory, and the absolute owners
and proprietors of the soil '" 4 is to strain credulity. The only defensible prin-
cipled approach to tribal recognition is to acknowledge that there is no such
clear principle: the matter is indeed a political one, quite resistant to jurispru-
dential assessment.
The courts have, from time to time, hinted that there might be some sub-
stantive limit upon federal authority to recognize groups of Indians as tribal
political "sovereigns" capable of existing in the sort of intergovernmental
relationship with the United States that lies at the core of Indian law. As long
ago as 1832, Justice M'Lean, concurring in Worcester v. Georgia, asked "is
there no end to the exercise of this [recognition] power over Indians within the
limits of a state, by the general government?" '' According to Justice
M'Lean the limit of this principle was that "in its nature, it must be limited by
circumstances.""
If a tribe of Indians shall become so degraded or reduced in numbers,
as to lose the power of self-government, the protection of the local
[state] law, of necessity, must be extended over them. The point at
which this exercise of power by a state would be proper, need not
now be considered: if indeed it be a judicial question." 7
Just over 80 years later, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Sandoval"°8 suggested, in dicta, that this might indeed be "a judicial ques-
tion." In finding that the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico could be regulated as
an Indian tribe pursuant to the enabling legislation which authorized New
Mexico's entry into the Union, the Court did not stop upon finding a sort of
de facto federal recognition resulting from the Pueblos' treatment by the Presi-
dent and Congress as "dependent communities entitled to [United States] aid
and protection, like other Indian tribes."" Rather, the Court undertook an
independent examination into the "Indian-ness" of the Pueblo groups:
"[C]onsidering their Indian lineage," and their "isolated and communal life,
primitive customs and limited civilization, this assertion of guardianship over
them cannot be said to be arbitrary but must be regarded as both authorized
and controlling. ' " o
103. L.R. Weatherhead, What Is an "Indian Tribe"?-The Question of Tribal Existence, 8
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 8 (1980).
104. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 545 (1823).
105. Worchester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 593 (1832) (M'Lean, J., concurring).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
109. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 47.
110. Id.
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The Sandoval Court apparently claimed for itself the authority and ability
to review the tribal-recognition determinations made by the political branches.
Though conceding to federal authorities a general right to determine matters of
tribal recognition, it added that:
it is not meant by this that Congress may bring a community or body
of people within the range of [the Indian affairs] power by arbitrarily
calling them an Indian tribe, but only that in respect of distinctly
Indian communities the questions whether, to what extent, and for
what time they shall be recognized and dealt with as dependent tribes
requiring the guardianship and protection of the United States are to
be determined by Congress, and not by the courts.'
Federal recognition of groups not "distinctly Indian" in the judgment of
the Court, therefore, might be rejected. This odd and arguably racist"2 theme
was obliquely endorsed a half-century later, when Sandoval was discussed as
an example of the Supreme Court's flexible "political question" jurisprudence
in Baker v. Carr."3 "Able to discern what is 'distinctly Indian,"' wrote Jus-
tice William Brennan in Baker, "the courts will strike down any heedless
extension of that label. They will not stand impotent before an obvious in-
stance of a manifestly unauthorized exercise of power."'' Perhaps not sur-
prisingly, given the stereotyped cognitive baggage carried by the pregnant
dictum in the Sandoval decision, the Court has never attempted further to
explain this "arbitrariness" standard." 5 In fact, "there is no case in which a
congressional judgment or enactment [regarding tribal recognition] has been
overturned on the basis of [these] limitations.""' 6 Nevertheless, Sandoval
lurks ambiguously behind the otherwise political core of Indian recognition
law.
2. Ambiguities of Recognition
The statutes and case law on the import of formal political recognition of
Indian tribal status is remarkably varied. Even though, in theory, the special
relationship between the federal government and the Indian tribes depends
entirely upon recognized status, the courts have declared that even statutory
termination does not always end all of the federal relationship. Terminated
111. Id. at 46.
112. See supra text accompanying note 110. Twelve years after Sandoval, in United States v.
Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926), the Supreme Court reiterated its power to decide what was "dis-
tinctly Indian," stating, again of the Pueblos:
While there is no express reference in the [federal statute at issue] to Pueblo Indians, we
think it must be taken as including them. They are plainly within its spirit, and, in our
opinion, fairly within it words, 'any tribe of Indians.' Although sedentary, industrious,
and disposed to peace, they are Indians in race, customs, and domestic government,
always have lived in isolated communities, and are a simple, uninformed people, ill-
prepared to cope with the intelligence and greed of other races.
Id. at 441-42.
113. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
114. Baker, 369 U.S. at 216-17 (citation omitted).
115. See COHEN, supra note 67, at 5.
116. Weatherhead, supra note 103, at 4.
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tribes may, for example, sometimes retain the capacity collectively to contract,
receive grants, exercise traditional hunting and fishing rights, and sue in
court." 7 The canons of construction peculiar to federal Indian jurispru-
dence"' appear somewhat to limit the impact of most termination statutes: a
congressional enactment can completely end all tribal rights," 9 but only if it
is "clear and specific" in this respect. 2
As to which groups may be considered Indian tribes under the law of the
United States, the courts have seldom limited the exercise of federal Indian
affairs powers to the formally recognized tribal status of Indian groups. Where
formal recognition has not been forthcoming, courts have tried to develop
factual standards for judging tribal existence: "The absence of federal recogni-
tion ... is not dispositive where no contrary statutory requirement exists, and
in such situations courts have developed broad criteria to make determinations
of tribal status."' 2 "[W]hile Congress' power to regulate commerce with the
Indian tribes includes authority to decide when and to what extent it shall
recognize a particular Indian community as a dependent tribe under its guard-
ianship, Congress is not prevented from legislating as to tribes general-
ly .... ,22 The Supreme Court, for example, has professed to understand the
117. COHEN, supra note 67, at 19. The "terminated" Klamath tribe, for example, was found
still to possess hunting, fishing, and trapping rights on their ancestral lands, Kimball v. Callahan,
590 F.2d 768, 775 (9th Cir. 1979), while the Menominee were found to retain beneficial and
equitable interests in certain properties, Menominee Tribe v. United States, 388 F.2d 998, 1001
(Ct. Cl. 1967).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
119. It has long been accepted that "[it rests with Congress to determine the time and extent
of emancipation" from the guardianship status of federal-tribal relations. United States v. Waller,
243 U.S. 452, 459 (1917); see also Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 392 (1921) (holding that
"[tihe guardianship [over Indians] arises from their condition of tutelage or dependency; and it
rests with Congress to determine when the relationship shall cease"). Even United States v.
Sandoval, which first suggested the idea of an "arbitrariness" limit upon the federal tribal-recogni-
tion power, admitted that it was the prerogative of Congress to decide when Indian tutelage had
come to an end. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 110.
120. Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291, 1297 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting
COHEN, supra note 67, at 815); see also id. at 1298-99 (noting that treaty-given rights of occu-
pancy persist until clearly abrogated by Congress); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 388 F.2d
998, 1000 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (suggesting that tribe might have lost standing to sue had not termination
act contemplated that tribe would continue to remain in existence for such purposes); COHEN,
supra note 67, at 19 ("[A] terminated tribe retains all 'sovereign authority' not inconsistent with a
termination act .... ).
121. DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 32-33 (footnote omitted); see generally Weatherhead, su-
pra note 103, at 10-14.
122. Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 377 (lst Cir.
1975) (footnote and citations omitted). Examples of a "general" Indian enactment include the
Indian Trade and Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988), and the Snydar Act, 22 U.S.C. §
13, 42 Stat. 208 (1988) (giving certain benefits to "the Indians throughout the United States"),
which the Department of the Interior has interpreted to allow the Bureau of Indian Affairs to pro-
vide services to Indians of any degree, whether or not members of a recognized tribe. See
Weatherhead, supra note 103, at 4. It should be noted, however, that courts have found claims by
individual Indians under the Indian Trade and Nonintercourse Act to be impermissible. See, e.g.,
Epps v. Andrus, 611 F.2d 915, 918 (1st Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (rejecting claims by individual
descendants of the Chappaquiddick tribe because "plaintiffs are not suing as a tribe [and] have
failed to allege tribal status").
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word "tribe" to mean no more than "a body of Indians of the same or a simi-
lar race, united in a community under one leadership or government, and
inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined territory,"'23 and courts
have on occasion allowed Indian legislation to apply to "a bona fide tribe not
otherwise federally recognized."' 24
For federal purposes, therefore, "[t]he term tribe has no universal legal
definition," and "the question of tribal existence ... [may] depend in part on
the context and purposes for which the term is used."'2 5 As a result,
tribes cannot be neatly divided into "recognized" and
"nonrecognized" tribes for all purposes; rather, a tribe may "exist" for
some purposes but not for others .... The legal principles developed
under one statutory scheme often cannot be transferred to other situa-
tions because of the peculiar context in which the original principles
were developed.'26
These standards have produced a complex, and often confusing body of case
law of Indian tribal status.
Does the variety of statutory provisions and case law regarding tribal
recognition mean that federal Indian jurisprudence has abandoned its animat-
ing principles of tribal sovereignty and the political character of federal-Indian
relations? If the courts were ready to attempt to develop a Sandoval-style law
of genuine Indian identity, and if congressional Indian legislation really could
reach Indians irrespective of tribal recognition, it might represent a significant
departure from Indian law's political core. As the discussion above suggests,
our legislature and courts have flirted with such an approach, particularly with
respect to the Indian racial status of individual persons.
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, for example, defined "Indian" to
include not only members of recognized tribes but also "all persons who are
descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the
present boundaries of any Indian reservation," and even "all other persons of
one-half or more Indian blood."'27 In 1938, the Seventh Circuit found that
the percentage of Indian blood of a habeas corpus petitioner and "his racial
status in fact as an Indian" gave federal jurisdiction despite that individual's
lack of tribal membership.'28 The Supreme Court has noted that "enrollment
in an official tribe has not been held to be an absolute requirement for federal
[Indian] jurisdiction."
'' 29
Such suggestions of a court's ability to determine the "real" racial identity
of an individual claimant, or of a statute's ability to define it in a
123. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
124. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 528 F.2d at 377.
125. COHEN, supra note 67, at 3.
126. Id. at 7.
127. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1988).
128. Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 643 (1939).
129. DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 30 (citing United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 647
n.7 (1977)); see also United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649-50 (1978) (recognizing that § 19 of
the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1988), does not necessarily require tribal enroll-
ment for "Indian" status).
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comprehensive way, are conceptually quite problematic in their own right, 3"
and are entirely inconsistent with the principles of tribal sovereignty repre-
sented by the line of cases proceeding from Johnson v. M'Intosh3' through
Morton v. Mancari.'32 Real flirtations with such a constitutionally "suspect"
racial essentialism cannot be reconciled with the principle that "the [federal]
power over Indians reaches only Indian tribes or tribal Indians""' since as
"[tihe Indian tribe is the fundamental unit of Indian Law, in its absence there
is no occasion for the law to operate."' 34
3. Returning to Political Recognition
At least some of the varied case law on tribal recognition, however, may
perhaps be understood in ways which make it less problematic. If tribal sover-
eignty is to remain the foundation of federal Indian jurisprudence, the courts
must insist that "Congress may not favor a group of individual Indians with
special legislation unless that group is found to constitute an Indian tribe for
purposes of federal Indian law.' 35 With respect to findings of the Indian
"tribal" status of Indian groups not formally recognized as such,'36 much of
this case law may amount less to a rejection of the recognition power than a
judicial willingness to accept "a course of dealing with the tribe as a political
entity"'' as a form of de facto federal recognition. Thus, for example, courts
have found Indian "tribes" to exist for federal Indian law purposes where the
political branches of government, even in the absence of formal tribal designa-
tion, have dealt with Indian groups as if they were such tribes.' Reading
such cases as examples of de facto federal recognition rather than as assess-
ments of "real" racial or ethnological identity keeps federal Indian law faithful
130. See Ford, supra note 91, at 1239-40, 1280-85.
131. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
132. 417 U.S. 535 (1974); see DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 30 ("Although Mancari and
related decisions could be construed as requiring an opposite result, lower federal and state courts
have traditionally not required actual tribal membership, in the absence of a statutory directive, as
a condition of Indian status.").
133. Weatherhead, supra note 103, at 3.
134. CANBY, supra note 83, at 3; see also COHEN, supra note 67, at 1 ("Indian law is found-
ed in the political relationship between the United States and Indian tribes. In most instances, the
ights and obligations of individual Indians peculiar to Indian law derive from their status as mem-
bers or descendants of an Indian tribe, not solely from their race.") (footnote omitted).
135. Weatherhead, supra note 103, at 3.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 120-25.
137. CANBY, supra note 83, at 4.
138. See, e.g., United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) (effectively reversing the holding
of United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 505 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1974), that Choctaw Indians
were not a tribe by finding long history of Choctaw relations with federal government as if group
were tribe); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) (allowing Pueblo Indians to be con-
sidered Indian "tribe" by virtue of congressional provision in New Mexico statehood enabling
legislation that group's lands be considered Indian Country for purposes of federal ban on liquor
sales to Indians); Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 377-78
(1st Cir. 1975) (finding Passamaquoddies to be Indian tribe because group had long been dealt
with as if it were and "[nlo one in th[e] proceeding hatdl challenged the Tribe's identity as a
tribe").
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to its animating philosophy of tribal sovereignty, and allows it to avoid the
treacherous constitutional shoals of racial classification.
Fortunately, federal recognition policy is becoming more consistent on
this score. In its more recent pieces of Indian legislation, Congress has avoid-
ed the use of any definition of tribe, preferring instead to tie statutory provi-
sions to the acknowledgment of tribal status by the Secretary of the Interi-
or 39-- with "tribe" being defined in the legislation only as a group recog-
nized as eligible due to its status as an Indian tribe."4 Today, tribal recogni-
tion is "treated more fully as a conferral of a legal status" than was the case in
previous eras. 4 ' Perhaps, therefore, federal Indian law is returning to the
principles of tribal sovereignty and political relationships that lie at its core,
make it coherent, and help it to avoid the quagmires of equal protection analy-
sis.
4. Recognition and the Architecture of Federal Indian Power
Recognition by the political branches of government, either express or
implied, continues to lie at the center of federal Indian law, forming the exclu-
sive basis by which this peculiar body of American jurisprudence may be
invoked. This understanding of the recognition power has significant conse-
quences. There may well be substantive limits upon what the federal govern-
ment may do in its regulation of Indian affairs. For example, Indian lands may
not be taken by the United States government without the provision of just
compensation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.'42 The trust responsibility attached to the government's role as guardian
of the Indian tribes and protector of their interests may also entail some sub-
stantive limits upon federal authority to regulate Indian affairs at discre-
tion."'43
Yet there would seem to be no check upon the ability of the political
branches of the United States government to recognize, or to de-recognize,
Indian tribes.'" If a tribe's status as a "sovereign" power with the ability to
exist in a government-to-government relationship with the United States is
fundamentally a political status, then the federal power of tribal recognition
must, as with the recognition power of the President in foreign affairs,'45
139. See supra text accompanying notes 3-16.
140. See Weatherhead, supra note 103, at 1, 8, 14-15 (giving examples of such legislation).
141. Id. at 17.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
144. Cf The Maret, 145 F.2d 431, 442 (3d Cir. 1944) (noting the power of federal govern-
ment to refuse recognition to foreign sovereigns).
145. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) ("Who is the sovereign, de
jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but a political question, the determination of which
by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as
well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of that government."). In Guaranty Trust Co. v.
United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938), the Court held:
What government is to be regarded here as representative of a foreign sovereign state is
a political rather than a judicial question, and is to be determined by the political depart-
ment of the government. Objections to its determination as well as to the underlying
policy are to be addressed to it and not to the courts. Its action in recognizing a foreign
[Vol. 73:1
1995] INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE: TRIBAL RECOGNITION 163
remain a political status not subject to judicial review. This was recognized
more than a century ago by the Supreme Court which stated that
it is the rule of this [C]ourt to follow the action of the executive and
other political departments of the government, whose more special
duty it is to determine such affairs. If by them [certain] Indians are
recognized as a tribe, this court must do the same. If they are a tribe
of Indians, then, by the Constitution of the United States, they are
placed, for certain purposes, within the control of the laws of Con-
gress. ",6
While courts may be able to place limits upon the exercise of federal power
over the affairs of Indian tribes, the initial decision of federal authorities as to
the recognition of Indian tribes, a powerful antecedent power, is a non-justicia-
ble political matter.
This result is entirely consistent with the scope of the recognition power
as the Supreme Court has understood it in the context of federal dealings with
foreign sovereigns. As Justice Brennan stated in the seminal political question
decision of Baker v. Carr:
While recognition of foreign governments so strongly defies
judicial treatment that without executive recognition a foreign state
has been called "a republic of whose existence we know nothing,"
and the judiciary ordinarily follows the executive as to which nation
has sovereignty over disputed territory, once sovereignty over an area
is politically determined and declared, courts may examine the result-
ing status and decide independently whether a statute applies to that
area. 
47
The politically constrained power of the government to recognize Indian tribes
is also consistent with the discretion of the political branches of the federal
government to make and unmake treaties not only with foreign sovereigns,
4
8
government and in receiving [that government's] diplomatic representatives is conclusive
on all domestic courts, which are bound to accept that determination ....
Id. at 137-38; see also Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 419 (1839) (noting that
insistence by the United States government that the Falkland Islands are not Argentine "is bind-
ing ... on [the Circuit] Court, as to whom the sovereignty of those islands belongs"); United
States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 149 (1820) (referring to non-recognized "Mexican
Republic" as "a republic of whose existence we know nothing"); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S.
(3 Wheat.) 610, 634 (1818) (declaring that recognition questions "are generally rather [morel
political than legal in their character" and "belong more properly" to political branches); KMW
Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 606 F.2d 10, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that "[a]lthough there
has been a change of government in Iran, the United States has "recognized the present govern-
ment" so as to give governmental agency power to enforce its rights in U.S. courts).
146. United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 419 (1865). The Court in Holliday had been
faced with a dispute arising out of an 1862 statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to any Indians
under the supervision of a federal Indian agent. The act was found permissible on the grounds that
it did indeed regulate commerce "with the Indian tribes" as allowed by the Constitution. See id. at
417.
147. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962) (footnotes omitted).
148. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 212 (declaring that where government action purports to
have ended international agreement, "a court will not ordinarily inquire whether a treaty has been
terminated, since on that question 'governmental action ... must be regarded as of controlling
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but also with Indians, 49 and to refuse recognition to foreign governments"'
and terminate the federal-tribal relationship. 5'
Given, therefore, that the federal government's power of tribal recognition
is so powerful and so potentially unconstrained, it becomes quite important to
determine who may constitutionally exercise it.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIVISION OF INDIAN AFFAIRS POWERS
The Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides
that "[tihe Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."'52 It
has generally been interpreted to give Congress plenary power to regulate
Indian affairs.'53 This power, which replicates a similar but somewhat more
specific allocation of authority that existed under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, "'54 is extraordinarily broad and includes the power to "limit, modify or
eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise
possess."'55 The treaty-making power vested in the President and the
importance"'); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) (declaring that presidential
acceptance of facial validity of Spanish legal position in 1821 treaty could not be second-guessed
by judiciary).
149. Federal power to abrogate Indian treaties is both "political" and nonjusticiable. Delaware
Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977). The Court declared that while
[u]nquestionably a treaty [with Indians] may be modified or abrogated by an act of Con-
gress ... the power to make and unmake is essentially political and not judicial, and the
presumption is wholly inadmissible that Congress sought in this instance to submit the
good faith of its own action or the action of the government to judicial decision ....
United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U.S. 427, 468 (1893); see also United States v. Sioux Nation,
448 U.S. 371, 411 n.27 (1980) (citing cases in accord); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S.
584, 594 (1977); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 30 (1831) (Johnson, J., dissent
ing) (noting that "as between sovereigns, breaches of treaty [are] not breaches of contract cogni-
zable in a court of justice.... [Flor their political acts states [are] not amenable to tribunals of
justice."); cf Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366, 372 (1856) (refusing to second-guess
propriety of Indian treaty since "the treaty, after [being] executed and ratified by the proper au-
thorities of the Government, becomes the supreme law of the land, and the courts can no more go
behind it for the purpose of annulling its effect and operation, than they can behind an act of
Congress"). The Court stated in a later case, however, that
[t]he power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably
such power will be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify
the government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the
interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
150. See, e.g., The Maret, 145 F.2d 431, 442 (3d Cir. 1944) ("A policy of nonrecognition
when demonstrated by the Executive must be deemed to be as affirmative and positive in effect as
a policy of recognition.").
151. See, e.g., Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391-92 (1921); United States v. Waller, 243
U.S. 452, 459-60 (1917); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913). As we have seen,
termination of the federal-tribal "special relationship" is constrained merely by a "clear statement"
rule that requires congressional intent to be express. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
153. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
154. See U.S. ARTS. OF CONFED., art. IX, cl. 4 (giving Congress "the sole and exclusive right
and power of ... regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of
any of the States; provided that the legislative right of any State, within its own limits, be not in-
fringed or violated"), superseded by U.S. CONST.
155. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
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advisory role granted to the Senate 5 6 is also commonly discussed as a prin-
cipal component of the federal government's constitutional authority over
Indian affairs.
Curiously, no commentators have identified the independent presidential
prerogative of tribal recognition visible in the Constitution's allocation of
Indian authority. In addressing the constitutional bases of the federal
government's Indian affairs powers, Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indi-
an Law'57-"[t]he authoritative commentary" on United States Indian
law"'S--only discusses the Indian Commerce Clause, the treaty power,'59
the Property Clause,"6 Congress's power to regulate the terms of a new
state's accession, 6' and such "Congressional powers of lesser importance
156. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur .. ").
157. COHEN, supra note 67.
158. Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291, 1297 (4th Cir. 1983).
159. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 2. Interestingly, the Second Circuit in Oneida believed that
under the Articles of Confederation, "Congress's power to make Indian treaties" derived not from
the ordinary confederal treaty power but from the Articles' analogue to the modem-day Indian
Commerce Clause. See Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1155. This, the court concluded, was apparent from
the fact that Indian treaties such as the Treaty of Fort Stanwix became effective upon signature
and were not submitted for formal ratification pursuant to U.S. ARTS. OF CONFED., art. IX, cl. 6
(barring United States from entering into "any treaties or alliances ... unless nine States assent to
the same"). Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1154. Under such a system, therefore, the Indian treaty power
presumably derived not from the government's ordinary (foreign affairs) treaty-negotiation authori-
ty but simply by delegation from the legislature's general power to "manag[e] all affairs with the
Indians." U.S. ARTS. OF CONFED., art. IX, cl. 4.
This constitutional connection between the Indian treaty power and the Indian Commerce
Clause did not survive the adoption of the Constitution in 1787: with the establishment of an
executive presidency, the power to make treaties-both with Indians and with foreign pow-
ers-moved to that branch. See DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 1 ("For much of the first century of
the Nation's history, this [congressional] lawmaking power [in Indian affairs] was augmented by
exercise of presidential treaty-making authority under Article II, section 2 [of the Constitution].");
see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206 (1978) (noting that "Indian law"
has "draw[n] principally upon the treaties drawn and executed by the Executive Branch and legis-
lation passed by Congress". One case noted that
being within the territorial limits of the United States, [Indian tribes] were not, strictly
speaking foreign states; but they were alien nations, distinct political communities, with
whom the United States might and habitually did deal . .. either through treaties made
by the President and Senate, or through acts of Congress in the ordinary forms of legis-
lation.
Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884) (emphasis added).
By 1868, over 400 treaties had been made under presidential authority and ratified by the
Senate pursuant to U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 13 (citing 2 C.
KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS-LAWS AND TREATIES (1904) (collecting treaties between United
States and Indian tribes)). Indeed, even after Congress's ostensible "termination of Presidential
treaty-making authority, Congress routinely approved agreements negotiated by the Executive
Branch with tribes .... " DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 13.
160. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States .... ").
161. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl.l (providing that "[n]ew States may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union").
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involved in Indian legislation" '62 as the power to establish post roads, 6 ' to
enact a uniform rule of naturalization,"6 and to set up judicial tribunals infe-
rior to the Supreme Court.'65 Despite its obvious importance for Indian af-
fairs in a legal system founded upon doctrines of tribal sovereignty and gov-
ernment-to-government relations, Cohen never says anything about constitu-
tional allocation of the vital recognition power."6
The possibility of some independent constitutional authority for the Presi-
dent in Indian affairs has not been entirely overlooked.'67 But no attention
has been focused upon the recognition power itself, despite the Constitution's
clear assignment to the President of the power not only to make treaties, but to
"appoint Ambassadors" to other sovereign powers with the Senate's con-
sent"6 and to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers" therefrom
entirely at his own discretion."6 Indeed, though it explicitly analogizes the
federal power to recognize tribal sovereignty to the "recognition of foreign
governments and to other issues of international relations,"'70 Cohen's au-
thoritative Handbook attributes the power of tribal recognition to the "Indian"
portion of the Commerce Clause itself. 7'
This article contends that such a view is mistaken, and that there is an
independent presidential power of tribal recognition in the Constitution's allo-
cation of Indian powers. The Indian Commerce Clause does not constitute an
exclusive vesting of authority over all Indian matters to the Congress. Rather,
as has been long recognized with respect to the power to make treaties with
Indian tribes, Indian affairs are within the realm of executive and legislative
powers in which responsibility is to some degree shared. The Constitution's
allocation of powers between the two political branches of government, and its
commitment of the general recognition power to the President, serves both to
reserve that power to the executive in matters of foreign relations and to guar-
antee his authority to recognize or de-recognize the sovereignty of a tribal
"domestic dependent nation."
162. COHEN, supra note 67, at 210 n.21.
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
164. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
165. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 9; see also id. art. I11, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish.").
166. See COHEN, supra note 67, at 207-12.
167. In 1871 Congress passed a statute, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988), which purported to bar any
further treaty-derived federal recognition of Indian tribes' sovereign status. William Canby has
noted that while it is questionable that Congress could limit the constitutional treaty-making power
of the President, the statute did effectively end the making of Indian treaties by serving as notice
that none would thereafter be ratified. Reservations established after 1871 were accordingly creat-
ed either by statue or, until Congress ended the practice in 1919, by executive order. CANBY,
supra note 83, at 17-18.
168. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
169. Id. art. II, § 3.
170. COHEN, supra note 67, at 3.
171. Id. (discussing how "[s]uch determinations are incident to the Indian Commerce Clause
of the Constitution"). The Handbook goes no further than to suggest that either "Congress or the
Executive [may find] that a tribe exists." Id.
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A. Congressional Power over Indians
The powers of the Congress over Indian affairs derive primarily from the
Commerce Clause authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."'72 With this phrasing,
the Constitution carefully describes this "Commerce Power" as having three
distinct forms: the power to regulate foreign commerce, the power to regulate
interstate commerce, and the power to regulate Indian commerce. It is impor-
tant to understand that these three realms of congressional authority are not
equivalent in scope.
1. Interstate Commerce
The legislature's power over interstate commerce is the broadest of the
three. As any student of constitutional law knows, the Supreme Court has
given the Commerce Clause an increasingly expansive interpretation over the
years. Beginning as a comparatively modest mandate to regulate commercial
intercourse "which concerns more States than one,"'73 the clause became,
early in the present century, a bitterly-contested means by which the Court, for
a time, tried to rein-in the creation of the expansive modern administrative
state. "'74 In more recent times, the Commerce Clause has been held to permit
an ever-increasing scope for congressional regulation.7 Though the Supreme
172. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
173. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 3 (1824).
174. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (finding no congressional
power to regulate "manufacturing" under antitrust law provisions of Sherman Act because merely
making product in particular state does not itself bear a "direct relation" to interstate commerce);
Houston, E. & W. Tx. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (allowing Interstate Com-
merce Commission to regulate railroad rates on intrastate route because matter "ha[d] such a close
and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential or appropriate to the...
maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms");
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271-72 (1918) (striking down anti-child-labor law on
grounds that act did not "regulate transportation among the States" but rather aimed to "standard-
ize the ages at which children may be employed" while "the goods shipped are of themselves
harmless"); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 516 (1922) (allowing regulation of stockyards
because they were "but a throat through which the current [of interstate commerce] flows, and the
transactions which occur therein are only incident to this current"); Coronado Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925) (allowing regulation of coal mining on grounds that while
"[tihe acts of the persons involved [in labor unrest] were local in character, but the intent was to
restrain interstate commerce and the means employed were calculated to carry that intent into
effect"); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 543 (1935) (rejecting
regulation of poultry slaughterhouses since "[nleither the slaughtering nor the sales by defendants
were transactions in interstate commerce").
175. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937) (upholding
labor legislation in steel industry on grounds denial of employee rights to organize unions threat-
ens industrial peace and that "the stoppage of those operations by industrial strife would have a
most serious effect upon interstate commerce"); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (per-
mitting Congress to bar interstate shipments of goods produced by substandard labor practices);
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (upholding legislation prohibiting "extortionate
credit transactions" by deferring to purported congressional finding that such activities help fuel
organized crime activity and thus "affect interstate commerce").
Most famously, perhaps, it has even been invoked in support of federal legislation banning
racial discrimination by privately-owned motels and restaurants-on the grounds that their clien-
tele included some interstate travelers. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
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Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez176 demonstrates that the
power to regulate "Commerce . . . among the several States" is not unlimited,
it is clearly enormously broad, giving the legislature sweeping authority in
matters pertaining to domestic relations.
2. Foreign Commerce
In foreign affairs, by contrast, the Constitution affords the President con-
siderable power, assigning him not only the role of Commander-in-Chief,'
but also the power to negotiate treaties (though their entry into effect requires
Senatorial approval),"' to appoint United States ambassadors and other min-
isters (also with Senatorial approval),'79 and to receive ambassadors from
other governments.50 Congress is hardly powerless in this equation, possess-
ing the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, 8' establish uni-
form rules of naturalization,'82 define and punish crimes on the high seas and
against international law, 8 ' declare war, 8 4 and raise and maintain the
country's military forces.'85
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court made it clear in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp. 6 that the conduct of foreign relations is fundamentally
the prerogative of the Chief Executive. The federal government succeeded
directly to the plenary foreign affairs powers of the British Crown, and the
President is the embodiment of that power under our present constitutional
system.S7
U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding anti-discrimination provisions of Title 11 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 because the motel "serve[d] interstate travelers"); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
304 (1964) (upholding Title II provisions because restaurant "either serves or offers to serve inter-
state travelers or serves food a substantial portion of which has moved in interstate commerce").
176. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
177. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1.
178. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
179. Id.
180. Id. art. 1I, § 3.
181. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
182. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
183. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
184. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
185. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16.
186. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
187. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316-17. As the Supreme Court has observed:
since the states severally never possessed international powers, such powers could not
have been carved from the mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the
United States from some other source. During the Colonial period, those powers were
possessed exclusively by and were entirely under the control of the [British] Crown....
As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies, acting as a unit, the
powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but
to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America
... Sovereignty is never held in suspense. When, therefore, the external sovereignty of
Great Britain in respect of the colonies ceased, it immediately passed to the Union.
Id.; see also id. at 317 (quoting Rufus King at Constitutional Convention, in 5 DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION As RECOM-
MENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 212 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
New York, Burt Franklin 1888) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
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[T]he very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations ... does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress [though] of course, like every other governmental power,
[it] must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of
the Constitution. 88
Not only is the federal power over foreign relations different in origin and
character than the power over domestic affairs, but congressional "participation
in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm,
with its important, complicated, delicate, and manifold problems, the President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation."'89
The jurisprudential architecture of the foreign affairs power is therefore
quite different from the power over domestic affairs. As a result, the congres-
sional authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations" is necessarily a
narrower grant of power than that afforded to "regulate Commerce ... among
the several States." In the former, the legislature's discretion to set federal
policy at its discretion is much more powerfully qualified by the independent
authority of the executive than is the case in the domestic arena. Based on the
Court's holding in Curtiss-Wright, it would appear that in foreign relations,
Congress's authority is limited to those matters specifically assigned to the
legislature by the Constitution-in contrast to the powers of the Executive
Branch, for which the specific Constitutional enumerations are merely illus-
trative.
Where the interstate provisions of the Commerce Clause provide an ex-
pansive power of oversight and regulation in domestic affairs, therefore, the
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations seems rather narrowly to
mean only actual "commerce," that is, it confers the power to pass legislation
relating to United States commercial trading relations with other countries."
188. Id. at 320. Moreover, the Court suggested because of its extra-constitutional derivation,
the foreign affairs power is not in principle limited to the powers allocated amongst the branches
of government by our Constitution. Id. "The broad statement that the federal government can
exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied
powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically
true only in respect of our internal affairs." Id. at 315-16.
[T]he investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did
not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and
wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with
other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have
vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.
Id. at 318.
189. Id. at 319.
190. For example, Congress has assumed a supervisory role over trade agreements with for-
eign powers. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, for example, were negotiated
by the President pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2902 (1988 & Supp. V 1992), which authorized him to
enter into agreements to reduce tariff barriers, id. § 2902(a)(1)(A), agreements to reduce non-tariff
barriers, id. § 2902(b)(1), and bilateral agreements to reduce both tariff and non-tariff barriers, id.
§ 2902(c)(1). Under these provisions, moreover, before the President could sign agreements relat-
ing to non-tariff barriers, he was required to consult with the various congressional committees
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With respect to broader questions of United States policy in the international
arena, Curtiss-Wright makes clear that it is the President who enjoys the upper
hand.
191
3. Indian Commerce: Neither Fish nor Fowl
The distinct separation of the enumerated legislative powers of the Com-
merce Clause marks the power to regulate Commerce with the Indian Tribes a
distinct category, consisting neither of relations with "foreign Nations" nor of
domestic affairs regulable by virtue of being related to interstate com-
merce.' As Chief Justice Marshall's "domestic dependent nations" formula-
tion '9 suggests, this is entirely consistent with the principles of tribal sover-
eignty underlying federal Indian law. Indian tribes are not states for purposes
of the Interstate Commerce Clause,' 94 and indeed are clearly not states at
all. "'95 Nor, are Indian tribes foreign states within the meaning of the Consti-
tution. 96 Even though separate sovereigns, they are "admitted to compose a
charged with the oversight of federal policies likely to be affected by such international arrange-
ments. Id. § 2902(d)(1). The GATT's Uruguay Round fell under the provisions of §2902 (b)(1),
while NAFTA began as a bilateral agreement with Canada pursuant to § 2902(c)(1) and was sub-
sequently extended, through bilateral negotiations, to Mexico (thus apparently keeping it within §
2902(c)(1)).
191. This is not to say, however, that the legislature's role has been insignificant, since by the
exercise of its enumerated constitutional powers it can still influence the conduct of foreign rela-
tions in significant ways. The congressional power over the purse strings of the federal govern-
ment, for example, can be considerable. It has thus been said that:
Congress in making appropriations has the power and authority not only to designate the
purpose of appropriation, but also the terms and conditions under which the executive
department ... may expend such appropriations.... [This matter is] solely in the hands
of Congress and it is the plain and explicit duty of the executive branch . . . to comply
with the same.
Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft, Co., 60 F. Supp. 985, 988 (S.D. Cal. 1945), affld, 154 F.2d 419
(9th Cir. 1946). Congress has thus "often used its defense appropriations power to control national
security policy, particularly since World War Il." STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW 107 (1990). This power of conditional appropriations may itself not be without limit. See,
e.g., 41 Op. ATI'Y GEN. 507 (1960) (arguing that appropriations power cannot be exercised to in-
validate direct constitutional commitment of power to other branches); 41 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 230
(1955) (same); 4 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 731 (1980) (same). Nevertheless, it has, for example,
proven significant in precipitating the "Iran-Contra" scandal by banning the expenditure of federal
funds "for the purpose ... of supporting ... military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua,"
Dept. of Defense Appropriations Act 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1935 (1984) (the
"Boland Amendment"), and in providing an important legislative means of pressuring the Presi-
dent to abandon overseas military operations. See generally Christopher A. Ford, War Powers As
We Live Them: Congressional-Executive Bargaining Under the Shadow of the War Powers Reso-
lution, 11 J.L. & POL. 609, 633, 692, 699 (1995).
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S.
163, 192 (1989) ("The extensive case law that has developed under the Interstate Commerce
Clause ... is premised on a structural understanding of the unique role of the States in our consti-
tutional system that is not readily imported to cases involving the Indian Commerce Clause.").
193. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
194. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 191-92 (1989).
195. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980); see, e.g., Cotton
Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 191-93 (finding that tribes are not "states" for purposes of tax apportion-
ment); Wounded Head v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 1975) (citing Barta v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 1958)).
196. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18; see generally Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1154 (tracing
status of Indian tribes under Articles of Confederation and United States Constitution).
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part of the United States, [and in United States dealings with foreign powers]
are considered as within the jurisdictional limits of the United States."'97
Indian tribes are thus neither international fish nor domestic fowl. The
Indians "sustain a peculiar relation to the United States" ' which is unique.
They were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-inde-
pendent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as
states, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sover-
eignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their
internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws
of the Union or of the state within whose limits they resided.' 99
Although the Supreme Court has used similar language in describing Indian
tribal sovereignty as that used to describe sovereignty in the international
arena,"' it is clear that the two categories are not the same."' As
197. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. The Indian tribes, Chief Justice Marshall contin-
ued, are "so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any attempt
[by foreign powers] to acquire their lands, or to form a political connection with them, would be
considered ... an act of hostility." Id. at 17-18.
Under international law, "[a]n entity is not a state unless it has competence, within its own
constitutional system, to conduct international relations with other states, as well as the political,
technical, and financial capabilities to do so." 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 cmt. e (1990) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; cf
MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915) (noting that United States government "is invested
with all the attributes of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has the powers of
nationality, especially those which concern its relations and intercourse with other countries."). In
this respect, ironically, the various states of the Union might be considered to be closer to the sta-
tus of a state under international law than are the Indian tribes: while tribes' foreign relations are
conducted exclusively through the federal government, states enjoy the ability to reach agreements
with foreign sovereigns as long as these arrangements to not "encroach ... upon the full and free
exercise of federal authority." Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893). States are, howev-
er, barred from making actual treaties with foreign powers, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, or from "oth-
erwise engag[ing] in or intrud[ing] upon foreign relations to any substantial extent." RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD), supra, § 201 cmt. g.
198. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 581 (1832) (M'Lean, J., concurring). M'Lean
went on to note:
In the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our government, we have admitted,
by the most solemn sanctions, the existence of the Indians as a separate and distinct
people, and as being vested with rights which constitute them a state, or separate com-
munity-not a foreign, but a domestic community-not as belonging to the confederacy,
but as existing within it, and, of necessity, bearing to it a peculiar relation.
Id. at 583.
199. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886).
200. The Worchester Court described Indian sovereignty by citing the international law writ-
ings of Vattel to the effect that
[a] weak state ... may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without
stripping itself of the right of government . . . [and that] [tlributary and feudatory
states... "do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states, so long as self
government and sovereign and independent authority are left in the administration of the
state."
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 197, § 201 cmt. e ("An entity that has the capacity to conduct foreign relations does not
cease to be a state because it voluntarily turns over to another state control of its foreign relations,
as in the 'protectorates' of the period of colonialism, the case of Liechtenstein, or the 'associated
states' of today."). Similarly, Chief Justice Marshall observed in Worcester that
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"extraconstitutional political bodies''2.. existing in a intergovernmental rela-
tionship with the United States, yet falling within United States jurisdiction
and a sweeping federal regulative power, Indian tribes exist as a distinct legal
category, between the foreign and domestic paradigms of legislative power.
The status of Indian tribes as a third category subject to congressional
commerce authority has significant implications. Chief Justice Marshall, for
example, wrote in Cherokee Nation, that "[tihe objects, to which the power of
regulating commerce might be directed, are divided into three distinct class-
es-foreign nations, the several states, and Indian tribes. When forming this
article, the [Constitutional] convention considered them as entirely dis-
tinct."203
This is true not solely with respect to the nature of Indian sovereignty, but
with respect to the powers of Congress itself. This long-understood constitu-
tional distinction between the three realms of interstate, foreign, and Indian
affairs underscores the conclusion that the legislature has different degrees of
power in each of these areas.2" Being neither clearly in the realm of foreign
relations nor in that of domestic affairs, Indian affairs have a constitutional
division of power all their own-and one which admits some independent role
for the executive branch.
B. The Distribution of Constitutional Power over Indian Affairs
Under the scheme articulated by the Court in Curtiss-Wright, the doctrinal
groundings of Indian tribal sovereignty would suggest a federal allocation of
powers more analagous to that of foreign relations, rather than that of domes-
tic affairs. For domestic matters, the "primary purpose of the Constitution was
to carve from the general mass of legislative powers then possessed by the
states such portions as it was thought desirable to vest in the federal govern-
ment, leaving those not included in the enumeration still in the states."205 As
[t]he words 'treaty' and 'nation' are words of our own language, selected in our diplo-
matic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well under-
stood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the other
nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559-60.
201. Justice Thompson, dissenting in Cherokee Nation, resisted this distinction. See Cherokee
Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 52-53 (Thompson, J., dissenting). As Justice Johnson discussed, Eu-
ropean law encompassed an array of sovereign and "demi-sovereign" states, but a Cherokee state,
"if it be a state, is still a grade below them all: for not to be able to alienate without permission of
the remainder-man or lord, places them in a state of feudal dependence." Id. at 26-27 (Johnson, J.,
concurring).
202. DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 1162.
203. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18.
204. Indeed, Justice M'Lean, concurring in Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 592, suggested that
the commerce power of Congress with respect to the Indian tribes might be more limited even
than the legislature's power over foreign commerce. While "[i]t is the same power, and is con-
ferred in the same words, that has often been exercised in regulating trade with foreign countries,"
he wrote, it was nonetheless true that "[i]n the regulation of commerce with the Indians, Congress
has exercised a more limited power than has been exercised in reference to foreign countries." Id.
205. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936) (emphasis in
original).
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Chief Justice Marshall made clear in Worcester, the power of the British
Crown, as discoverer and conqueror of the Indian nations, passed directly to
the United States as a whole-as in Justice Black's Curtiss-Wright opinion,
which described how the authority to conduct foreign relations passed to the
United States upon American independence.2"
While this theory underscores federal Indian-affairs supremacy vis-a-vis
the states, the mere fact that the power over Indian affairs was transmitted
from the British Crown to the federal government may not tell us everything
we need to know about the allocation of Indian powers within the federal
system. Precisely because an Indian tribe is not as foreign a sovereign as is,
say, France, the direct acquisition of authority from the Crown does not neces-
sarily imply the same overarching presidential power to "speak or listen as a
representative of the [United States]"2 8 in Indian affairs as it does in foreign
relations. To find the presidential supremacy of Curtiss-Wright implicit in
Indian affairs would be inconsistent with the distinction that has been drawn
between Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Saw-
yer,2" in which President Harry Truman's seizure of the nation's steel mills
in order to prevent the disruption of armaments production by labor unrest
during the Korean War was found unconstitutional because the President's ac-
tion in Youngstown had a "profound and demonstrable domestic impact" while
the powers at issue in Curtiss-Wright had effects "entirely external" to the
United States.' The recognition of an Indian tribe and the adoption of fed-
eral legislation regulating Indian affairs, which has the effect under prevailing
tribal sovereignty principles of carving a federal enclave out of the reach of
most state law and regulatory powers,2 ' certainly does not have effects sole-
ly external to the United States.22
206. Compare Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544 (1832) and Johnson v.
M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584 (1823) with United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936). At least one court has suggested that the system established by the
Articles of Confederation might perhaps have "redistributed some of these powers to the states."
Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1161 n.10; cf U.S. ARTS. OF CONFED., art. IX, cl. 4 (giving Congress "the
sole and exclusive right and power of ... regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the
Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that the legislative right of any State within
its own limits be not infringed or violated") (emphasis added). During the Confederal period the
states appear to have had at least some ability to purchase Indian land without federal approval.
Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1160-61 ("We conclude that the ... power of Congress to manage Indian
Affairs [under the Articles of Confederation], as limited by the Legislative Rights Proviso, did not
preclude New York from making ... purchases of Oneida [tribal] land within its borders.").
207. See, e.g., Oneida, 470 U.S. at 234 (declaring that Indian relations are "the exclusive
province of federal law").
208. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
209. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
210. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004-05 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring,
joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, and Stevens, JJ.).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
212. The only court to address such a question said, with respect to the Articles of Confedera-
tion rather than with our present Constitution, that it had
considerable doubt whether the "international powers" discussed in Curtiss-Wright in-
cluded any authority with respect to Indians. The whole tenor of the [Supreme] Court's
discussion concerns international relations, the very matters that during the Confedera-
tion were the subject of the powers enumerated in Article IX(I) [of the Articles of Con-
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How, then, does the Constitution divide the power to regulate Indian
affairs? Despite the implicit assumptions of courts and commentators that the
Indian Commerce Clause and the treaty power constitute the entirety of federal
power over Indian affairs,2 ' this article contends that by virtue of the status
of Indian relations as neither a fully domestic nor a fully international realm of
federal power, there exists at least some independent executive authority over
Indian affairs. Moreover, the necessarily political nature of federal relations
with the Indian tribes means that an independent presidential recognition pow-
er must be part of that authority.
1. Congressional Power over Recognized Tribes
The constitutional distribution of federal power over Indian affairs, though
admitting a role for both the legislature and the executive, probably favors
Congress. Because of the significant domestic impact of Indian affairs legisla-
tion, both upon the Indians2 4 and upon the states in which they live, it is
reasonable to suppose that the full bundle of executive privileges of Curtiss-
Wright does not adhere to the President in Indian affairs. Indeed, the courts
have invariably interpreted the Indian Commerce Clause as giving Congress
vast power over tribal affairs extending even to involuntary tribal dissolu-
tion," 5 with the result that its parameters may be considered well estab-
lished. Indeed, the Constitution expressly mentions authority over Indian af-
fairs only once, in the Indian Commerce Clause. As the only direct textual
commitment of Indian powers in the Constitution, this provision suggests the
Framers' intent to give Congress the dominant role in regulating relations with
the Indian tribes.216 (Nor, it should be added, do most of the explicitly presi-
federation], which did not include Indian affairs. We recognize, however, that Indian
affairs do not fall neatly into the category of either international or domestic matters,
and it is surely arguable that on matters concerning war and peace with the Indians, the
national government did possess the inherent powers that Curtiss-Wright ascribed to the
national government in the realm of traditionally "international" matters.
Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1161.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 158-66.
214. Indians born within the United States have been U.S. citizens since 1924. See 8 U.S.C. §
1401(a)(2) (1988).
215. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
216. On the other hand, at least some things may be beyond the reach of congressional power
under the Indian Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1026-28
(1lth Cir. 1994) (finding Indian Commerce Clause to give no power to abrogate state Eleventh
Amendment immunity). But see Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1432 (10th Cir. 1994)
(finding congressional power under Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity).
The drafters of the Articles of Confederation, it appears, believed the central government's
authority to deal with the Indians, including its power to make treaties with the tribes, derived
from the Indian Commerce Clause's confederal antecedent, Article IX, cl. 4 of the Articles of
Confederation. Oneida, 860 F.2d at 1155 (discussing the intent of drafters of Articles). As early as
1775, the Continental Congress had taken Indian affairs as its direct responsibility, dividing Indian
Country into three departments and appointing commissioners for each department who were to
supervise treaty negotiations, disbursements of the Congress's money, and the carrying-out of the
Congress's Indian policies. See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 573 (M'Lean, J., concurring)
(recounting the history of federal Indian policy).
Prior to the drafting and ratification of the United States Constitution, debates raged as to
the extent that certain states should cede their western land claims to the central government.
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dential powers potentially relevant to Indian relations bear much relevance to
Twentieth Century issues of Indian policy: Congress has not ratified an Indian
treaty since 1871,27 and it has happily been a century or so since federal re-
lations with the Indian tribes implicated the President's powers as Command-
er-in-Chief.) Thus the courts and commentators are correct that the federal
power over "Indian" affairs is lodged primarily in the Congress."8
2. Recognition as a Trigger for "Indian" Commerce
The flaw in the traditional legislative-supremacy view of the constitutional
distribution of power, however, is that it ignores the constitution's clear desig-
nation of the President as the constitutional actor empowered to recognize
sovereign governments with which the United States will have political rela-
tions. '9 In one sense this might be said not to constitute a power over Indian
affairs, because it entails no power to regulate the lives of Indian tribes recog-
nized by the federal government. Nevertheless, the recognition power is a vital
aspect of federal Indian law because under the longstanding doctrines of tribal
sovereignty and intergovernmental relations, it is by federal recognition that
the legal system determines whose affairs are "Indian affairs" in the first
place. This recognition power belongs to the executive branch.
C. Disputes over Recognition
Just as the Constitution expressly commits federal power over Indian
affairs only to the legislature, it commits the power to recognize a fellow
political sovereign only to the President. Is the power of Indian recognition,
then, an exclusively executive power? The structure of the Constitution sug-
gests that it should be: the power to designate the sovereign political commu-
nities with which the United States may have relations is given to one branch,
and the power to regulate relations with certain such designated units, Indian
tribes, to another.22
Virginia, in particular, had refused to agree to such a cession unless the Continental Congress
were to nullify pre-Revolutionary purchases of land from the Indians by various speculating com-
panies. Finally, in 1784, Congress accepted Virginia's terms, a compromise effectively endorsed
by the Constitutional Convention in 1787.
With little debate, the convention's new constitution for the nation vested exclusive
authority in Congress to regulate trade and commerce and to make treaties with Indian
tribes. This was a far simpler and clearer declaration of legislative authority over Indian
tribes than the superseded Articles of Confederation contained.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 27, at 70-71; but see supra note 167 (noting that treaty-negotiating
power of President, though of little practical import in absence of congressional ratification, is also
relevant to Indian affairs under the United States Constitution).
217. See supra note 167.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 158-66.
219. The recognition power derives from the express textual commitment to the President of
the power to "appoint Ambassadors" with Senatorial approval, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and
to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers" from other sovereign powers, id. art. 1I, § 3.
The latter power does not contain any requirement of Senatorial approval.
220. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (noting that with respect to
recognition of foreign sovereigns, "the Executive [has] authority to speak as the sole organ of [the
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However, the courts have not seemed to agree with this position. Judges
have long upheld the power of Congress to terminate the federal-tribal rela-
tionship,22" ' and there have been no constitutional challenges to the existing
statutory acknowledgment procedures as an unlawful restriction upon the con-
stitutional powers of the President. Until the courts clarify their position, it
appears as if the recognition and de-recognition power is possessed concur-
rently by the legislature and the executive.
What if the two branches disagree on whether or not to extend political
recognition to an Indian tribe? The courts have on occasion "order[ed] the
executive branch of the federal government to honor tribal status for a par-
ticular purpose when that is deemed to have been the intent of Congress." '222
But if the independent recognition power of the executive branch has not
hitherto been understood, the issue has yet really to be posed. The present
regulatory scheme of Indian tribal acknowledgment denies administrative
recognition by the Secretary of the Interior to any group "subject [to] congres-
sional legislation that has expressly terminated or forbidden the Federal rela-
tionship." '223 Yet this recognition scheme is one established pursuant to the
Secretary's statutory authority under 25 U.S.C. § 9 (1988); it is not one de-
rived from the executive's independent constitutional power to recognize for-
eign sovereigns. Of course this position prohibits conflict with prior congres-
sional enactments. But if the President possesses an independent recognition
power, he might be able to recognize even a group so proscribed by the legis-
lature. What would happen if the issue, thus cast, were presented to a court?
One possibility is that the political character of tribal recognition would
necessarily make such a dispute an nonjusticiable political question. As the
Supreme Court defined it in Baker v. Carr, "[tihe nonjusticiability of a politi-
cal question is primarily a function of the separation of powers." '224
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political ques-
tion is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
national] government"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 197, § 204 ("Under the Constitution
of the United States, the President has exclusive authority to recognize or not to recognize a for-
eign state or government, and to maintain or not to maintain diplomatic relations with a foreign
government."); see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (upholding power of
President to settle claims of U.S. citizens as incident to recognition power since "[nlo such obsta-
cle can be placed in the way of rehabilitation of relations between this country and another na-
tion"). Tribal governments, of course, are not genuinely foreign governments, but the power to
recognize a fellow political sovereign certainly seems to be quite centralized. Indeed, the President
appears also to have the power unilaterally to terminate a formal treaty. Cf. Goldwater v. Carter,
444 U.S. 996 (1979) (refusing to consider challenge to President's ability to terminate treaty with
Taiwan by recognizing People's Republic of China). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) provides that
[tiermination of a treaty by the President is not 'repeal' of a 'law'; it is an international
act terminating an international legal obligation. Terminating the international legal
obligation will also terminate the status of the treaty as domestic law, but that is an
incidental consequence when an international legal obligation lapses for any reason.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 197, § 339 rptr's note 1.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 119, 149, & 151.
222. CANBY, supra note 83, at 5.
223. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(g); see also id. § 83.3(e) (similar phrasing).
224. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
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discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impos-
sibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.22
It may be true, as Justice Jackson noted in his Youngstown concurrence, that
"[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter., 226 Nevertheless, the "textually demonstrable con-
stitutional commitment" 227 of the recognition power to the President, not to
mention the explicitly political character of all federal Indian relations-which
has been affirmed and reaffirmed by the courts-would seem to bring an exec-




Since the possibility of an independent presidential recognition power has
not yet been identified, the nonjusticiability of legislative-executive disputes
over recognition is, perhaps, an unsatisfying conclusion. Both the presidential
recognition power and the resistance to judicial determination of disputes
relating thereto, however, are consequences that flow directly from the doc-
trine of tribal sovereignty that lies at the root of federal Indian law. Federal
Indian law must ground itself exclusively in the political character of federal-
Indian relations if it is to avoid a battery of equal protection challenges and a
whole host of uncomfortable conceptual problems.
The political character of governmental relations with the tribes-the
courts' insistence that tribes are indeed sovereign powers in some meaningful
sense-may point to a new understanding of the constitutional division of
power with respect to Indian affairs. This character suggests a presidential
power to recognize or de-recognize tribal governments, and that disputes with
Congress over such matters may well be immunized from judicial review.
225. Id. at 217.
226. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring).
227. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
228. As long as tribal recognition is seen as a power exercised by the executive pursuant to
statute, it will remain possible to challenge recognition decisions on grounds, for example, that
they failed to comport with the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act and
conventional due process analysis. See, e.g., Greene v. Babbitt, No. 93-37010, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23370, at **17-19, 21-25 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 1995) (requiring hearing procedures under
APA before permitting change in tribal recognition eligibility standards).
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The extent to which this new understanding may unsettle federal Indian
policy, and produce inter-branch conflicts over Indian affairs, remains to be
seen. Absent a presidential inclination to challenge the will of the Congress
over a matter of tribal recognition or termination, no problems need arise.
Nevertheless, if the doctrines of tribal sovereignty and intergovernmental rela-
tions are taken seriously, we may sooner or later have to come to terms with
the constitutional implications of our principles.
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF FAMILIES
THROUGH PEDAGOGY
IN FAMILY LAW CLASSROOMS
LUNDY LANGSTON*
INTRODUCTION
Most family law materials available today fail to reflect the diversity' of
family arrangements in modem society. Traditionally, family law is taught as a
rules-based area of law. Students learn the requirements of marriage and the
grounds for and consequences of divorce. Currently, there are efforts to ex-
pand the codification of family law through such things as support guidelines,
uniform acts,2 and legislation listing specific factors to be considered in custo-
dy and property distribution cases. Many of these efforts stem from the under-
lying assumption that there is a uniform methodology describing and defining
doctrine appropriate for resolution of family related matters. This uniform
methodology stems from the perception that there is a preferred model for
family structure.
Because the substance of family law is personal and emotional and be-
cause we live in a period of intense sensitivities about race, gender, and diver-
sity, consideration of these issues is a delicate matter for both professor and
student. Students as well as society have a variety of family lifestyle experi-
ences. Our pedagogical style for family law can have a silencing, as well as
normalizing effect if our focus is on the married unit as the norm.
Family law courses generally launch this silencing or normalizing effect
by beginning the course in one of two ways-either with a consideration of
* Associate Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University.
J.D., North Carolina Central University School of Law, 1989; LL.M., Columbia University School
of Law, 1991. I began the critique of family law, a subject area which is so immersed in the law
school curriculum, quite precariously. The social impact of what we do or ought to do in family
law classrooms is critical to the thought process of future law makers and adjudicators. In my
attempt to address some of the issues of pedagogy in family law, I sought, early on, the input of
various people in the legal profession. I presented issues of family law pedagogy at a faculty
colloquy at the University of Tulsa College of Law and at the First Annual Mid-Atlantic People of
Color Legal Scholarship Conference held at Howard Law School. I thank my colleagues at Tulsa
and Nova, participants at the Howard conference, and friends in the academy for their advice,
input, and encouragement. I also wish to thank my former research assistants Marsha Rogers at
the University of Tulsa College of Law and Karen Clark at Nova Southeastern Shepard Broad
Law Center for their research, discussions, and patience.
1. By diversity, I mean in terms of ethnic groups and also in terms of the various defini-
tions of the word "family."
2. The latest item is the Uniform Adoption Act (1994) which was approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. I
(Supp. 1995).
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the institution of marriage or with an examination of the rules governing its
dissolution.' Given the changes in behavior in the past several decades,4 one
wonders why marriage is still the universally-accepted starting point.5 Is it
presumed that marriage continues to be the exclusive foundation of the fami-
ly? If so, this article suggests it is a flawed beginning.6
Discussing family law from the starting point of marriage defines a family
structure which may not characterize all cultures in our society and may sug-
gest a preference for one family structure over another.7 Our society hinges
upon dichotomies Teaching family law through marriage discussions gives
3. Several family law textbooks were reviewed. The majority of them began with some
discussion of marriage, i.e., formation of marriage or its dissolution, or contrasting marriage with
other units. Textbooks reviewed include: JUDITH C. AREEN, FAMILY LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS
(3d ed. 1992); IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW, CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1986);
CALEB FOOTE El AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW I (3d ed. 1985) (beginning with a
discussion of the creation of families, not marriage); WALTER WADLINGTON, CASES AND IATERI-
ALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS (3d ed. 1995); DAVID WESTFALL, FAMILY LAW 165 (1994) (be-
girming with constitutional issues, until Part II which is entitled "Family Formation: Marriage and
Alternatives"); WALTER 0. WEYRAUCH ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW, LEGAL
CONCEPTS AND CHANGING HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS (1994).
4. Men and women have come out of their closets in various ways. For example, cohabita-
tion over marriage is a widely-accepted choice, single-parenthood is often a matter of choice, not
of accident, gays and lesbians are entering into relationships much more openly than before, re-
lationships have developed for the sole purpose of child bearing, and older men and women are
selecting younger mates. See generally Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the
Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1604 (1989) ("Society has recognized that many modem families
are headed either by two adults who work outside of the home or by a single parent."); Recent
Case, Family Law--Visitation Rights--New York Court of Appeals Refuses to Adopt a Functional
Analysis in Defining Family Relationships-Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991),
105 HARV. L. REV. 941, 941 (1992) ("Increases in the number of unmarried cohabitants, single
parents, and stepparents have altered the makeup of the nuclear family and have prompted many
commentators to call on the courts to define the family unit more broadly.") (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter Recent Case].
5. Family law professors should ponder the question of why marriage has been the starting
point before they begin discussions in their family law courses.
6. One author has stated:
As a society, we find it difficult to decide what exactly constitutes a family. In
some circles we tout the nuclear family as the model family; yet divorce has broken up
many "model" families, causing a disproportionate increase in single parent, female-
headed households. Therefore, it would be unrealistic and elitist for us to choose one
particular family style or category as having the greatest moral value. Each family style
reflects some aspects of the moral values deemed important by society. Because such a
broad range of family styles and relationships exists, we need to expand our scope in
order to capture a more universal definition of family.
Steven H. Hobbs, In Search of Family Value: Constructing a Framework for Jurisprudential Dis-
course, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 529, 534 (1992) (footnote omitted). But see At the Root of the Prob-
lem: Fatherlessness, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1995, at A21 ("[Tihe decline in the importance of
marriage makes boys (and men) less valuable to their families and communities than they might
otherwise be. This marginalization, I am convinced, feeds antisocial behavior.").
7. One commentator has stated:
Family law is that area of law whereby the state regulates certain intimate relationships
by defining a legal family relationship and assigning formal legal consequences and
obligations within the context of that definition. Family law both reflects and contributes
to our cultural understandings of the traditional family roles of mother, father, husband,
wife, and child.





the appearance that marriage is the accepted way of starting a family, thereby
devaluing other units-even though marriage is prohibited in some units. The
married family unit may be deemed the good and all other units, the bad.
Relationships and arrangements that do not resemble "nuclear" families are
labeled dysfunctional. This negative label is not always a result of some prob-
lem in the family, but attaches simply because the unit does not conform to
the "marriage nuclear norm."
Former Vice President Dan Quayle and his allies believe that many of the
problems we face today result from the breakdown of "family values," that is,
the breakdown of the traditional nuclear family structure. However, the real
problem is the judgmental attitude which favors certain family units while
denigrating others. When a particular unit is favored as the norm, individuals
who do not fit that standard often struggle futilely to conform. Frequently, this
results in utter hopelessness and a lack of self-esteem. Disengagement, lack of
productivity, and antisocial behavior are frequent by-products. Such a melan-
choly view can lead to a lack of value in one's self and in life in general. This
reduction in the value of life may result in acts of violence to oneself or to
others. Triggering this sense of lack of value in one's self simply because of
the make-up of an individual's family unit is, to this author, preposterous.
Some individuals fall outside of the norm because of factors beyond their
control, such as death and divorce;9 others do so by choice.
Clearly, we live in a pluralist society where a variety of personal lifestyle
choices abounds. Therefore, the laws and legal doctrine affecting those person-
al choices should address the diverse nature of our society in a positive way.
Family law materials should reflect diversity of family arrangements in present
day society without valuing some structures over others. The personal relation-
ships which develop when a family is formed should be celebrated and valued
regardless of whether the family mirrors the traditionally accepted model. Dis-
cussing family structures only from the point of marriage may be offensive to
certain ethnic groups and various individuals who prefer to organize their
families in less traditional ways.
The thesis of this article posits that a discussion of "family," regardless of
the unit's form, is a more appropriate starting point for a family law class."'
Western thought has always been structured in terms of dichotomies or polarities: good
vs. evil, being vs. nothingness, presence vs. absence, truth vs. error, identity vs. differ-
ence, mind vs. matter, man vs. woman, soul vs. body, life vs. death, nature vs. culture,
speech vs. writing. These polar opposites do not, however, stand as independent and
equal entities. The second term in each pair is considered the negative, corrupt, undesir-
able version of the first, a fall away from it .... In other words, the two terms are not
simply opposed in their meanings, but are arranged in a hierarchical order which gives
the first term priority ....
Kimberle' W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1373 (1988) (omissions in original) (quoting
JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION viii (B. Johnson trans., 1981)).
9. It may be argued that there is some control over divorce. However, arguments against
divorce may lead to an increase in the hidden secrets of domestic violence.
10. Economic forces can influence the formation of a "family":
Barbara Omolade's article, the "Unbroken Circle," describes how the [BIlack family has
developed as a response to slavery, racism, and economic deprivation that have marked
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Focusing on what constitutes a family would foster discussions of laws and
legal doctrines which affect our personal choices and address the diverse na-
ture of our society. A value-free discussion of family would include consider-
ation of various cultural backgrounds, perspectives, and norms that are extant
in our pluralistic society.
Part I of this paper discusses perspectives on modem day family units.
Part II discusses the selection of an effective pedagogical style for teaching
family law that will include various perspectives on "family." Finally, the
article concludes that family law professors should select a pedagogical style
and textbooks that incorporate diverse family structures without implying that
marriage is the only acceptable family unit.
I. PERSPECTIVES IN FAMILY LAW
"People live in a wide diversity of intimate arrangements.... Historically
only the nuclear family has been protected and promoted by legal and cultural
institutions."".. "In regard to regulating intimacy, the law defines and enforces
norms by referencing a specific and historically based metanarrative about 'the
family.""' 2 In our society, that norm has been the traditional, nuclear family
the African-American experience in the United States. From her article, it becomes bril-
liantly obvious that family structures and their allocations of power develop in response
to a variety of forces. They do not exist in a "natural form." She argues, focusing on the
prevalence of single motherhood, that family is a "survival strategy" in a crushing cul-
ture that otherwise promises "social death." Family structure is as much a response to
economic conditions as it is to "nature."
Elizabeth Daniel, Supervision of Parenting and Family Law (Feb. 15, 1991) (unpublished paper
presented in Martha Fineman's Families, Poverty, and Law class at Columbia Law School on file
with the author).
"Family" has been defined according to the functions of a unit:
Regardless of family style or structure, each family where children are present must
socialize the children, provide the economic necessities of life and act as a center for
emotional growth and support.
First, the function of a family is to provide societal training to its members. Soci-
etal training is the process by which members of the family, the smallest social unit, are
equipped for membership in a larger social unit-a clan, a community or a state.
The socialization function in the family is vital to the greater good of the larger
society.
Second, part of the socialization process is an economic function which provides
the means for maintaining life.
Third, the family unit also provides an entity in which emotional needs can be
met and personal fulfillment achieved.
Steven H. Hobbs, We Are Family: Changing Times, Changing Ideologies and Changing Law, 14
CAP. U. L. REV. 511, 521-22 (1985).
"I have always begun my Family Law class by having students reflect, through a class
discussion, on the meaning of family." Susan B. Apel, Kinetic Classroom, in THE LAW TEACHER
1, 1 (Gonzaga University, Institute for Law Teaching, Spring 1990).
11. Martha A. Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American Law
and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 388 thereinafter Fineman, Sacred Institution].
12. Id. "[Tlhe Black American family is the product of a particular history and ... we must
explain the family by the history and not the history by the family." Lerone Bennett Jr., The 10
Biggest Myths About the Black Family, EBONY, Nov. 1989, at 114, 116 (emphasis in original).
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unit, often viewed as consisting of a wage-earning male and a housewife. 3
The acceptance of this unit as the norm "reformulates images of
'appropriateness' or 'naturalness' found in the larger society."' 4 The problem
with accepting one entity as the norm is that "in recent years there have been
changes in patterns of intimate behavior that present substantial challenges to
the exclusivity of the nuclear family as the only image of appropriate intima-
cy." 5 Once there is a variation from the accepted norm, that unit is "labeled
deviant [and] .. .abnormal."' 6
Deviancy is the label even though the traditional nuclear family "is rapid-
ly becoming an American anachronism."' 7 "Although the legal system has
begun to recognize ... demographic changes [in family] the definitions of
"family," "spouse," and "parent" in many legal contexts still encompass only
the traditional family and its members."'" "We all shun the characterization
of 'deviance' and seek to align ourselves and our behavior with the safety of
normalcy."' 9 Natural law defines "the 'family' as a legal, functional, and
symbolic institution. 20
Reflecting on the changes of how families are constructed, "some courts
have shifted to a functional analysis of family."'" What is problematic here is
that even when courts have shifted to a functional approach the units have
been composed of married units in an effort to legitimate non-married units.
"[T]he functional approach inquires whether a relationship shares the essential
characteristics of a traditionally accepted relationship and fulfills the same
human needs."22 Courts using the formal or functional approach fail to reflect
true diversity because they are attempting to value structures that either are
traditional or have all the necessary ingredients of a traditional unit without the
21marriage component.
Most legal institutions are rule-based, and family law is no exception.24
13. Although a family in the United States was "once seen as strictly a patriarchy, consisting
of an income-eaming male and a housewife," today, in light of the evolution of social norms and
practices, the colloquial and legal definitions of family are broader. Developments in the
Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 4, at 1603-04.
14. Fineman, Sacred Institution, supra note 11, at 390.
15. Id. at 393.
16. Id. at 392.
17. Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the
Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (1989) [hereinafter Looking for a Family
Resemblance].
18. Id. at 1640.
19. MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 6 (1995) [hereinafter FINEMAN, TRAGEDIES].
20. Fineman, Sacred Institution, supra note 11, at 403.
21. Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 17, at 1641.
22. Id. at 1646.
23. Martha Fineman noted that
reform of the traditional family for the liberation of women has been clearly demonstrat-
ed to be misguided. On a doctrinal level we now have an egalitarian model for the fami-
ly, but it operates in a social context that remains very gendered. This is extremely detri-
mental to many women and children, and ... therefore .. we [should) leave our aspi-
rations for the traditional family form behind and reimagine what should be our core
family connection.
FINEMAN, TRAGEDIES, supra note 19, at 27.
24. A substantial portion of family law is statutory, e.g., marriage, divorce, and custody
19951
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Presenting discussions on family matters as "simple exercises in rule applica-
tion"" may have the effect of silencing some students. 6 "A common formal
legal definition [of family] looks to whether official rules of family forma-
tion-marriage, birth to a married couple, adoption-have been followed." 7
"Courts have traditionally adopted a formal analysis to resolve challenges to
the legal definition of family relationship.""Courts utilizing the formal ap-
proach use terms such as "family, spouse, and parent [with reference] only to
members of the nuclear family."29 Extended family groups are referred to as
alternatives."
The formal legal definition does not acknowledge an extended family or
people who behave like a family despite noncompliance with official legal
practices. For example, African-American students, many of whom come
from single-parent homes,32 may feel alienated when a family law professor
is insensitive to or lacks the knowledge of various perspectives on this particu-
lar family structure due to ethnic orientation or negative views on single-par-
ent status." The alienation may be even more severe if the discussion leads
to valuing single-parent adoption as a family unit only because of the difficul-
ty of placing African-American children in stable homes.34
Professors further complicate matters by teaching the dominant view as
the "law," rather than as a perspective.35 Although the dominant view may be
deemed the "law" because of its acceptance in society, it should be made clear
laws.
25. Kimberle' W. Crenshaw, Foreword, Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Edu-
cation, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 3 (1989).
26. For example, multicultural students may be silenced because marriage may not be the
norm for the formation of their family. See id. "If the subject involves some issue, rule, or case
that is implicated in the subordination of the students' racial group, minority students confront
unattractive options." Id. Also, family structures formed from same-sex relationships generally are
not formed by the institution of marriage. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two
Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990) (discussing the legal and social complexities
surrounding custody in extra-marital same-sex relationships).
27. Definitions of Family: Who's in, Who's Out and Who Decides, in FAMILY MATTERS,
READINGS ON FAMILY LIVES AND THE LAW 19, 19 (Martha Minow ed., 1993) [hereinafter Defini-
tions of Family].
28. Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 17, at 1640.
29. Id. at 1641.
30. Id.
31. Definitions of Family, supra note 27, at 19-20.
32. One-half of all African-American children live with a single parent, compared to one-
third Latino and one-fifth white. Elizabeth Shogren, Traditional Family Nearly the Exception,
Census Finds, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1994, at Al.
33. See Crenshaw, supra note 25, at 9-10.
34. Single-parent adoption of a biracial child, generally deemed an African-American if the
mother is white and the father is African-American, could be discussed in the context of adoption
by a white woman. This would allow a discussion without the taint of stereotypes such as poverty
and low morals that are associated with single-parent African-American women. See generally
Sharon E. Rush, "If Black Is So Special, Then Why Isn't It in the Rainbow?", 26 CONN. L. REV.
1195 (1994) (discussing adoption of a biracial child, with a white biological mother and an Afri-
can-American biological father, by a white woman). Adoption of a biracial child by a white wom-
an should not be discouraged, especially when the biological home would have been with a white
mother.
35. See Crenshaw, supra note 25, at 10.
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that it too, like other family structures, is a perspective. By including all stu-
dents in a discussion of diverse groups in society, a professor can "creat[e]
space for competing perspectives," which allows for a subjective legal analy-
sis. 6 A subjective analysis promotes discourse from students of diverse back-
grounds and casts contrasting alternative views with the dominant perspective
in a more positive light."
The legal definition of what constitutes a family and the role of its mem-
bers can be traced to 1872 when Justice Bradley, in his concurring opinion in
Bradwell v. Illinois,38 wrote:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine
ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views
which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant
to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career
from that of her husband .... The paramount destiny and mission of
woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.
This is the law of the Creator. 9
Justice Bradley relayed the Court's position on the role of the woman in
the family. As a married woman in Illinois, Ms. Bradwell could not enter into
a contract without likewise binding her husband.'
The modem Court has reiterated the societal imprimatur placed on mar-
riage. In Griswold v. Connecticut,4 Justice Douglas observed that "[m]arriage
is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred. '.2 "It is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony of living .... ,,43 The concurring opinion authored
by Justice Goldberg, although seemingly concerned with the rights of privacy
of individuals in intimate relationships, clearly excluded non-marital intima-
cies:
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the
State forbids . . . but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily
an essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an
36. Id. at 12.
37. See id.
38. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (denying Myra Bradwell's appli-
cation for a license to practice law solely on the basis that she was female).
39. Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141.
40. Id.
41. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the use of contraceptives falls within the rights of
marital privacy).
42. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
43. Id.
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institution which the State not only must allow, but which always and
in every age it has fostered and protected."
It is obvious that the Court's prepossessions have set the stage for what consti-
tutes the make-up of a family. It is also clear that the Court values certain
individual perspectives on marriage and family.
In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,45 a man who fathered a child during an af-
fair with a married woman challenged California's presumption that a husband
living with his wife is the father of all children born to his wife.' Questions
were raised as to which family unit the child belonged-a unit including the
biological father or the mother's husband.47 Justice Scalia emphatically reject-
ed the notion that the relationship of adulterers "has been treated as a protect-
ed family unit under the historic practices of our society."' He stated, "quite
to the contrary our traditions have protected the marital family."49 In refusing
to consider the various types of family units in modern society, the Court
ignored the biological father's ongoing relationship with his daughter, a rela-
tionship encouraged by her mother."
In his dissent, Justice Brennan suggested that the Due Process Clause is
useless if its sole purpose is to merely "confirm the importance of interests
already protected by a majority of the States."'" Justice Brennan further in-
sisted that
[by] offer[ing] shelter only to those interests specifically protected by
historical practice ... the plurality ignores the kind of society in
which our Constitution exists. We are not an assimilative, homoge-
neous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one, in which we must be
willing to abide someone else's unfamiliar or even repellent practice
because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncra-
cies. ... In a community such as ours, "liberty" must include the
freedom not to conform. 2
Although the Court indirectly considered the composition of a family unit
in Bradwell, Griswold and Michael H., the Court addressed this issue directly
in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.53 Belle Terre involved a New York vil-
lage zoning ordinance which restricted land use to single-family dwellings."
The word "family" was defined as those persons "related by blood, adoption,
or marriage," or two unrelated persons "living and cooking together as a single
housekeeping unit.""
44. Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
45. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
46. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 124. Justice Scalia also rejected any "rights of the natural father of a child adulter-
ously conceived." Id. at 127 n.6.
49. Id. at 124.
50. Id. at 114-15.
51. Id. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 141.
53. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
54. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 2.
55. Id. It is arguable that courts treat zoning cases differently because a statute is involved.
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The complainants in Belle Terre were six unrelated college students who
leased a house in the village." The Court, in stating that the ordinance placed
no ban on other forms of association," held steadfast to its promotion of tra-
ditional family needs and values."
It is interesting that Justice Marshall in his dissent also shied away from
deeming the unit a family. However, he concluded that freedom of association,
together with privacy rights and the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests,
gives individuals the right to "establish a home."59 Assuming the six students
were not a family, he discussed whether a person's intellectual and emotional
needs are best met by living with family or friends."l
Distinguishing Belle Terre, the Court in Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land" struck down a zoning ordinance which narrowly defined "family" so
as to prohibit Mrs. Moore from living with her grandson.62 Although the
Moore decision recognized a slightly extended family, it did not address the
array of non-traditional family arrangements in the modem United States.63
The Court in Moore indicated that the six college students in Belle Terre were
not a family.64 Justice Powell, in writing the majority opinion in Moore, stat-
ed that Belle Terre involved an ordinance which "allowed all who were related
by 'blood, or adoption or marriage' to live together."65 In sustaining the Belle
Terre ordinance, the Court was "careful to note that it promoted 'family
needs' and 'family values.""'66 Justice Powell recognized without hesitation
the complainant's grandson in Moore as a family member, distinguishing this
issue from the Belle Terre ordinance because it affected only unrelated indi-
viduals.67 According to the Court, however, the related individuals in Moore
comprised a family. Hence, the city could not impose such intrusive regula-
tions.68
Although Moore recognized the existence of a nontraditional unit, it did
not go far enough. Anderson v. Edwards69 afforded the Court this opportuni-
ty. There, the Court held extended members of a family in one household
constituted a family for government aid purposes." Anderson involved Ms.
Edwards, a grandmother, who received Aid to Families with Dependent
However, the treatment of family in zoning cases also demonstrates an unwillingness of courts to
recognize diversity.
56. Id. at 2-3.
57. Id. at 9. The Court stated a "family" may "entertain whomever it likes." Id.
58. The Court concluded the police power "is ample to lay out zones where family val-
ues ... make the area a sanctuary for people." Id.
59. Id. at 15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 16.
61. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
62. Moore, 431 U.S. at 496-97, 506.
63. See id. at 503-06.
64. Id. at 498-99.
65. Id. at 498.
66. Id. The Court is judging the value of the Belle Terre students' living arrangement.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 499, 506.
69. 115 S. Ct. 1291 (1995).
70. See Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1298.
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Children (AFDC) benefits for her granddaughter. 7 An issue arose in Ander-
son when two grandnieces moved into the home. 72 The grandnieces were sib-
lings and were entitled to $560 per month in AFDC benefits." Prior to the
grandnieces moving in, Ms. Edwards received $341 per month for her grand-
daughter.74
After the grandnieces moved in, Ms. Edwards received $901 per month
for all three girls. 75 Sometime after the grandnieces' arrival, Ms. Edwards
benefits were reduced to $694 per month.76 The Court recognized that federal
law prohibits a reduction in AFDC benefits "'solely because of the presence in
the household of a non-legally responsible individual."' 77 The Court, howev-
er, stated that the reduction was not solely because of the presence of the
grandnieces, rather it was their presence plus their application for AFDC bene-
fits through Ms. Edwards.78 Speaking for the Court, Justice Thomas conclud-
ed that for purposes of receiving AFDC benefits the granddaughter and two
grandnieces were siblings, but only as long as they lived in the same house-
hold.79 In essence, the Court recognized all of the individuals as a family
unit. Nonetheless, if the issue involved other benefits, such as health insur-
ance, it is unlikely that the Court would consider the granddaughter and
grandnieces a family unit.
Before Anderson, the Court's decisions reflected what many would con-
sider the dominant views of what constitutes a family. Although family law
professors should teach the "law," changes in living patterns and family units
should also be reflected in family law courses." To this end, professors must
be cognizant of the fact that students in law school classrooms come from
diverse backgrounds. Moreover, upon embarking on their careers in the legal
profession, they will serve individuals of various ethnic, religious, and
uncloseted backgrounds-a pluralistic society, i.e., one that consists of various
groups, each of which brings to society a distinct set of norms and values.
These principles inhere from a multitude of sources, such as religion, custom,
history, personal choice, and formal legal mandates. The customs brought by
71. Id. at 1295.
72. Id. Under the federal rule, all cohabitating nuclear family members are grouped into one
"assistance unit" (AU) for eligibility determinations in the AFDC program. Id. at 1294. California
additionally groups into one AU all needy children living in the same household if only one adult
is caring for them. Id. If two or more AU's are consolidated into a single AU under the California
rule, the maximum per capita AFDC benefits decrease. Id.




77. Id. at 1296 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(viii) (1994)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1299.
80. One author has stated:
The law ... becomes a reflection of the interrelationship between the demands of the
society and the demands of individual family units. It gauges normative behavior and
codifies the norms establishing a system of rights and responsibilities. The familial rights
and responsibilities of individual family members are owed in part to society and in part
to other individual [sic] within the family units.
Hobbs, supra note 10, at 521.
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these various groups may conflict with the dominant view of an appropriate
family as codified in family law. In a pluralist society, these various customs
should be taken into consideration when deciding family matters. Rather than
taking the dominant view, or the married or related family approach, the pro-
fessor should present various views of what constitutes a family, thereby al-
lowing all students to participate.
Concerns over composition of a family do not generally arise when indi-
viduals decide their family unit, but rather when conflict arises within the unit.
What do we do when faced with such a conflict? Because family units are
personal in nature and derive from various sources, resolution of conflicts by
the courts may be quite complex.
The interaction of customary law and state law creates a conflict to be
resolved with legal pluralism." The Fourteenth Amendment reflects a:
recognition that self-definition and moral autonomy depend upon an
environment in which the socializing influences of families and other
intimate communities are not overwhelmed by the socializing influ-
ences of the state-an environment in which chosen systems of val-
ues interact, rather than one in which choice is inhibited and values
are absolute and imposed. 2
Legal pluralism provides a forum for deciding conflict between two or
more laws.83 The issue is not whether to use one law over another or
to compare them, but rather, the issue is whether the customary law
should be considered at all: "
In order to render a valid report on the law of a people, two separate
but related tasks have to be worked out. One is to ascertain the cogni-
tive categories by which the people whose legal system is to be stud-
ied structure their ideas of ... forms and procedures of redress to be
taken. The other task requires a translation of these categories into
our medium of communication. This is an exceedingly difficult job,
for it demands both that the essential features of the native system
not be distorted and that they be cast into a scientific terminology
which makes cross-cultural comparisons possible.85
Although authors differ as to the identities they attach to plural factors,86
they agree that these factors are defined as the "law" of the dominant group 7
and the customary law.88 Whether it is deemed an interpretation of the cus-
81. "Legal pluralism" refers to situations in which two or more laws interact. M. B. HOOK-
ER, LEGAL PLURALISM, AN INTRODUcTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS 6 (1975).
82. Peggy C. Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 1348, 1349 (1994).
83. Plural law involves the "meeting of two or more cultures at a point-the law-where a
conflict of principle" arises. HOOKER, supra note 81, at 6.
84. The admissibility of customary law is at issue rather than a comparison of legal cultures
(customary law) and local (common) law. Id.
85. Id. at 9 (citation omitted).
86. MASAJI CHIBA, LEGAL PLURALISM: TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY THROUGH JAPANESE
LEGAL CULTURE 2 (1989) (referring to plural factors as law and customary law as non-law).
87. Chiba refers to dominant law as "state law, official law, [or] national law." Id.
88. Chiba states that non-law, also called "unofficial law, people's law, local law, [or] tribal
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tomary law or an issue of admissibility of customary law, most would agree
that an interpretation of the law according to a "contemporary human society"
is required. 9
Recognizing that students in family law classes reflect our pluralist society
and that the subject matter is personal in nature, family law professors should
be prepared to acknowledge the various ethnic variables and incorporate them
into class discussions. Discussions considering ethnic variables should be
implemented because the substantive material raises issues about families,
which are, of course, the foundation of our pluralist society. Textbooks refer
students to the "law" on particular issues, but generally do not incorporate
ethnic norms." Yet ethnic norms of various groups are a major component of
our society. The initiation of family problems calling for legal resolution are
not determined by cases printed in textbooks, or by the "law,"-rather they are
based on culture.9' Even if a society is committed to resolving disputes ac-
cording to only one culture, including norms codified as "law," by addressing
various ethnic norms, students will learn about the dispute and the effect of
using one resolution method over another. Although social scientists define
culture as being predictable based on scientific studies of histories,92 other
definitions of culture include past patterns giving meanings to the future,93
and programs for survival94 that continually change.9" Although varying to a
degree, these cultural definitions lead to the conclusion that cultures should be
viewed as a whole rather than in isolated segments.96
Even if family law courses began with American culture, this culture is
pluralist and encompasses various ethnic groups. Therefore, a discussion on
law," is appropriate when the focus is on jurisdiction. Id. The terms "customary law, traditional
law, indigenous law, folk law, primitive law, [or] native law," are used when cultural origin is the
focus. Id.
89. See id.
90. If ethnic norms are included, they are ethnic norms of the dominant group and not the
norms of individual groups, i.e., Native Americans, African-Americans, and Asian-Americans, etc.
91. "Culture" has been defined as "'that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief,
art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man [or woman] as a
member of society."' JAMES A. BANKS, MULTIETHNIC EDUCATION, THEORY AND PRACTICE 72 (2d
ed. 1988) (quoting E.B. Taylor from Primitive Culture) (citation omitted).
92. Most social scientists define culture as "patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behav-
ior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human
groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional
(i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially attached values." Id. (quoting ALFRED
L. KROEBER AND CLYDE KLUCKHORN: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 161
(1952)).
93. Culture is
an interdependent and patterned system of valued traditional and current public knowl-
edge and conceptions, embodied in behaviors and artifacts, and transmitted to present
and new members, both symbolically and non-symbolically, which a society has evolved
historically and progressively modifies and augments, to give meaning to and cope with
its definitions of present and future existential problems.
Id. at 73 (quoting BRIAN M. BULLIRANT, PLURALISM, CULTURAL MAINTENANCE AND EVOLUTION
4 (1984)).
94. Id.
95. "Cultures are dynamic, complex, and changing," however, they are often viewed as "stat-




the American culture should include a discussion of the various ethnic groups.
In turn, a discussion of family should be characterized according to the func-
tion of the individuals within a connected group. This functional approach
would include a broader class of individuals as a family unit.97 Courts have
suggested that legal protections "'should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions
or genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in the reality of fami-
ly life.'. . [T]he nature of the family in America [has changed].
9 g
The legal scholarship on family law, however, does not reflect this
change. For example, many family law textbooks fail to consider ethnic per-
spectives in coverage of issues such as same-sex relationships and the African-
American family.99 The state law and the Uniform Code for Marriages were
discussed extensively, but coverage of the cultural influences behind the laws
was sparse or nonexistent.""'
Although a chapter in one of the textbooks reviewed is entitled "Imposing
Current Values on Traditional Marriage Revolution,"'' the current values are
not those of various ethnic groups, but new values of the dominant group.
Some of these new values promote or tolerate plural marriages, same-sex
marriages, and marriage between siblings by adoption." 2 Even though this
chapter analyzes these new values according to what is acceptable in the dom-
inant group, addressing the values at least acknowledges that culture plays a
significant role in family structures. The proposal made here simply argues for
expanding this approach beyond the margins of the dominant culture to other
cultures.
Ralph Ellison questioned whether African-Americans have simply fash-
ioned themselves after white America and, therefore, do not have a cul-
ture.'0 3 He concluded that, "in a limited way, [African-Americans are their]
own creation."'' 4 African-Americans have a culture. It is an old adage that
"poor and segregated populations develop a distinctive set of beliefs, values,
and behavior patterns."'0 5 African-Americans are a segregated people, forced
to utilize their own uniqueness, their survival skills-their own set of norms.
African-American families adhere to their norm of the "nuclear family,""'6
comprised of a cohesive, extensive kinship network. 7 This "kinship net-
97. Recent Case, supra note 4, at 941.
98. Id. at 946 (quoting Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989)).
99. See textbooks discussed supra note 3.
100. See textbooks discussed supra note 3.
101. FOOTE ET AL., supra note 3, at 79.
102. See id. at 79-146. There is an awareness of cultural norms but they are contrasted to the
marriage norms of the dominant group.
103. Lee Rainwater, Crucible of Identity: The Negro Lower-Class Family, in THE NEGRO
AMERICAN 160, 160 (Talcott Parsons & Kenneth B. Clark eds., 1966) (quoting Ralph Ellison).
Ellison asked "Are American [Blacks] simply the creation of white men, or have they at least
helped create themselves out of what they found around them?" Id. Ellison responds that "(The
American Negro] in a limited way, is his own creation." Id.
104. Id.
105. C. MINDEL & R. -ABENSTEIN, ETHNIC FAMILIES IN AMERICA 240 (1977) [hereinafter
ETHNIC FAMILIES].
106. Id. at 226.
107. Id.
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
work" is similar to the dominant group's extended family, but is "broadened to
include all members of the African-American community.' 8 When a court
addresses the needs of a family unit that encompasses an entire communi-
ty-in a child custody dispute, for example-it must recognize a cultural per-
spective different from that of the dominant group.'
The "law" begins with the premise that "parents have a fundamental right
to make custody decisions,' '  whereas in the "kinship network" within the
African-American community, a non-traditional "unrelated" parent might be
the best suited custodian. Law professors who discuss custody "law" without
reference to the customs of the community are not preparing students to serve
the needs of all members of a pluralist society.
Substantive textbook coverage of child custody often focuses on the evo-
lution of the "best interests" of the child test."' The best interests of an Afri-
can-American child may be different from other children. Beginning from the
premise that parents have the fundamental right to make child custody deci-
sions, the "law" then requires a determination of the fitness of the parents."2
This determination is made according to the best interests of the child."3
Consider once again the "nuclear family." This standard cannot apply when
the parent may not be a "traditional" parent.
The "best interests" test could prove workable if judges were able and
willing to resolve each problem from the child's cultural perspective. Although
it would be difficult for any judge to completely rule out his or her biases
about a child's culture, a rule that would consider, at the request of those
involved, the cultural aspects of the particular family would move us in the
right direction. It has been suggested that the "best interests" standard should
be replaced with a more definite rule."4 This rule would have "at its core an
appreciation of what we as a society agree will be in the 'best interests' of
children,"" 5 and would better serve all members of our pluralist society.
For example, in a dispute for custody of an African-American male it may
be in the best interests of the child that a male neighbor be awarded custo-
dy." 6 Without the perspective of diverse family units in family law class dis-
cussions, future lawyers may not be equipped to present this type of argument.
Yet cultural perspectives are a unique part of family and should be included as
part of a family law course.
108. Id. at 241.
109. Id. Also note that the extended family of the dominant group refers to blood relatives.
110. Laura D. Dupaix, Note, Best Interests Revisited: In Search of Guidelines, 1987 UTAH L.
REV. 651, 651 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
111. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in
Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 736 (1988).
112. See Robert J. Levy, Custody Investigations as Evidence in Divorce Cases, 21 FAM. L.Q.
149, 149-50 (1987).
113. Lundy Langston, Force African-American Fathers to Parent Their Delinquent Sons-A
Factor to be Considered at the Dispositional Stage, 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 173, 175 (1994).
114. Fineman, supra note 111, at 770.
115. Id.
116. Langston, supra note 113, at 198.
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Again, what constitutes a family? Members of a group home? Elderly
persons who have lived together for a number of years? Consider the follow-
ing:
Edna Freimuth, Winnie Honsinger, and Austin Lederer live together
with eleven other elderly people in a large home in Ridgewood, New
Jersey. In order to insure privacy, each resident has her own room
within the household, though all share common kitchen and recre-
ational space. Members of the household care for one another, and
work together to take care of their home. Residents often act as fami-
ly members; some refer to other residents as "sisters." Winnie
Honsinger, an eighty-eight-year-old member of the household, ex-
plains: "we are a family; we are compatible and enjoy living togeth-
er."' 7
These individuals should be considered a family not solely because they live
together as a group, but because "they believe themselves to be in a fami-
ly ... [and] they speak of their relationships in the language of 'family.""' 8
Individuals should be allowed to self-select or self-define their family struc-
ture, thereby entitling them to certain rights and responsibilities which reflect
their unique social significance in areas such as child custody and su'pport, tax
benefits and inheritance.
Some courts have defined family on a basis other than biology, marriage,
or adoption. For example, in City of West Monroe v. Ouachita Ass'n For Re-
tarded Children, Inc.,"9 the court determined that six mentally retarded
adults living with two foster parents as a household constituted a family and
permitted them to live in a single-family zone.' 20 Thus, elderly persons in
nursing homes may be in the category of family:
Like other kinds of social ties, friendship is considered precious by
patients and residents [of nursing homes]. Friends spend much of
their social lives together in various places at the Manor-morning
until night, most days of the week. Those who are roommates are
together around the clock. A change in such ties means a change in
their lives.'2'
Is this problem of defining "family" unique to the American culture or is
it firmly rooted in all western civilizations? The French, for example, address
the needs of the new family by referring to it as the "free union." '22 French
statutes and regulations give stable "free unions" the same benefits as those
117. Kris Franklin, Note, "A Family Like Any Other Family": Alternative Methods of Defin-
ing Family in Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1027, 1028 (1990-1991).
118. Id. at 1048.
119. 402 So. 2d 259 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
120. West Monroe, 402 So. 2d at 266.
121. Comment, Don't Make Them Leave Their Rights at the Door: A Recommended Model
State Statute to Protect the Rights of the Elderly in Nursing Homes, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 321, 334 (1988) (quoting JABER F. GUBRIUM, LIVING AND DYING AT MURRAY MANOR
118 (1975)).
122. MARY A. GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW, STATE, LAW, AND FAMI-
LY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 261 (1989).
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conferred on a marital union.'23 Unlike the American "family values" debate,
the French view both stable unions and marriage unions as "legitimate fami-
lies."'24 However, recognition of same-sex relations as a "family" seems to
be as problematic with the French as it is with Americans. 25 It appears that
the French are concerned with maintaining the "secular character of the mod-
em social order."'1
26
The German27 attitude towards unmarried cohabitants is "to treat them
as though they had deliberately chosen to have a relationship without legal
consequences."'28 In England, as in France and Germany, a new approach to
what constitutes a "legitimate family" emerged as a result of considerations for
the interests of children born outside of marriage. 21 In Sweden, where
"[i]nformal family behavior is markedly more widespread ... than in England,
France, West Germany, or the United States,"'30 laws are neutral with regard
to "different forms of cohabitation and different moral ideals."'' In Sweden,
when a child is born to the union, the union takes on a more marital sem-
blance.32
123. See id. A free union is described as follows:
[T]he more a particular free union resembles marriage in stability and in the way the
partners conduct themselves toward each other and the community at large, the more
likely it is to be given effects resembling those of legal marriage. The presence of chil-
dren in the household seems to play an important role in the courts' assessment of
whether legal effects should be accorded.
Id.
124. See id. "'In appearance, the [traditional family] has ... lost ground, but in fact it has
imposed the matrimonial model on those who have declined to marry."' Id. at 261-62 (citation
omitted). "'No longer bothering to disdain its adversaries, it has transformed them into its own
image."' Id. at 262 (citation omitted).
125. See id. at 261. "[Tlhe terms living maritally or free union ... by definition exist only
between a man and a woman." Id. Two recent French Court of Appeal's decisions have denied
"homosexual cohabitants certain benefits available both to married persons and to cohabitants." Id.
126. Id. at 263.
127. This refers only to individuals who were formerly West Germans.
128. Id. at 264. Although historically the West Germans treated non-married unions as im-
moral, in the 1960s they decriminalized adultery and passed laws to improve the conditions for
children bom outside marriage. Id.
129. Id. at 268. "The presence of children, the duration of the relationship ... and the degree
to which the life of the partners conformed with the court's idea of marriage are all factors which
have played an important role in the cases." Id. at 273.
130. Id. Approximately "20 percent of all couples in Sweden are unmarried, and virtually all
Swedish marriages are said to be preceded by a period of cohabitation." Id. Unlike the United
States, the majority of children born outside of marriage in Sweden live with their father. Id.
131. Id. at 274. Sweden's provisions apply to persons living together in a homosexual rela-
tionship. Id. at 276.
132. Id. at 275.
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Although marriage is a very significant part of all African societies, 33 it
is a union between families, not individuals.34 In African societies, a wom-
an, her husband, and their children do not constitute a family.' 3 "Family, in
the African sense, is the extended family."'' 6 Because legitimacy is deter-
mined by paternity, all children are legitimate unless the father refuses to
acknowledge paternity. 37 Even then, the consequences are not the same as in
the United States. Because the child is born into an extended African family,
the fact that he 3 does not have an identified father does not create for him
the dysfunctional, devalued, and stigmatized childhood so likely to be in store
for him in our country. Although marriage is significant in African societies, it
does not determine whether the family is valued or not.
The law plays a significant role, not only in America but around the
globe, in defining family units. The law becomes problematic when people
choose to form non-marital or non-traditional family units. Our diverse Ameri-
can society as well as societies around the globe dictate that we look towards
the intent of the parties and whether the intent was to form a family that re-
sembled that of the marital union. The legal effect of non-marital unions is
that they are families once children are born to the union. If laws can effec-
tively be implemented in various changing circumstances, with some ingenuity
and training we can implement laws that will work for informal or non-tradi-
tional units. This training begins in our law school classrooms. If the law of
marriage is taught and non-marital units are discussed only when contrasted
and compared to married ones, our future lawyers, legislators, and judges will
not be prepared to address the great diversity of family arrangements in a
positive light. If the Swedes have been able to legislate protections for unmar-
ried individuals and have done so with policies that are nondiscriminatory, so
can we. Like Sweden, the democratic society of the United States should also
protect all family units by allowing the laws of family to reflect both the di-
versity in lifestyles as well as cultural differences.
133. FLORENCE A. DOLPHYNE, THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN, AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 1
(1991). Dolphyne stated:
Throughout Africa, there are three types of marriage that a man may opt for-marriage
under Customary law, in which he can marry as many women as he feels he can support
financially; Moslem marriage, in which a man can marry up to four women; and Ordi-
nance marriage (including Christian marriage) in which a man can only have one wife at
a time.
Id. at 3-4.
134. Id. at 1-2.
135. Id. at 3.
136. Id. If it is a patrilineal society, where descent is traced through one's father, then it in-
cludes all the paternal relations. Id. at 4. If it is a matrilineal society, where lineage is through the
mother, then it includes all maternal relations. Id. In some patrilineal societies, "a woman is never
a member of her husband's family" and in some matrilineal societies "a woman and her children
never belong to the husband's family." Id. In 1985, Ghana passed the Law on Intestate Succession
which "confirms the traditional view on legitimacy of children and stipulates that all children that
a man has, inside and outside wedlock, have equal interest in his property." Id. at 7.
137. Id. at 6.
138. 1 use the male gender here because of my deep concerns for the plight of African-
American boys in the United States. See generally Langston, supra note 113, at 178-85 (discuss-
ing issues facing young African-American males).
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II. SELECTING AN EFFECTIVE PEDAGOGICAL STYLE
Several concepts have emerged as techniques for educating in diverse
programs and practices relating to pluralism.'39 "These concepts include
multicultural education,""' multiethnic education,"' ethnic studies,"'2 and
global education.""' Multicultural education's objective is "[t]o help reduce
discrimination against stigmatized cultural groups and to provide all cultural
groups with equal educational opportunities."'" This is an objective that a
family law professor can use in preparing students for practice in the domestic
relations area. Adhering to a multicultural education paradigm would better
prepare students, as future lawyers, to serve all groups.
"Legal education is frequently criticized as overly formalistic, abstract,
and depersonalized.""' Important lessons for teaching from a multicultural
perspective can be learned from feminist theory, which "strives to include
people's personal experiences."" Furthermore, a multicultural perspective
"acknowledges that more than one individual's values and assumptions may be
simultaneously correct.'
47
Feminism focuses on gender, which may or may not be significant in
discussions on multiculturalism. Multiculturalism may cover a broader spec-
trum. There are customary ways of dealing with particular problems within
each ethnic family and there are varying themes as to what constitutes a fami-
ly. In addition to the cultural differences there are also differences in lifestyle.
Differing lifestyles can reflect positively in family units as well. The
lifestyle discussions' dilemma questions the definition of the "unit"-who's in,
who's out, who decides. The first prong-who's in-initiates an offshoot of
the celebrated chicken and egg question. Does the family begin with the join-
ing of two people or does it begin once a child is added to the union? Does
139. See generally JAMES A. BANKS, TEACHING STRATEGIES FOR ETHNIC STUDIES (4th ed.
1987) (presenting strategies for teaching comparative ethnic studies and integrating ethnic content
into the total school curriculum).
140. Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted). "[Tihe term suggests a type of education concerned with
various cultural groups within American society." Id.
141. Id. (emphasis omitted). The concern of multiethnic education is to modify education so
that it reflects ethnic diversity within American society. Id. at 29-30. It involves not only showing
ethnic cultures and experiences, "but also making institutional changes within the school setting so
that students from diverse ethnic groups have equal educational opportunities and the concept of
diversity is encouraged." Id. at 30.
142. Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted). This term is "defined as the scientific and humanistic study
of the histories, cultures, and experiences of the ethnic groups within society." Id. at 30. Ethnic
studies focuses on a formalized curriculum. Id.
143. Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted). The concern of global education is to modify "the total
school environment, including teacher attitudes, curriculum, teaching strategies, and materials, so
that students can develop the knowledge, attitudes, and skills needed to understand and participate
effectively in a highly interdependent world society." Id. at 30.
144. Id. at 31; see also BANKS, supra note 139, at 71-72 (discussing the use of multicultural
education).
145. Morrison Torrey et al., Teaching Law in a Feminist Manner: A Commentary from Expe-
rience, HARV. WOMEN'S L.J., Spring 1990, at 87, 90.




the joining begin with marriage, dissolving with a divorce? Beginning a family
law class with a discussion of "what is a family" is a methodology that would
minimize the normalizing effect of the language and concept of marriage. For
example, Thomas S. v. Robin Y." is a good source for beginning a discus-
sion in a family law class because, unlike the beginnings of textbook cover-
age, the family unit here does not begin with marriage and cannot end with
divorce.
In Thomas S., two lesbian women joined as a family unit.'49 During the
relationship, both women bore children through alternative insemination proce-
dures. 5" A classroom discussion of what constitutes a family can pursue sev-
eral different angles. Did the family unit begin when the two women decided
to join in their relationship? Or when children, through alternative insemina-
tion, were brought into the unit? Or when the sperm donor was allowed to
have contact with the children? Or is this unit really not a family at all? If you
use the textbook approach, marriage is usually a prerequisite to "family," i.e.
marriage is the only acceptable way to begin a family. Because there was not
a marriage and could not be a marriage in Thomas S., the child's family is
deemed dysfunctional.
Those textbooks which address other family arrangements discuss them
only as alternatives to traditional, conventional marriage. Marriage is the "law"
of joining two people apparently with the intention of starting a family. If no
children are brought into the relationship, then is there no family? If the rela-
tionship is joined with the intention of bringing in children, as in the Thomas
S. case, it can occur without a marriage. Another example not involving mar-
riage is single parenting by choice. However, by beginning the discussion with
marriage you are stating the norms of how a family begins. Families are per-
sonal, and one unit should not be legitimized according to, or stigmatized by,
another unit.
An effort to prevent the valuing and therefore, devaluing, of "family"
perhaps can best be attained by changing the title of the family law course. In
an attempt to counter the normalizing "marriage" aspects of the language, we
could begin by changing the name of the course to "The Law of Relation-
ships," "Legally Protected Relationships," or "Relationships." A "Relation-
ships" course would allow for discussions about single-parenthood, including
adoption, without the negative connotation that the unit is missing an essential
element of a proper family, i.e., the other parent. A "Relationships" course
would also allow for discussions on extended family units without the val-
ued/devalued connotations.
A "Relationships" course does not presume that there are or will be chil-
dren in the unit. What if there are no children? Is the unit a family? A "Rela-
tionships" course would allow for protections of individuals in a unit regard-
less of whether there are children in the unit or not. For example, if a
148. 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1993), order rev'd, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994), stay granted, 650 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1995).
149. Thomas S., 599 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
150. Id. at 378.
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nonmarital relationship dissolves there may be still be property distribution
protections. 5
Another approach would be to teach family law with an emphasis on
multiculturalism which would prevent a "perspectivelessness"'' view and
would provide an education on family matters according to the various cultural
perspectives that make up our pluralistic society. Implementing a course on the
law of relationships would allow for various lifestyles and cultural differences
to be discussed in a way that would force the students to think about, but not
value, varying structures. It would also encourage students, as future lawyers,
to focus on serving the individual needs of their clients.
Family law class discussions can be outlined in a way to prevent valuing









B. Rights of Married Individual
C. Dissolution of Marriage
1. Divorce









C. Dissolution of Relationship
VI. Adoption
(2) Family Law
I. Guardian and Ward
A. Adoption
B. Foster Care
151. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 123 (Cal. 1976) (holding that certain express con-
tracts between nonmarital partners are enforceable).
152. Crenshaw, supra note 25, at 2.
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II. Parent and Child
III. Relationships





I. Domestic in Nature
II. Judicial Recognition
III. Child Birth
(4) Law of Relations"'
I. Nonsexual
II. Sexual




a. Mother as symbol
b. Construction of Mother-in-Law
B. Fathers as mothers
C. Child/inevitable dependency




Other approaches could utilize doctrines such as equal protection, privacy,
and personhood under the Constitution to permeate the initial discussions in a
family law or relationship course so that students can see the benefits of treat-
ing an interpersonal relationship as a family and the difficulties that abound
when personal relationships are not treated as a family. Intra-family and state
and family cases such as abortion, contraceptive, right to die, parent-child
relationships and property distribution on death, provide excellent opportunities
to discuss the legal analysis and consequences that attend to the determination
of whether individuals constitute a family, without using marriage as the start-
ing or ending point in the discussion. With either approach, when the discus-
sions get to marriage, the students are used to examining and applying doc-
153. For a suggested outline format for (2), see Hobbs, supra note 10, at 519 n.4l (quoting
JAMES SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 1 (6th ed.
1921)).
154. See FINEMAN, TRAGEDIES, supra note 19.
155. Id. at 234-35.
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trine that accepts diversity, thereby reducing the normalizing aspect of mar-
riage. 56
CONCLUSION
Family matters are personal in nature. Law and culture will oftentimes
clash during discussion of "family"-what is, who are members, etc. A mod-
em family law class, however, should adequately stimulate students to provide
and appreciate input on their diverse backgrounds in an effort to incorporate
customary rules into the state rules or to present the dominant view in a truly
objective way. This can be done by including subjective, customary views as
part of the discussion, and beginning the discussion with a truly open-ended
question of what constitutes a family. These approaches would allow students
more freedom to discuss various family units before addressing relevant state
law on marriage. The "law" is a uniform social matrix for dispute resolution,
and while it does not have to be abandoned in the family law area, its centrali-
ty to the classroom can and should be refocused.
156. One family law professor observed:
I followed the family definition discussion with an exploration of what I called "Family
Formation via Procreation." During this segment we examined issues involved in contra-
ception, abortion, sterilization, rights of the fetus and new reproductive techniques, such
as surrogacy and alternate insemination. The result of covering this material at the be-
ginning of the course that discusses marriage, divorce and custody, has been that we did
not discuss marriage until the fourth week of the semester. By then, the students ap-
peared to be accepting the notion that "family" did not require or mean marriage. While
my experience is anecdotal at best, it certainly raised the prospect of moving the discus-
sion of family further back in the course and discussing more legal doctrine that affects
"families" rather than "marriages."
Comments from a Family Law professor, First Annual Mid-Atlantic People of Color Conference
at Howard Law School (Feb. 17, 1995).
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COMMENTARY
LOST IN THE WOODS:
THE SUPREME COURT, RACE, AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE
IN CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT
INTRODUCTION
We begin with the premise that we must have a government of some sort,
that the officials in that government must be elected, and that, to elect them,
we must cast votes in a structured and coherent fashion. We postulate further
that votes thus cast are to be counted and that the candidate receiving the most
votes becomes our elected official. The proposition seems straightforward; any
middle-school civics student could tell you as much. Our casual acceptance of
the political system as described, however, belies the complex interaction of
rights and protections that make up the electoral process. This process invites
a thoughtful questioning of the manner in which each of our votes is cast and
tallied. For the most part, our system operates on the assumption that a candi-
date receiving half of the votes plus one is entitled to represent the whole:
majority rules. How well the majority rules when the voting populace includes
viable and active minority interests is a question open to valid debate.
This tension becomes most apparent in the area of reapportionment.
Again, the concept is deceptively simple. For the purpose of electing represen-
tatives, individuals are grouped into geographical units. Periodically, changes
in population require the redefinition of those boundaries, and such redefini-
tions can take a variety of forms. States, while political groupings in their own
right, are divided into smaller voting units for localized matters. County com-
missioners, school board members, and other relatively low-level officials are
generally elected from "at-large," "single-member," or "multimember" dis-
tricts.' Suppose you live in Fleugerville, Wisconsin. The Fleugerville city
council is composed of three council members. All three seats are contested in
this year's election. When the time comes to choose your city councilperson,
you might cast your vote three times-once for every contested seat. If so,
Fleugerville operates under an "at-large" election scheme: each voter in the
city votes for every office. If, on the other hand, you cast only one vote for
one candidate, Fleugerville uses a "single-member district" system-that is,
the voters in the city are subdivided into three smaller geographical units, each
of which elects a single city council representative.2 Finally, if Fleugerville is
1. QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-
1990, at 7 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) [hereinafter QUIET REVOLUTION].
2. Id.
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divided into separate districts but each district elects more than one representa-
tive in an at-large fashion, the city operates under a "multimember" scheme.3
The significance of these seemingly technical distinctions is that elections are
won and lost on the basis of which people are grouped where. The subtle
placement of a congressional districting line may mean the difference between
a constitutionally fair vote and effective disenfranchisement. Whether the
result of deliberate manipulation or simple carelessness on the part of legisla-
tors, gerrymandered congressional districts jeopardize the integrity of the elec-
toral process.
Voting rights law is in crisis. Beyond all of the rhetoric, past all of the
vacillations, we have no meaningful standards for determining how candidates
should be elected in this country. If the color of a person's skin dictates how
he or she behaves in the voting booth, elections in this country are rigged,
because legislators have the power to determine the outcome of any election
simply by manipulating district lines to favor particular racial groups. This
view of the electoral process may be unduly fatalistic, however, because non-
minority candidates do get elected in minority districts and, occasionally, vice
versa. Candidates rarely make blatant racism the cornerstone of their cam-
paign, and almost never successfully.' Instead, politicians tend to run on plat-
forms embracing a variety of social, economic, and moral positions perhaps
correlated with, but not dictated by, race. This suggests a more complex rela-
tionship between voting behavior and ethnicity than the more cynical view
would seem to sustain.
This inconsistency may stem from a fundamental misunderstanding of
race and its relevancy in our society. By using terms like "black" and "white"
to designate those holding perceived common attributes and interests, we have
made skin color a shorthand for other, more salient characteristics.5 This ver-
bal laziness clouds the political process and obfuscates legitimate issues and
policy concerns. In the reapportionment arena, the use of race as a shorthand
has proven fatal to redistricting schemes in North Carolina and Georgia.6 This
3. ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES CouNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORI-
TY VOTING RIGHTS 304 (1987). Because they represent similar threats to minority voting potential,
"at-large" and "multimember" districts will be viewed interchangeably for purposes of this Com-
mentary.
4. Even the quintessential white supremacist David Duke was forced to mainstream his
message in a 1991 bid for Governor of Louisiana. Duke garnered approximately 40% of the popu-
lar vote with a platform grounded in economic reform-nde-racism. Michael Riley, The No-Win
Election, TIME, Nov. 25, 1991, at 43.
5. The author prefers a conceptualization of race similar to that envisioned by Ian F. Haney
Lopez in The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusions, Fabrication, and
Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994). Under this rubric, skin color is significant only to
the extent that it is "historically contingent" or "socially significant." Id. at 40. Rather than being
biological in origin, race-constructs are an outgrowth of chance ("morphology" and "ancestry," or
the uncontrollable variable of "what we look like or to whom we are born"), context ("the social
setting in which races are recognized, constructed, and contested"), and choices-in-context (the
"mundane and epic" self-selection of racial identity). Id. at 40-47 (emphasis added). As social
constructs, racial affiliations and identifications become powerful mechanisms for the transforma-
tion of the contexts in which they were created. Id. at 51. For example, by refusing to be grouped
into the inaccurate categories available to them, Chicano-Americans in effect "created" a new race.
Id.
6. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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Commentary examines voting rights law in detail. Part I traces the tortuous
path establishing reapportionment as a legitimate area of judicial inquiry. Part
II brings us to a crossroads, the passage and implementation of the Voting
Rights Act. Part III discusses the recent detour cases, Shaw v. Reno7 and Mill-
er v. Johnson.! Part IV analyzes Shaw and Miller in an effort to understand
what the Court was attempting to accomplish with these decisions, and wheth-
er these goals were met. Finally, Part V examines the issues left unresolved by
case law to date, including the lingering question of whether voters might be
better served by a redefinition of our electoral process.
I. A LONG AND WINDING JOURNEY:
THE EVOLUTION OF VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA
Like the children of Israel in the Wilderness of Paran,9 the United States
Supreme Court has, for almost a generation, wandered lost in the "political
thicket"'" of congressional redistricting. Since Baker v. Carr allowed judi-
cial intervention in the reapportionment process in Tennessee after the 1960
Federal Census, 2 the Supreme Court has fumbled its way from decision to
decision, managing in the process to tangle the electoral system in this country
almost beyond redemption. In 1993, the Court wandered deeper into the
underbrush of the political thicket when it established an equal protection
cause of action for non-minority individuals. The Court, in Shaw v. Reno, 4
reasoned that voters suffer a constitutional harm when placed in districts so bi-
zarrely drawn they could rationally only have been designed to separate voters
based on race.' As lower courts and commentators struggled to follow the
Court down this meandering new path,'6 night fell in the political thicket: the
Court "clarified" equal protection doctrine in the context of political redis-
tricting. This year's decision in Miller v. Johnson7 expanded Shaw's equal
protection cause of action to include even facially regular districts where race
was the "predominant factor" in the legislature's placement of the district
lines. 8 Hence, after Miller, even congressional districts drafted in accordance
7. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
8. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
9. See Numbers 14:33. In the Biblical story of the Exodus, the Children of Israel wandered
for forty ears in the wilderness outside of Canaan before being allowed to enter the Promised
Land. Id.
10. The term is from Justice Frankfurter's infamous plurality opinion in Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (finding that the Illinois House of Representatives' redistricting plan
raised a nonjusticiable "political question"). Justice Frankfurter cautioned the Court against enter-
ing this "political thicket." id.
11. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12. Baker, 369 U.S. at 192, 197-98.
13. For a discussion of the problems inherent in our current political system, see DOUGLAS J.
AMY, REAL CHOICES, NEW VOICES: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1993); see also THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 232-44 (criticizing the
expansion of the Voting Rights Act and examining racial politics).
14. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
15. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
16. See THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 77-78.
17. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
18. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488.
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with traditional standards of redistricting may face criticism on equal protec-
tion grounds. 9 This broadening of the scope of equal protection inquiry rep-
resents an alarming trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence. The impetus behind
the judicial movement to abolish long-standing racial bias in voting is a good
one. Unfortunately, good intentions often prove unworkable, and the Court's
enthusiasm for a color-blind society may have pushed its decisions beyond the
boundaries of common sense. Voting rights in America are at the point of
representational gridlock." The story of how this situation came to be is a
complex one, full of heroes and villains and, above all, a well-intentioned
judiciary in over its head.
A. The Gerrymander and Issues in Redistricting
The term "gerrymander" is an ugly word with a correspondingly ugly
history. The political ideology that broadly informs our concept of "voting
rights" began to solidify in 1789, when the requisite ninth state ratified the
Constitution.2 It did not take politicians long to recognize the plastic nature
of voting districts-and how best to use this manipulability to their advantage.
The first true "gerrymander" was designed for an 1812 Massachusetts congres-
sional race. When presented with a picture of the oddly-shaped district, an
artist sketched a few additions to the drawing and cried, "'That will do for a
salamander!' His editor, Benjamin Russell, replied, 'Better say a Gerryman-
der,"'-after the incumbent governor, Elbridge Gerry. 2 The concept of ma-
nipulating political boundaries to achieve particular election results became a
mainstay of American politics.23
A gerrymander may be political, racial, or both.24 Political gerrymanders,
of the sort drawn in the 1812 Massachusetts race, involve demarking the
boundaries of a given district so that a specific party-that of the incum-
bent-is virtually assured a victory in that district. As noted, political gerry-
manders have a long history in this country, and are generally considered a
constitutionally valid means of dividing the population.25 Political gerryman-
19. Id. at 2486.
20. The electoral system has been described as a state of "[1legislative paralysis," an "alto-
gether defensible result in the absence of adequate representational consensus." Daniel D. Polsby
& Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry into the Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under the
Voting Rights Act, 92 MICH. L. REV. 652, 666 (1993).
21. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (1993).
22. AMY, supra note 13, at 43.
23. See Andrew J. Clarkowski, Comment, Shaw v. Reno and Formal Districting Criteria: A
Short History of a Jurisprudence that Failed in Wisconsin, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 271, 301 n.2 (quot-
ing RICHARD L. MORRILL, POLITICAL REDISTRICTING AND GEOGRAPHIC THEORY 11 (1981)); see
also Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983) (listing the avoidance of competitions between
incumbents as a "legitimate objective" potentially justifying the creation of districts of unequal
population).
24. See Elizabeth Bachman, Note, Shooting Down the Phoenix: Shaw v. Reno and the Con-
troversy over Race-Conscious Districting, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 153, 202 (1994) (arguing that
racial gerrymandering is best treated as a form of political gerrymandering); Jeffrey G. Hamilton,
Comment, Deeper into the Political Thicket: Racial and Political Gerrymandering and the Su-
preme Court, 43 EMORY L.J. 1519, 1542 (1994) (suggesting that "where racial gerrymandering is
mandated, political gerrymandering necessarily follows").
25. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). While political and racial gerryman-
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ders may not offend equal protection principles because political classifications
do not automatically trigger heightened scrutiny. Republicans, Democrats, or
Libertarians may be grouped into districts at the legislature's discretions, pro-
vided each district's population is roughly proportional.26
More problematic is the racial gerrymander, and deservedly so. To begin
with, racial gerrymanders traditionally serve to perpetuate the systemic exclu-
sion of certain minority groups from meaningful political participation.27
Moreover, the modem Supreme Court has taken the position that all classifica-
tions based on race are presumptively unconstitutional." In particular, a state
legislature may not discriminate against members of a "suspect class," such as
African-Americans, without satisfying the highest level of judicial inquiry,
strict scrutiny.29
Racial gerrymanders affect minority voters in one of two ways. First,
certain groups may be selectively disenfranchised, as when the boundaries of
an election district are carefully drawn to exclude minorities.3" However,
even when the minority voters are not physically denied access to the polls,
they may face a more insidious threat: vote dilution. Vote dilution occurs
when the votes of a cohesive majority "swallow up" the votes of an equally
cohesive minority "in an election system to which there is a feasible alterna-
ders may be analogous in certain respects, they can also raise very different concerns. See general-
ly MARK E. RUSH, DOES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE? (1993) (exploring the issues
raised by political and racial gerrymanders).
26. See Davis, 478 U.S. at 138 ("[Elven if a state legislature redistricts with the specific
intention of disadvantaging one political party's election prospects, we do not believe that there
has been an unconstitutional discrimination against members of that party unless the redistricting
does in fact disadvantage it at the polls."). The Court treats voting as a fundamental right, howev-
er, and applies "meticulous[] scrutiny" to voting restrictions. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562
(1964). See NORMAN REDLICH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 298-300 (1995)
(citing Reynolds and suggesting that the Court is less restrictive when dealing with state and local
voting matters than congressional districts).
27. For an excellent review of voting rights case law, see Chandler Davidson, The Recent
Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial and Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION,
supra note 1, at 21.
28. "A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and
can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification." Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 272 (1979) (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)). Today, the Supreme Court
will probably view any race-based classification as presumptively unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (remanding a reverse-discrimination
case to determine whether offering financial incentives to companies hiring disadvantaged subcon-
tractors was narrowly-tailored to further a compelling state interest); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (finding that Richmond's plan requiring all contractors awarded
city construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the value of the contract to "Minority
Business Enterprises" violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
29. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Members of a
"discrete and insular" minority are those marked by some immutable characteristic which has
historically made them the subject of discrimination and limited their political power. Such minor-
ity groups enjoy suspect class status, meaning the government must satisfy the highest level of
judicial review-"strict scrutiny"-if it wishes to classify the individuals based on their minority
status. To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State must show that the classification is narrowly tailored to
further a compelling government interest. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) (ruling that racial classifications must be reviewed under the "most rigid scrutiny").
30. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (involving a twenty-eight-sided
municipal boundary drawn to exclude virtually every African-American from the city limits of
Tuskegee, Alabama).
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tive. '" Vote dilution undermines the principle of "one man, one vote"-the
theory that each individual vote should receive no less proportional weight
than any other individual vote.32 For example, if Voter A lives in a district
containing only ten people, and Voter B lives in a district containing one
hundred people, Voter A's voting strength is ten times that of voter B. In
other words, Voter B would have to control ten votes to match the relative
strength of Voter A's vote alone. This breakfast-cereal-like comparison is
significant because one of the crucial aspects of our political system is rough
equality of voting potential. As a matter of policy, we do not allow certain
individual votes to be weighted more heavily than other individual votes. This
becomes especially pertinent to Voter B if she is a member of a minority
group, and the other ninety-nine individuals in the district are not.
Minority voting strength may be "watered down" or artificially com-
pressed. If a substantial minority voting bloc is scattered among several dis-
tricts, the minority group loses the effectiveness of its bloc vote. Conversely,
if all the minority voters in the area are "packed" into a single district, the
ability of the minority voters to influence the outcome of other elections is
severely diminished." Intuitively, both of these practices seem unfair. Murki-
er is the question of whether a cognizable harm occurs when the manipulation
of district lines results in a member of the overall majority casting a minority
vote solely because of the way the political boundaries are drawn. In its most
basic form, the question becomes: When a state legislature deliberately designs
a district to the advantage of African-American candidates, do the "white"
voters in the district suffer a constitutional harm? The United States Supreme
Court says they do.34
The issue is clear enough in its traditional context. We can all picture a
room full of good-ol'-boy politicians, stripped to their shirtsleeves, sitting
around a map of, say, Georgia, and winkingly agreeing between puffs of their
cigars that there should be no "nigger districts."35 We can all agree that this
is wrong. It is harder to acknowledge that a group of well-meaning and pre-
sumably more enlightened legislators, acting under the auspices of the Justice
Department, could inflict an equally cognizable harm on non-minority voters
in districts drawn for the explicit purpose of giving the traditionally
underrepresented a voice in congressional politics.
31. Davidson, supra note 27, at 23.
32. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
33. Davidson, supra note 27, at 23.
34. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2494
(1995).
35. This statement was made during the 1982 campaign to block the creation of the first
majority-minority district in Georgia. The comment was made by then-chairman of the Georgia
House Reapportionment Committee, Joe Mack Wilson. Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 501
(D.D.C. 1982), quoted in Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2501-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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B. Early Redistricting Decisions: A Judicial Fairy Tale
Certain things fall within the scope of judicial review, and certain things
do not. The Supreme Court initially placed matters of political redistricting in
the latter category. By designating questions of reapportionment as "political,"
the Court was able to successfully skirt the political thicket until 1961. 6 The
political question doctrine grew out of the Court's early interpretation of Arti-
cle I, section 4, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he Times, Places,
and Manner of holding Elections ... shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof,"" as rendering apportionment questions nonjusticiable. In
Colegrove v. Green,38 the Court refused to adjudicate a claim that gradual
changes in population had rendered congressional districts in Illinois uncon-
stitutional because they now lacked compactness and approximate equality of
population. In a plurality opinion, Justice Frankfurter expressed an aversion to
the idea of "an appeal to the federal courts to reconstruct the electoral pro-
cess" of a given state." Justice Frankfurter described reapportionment as an
issue of a "peculiarly political nature" and stated unequivocally: "Nothing is
clearer than that this controversy concerns matters that bring courts into imme-
diate and active relations with party contests.... It is hostile to a democratic
system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people."''0 Justice Frank-
furter viewed judicial intervention as unnecessary because the Constitution
conferred the duty of securing fair representation on the states. Even if Con-
gress neglected that duty to the point it "offended" the "standards of fairness,"
the judiciary was forbidden from intervening because reapportionment was by
definition political." Frankfurter's summarization of the issue is probably the
most-quoted passage in Congressional redistricting law: "To sustain this action
would cut very deep into the very being of Congress. Courts ought not to
enter this political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure
State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers
of Congress."42 Justice Rutledge, in a concurring opinion, stated the issue
more bluntly: "There is not, and could not be except abstractly, a right of
absolute equality in voting."43 Citing the great latitude granted state legisla-
tures in making apportionment decisions, Justice Rutledge continued, "The
right here is not absolute. And the cure sought may be worse than the dis-
ease.""
The path open to the Court after Colegrove seemed clear: Districting is
political, and political matters do not fall within the purview of the judiciary.
Like Little Red Riding Hood, however, the Court was soon to stray from the
36. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1961) (describing characteristics typical of
political questions).
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
38. 328 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1946) (plurality opinion).
39. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 552.
40. Id. at 553-54.
41. Id. at 552-54.
42. Id. at 556.
43. Id. at 566 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
44. Id.
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well-marked path. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Colegrove foreshad-
owed the emergence of the vote dilution claim:
Petitioners claim that since they live in the heavily populated districts
their vote is much less effective than the vote of those living in a
district which.., is also allowed to choose one Congressman, though
its population is sometimes only one-ninth that of the heavily populat-
ed districts .... [T]his reduction of the effectiveness of their vote...
amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment .... [T]he right to have their vote count-
ed is abridged unless that vote is given approximately equal weight to
that of other citizens. 5
For the dissenters, destroying the effectiveness of the plaintiffs' vote was
tantamount to denying them the vote altogether. Thus, the issue crept beyond
the boundaries of the political question doctrine into the arena of constitutional
protections.' To dismiss a clear constitutional inequity as "political," the
dissenters felt, was to endorse semantics over substance.47
The dissenters in Colegrove had the moral high ground, and the appropri-
ate case for proving it came in 1960. Gomillion v. Lightfoot' involved a
1957 Act of the Alabama legislature which redrew the boundaries of
Tuskeegee, Alabama, to exclude all but four or five African-Americans from
residency.49 The legislative act was clearly discriminatory. The "strangely
irregular twenty-eight-sided figure"5 it created was patently indefensible as a
municipal boundary, and the Court rightly allowed the claim.5 In the majori-
ty opinion, Justice Frankfurter distinguished the facts of Gomillion from those
of Colegrove. In Gomillion, the Alabama legislature had "single[d] out" and
discriminated against an identifiable racial minority. 2 In Colegrove, by con-
trast, the disparity in voting strength had developed gradually over a period of
time, a product of "benign neglect" on the part of the state legislature. The
Gomillion Court focused on the active nature of the harm: "While in form this
is merely an act redefining metes and bounds ... the inescapable human
effect of this essay in geometry and geography is to despoil colored citizens,
and only colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights. That was
no Colegrove v. Green."54
45. Id. at 567-68 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
46. Id. at 567-69. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "No
State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifteenth Amendment states: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged ... by any State on account of race, color, or previ-
ous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
47. See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 572-73.
48. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
49. GomilIion, 364 U.S. at 341.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 347-48.
52. Id. at 346.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 347.
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Gomillion made problematic law. Although the service of justice in the
particular case demanded Court intervention, Gomillion opened a Pandora's
box of potential litigation. This became apparent with the next milestone case
in redistricting litigation, Baker v. Carr." Argued only one year after the
Gomillion decision, Baker was a brave new world of apportionment adjudica-
tion. In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court held that
the issue of whether Tennessee's reapportionment plan violated the Fourteenth
Amendment was justiciable in that it arose under the Constitution. 6 The
Court examined the parameters of the political question doctrine and found
reapportionment to be a matter of political "cases," not "questions,"57 mean-
ing reapportionment was no longer beyond the judicial pale. In Colegrove, the
Court had rather summarily drawn the contours of the political question doc-
trine to exclude consideration of reapportionment issues. 8 In Baker, the
Court as uncritically rechalked the lines of justiciability to include reappor-
tionment within the scope of judicial review. 9 In neither case did the Court
articulate a satisfying explanation for the contradictory outcomes.
In Reynolds v. Sims,' the last major case before the passage of the Vot-
ing Rights Act, the Court examined the constitutionality of legislative appor-
tionment in Alabama.6 The Alabama Constitution, drafted in 1901, estab-
lished a set maximum of thirty-five senators and one-hundred and five repre-
sentatives, to be apportioned according to the 1900 Census figures.62 The
State constitution called for reapportionment following every decennial census;
however, as of 1961, Alabama had not modified its districting scheme since
1903, when it added one additional House seat.63 Chief Justice Warren's suc-
cinct statement, "[L]egislators represent people, not trees or acres''64 answered
the question of whether a district's population or its square footage is determi-
native for the purposes of reapportionment. The Court found Alabama's cur-
rent districting plan and two proposed plans invalid under the Equal Protection
55. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
56. Baker, 369 U.S. at 198-99.
57. According to the Baker Court, political questions involve issues which: (1) have been
delegated by the Constitution "to a coordinate political department"; (2) lack "judicially discover-
able and manageable standards for resolving"; (3) involve an "initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion"; (4) cannot be undertaken without showing a "lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government"; (5) show "an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made"; or (6) could lead to "embarrassment from multi-
farious pronouncements by various departments on one question." Id. at 217.
58. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 553-56.
59. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
60. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
61. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561.
62. Id. at 538-40.
63. Id. at 538-39.
64. Id. at 562. Interestingly, only one year later "white" plaintiffs in Georgia brought suit
arguing that the state's use of both multimember and single-member districts resulted in their re-
ceiving unfair representation. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). While the Court denied the
plaintiff's claim, it did note the problems with multimember elections in general. Id. at 439.
Multimember districts include elements of both at-large and single-member districts. Because they
involve electing more than one representative per district, they share the problem of minority vote
dilution with at-large districts. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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Clause, and stated that the current plan and one proposed version were "crazy-
quilts, completely lacking in rationality."65
At this point, then, the Supreme Court could review districting schemes to
ensure they neither abridged the right of minorities to vote under the Fifteenth
Amendment nor diluted minority voting strength under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' The Court had thus expanded the scope of judicial review to offer
minorities protection against only the most grievous bars to enfranchisement.
Times were changing, however, and the comparatively meager guarantees
found within the black-letter text of the Constitution proved increasingly unsat-
isfactory to progressive thinkers of all races. In 1965, the political climate was
ripe for activism, and the Civil Rights Movement found its Crusade in the
Voting Rights Act.
II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
The Voting Rights Act (VRA) 67 is perhaps second only to the Constitu-
tion in securing for traditionally disempowered minority voters something
approximating equality in the voting booth.6' Although originally proposed as
early as 1959,69 the final version of the VRA was not signed into law until
August 6, 1965.70 Congress passed the VRA, in part, because the states had
continued in "unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution."'" The
VRA targeted Southern states-"states with dirty hands on the question of
race" 72 -namely Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina,
Virginia, and parts of North Carolina." It also abolished literacy tests,
grandfather clauses, and similar obstacles to suffrage in areas where less than
half of the voting-age population was registered to vote as of November 1,
1965, or where less than fifty percent of the registered voters had voted in the
1964 presidential election.74 In addition, section 5 of the Act required South-
ern states to obtain preclearance from the Attorney General of any proposed
65. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
66. See supra note 46.
67. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973gg-10 (1988 & Supp. V 1994)).
68. See Davidson, supra note 27, at 21 ("The voting fights of American ethnic minority
groups are guaranteed primarily by two documents: The United States Constitution ... and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965."); see also HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 171 (1990)
(describing the Voting Rights Act as "radical in design and extraordinarily effective in enfranchis-
ing the southern blacks who were its intended beneficiaries").
69. GRAHAM, supra note 68, at 164.
70. Id. at 173; see Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. at 446. The VRA was the product of both a
sympathetic Congress and President Johnson's skillful maneuvering in the face of the massacre at
Selma. GRAHAM, supra note 68, at 166-67. The civil rights demonstrations in Selma, Alabama,
led by Martin Luther King, Jr., precipitated a violent reaction which left two civil rights protestors
dead and over forty injured. Id. at 164-66. In addition, August, 1965, was marked by violent un-
rest in Los Angeles. The "Watts Riots" left 34 dead, 930 injured, and resulted in approximately
$40,000,000 in property damage (adjusted for 1992 inflation rates). KEITH BEA & DAVID
TEASLEY, AMERICAN NAT'L GOV'T, GOV'T DIV., URBAN RIOTS AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE: AN
OVERVIEW 3 (1992).
71. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966).
72. THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 4.
73. Davidson, supra note 27, at 30-31.
74. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4.
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changes to voting rules, to ensure that such changes would not have the effect
of abridging minority voting rights.7" Finally, sections 6, 7, and 8 authorized
the Attorney General to appoint voting examiners and observers to monitor the
states' implementation of the measures.76
A. Judicial Interpretation and Expansion of the VRA
The Court viewed the VRA as "an array of potent weapons" for the battle
against discrimination." In ruling on the constitutionality of the Act only two
years later, Chief Justice Warren lauded Congress for its efforts to eliminate
the "insidious and pervasive evil" of systemic discrimination." Originally, the
Act may have been intended only to remedy the most blatant procedural
wrongs aimed at keeping minorities from physically casting a ballot. 79 In Al-
len v. State Board of Elections,' however, the majority, lead by Chief Justice
Warren, expanded the scope of the VRA to include the "practice, or proce-
dure" of replacing single-district schemes with at-large elections for county
commission seats.8' The Chief Justice noted the danger of minority vote dilu-
tion in at-large elections and likened the inability of a minority group to "elect
a candidate of [its] choice" to "an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot."82
The effect in each case is the same: the individual voter of color is left, at
best, a muffled voice in the halls of power.
The Allen decision had a number of significant ramifications, both good
and bad. Most importantly, the decision opened the door to "unprecedented
federal involvement in local electoral matters,"8 giving the federal govern-
ment the right-if not the obligation-to "define racial equity-the point at
which black ballots 'fully' count.' 84 Thus, the Court reshaped the VRA into
"an instrument for affirmative action in the electoral sphere."8 When subse-
quent cases acknowledged that inequities in black educational opportunities
rendered literacy tests inherently disenfranchising86 and suggested that
multimember districts might be unconstitutional altogether,87 the VRA be-
came a powerful tool for remediation in the arena of voting rights.
75. Id. § 5.
76. Id. §§ 6-8.
77. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337.
78. Id. at 315, 309.
79. See, e.g., THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 22 (describing the goals and scope of the
VRA).
80. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
81. Allen, 393 U.S. at 569-71. Nothing in the ruling required the elimination of existing at-
large schemes, however.
82. Id. at 569. Minority voters will by definition always be outnumbered if their votes are
simply counted against the votes of the majority. In a district composed of 70,000 "white" voters
and 30,000 "non-white" voters, the "white" voters will always win if race is the definitive predic-
tor of voting behavior.
83. THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 25.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 27.
86. Gaston County, N.C. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 293 (1969).
87. Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966).
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Then, in Whitcomb v. Chavis," a group of African-American plaintiffs
alleged that Indiana's multimember district electoral system operated to keep
the number of minority officeholders disproportionately low. 9 The Supreme
Court disagreed, ruling that the plaintiffs had suffered only "political defeat,"
not racial discrimination." Two years later, however, in White v. Regester,"
the Court allowed a challenge to a multimember reapportionment plan.92 In
allowing a claim against the 1970 redistricting plan for the Texas House of
Representatives, the Court cited the long history of discrimination against
Mexican-Americans in Texas and the de facto "cultural and language barrier"
between Anglo-Americans and Mexican-Americans.93
Using the VRA, the Court was thus able to limit even relatively subtle
discrimination on the state level. The VRA clearly barred any form of vote
dilution, including the blatant manipulation of district lines to pack or exclude
minority voters, as well as the use of at-large elections to submerge minority
voting strength. The Court in White acknowledged that a particular voter under
a particular set of circumstances may be able to show a cognizable claim of
racial discrimination. Chavis indicated that the VRA did have boundaries,
however: in a fair election, no individual voter has a constitutional right to
win.
B. Early Amendments to the VRA and Subsequent Case Law
In 1970, Congress extended the ban on literacy tests by another five years
and expanded "covered states" to include any state which had below a fifty-
percent voter turnout in the 1968 election, regardless of whether the state had
a history of racial discrimination.94 In 1975, Congress demonstrated that race
itself was not the only pertinent consideration in voting rights analysis when it
added a "language-minority trigger formula" to the VRA.95 This new
"trigger" required jurisdictions to provide bilingual election materials if the
following three criteria were met: (1) more than five percent of the voting-age
citizens belonged to a single-language minority group (defined as Asian-Amer-
ican, American-Indian, Alaskan-native, or "of Spanish heritage"); (2) fewer
than fifty percent of the voting-age citizens had voted in the 1972 election;
and (3) the 1972 election had been conducted only in English.96
88. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
89. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 124-25.
90. Id. at 153. In Whitcomb, the Supreme Court overturned the ruling of the district court
sitting in Indianapolis. The three-judge panel included Judge Otto Kerner, author of the famous
"Kemer Report" which described America circa 1968 as "two societies, one black, one
white-separate and unequal." THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 67-68 (quoting REPORT OF THE NA-
T'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 10 (1968)).
91. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
92. White, 412 U.S. at 755.
93. Id. at 768.
94. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 4, 84 Stat. 314, 315
(1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1988)); THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 33-34.
95. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73 §§ 201-08, 301, 89 Stat.
400, 400-03 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973aa-la (1988 & Supp. V
1994)).
96. Id. The states primarily impacted by this Amendment were Alaska and Texas. Davidson,
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Post-1975 litigation, however, paints an increasingly confusing picture of
voting rights protections. In 1975, Justice Blackmun suggested that voters in
multimember districts could bring an equal protection claim if they could
prove they were being "denied access to the political process equal to the
access of other groups";97 however, "simple disproportionality between the
voting potential and the legislative seats won by a racial or political group"
was not enough.9 One year later, in Beer v. United States,' the Court set a
"nonretrogression" standard for determining whether a reapportionment plan
complies with section 5 of the VRA: so long as the new legislative apportion-
ment does not reduce the representation of racial minorities, no section 5
violation occurs.""' In ruling that a New Orleans city council district satisfied
the VRA because it created one black-majority district where none had been
previously, the Court explicitly rejected the idea that "members of a minority
group have a federal right to be represented in legislative bodies in proportion
to their numbers in the general population."' ..
Finally, in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey (UJO),0 2 the Court
disallowed the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims of a group of
Hasidic Jews who were split between two districts in an effort to create "sub-
stantial nonwhite majorities" in the districts.' Justices White, Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens found convincing the argument that a community of
some 30,000 Hasidic Jews was "white"-nothing more-for the purpose of
drawing state senate and assembly districts." 4 Using this assumption as its
baseline, the plurality ruled that, although in "individual districts" the appor-
tionment plan diminished the chances that the "white [Jewish] voters would be
represented by a member of their own race," no discrimination had occurred
so long as "whites in Kings County, as a group" received adequate representa-
tion." 5 Justice White rejected the idea that race is always an impermissible
criteria for drawing district lines in compliance with the VRA."'° In particu-
lar, he felt that the petitioners had suffered no harm from the redistricting
because the state's plan "represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to
whites or any other race."' 7 The Court, seemingly unsympathetic to the
plight of the Jewish voters, stated:
Where it occurs, voting for or against a candidate because of his race
is an unfortunate practice. But it is not rare; and in any district where
it regularly happens, it is unlikely that any candidate will be elected
who is a member of the race that is in the minority in that district.
supra note 27, at 31.
97. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17 (1975).
98. Id.
99. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
100. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141-42.
101. Id. at 137 n.8 (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971)). Some scholars disagree
with this position. See infra notes 275-300 and accompanying text.
102. 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality opinion).
103. UJO, 430 U.S. at 152, 162.
104. Id. at 151-52.
105. Id. at 166.
106. Id. at 161.
107. Id. at 165.
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
However disagreeable this result may be, there is no authority for the
proposition that the candidates who are found racially unacceptable
by the majority, and the minority voters supporting those candidates,
have had their Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment rights infringed by
this process. Their position is similar to that of the Democratic or
Republican minority that is submerged year after year by the adher-
ents to the majority party who tend to vote a straight party line. °8
Justice Brennan's concurrence expressed concern over the use of an "overt
racial number" to assign voters to districts."° In his view, "the Justice
Department's unofficial instruction to state officials effectively resulted in an
explicit process of assignment to voting districts pursuant to race."' ..
In UJO, the majority erected a shaky ladder on sloping ground. They
began with the premise that there are two types of voters-white and non-
white. As Chief Justice Burger pointed out in dissent, "whites" for the purpose
of districting included "a veritable galaxy of national origins, ethnic back-
grounds, and religious denominations," while "'nonwhites"' included both
African-Americans and Puerto-Rican-Americans."' Having set up this di-
chotomy, however, the majority was forced to work within its confines. The
majority's treatment of the issue begged the question of which characteristic
the Jewish voters themselves viewed as salient-the color of their skin, or their
adherence to a unique and separatist system of religious belief."2
From 1970 to 1980, voting rights law reflected a curious blend of judicial
activism and inertia. The VRA continued to grow in importance and accep-
tance with each passing year, and, by 1980, covered a variety of minority
groups and states not contemplated in the original Act. On the other hand, cas-
es like UJO suggested that the judiciary had still not come to a full apprecia-
tion of minority voting concerns.
C. The 1982 Amendment and Judicial Standards
In response to the position taken by the Supreme Court in City of Mobile
v. Bolden,"3 Congress in 1982 amended the VRA. In Bolden, African-Amer-
icans living in Mobile, Alabama, brought suit as a class challenging the at-
large districting scheme for the city's governing commission." ' A fractured
Court ruled that the Fifteenth Amendment did not countenance claims of vote
dilution absent discriminatory intent on the part of the state legislature."5
The Court viewed the scope of the Fifteenth Amendment narrowly: "[I]t
108. Id. at 166-67.
109. Id. at 169 (Brennan, J., concurring).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 185 (Burger, J., dissenting).
112. The Supreme Court has elsewhere addressed the issue of "religious gerrymandering."
See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2494
(1994) (plurality opinion) (finding special school district drawn to exclude all but practitioners of
Satmar Hasidim Judaism unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause).
113. 446U.S. 55 (1980).
114. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 58.
115. Id. at 65.
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imposes but one limitation on the powers of the States. It forbids them to dis-
criminate against Negroes in matters having to do with voting.""' 6 Because
the Fifteenth Amendment "does not entail the right to have Negro candidates
elected," the plaintiffs' voting rights had not been abridged."'
Faced with intense pressure from civil liberties groups,"8 Congress
amended the VRA so that it covered any voting measure that resulted in a
lessened opportunity for equal voting on the part of minorities, whether or not
the state legislature had explicitly intended such a result."9 Additionally, the
amended Act explicitly excluded any cause of action based on the right to
proportional representation.'2"
The first-and arguably last-hint of manageable standards for judicial
review in apportionment cases came in 1986. In Thornburg v. Gingles,"' the
Court defined three standards for determining whether a given minority group
had a cognizable vote dilution claim.'22 First, the minority group must be
"sufficiently large and geographically compact" to constitute a majority-mi-
nority district. 2' Second, the group must be "politically cohesive," meaning
that, as a group, the minority members tend to display common preferences
for given candidates.'24 Finally, the group must show that the majority in the
district votes in a polarized manner, "usually" defeating the minority-preferred
candidate.'25 Gingles was decided in the context of "at-large" or
"multimember" elections.'26 In at-large elections,'27 all of the individuals in
116. Id. at61.
117. Id. at65.
118. ACLU, REAFFIRMATION OR REQUIEM FOR THE VOTING RIGHTs ACT? THE COURT WILL
DECIDE 4 (1995); see also Davidson, supra note 27, at 34 (discussing the ACLU's influence on
the 1982 amendments, which eliminated the Court mandated intent requirement in claims of dis-
criminatory reapportionment). Under the 1982 Amendments, minorities seeking to challenge a
redistricting plan on VRA-grounds needed to show only discriminatory result, not discriminatory
purpose. Id.
119. As amended in 1982, Section I-A of the Voting Rights act read:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color....
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances,
it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citi-
zens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representa-
tives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elect-
ed to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be con-
sidered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 134 (1982) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)).
120. Id.; see also Davidson, supra note 27, at 35 (discussing the 1982 Amendments to the
VRA).
121. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
122. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50.




126. Id. at 35-38.
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a political jurisdiction vote for every candidate. Thus, the minority votes are
usually "swallowed up" by the majority. The typical solution to this problem
is to create single-member districts--discrete districts within the larger politi-
cal unit. As discussed below, however, single-member districts raise their own
unique set of constitutional concerns.
III. THE FOREST PRIMEVAL: SHAW V. RENO AND MILLER V. JOHNSON
A. Shaw v. Reno: The Road Less Traveled'
28
Until Shaw v. Reno, 129 the progression of voting rights law in this coun-
try was comprehensible, if not straightforward. In the beginning, reapportion-
ment was judicially off limits. As the Court and society changed, however, it
became an acceptable-and then preferred-vehicle for judicial activism. In
1993, however, the current Court embarked on a strange sidetrip in the voting
rights journey. The focus of litigation shifted from minority to non-minority
concerns, with a favorable response from the Court. Thus, as Abigail
Thernstrom writes:
We have arrived at a point no one envisioned in 1965. The right
to vote no longer means simply the right to enter a polling booth and
pull the lever. Yet the issue retains a simple Fifteenth Amendment
aura-an aura that is pure camouflage. An alleged voting violation
today is a districting plan that contains nine majority-black districts
when a tenth could be drawn. The question is: how much special
protection from white competition are blacks entitled to?
13
Shaw was a landmark redistricting decision.'' The facts were undisputed.
The 1990 Census showed that population increases in North Carolina entitled
it to a twelfth seat in the House of Representatives.'32 A redistricting plan
creating only one majority-minority district was rejected by the U.S. Attorney
General under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The ultimate creation of a
second majority-minority district, drawn in a "dramatically irregular shape,"
prompted five voters split among Districts 2 and 12 to bring a constitutional
challenge to the new districting plan in district court.'33
127. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
128. Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, in 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN
LITERATURE 1099 (1989). The last stanza of the poem may well describe the Supreme Court's
entire foray into the political thicket:
I shall be telling this with a sigh
Somewhere ages and ages hence:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I-
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.
129. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
130. THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 5 (citations omitted).
131. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion; Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens
each filed dissenting opinions.
132. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2819.
133. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D. N.C. 1992), remanded sub nom. Shaw v. Reno,
113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), and affd sub nom. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. N.C. 1994).
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The district court took judicial notice of the fact that the appellants were
"white."' 34 Because the voting strength of the appellants had not been diluted
on a state level, the district court found no basis to support the plaintiffs'
equal protection claim.'35 Chief Judge Voorhees, while agreeing that race-
conscious redistricting was not always unconstitutional, nevertheless dissented
from the majority's equal protection analysis, based on his reading of
UJO. "' In particular, Judge Voorhees felt that race was an acceptable basis
for redistricting only when considered in conjunction with other, more tradi-
tional principles of design, such as compactness and contiguity. 7
The United States Supreme Court seemed to agree with Judge Voorhees'
dissent. The Court held that the appellants stated a valid claim, noting that the
reapportionment plan used by the North Carolina General Assembly was "so
irrational on its face" that it could only be viewed as an attempt to "segregate
voters" based on race.' 38 The appellants in Shaw complained that such segre-
gation "violated their constitutional right to participate in a 'color-blind' elec-
toral process." The Court implied that no such right existed,'39 and cited
Wright v. Rockefeller' as an example of race-conscious districting that did
not "lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination."' In Wright, non-
white voters in New York complained that they had been concentrated into
only one of four congressional districts.'42 Because the district's design
could be explained on grounds other than race-the minority voters lived in a
geographically compact area, and the state legislature would have been hard-
pressed to design a district that did not group them together-the Supreme
Court ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proof.'43 In
contrast, the Court characterized the Shaw-appellants' complaint as being
against the unjustified segregation of voters into racially-based voting dis-
tricts.'" The Court found the equal protection claim, thus framed, valid.'45
134. Id. at 470.
135. Id. at 473.
136. Id. at 474 (Voorhees, C.J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 475-76. The district at question in Shaw violated every traditional principle of
redistricting. It wound across the state along the 1-85 corridor, prompting state legislator Mickey
Michaux to quip, "If you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of
the people in the district." Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2502 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Joan Biskupic, N.C. Case to Post Test of Racial Redistricting: White Voters Challenge
Black-Majority Map, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A4).
138. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832. However, the Court's assumption may be a faulty one. "Bi-
zarre" congressional districting lines may be drawn for a variety of reasons unrelated to the race
of the constituents. See Melissa E. Austin, Comment, Shaw v. Reno: A Beginning for Color-Blind
Reapportionment, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 495, 510 (suggesting that the lines in Shaw
could have been drawn to protect incumbents) (citing GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION 48 (1992)).
139. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832. "[Alppellants appear to concede that race-conscious districting
is not always unconstitutional .... That concession is wise: This Court never has held that race-
conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances." Id. (footnotes omitted).
140. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
141. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2826.
142. Wright, 376 U.S. at 53-54.
143. Id. at 56-58.
144. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
145. Id.
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Express racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny; that is, they must be
narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest." In addition, even
apparently race-neutral statutes are subject to strict scrutiny if they are facially
"unexplainable on grounds other than race.""'c Boundaries may legitimately
be drawn "to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory, or to main-
tain the integrity of political subdivisions. '"" Compactness, contiguity, and
respect for political subdivisions are "objective factors" that will help defeat a
gerrymandering claim. They are not, however, constitutionally required fac-
tors. 49 As Justice O'Connor wrote, "reapportionment is one area in which
appearances do matter."'' Thus, the facial appearance of a congressional
district may imply the presence of racial considerations in its construction.
According to the Court, drawing district lines to include "members of the
same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the
community in which they live" produces a two-fold harm. First, it reinforces
the unacceptable racial stereotype that all African-Americans think alike be-
cause they are African-American.' 5' Second, racially-motivated districting
encourages polarized voting which, in turn, encourages candidates to "play" to
their political base: "When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate
the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more
likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members
of that group .... This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative
democracy."'52 Justice O'Connor cited favorably the dissenting opinion by
Justice Douglas in Wright v. Rockefeller' 3 :
Here the individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color.
The principle of equality is at war with the notion that District A
must be represented by a Negro, as it is with the notion that District
B must be represented by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew, District
D by a Catholic, and so on .... That system, by whatever name it is
called, is a divisive force in a community, emphasizing differences
between candidates and voters that are irrelevant in the constitutional
sense.'
54
In ruling that UJO'5 did not apply, the majority stated: "Nothing in the
decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the
analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be
146. Id. at 2825.
147. Id. (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977)).
148. Id. at 2827. The Court cited Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578, for the proposition that these are
legitimate state interests. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. The Court notes that such distinctions have been ruled impermissible in other legal
contexts. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 n.2 (1990) (presuming black jurors are
partial simply because of their race is unconstitutional).
152. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
153. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
154. Wright, 376 U.S. at 66 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 102-10 (UJO involved Hasidic Jews denied Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims because of their non-minority status.).
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understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate
voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification." 56 Distin-
guishing between "what the law permits, and what it requires,""' Justice
O'Connor took the position that "narrowly tailored" meant no retrogression.
Any plan that included minority gains would thus not be narrowly tailored to
satisfy the VRA.'58 As O'Connor noted:
[O]nly three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a
significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc
voting apart from the requirements of the [VRA]. And those three
Justices specifically concluded that race-based districting, as a re-
sponse to racially polarized voting, is constitutionally permissible only
when the State "employ[s] sound districting principles," and only
when the affected racial group's "residential patterns afford the op-
portunity of creating districts in which they will be in the majori-
ty .' 
59
In dissent, Justices White, Blackmun and Stevens expressed a hope that
the holding of Shaw would be restricted to "anomalous circumstances" such as
those present in the North Carolina reapportionment plan.'" The dissenters
argued that the facts of Shaw were similar to those in UJO, and that neither
group could "plausibly argue that their influence over the political process had
been unfairly canceled."'' In neither case were the plaintiffs as "whites"
removed from an overall majoritarian role in the political process.'62 Thus,
they suffered no constitutionally cognizable harm. 6 '
Shaw specifically allows plaintiffs to bring an equal protection claim when
a reapportionment statute, although facially neutral, "cannot be understood as
anything other than an [unjustified] effort to separate voters into different
districts on the basis of race."'6 4 This new "Shaw claim" is "analytically dis-
tinct" from that of vote dilution, because the wrong addressed is that of explic-
itly classifying individuals by race-as opposed to inadvertently reducing the
efficacy of certain votes simply because they happen to be in the minority.'65
Strict scrutiny attaches even with apparently "benign" districting-districting
which acts to increase rather than decrease minority representation-because
the nature of such classifications is not apparent without probing the intent of
156. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2829-30 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 2830.
158. Id. at 2831.
159. Id. (quoting United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1977) (White,
J., dissenting)).
160. Id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. Id. "White" voters still constituted a majority in ten (83%) of the twelve total congressio-
nal districts. The fact that they might now find themselves consistently supporting a losing candi-
date was no more than "a lot shared by many, including a disproportionate number of minority
voters." Id. at 2838.
163. ld. at 2842.
164. Id. at 2828.
165. Id. at 2828-29.
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the statute." In addition, racial bloc voting must be proven in each case,
and may never be assumed.'67
B. Miller v. Johnson: 6s The Woods Are Lovely, Dark and Deep . . .
Following the 1990 Census, Georgia engaged in a redistricting plan to add
one congressional seat. As required by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 7'
the legislature sought preclearance of its redistricting plan from the U.S. De-
partment of Justice. The Justice Department refused to grant preclearance to
the original plan, which included two majority-minority districts, the Fifth and
the Eleventh, as well as a new Second District with a thirty-five percent Afri-
can-American voting-age population, on January 21, 1992.' A second plan,
which increased the African-American population of the three previously-men-
tioned districts, was also rejected. The plan finally accepted by the Justice
Department created three majority-minority districts, the Eleventh, Fifth, and
Second. The Eleventh District, described as a "monstrosity,"' 2 connected the
"black neighborhoods of metropolitan Atlanta and the poor black populace of
coastal Chatham County, though 260 miles apart in distance and worlds apart
in culture."' 7 3 Black candidates from each of the three majority-minority dis-
tricts were elected within one year of the redistricting, on November 4,
1992.1
4
A group of five white voters from the Eleventh District brought suit on
January 13, 1994, alleging that Georgia's redistricting plan violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution as interpreted by the Court in Shaw.'
By a vote of two to one, a district court panel found the Eleventh District
invalid. The court concluded that Shaw requires strict scrutiny whenever race
was the "predominant factor" in drawing the lines of a congressional district.
Although compliance with the Voting Rights Act would constitute a compel-
166. Id. at 2824 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
167. Id. at 2830. For an example of the techniques used to prove racial bloc voting, see Garza
v. Los Angeles, 756 F. Supp. 1298 (1990). The majority's refusal to assume racial bloc voting
indicates some acknowledgement that race does not alone control voting behavior. If this is true,
the question becomes whether "white" voters would necessarily be disadvantaged by placement in
a majority-minority district.
168. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
169. Robert Frost, Stopping By the Woods on a Snowy Evening, in 2 THE NORTON
ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE, supra note 128, at 1103. Again, the final stanza of this
poem might serve as a reminder to the current Court of its duty in voting rights law:
The woods are lovely, dark and deep.
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep.
And miles to go before I sleep.
170. See supra text accompanying note 75.
171. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483.
172. Id. at 2484 (quoting MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 356 (1994).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2485.
175. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (per curiam), affd, 115 S.
Ct. 2475 (1993).
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ling state interest, such compliance did not require the creation of three major-
ity-minority districts.'76
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that plaintiffs seeking
to bring an equal protection claim in the context of redistricting must demon-
strate that the redistricting plan in question subordinated nonracial districting
principles to racial concerns.' The plaintiffs in such a case are not limited
to direct evidence of legislative purpose, nor are they required to show that the
district is bizarre on its face. However, circumstantial evidence of the district's
shape and racial makeup is persuasive toward proving that traditional
districting principles were given less weight than race in drawing the district
lines. ' s Subsumed in this holding is the idea that maximizing minority vot-
ing potential in a state necessarily subordinates traditional districting principles
to racial concerns, and that this type of minority-maximization goes far beyond
the requirements of the VRA.
I. The Miller Majority
The majority, Justice Kennedy joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas, began with an analysis of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Central to the guarantee of "equal protection of
the laws," reasoned the majority, is the mandate that governmental
decisionmaking be racially neutral.' 79 Because the goal is one of neutrality,
not remediation, distinctions based on race are subject to strict scrutiny regard-
less of the racial group they benefit. 8 ° To satisfy strict scrutiny, racial dis-
tinctions must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.'
The majority then moved into a discussion of Shaw v. Reno.'82 After
noting the delicate nature of equal protection analysis, the Court stated that
facially-neutral district plans "unexplainable on grounds other than race" are
subject to strict scrutiny.'83 The Court noted that the claim created in Shaw
is "analytically distinct" from that of vote dilution and provides a cause of
action if the state used race as a basis for dividing voters.'84 The Court then
applied the principles from Shaw to Georgia's redistricting plan.
85
The Court first outlined the facts and procedural posture of the case.'86
In explaining its understanding of equal protection mandates, the majority
cited favorably from Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC.'87 In Metro Broadcasting, Justice O'Connor had stated that the Equal
176. Id. at 1373, 1379.
177. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2481.
178. Id. at 2486.
179. Id. at 2482.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2483.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2485-86.
185. Id. at 2483.
186. Id. at 2483-85; see supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
187. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). Metro Broadcasting involved Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) policies favoring minority-controlled firms. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 547
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Protection Clause requires the government to treat citizens "as individuals, not
as simply components of a racial, religious, or national class."'88 In Miller,
as in Shaw, the Court seemed especially concerned with the specter of legis-
lative stereotyping, "the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a
particular race, because of their race, 'think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls."" 9 The Court ex-
plained that Shaw required no threshold showing that the district in question is
"bizarre" on its face.'" The Court did note, however, that the shape of the
district is relevant in that it provides "persuasive circumstantial evidence that
race for its own sake" was the legislature's primary focus in creating the
district's boundaries. 9'
The Court summarized Shaw as applying strict scrutiny jurisprudence to
the redistricting arena. 92 In the context of redistricting, strict scrutiny may
attach in one of two ways. In some cases, the discriminatory intent will be
obvious from the otherwise inexplicable shape of the district. 93 Such was the
case in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,"94 where the boundary of Tuskegee, Alabama,
was drawn to exclude almost every African-American from city citizen-
ship.'9 Districts blatantly designed to preclude any rational explanation other
than discriminatory intent would be analogous to the line of cases stemming
from Yick Wo v. Hopkins,9" in which the Court declared even facially "neu-
tral" laws applied in a racially-hostile manner unconstitutional. 97 More com-
monly, the district will not be so bizarre as to brook no explanation other than
racial segregation. In those cases, the Court must examine the weight given to
race in relation to other, more traditional districting principles.' 98 These so-
called "race-neutral" principles include compactness, contiguity, and respect
for political subdivisions.'"
The Court acknowledged that legislatures attempting to draw district
boundaries face a difficult task.2" While racial considerations will "almost
always" be a factor in the redistricting process, they must not be the predomi-
nant factor.2"' Because of this tension, state legislatures are accorded a pre-
sumption of good faith, and the courts must use "extraordinary caution" when
faced with a claim of racial gerrymandering.2"' The Court explicitly rejected
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Court found the FCC's interest in "enhancing broadcast diversity"
to be a sufficient basis for the favorable practices. Id. at 567.
188. Id. at 602 (quoting Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983)).
189. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486 (quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827) (emphasis added).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2487.
193. Id.
194. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
195. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341; see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
196. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
197. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74, cited in Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487.
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the idea that "individuals of the same race share a single political interest,"
stating that such a view is "based on the demeaning notion that members of
the defined racial groups ascribe to certain 'minority views' that must be dif-
ferent from those of other citizens. 21 3
The Court then outlined the plaintiff's burden in claiming that a redistrict-
ing plan violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff must prove that the
legislature allowed racial considerations to dominate race-neutral districting
principles, including compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivi-
sions or "communities defined by actual shared interests."2 4 However, a
state may defeat the gerrymandering claim by showing that "race-neutral con-
siderations are the basis for redistricting legislation, and are not subordinated
to race.'21
The majority relied heavily on what it called Georgia's "own concessions"
that it had given preference to race over other considerations."' For exam-
ple, when the Justice Department rejected the legislature's second redistricting
plan and renewed its insistence on a third majority-minority district, the State
Attorney General objected on the grounds that creating such a district would
force the State to "violate all reasonable standards of compactness and conti-
guity."2"7 The legislature admittedly would not have added part of the Elev-
enth District "but for the need to ... offset the loss of black population
caused by the shift of the predominately black portions of Bibb County in the
Second Congressional District.""2 The legislature also conceded that increas-
ing the minority voting population was a "substantial reason" for splitting
certain precincts in the Eleventh District.2" Finally, Georgia did not dispute
the assertion that the Eleventh District was the "product of a desire by the
General Assembly to create a majority black district. 2 '
The Supreme Court blamed the Justice Department. The Court agreed
with the lower court that it "became obvious" the Justice Department would
be satisfied with "nothing less than abject surrender to its maximization
203. Id. at 2487 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). The
problem with this reasoning is that no two individuals are likely to share a "single political inter-
est," much less an entire political unit, however defined. Justice Kennedy's reasoning would leave
any electoral scheme short of a straight democracy constitutionally questionable.
204. Id. at 2488 (emphasis added).
205. Id. The Attorney General's statement should not be considered dispositive on this issue.
It is understandable that the State of Georgia would wish to avoid the time and expense of draft-
ing and submitting a third redistricting plan; however, the Attorney General's words were hyper-
bole. In fact, the third majority-minority district was created, and it is not an egregious violation
of the traditional principles of redistricting. The characteristics of the Eleventh District are similar
to those of districts throughout the state. As noted by the dissent, Georgia's Eleventh District does
not even make the "Top 28" list of the most bizarre districts in the United States. Richard H.
Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating
Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 565 (1993).
206. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2489.
207. Id. at 2489-90, citing app. 118.
208. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1377 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (per curiam), affd, 115 S.
Ct. 2475 (1993).
209. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2489.
210. Id.
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agenda.""' The Court soundly chastised the Justice Department for denying
preclearance until the legislature had adopted a proposal similar to the
ACLU's suggested "max-black" plan.2 2 The plan called for the creation of
three majority-minority districts, which the lower court regarded as an attempt
to "secure proportional representation for the black population."2 3  The ma-
jority found this increase in majority-minority voting districts unnecessary
under the "substantive provisions" of the VRA.2 4 The Court rejected the as-
sertion that states have a "compelling interest in complying with whatever
preclearance mandates the Justice Department issues."2 '5 The majority also
refused to accept the Justice Department's assessment that the Eleventh Dis-
trict needed to be drawn, insisting that the judicial branch has an "independent
obligation" to evaluate the necessity of the proposed measures.2 6 The Court
adamantly refused to "surrender[] to the Executive Branch [its] role in enforc-
ing the constitutional limits on race-based official action."2 7 Unlike the Jus-
tice Department, the majority of the Supreme Court found no need for the
creation of the Eleventh District. The Court reasoned that both of Georgia's
prior proposed plans were ameliorative,' s so they could not have violated
the VRA's nonretrogression standard.2 9 The Court also rejected the argu-
ment that Georgia's plan was justified on the grounds of correcting past dis-
crimination, because the state had failed to show "a strong basis in evidence"
of that discrimination.220
2. The Miller Dissents
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that Georgia did not in fact elect
a black Congressman from Reconstruction until 1972-hardly a compelling
argument for the State's unfailing commitment to minority representation.22'
Furthermore, race was substantially the only factor considered in Shaw, not
merely the primary one. In Miller, by contrast, the district at issue "re-
flect[ed] significant consideration of 'traditional districting factors ... and the
usual political process of compromise and trades for a variety of nonracial rea-
sons."' 23 For example, the DeKalb County portion of the Eleventh District
was drawn to include the precinct in which an incumbent State Senator's son
lived.224 Georgia's Eleventh District is not even on the "statistically
211. Id.
212. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2484.
213. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. at 1360.




218. Meaning they increased the number of minority voting districts. Beer v. United States,
425 U.S. 130 (1976); see supra note 99 and accompanying text.
219. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2492; see also Beer, 425 U.S. at 141-42 (establishing non-retrogres-
sion standard).
220. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2492.
221. Id. at 2501 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 2502.
223. Id. at 2502-03 (quoting Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1397, n.5 (1994)
(Edmondson, J., dissenting)).
224. Id. at 2503.
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calculated list of the 28 most bizarre districts in the United States. 225 Joined
in various parts by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter, Justice Ginsburg's
dissent argued the dangers of a "strict scrutiny" test that will be "triggered not
only when traditional districting practices are abandoned, but also when those
practices are 'subordinated to'-given less weight than-race. "226
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens noted the fatal shortcoming of both
Shaw and Miller: In neither did the Court adequately explain the precise harm
it sought to remedy.227 Stevens pointed out the logical fallacy in the
majority's reason for wanting to grant the plaintiffs relief: The assumption that
a minority candidate elected in a majority-minority district will only represent
the interest of his or her racial group suggests the same sort of stereotypes and
generalizations the majority purportedly finds unacceptable. 28 Because he
failed to find a sustainable injury suffered by the plaintiffs, Stevens felt the
claim should have been dismissed.
29
The dissenters outlined several points upon which all members of the
Court did agree. First, political districting is, in general, within the province of
the state legislature. Second, minorities have historically suffered discrimina-
tion in the political arena, and the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting
Rights Act give such traditionally disfranchised groups a remedy against "state
action that dilutes minority voting strength. '23. Third, race is often and legiti-
mately considered by state legislatures in districting plans.2 1' Finally, "state
legislatures may recognize communities that have a particular racial or ethnic
makeup, even in the absence of any compulsion to do so, in order to account
for interests common to or shared by the persons grouped together.
' 23 2
The dissenters took issue with the majority, however, in defining how
much weight state legislatures could give racial considerations before implicat-
ing the Equal Protection Clause.233 In short, Miller leaves open the possibili-
ty that "a federal case can be mounted whenever plaintiffs plausibly allege that
other factors carried less weight than race. 234
IV. SHAW AND MILLER: ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
A. "Black and White"-Or Shades of Grey?
Race as an Immutable Characteristic
The Supreme Court faced a difficult decision. In the absence of clear
evidence of discriminatory intent,235 districting decisions become largely a
225. Id. at 2504 (citing Pildes & Niemi, supra note 205).
226. Id. at 2499-2500.
227. Id. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting).





233. Id. at 2500 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 2505.
235. Of the sort described in supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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question of perspective. From the perspective of the state legislature, the cre-
ation of a third majority-minority district was necessary both to satisfy the
demands of the Justice Department and to remedy long-standing disparities in
minority voting opportunity for Georgia's twenty-seven percent African-Amer-
ican population."' The legislators can hardly be blamed for responding with
righteous indignation to the claim that they had essentially engaged in reverse-
discrimination. On the other hand, the "white" voters, perhaps less inclined to
see a problem with the status quo, resented having their voting strength "sub-
jugated" to what they perceived as an artificially-constructed majority. Both
points of view may be argued with integrity, and it does the political system a
disservice to merely dismiss one side or the other as "wrong."
In its rejection of Georgia's districting plan as remediation, the Court
embraced a double standard. In Shaw, the Court inferred from the mere shape
of a district legislative intent to discriminate. In Miller, however, the Court
failed to recognize the systemic bias inherent in Georgia's well-documented
history of actual discrimination, including the state's failure to elect an Afri-
can-American congressperson in over one hundred years." 7 The Court seems
to pick and choose its presumption without the benefit of a clear standard for
doing so. This trend is alarming, because the Court seems to prefer inferences
which contradict the original purpose of the VRA-and, perhaps, even the
Constitution.23
In addition, both the Georgia state legislature and the United States Su-
preme Court fatally misconceive the concept of "race" in our society. Justice
Kennedy and his cohorts toss around the terms "black" and "white" as if they
still retained some independent descriptive significance. With the exception of
very limited239 segments of the population, we recognize that the designa-
tions "black" and "white" refer only to differences in skin pigmentation." °
We have moved beyond the days when "blacks" were thought to be physiolog-
ically distinct from "whites" in any meaningful way. This may in part explain
why the term "black" has gradually given way to "African-American" in
236. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483.
237. See supra note 221.
238. It is difficult to believe the Framers intended the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
as tools for majority protection or, as Lani Guinier terms it, a "permanent majority hegemony."
Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral
Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism].
239. "Limited" here refers both to numerical density and mental capacity.
240. Between 50% and 70% of anthropologists reject race as a "biological category." Sharon
Begley, Three Is Not Enough, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, at 67, 67. For a discussion of race-as-
social construct in the legal context, see, e.g., Trino Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality:
Tools to Dismantle the Master's House, 10 BERKLEY WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 24 (1995) ("To begin
with, we must fully understand that race is not a biological concept, but a social and historical
construct."). Lopez, supra note 5, provides probably the best review of racial identity as a social
construct. Lopez first rejects the existence of "biological race," the concept that "there exist natu-
ral, physical divisions among humans that are hereditary, reflected in morphology, and roughly but
correctly captured by terms like Black, White, and Asian." Id. at 6. Lopez notes the absence of
any "genetic characteristics possessed by all Blacks but not by non-Blacks," or vice versa, and that
"greater genetic variation exists within the populations typically labeled Black and White than be-
tween these populations." Id. at 11-12 (citations omitted). In summary, Lopez states simply: "Bio-
logical race is an illusion." Id. at 61.
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popular speech. Both are society's shorthand way of describing a perceived
heritage and community of interest; the phrase "African-American" simply
better captures this distinction.
When the Georgia legislature drew the Eleventh District, it did not care
about the concentration of melanin in each voter's skin. The fact that the
majority of the inhabitants of the Eleventh District would be "black" in the
basest sense of the word was of no significance as such. The legislators were
attempting to identify and accommodate a group of voters with what they
perceived as similar interests, perspectives, and needs. Redistricting is by
definition a process of stereotyping. 4 ' When legislatures create districts, they
do so based on the assumption that people of particular religious, ethnic, so-
cioeconomic, ideological, and geographic groups will vote in similar ways.
Some African-Americans may, indeed, vote in identifiable patterns-as do
(some) Catholics, (some) feminists, and (some) Midwesterners. These patterns
emerge, not because the voters are "black" or "Catholic" or "female" or "Mid-
western," '242 but because they happen to share with other voters a common
history, shared political goals, and group economic interests.24 When the
Georgia legislature admitted to creating districts based on these electoral simi-
larities,2 it was not admitting to racial discrimination. It was acknowledging
political reality. The Eleventh District was not drawn to segregate voters, but
to tap into a real and identifiable community of interest which coincided with
race. Under the Constitution, the VRA, and case law to date, drawing district
lines to reflect legitimate communities of interest is perfectly constitution-
al.245
The Supreme Court dismissed the State's argument to this effect as "mere
recitation of purported communities of interest."2" The Court acknowledged
that Georgia was free to recognize minority-majority communities, provided
the communities had "some common thread of relevant interests"; however,
the Court recognized no "tangible communities of interest" in the Eleventh
District.247 The Supreme Court apparently discounted the suggestion that two
hundred years of slavery followed by a violent and bloody struggle for em-
powerment constitute a continuing "thread" of interests at least equal to that of
241. "[T]o meet statutory requirements, state legislatures must sometimes consider race as a
factor highly relevant to the drawing of district lines." Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2500 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
242. The author uses quotes here in recognition of the fact that no individual is uni-dimen-
sional.
243. At first blush, this would seem contrary to the Court's position in Reynolds: "Citizens,
not history or economic interests, cast votes." Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 580. In context, however, it
becomes apparent that the Court intended this maxim to apply in the limited area of district popu-
lation inequity: "[Nleither history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are per-
missible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based representation." Id. at
579-80 (emphasis added).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 206-10.
245. See, e.g, Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578-79 ("A State may legitimately desire to maintain the
integrity of various political subdivisions ... and to provide for compact districts of contiguous
territory in designing a legislative apportionment scheme.").
246. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490.
247. Id.
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"whites" who share little common ancestry but happen to live next door to one
another."4
If African-Americans tend to vote as a bloc on certain issues, they do so
for the same reasons as do the members of every other sub-group in America.
And yet, if the state legislature had drawn three districts with a slightly Pres-
byterian majority, no Fourteenth Amendment concerns would have been impli-
cated. The Supreme Court examines voting districts drawn along racial lines
with a degree of scrutiny not accorded to any other voting group classifica-
tion.249 The next section of this Commentary criticizes strict scrutiny as a
method for overturning State apportionment decisions.
B. Race as a Non-Suspect Class in Redistricting
Many scholars reject the Shaw-majority view that African-Americans have
"little in common with one another but the color of their skin," ''5 insisting
instead that African-American voters share at the very minimum a common
culture and history of suppression."s' The cultural and historical link shared
by minority groups may result in racially "polarized" voting; that is, "absent
compelling reasons to do otherwise," minorities and nonminorities tend to vote
for candidates of "their own racial/ethnic background." '252 Social science re-
searchers have repeatedly demonstrated that race does matter in the voting
arena, at least in certain circumstances. One 1990 study suggested that race
has a "pervasive influence" on voting behavior, and that "white" voters are
more likely to "vote white" the more serious and hotly-contested the
election. " When statisticians look at ethnic voting patterns, however, they
may really be tapping into those same communities of interest discussed
above. For example, there is some suggestion that minority candidates may in
fact represent minority interests more effectively than do non-minority candi-
dates. Lani Guinier's assertion that "[a]uthentic" leadership for blacks is
248. The Court based its conclusions on a "comprehensive" report concerning the "fractured
political, social and economic interests" present in the Eleventh District. Id. The Court's reliance
on this study is misplaced, however, in that it begs the question of how homogenous the "white"
voters in the Eleventh District would appear if evaluated on the same criteria.
249. In Reynolds, however, Chief Justice Warren compared geographic vote dilution to racial
discrimination and stated that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees extend to persons of "all
places as well as all races." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); see supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
250. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
251. See generally Higginbotham et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with
Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593 (1994) (arguing that "[b]lackness is
culturally and politically relevant," in part because it denotes a shared heritage of slavery and
victimization); see also Anthony R. Chase, Race Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield
to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1995) (suggesting that "in noticing race, we perceive
much more than simply color. We perceive, and thereby project, a set of qualities. This is ... a
necessary and heuristic practice that helps us to tentatively organize our reactions to safe and
dangerous situations."). Id. at 44. See also Lopez, supra note 5, at 14-15 (noting the fact that skin
color is gradated and that "race is not a function of skin color alone"). Lopez feels that "[rlace
must be viewed as a social construction." Id. at 27.
252. Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 238, at 1112.
253. Jack Citrin et al., White Reactions to Black Candidates: When Does Race Matter?, 54
PUB. OPINION Q. 74-96 (1990).
[Vol. 73:1
LOST IN THE WOODS
provided only by those who are "politically, psychologically, and culturally
black,"" 4 finds support in at least one study. A 1993 study looked at Afri-
can-American mayors and their constituents and found that "black-owned
firms in cities with black mayors have higher total revenues, greater average
sales revenues, and lower rates of failure compared to black-owned firms in
cities with no black mayor." '255 For whatever reason this may be true, it is
disingenuous for the Court to take the position that minorities have no com-
mon interest beyond skin pigmentation.
In the voting arena, "race" cannot rationally be considered synonymous
with skin color. An African-American voter's "race"-the amalgam of beliefs,
experiences, and perspectives that inform his or her behavior in the voting
booth-is the product of a lifetime of being an African-American. As such, it
is subject to change. When an African-American casts a vote for a particular
candidate, he or she is making a conscious decision based on a myriad of
circumstances and opinions. That decision is not dictated by the color of the
voter's skin. Therefore, in the narrow context of redistricting, the Supreme
Court is in error when it considers race an immutable characteristic. An indi-
vidual may not be able to change her skin color, but she can change her mind.
In the voting booth, race is an intellectual choice." 6
The Court's misconceptions concerning race lead it to erroneously apply
strict scrutiny where none should attach. The Georgia legislature did follow
traditional districting principles in creating the Eleventh District, and these
principles were not subordinated to the Court's mythical conception of race-as-
skin-color. Because the Georgia legislature based its decisions on
constitutionally permissible considerations-and not on the immutable charac-
teristic of skin color-its actions should not have been reviewed under height-
ened scrutiny. The appropriate level of review for routine legislative decisions
is mere rationality, meaning the State need only show that its action was ratio-
nally related to a legitimate government purpose.257 Georgia's interest in pre-
serving the state's African-American community of voters is enough to survive
this standard.
The Court's misapplication of strict scrutiny effectively undermines the
original goal of the doctrine. Recent decisions by the current Court reflect a
trend toward using strict scrutiny to subvert, rather than to encourage, minority
gains by applying strict scrutiny to "benign" racial classifications."' The
Court's language and reasoning in Miller underscore the growing tension
between the VRA and the Fourteenth Amendment. 259 The Court failed to ad-
dress the question of whether compliance with the VRA is a sufficient state
254. Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 238, at 1103.
255. Timothy Bates & Darrell L. Williams, Racial Politics: Does It Pay?, 74 Soc. Sc. Q.
507-21 (1993).
256. See, e.g, Lopez, supra note 5, at 47 (arguing that "in racial matters, we constantly exer-
cise choice"). Lopez points to the phenomenon of "passing"--moving from one racial group to
another-as a powerful indicia of "race's chosen nature." Id.
257. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (requiring only a "reasonable
basis" for limiting AFDC grants).
258. See supra note 28 for a brief discussion of this trend.
259. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2493.
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interest to satisfy strict scrutiny. More troubling still, the Court explicitly ques-
tioned the VRA's constitutionality: "The Justice Department's implicit com-
mand that states engage in presumptively unconstitutional redistricting brings
the Voting Rights Act . . . into tension with the Fourteenth Amendment. '
The Court gives the impression it is not fond of the VRA, and would not
hesitate to remove whatever teeth the Act has left at the first appropriate op-
portunity. The VRA was designed as a remedial measure, and remedial mea-
sures have fallen into disfavor with the current Court. It may be only a matter
of terms before the Court overturns the entire VRA as unconstitutional and re-
turns redistricting power solely to the states.
C. Shaw v. Reno and Miller v. Johnson:
Expressive Harms and the Great White Cause of Action
What, precisely, is the Court trying to do in Shaw and Miller? While
"whites" constitute seventy percent of the population in this country, they hold
eighty-three percent of the congressional seats.26 What harm, then, have they
suffered when, on a local level, they are forced to confront a prospect faced
by millions of minority voters in every election-backing a candidate destined
to lose? Richard Niemi and Richard Pildes make a compelling argument that
the Supreme Court is trying to address what they refer to as "expressive
harms."'262 An expressive harm is one which grows out of the government's
apparent endorsement of a moral wrong.263 The Supreme Court does not
want to acknowledge race as an acceptable factor upon which to base political
decisions." The Court must rule against congressional districting that subor-
dinates all other factors to race, or risk being seen as endorsing racial distinc-
tions.265 Similarly, Stanley Halpin, Jr. suggests that perhaps the Supreme
Court has recently decided two types of redistricting cases-those in which the
Court recognizes principles, and those in which it implements them.2" In
particular, Halpin thinks that Shaw "may well suffer the fate of being a princi-
ple recognition opinion without a follow-up implementation opinion. As such,
it may be principally remembered as a moral statement in support of color-
blind districting." '267
As profoundly as the Court has redefined redistricting law within the past
few years, it has expressly avoided taking several possible avenues of
260. Id.
261. ACLU, supra note 118, at 11.
262. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 205, at 506.
263. Id. at 507.
264. Id. at 519-20.
265. Some scholars have argued that taking such a position results in a worse harm, however.
See Higginbotham et al., supra note 251, at 1638 (arguing that having an unrepresentative Con-
gress undermines the confidence of minorities in their government).
266. Stanley A. Halpin, Jr., Waves and Backwashes in Voting Rights Law: Recognition With-
out Implementation of a New Principle Opposing Gerrymandering, 22 S.U. L. REv. 255, 258-59
(1995). A case such as Baker v. Carr would, for example, be an instance of "principle recogni-
tion," with the "principle implementation" coming only later in Reynolds v. Sims. Id.
267. Id.
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change. 2" Shaw did nothing to alter the traditional vote dilution claim as ar-
ticulated in cases such as Gingles.269 Shaw did not recognize a constitutional
cause of action based solely on the shape of the district in controversy, nor did
it imply that race may never be considered in districting decisions. In fact, the
Court has declined to assert that the creation of any majority-minority districts
above the bare requirements of the VRA will always be invalid.7 In addi-
tion, the Court in Shaw explicitly reserved ruling on the question of whether
"'the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more' always
gives rise to an equal protection claim."27'
Shaw is a problematic decision. It "fits uncomfortably" into voting rights
activism and raises the issue of VRA unconstitutionality.272 One possible
interpretation for the rulings in Shaw and Miller is that the Court is attempting
to create a "white" cause of action. "White" voters, even when they form the
minority in a particular district, are generally unable to articulate a reasonable
vote dilution claim, because they still elect the majority of the representatives
in the nation as a whole, nor are they members of a suspect class. Shaw and
Miller give nonminority voters a previously unavailable means of access to the
courts. Both decisions, however, fail to definitively establish that such access
is both necessary and justified.
In Miller, the Court implies that equal protection claims may be valid
even when legislatures use race as only one of several factors taken into con-
sideration. Even if the traditional criteria for redistricting are observed-that
is, if the districts are compact, contiguous, equal in population, and drawn
along community lines-the Court may decide that the redistricting plan is
illegal if there is evidence, either in the legislative history or simply based on
the demographics of the district, that race was taken into account in creating
the districts. Legislators must walk a fiber-thin tightrope between the section 5
of the VRA vis-A-vis the Justice Department and the judicial branch. Under
the VRA, states are compelled to take steps to ameliorate the racial evils of
the past; thus, the VRA "not only permits, but requires policymakers, in cer-
tain specific circumstances, to be race conscious when they draw electoral
district lines." '273 Under Miller, however, they are practically forbidden to do
so. As a result, we are left unsure of what our voting rights are. Everyone
agrees that an individual is entitled to have his or her vote count as much as
the next person's, and that state legislatures have a moral as well as legal duty
not to reduce the efficacy of that vote by placing it in unfairly-drawn districts.
Unfortunately, however, our political system operates on a "winner take all"
philosophy: The candidate with the most votes gets the congressional seat, and
the runner-up gets, well, nothing. The next section examines whether this
system has perhaps outlived its usefulness.
268. See, e.g., Pildes & Niemi, supra note 205, at 494-96.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 121-25.
270. Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1156 (1993).
271. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993).
272. "If racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional, where does that leave statutes like the
VRA?" Polsby & Popper, supra note 20, at 654.
273. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 205, at 486.
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V. LOOKING AHEAD: DAWN AND THE PATH HOME
After thirty-some-odd years in the political thicket, the United States
Supreme Court has yet to settle on an equitable means by which political
boundaries may be drawn. "Equality" cannot be defined through a "focus on
numbers alone. 2 74 Tensions flare over the debate, and old wounds are re-
opened. Each side can argue with a fair degree of moral conviction. The ques-
tion for both groups is, "How long?" For the minority-how long until we are
given a meaningful voice in electoral politics? For the majority-how long
must we pay for the sins of our fathers? The political process in this country
has reached an impasse, and we are left with the sole choice of inertia or
change.27
Probably the most widely-supported alternative to the current American
political system is proportional representation (PR). Advocated by the likes of
Lani Guinier,276 PR means what it says: Representatives are elected in pro-
portion to the number of votes they receive.277 "In PR, a party or candidate
does not have to get a majority or plurality of the vote to win office. A small
party might only get 15 percent of the vote, but it would still get 15 percent of
the seats in the legislature." '78 In short, "[p]roportionate interest representa-
tion is an attempt to construct a deliberative decisionmaking body that repre-
sents, in proportion to their presence in the population, minority group inter-
ests, not minority group voters. '2 79 In other words, any group of voters able
to amass 1% of the vote in any given election would be able to seat a can-
didate of its choice.
PR would seem to solve a number of pressing voting rights concerns.
Voters who find themselves consistently in the minority are left with only
"virtual representation"--that is, representation by a candidate they did not
select, but who presumably has "common interests and sympathies.""28 Abi-
gail Thernstrom has suggested that "one can be represented in a political re-
gime in which one has no actual participatory role" 28'-virtual representa-
tion-but Professor Guinier rejects this view.282 Basing progress in minority
empowerment on raw "black electoral success" has two flaws: First, it misses
the point that the civil rights movement sought to ensure "favorable policy
outcomes, not just fairness in the struggle for a seat at the bargaining ta-
ble." '283 Second, it erroneously assumes that "technical access" to the polls
274. THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 77.
275. "The American political system is at a fork in the road.... Short of a paradigm
shift ... the terms of the argument leave a familiar choice: single-member districts, at-large elec-
tions, or some form of proportional representation." Polsby & Popper, supra note 20, at 664.
276. LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRE-
SENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994).
277. AMY, supra note 13, at 8.
278. Id.
279. Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 238, at 1148 (emphasis added).
280. Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 427-29 (1989).
281. Id.
282. Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 238, at 1126-27.
283. Id. at 1134.
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equals "meaningful access." '284 Professor Guinier questions the "fundamental
fairness" of a "political system whose legitimacy is based solely on the con-
sent of a simple, racially homogenous majority. 28 5
PR would presumably ameliorate these effects. One of the main problems
with our current districting system is that it "assumes geography is an ade-
quate proxy for interests"2"6 when, in reality, "principles of interest propor-
tionality may provide better proxies for political fairness."287 Professor
Guinier contends that "geographical districting wastes votes 288 because the
theoretical forty-nine percent that do not vote for the winning candidate have
no voice in the political process. Thus, she advocates "modified at-large sys-
tems," under which, "[diepending on the exclusion threshold, politically cohe-
sive minority groups are assured representation if they vote strategically. 289
Under this system, an interest bloc with less than fifty-one percent of the
vote could achieve representation. Each individual voter would be given a set
number of votes which could be divided among several candidates or used
aggregately for a single candidate, a concept known as "cumulative vot-
ing.''2' Thus, "[r]acial-group interests become those self-identified, voluntary
constituencies that choose to combine because of like minds, not like bod-
ies."29' Such a process has the advantage of allowing "all voters ... the po-
tential to form voluntary constituencies based on their own assessment of their
interests. '292 In this system, "[e]verybody's vote" would "count for
somebody's election, '293 making minority groups "necessary participants" in
the political process by "giving [them] additional bargaining power" and "veto
power" on important issues.2 94 Proportionate representation would make leg-
islators "accountable to a larger, more heterogeneous electorate, '295 because
they would not be obligated by the nature of the system to pander to majority
interests alone.
Guinier is not alone in her advocacy of proportional representation. Doug-
las J. Amy argues that PR would help eradicate gerrymandering, encourage
more issue-oriented campaigns, and lead to fairer representation for minorities
and women296 because fewer votes would be required to elect a candidate to
represent their "narrow" interests. Amy suggests a number of ways in which
PR might be implemented in this country.297 For state legislatures, Amy
284. Id. at 1135.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1147.
287. Id. at 1137.
288. Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the
Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1606 (1993).
289. Id. at 1632-33 (internal footnotes omitted).
290. Id. at 1617.
291. Id. at 1633.
292. ld.
293. Id. at 1634.
294. Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 238, at 1144.
295. Id. at 1145.
296. See generally AMY, supra note 13 (discussing the advantages of proportional representa-
tion for minority interest groups).
297. Id. at 183-97.
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advocates a "double ballot system" under which voters would cast votes "in
local district contests between individual candidates," and also for "an entire
party slate.""29 The winners from each ballot would form half of the legisla-
tive body."9 For the U.S. House of Representatives, Amy advocates a single-
transferable vote system of the sort currently used in Ireland, Australia, and
Cambridge, Massachusetts.3" Under this system, voters rank the candidates
on the ballot in order of preference. A quota or threshold number of top-
ranked votes are required before a candidate could be elected. Once a particu-
lar candidate receives the requisite number of votes, however, "the surplus bal-
lots are redistributed to the next available preferred candidate indicated on the
ballot" and "the votes ... recounted to see if any remaining candidates have
reached the threshold. If no candidates reach the threshold during a counting
round, the last place candidate [would be] eliminated, and those votes...
redistributed to the second-choice candidates .... until all seats are filled.,
30'
Other options for creating political subdivisions might include
"nonterritorial principles of organization" termed "printout districts."3 2 A
printout district is drawn from computer-generated lists of voters "compiled
according to any number of principles or by no principle-that is, random-
ly. 30 3 Printout districts could represent people by race, religion, sex, profes-
sional affiliations, or interests: "The possibilities are endless. 30 4
To date, case law and commentary have failed to suggest any workable
solution to this dilemma. The most obvious choice would be to place a grid
over a United States map and trace intersecting horizontal and vertical lines to
form our congressional districts. We have avoided such arbitrary distinctions
based on the assumption that certain groups share common goals and inter-
ests-a small businessperson in a rural fishing village along the coast of
Maine presumably has more in common with his or her similarly situated
neighbors than with an urban apartment-dweller living in downtown Augusta.
These commonalities extend beyond mere geography, and go to the heart and
spirit of the community. Perhaps such distinctions are no longer valid. It may
be that in reality we share more characteristics with those in our socioeconom-
ic strata than we do with our geographical neighbors.
We can leave the thicket-resurrect the political question doctrine3 5 and
allow the Supreme Court to refuse as nonjusticiable reapportionment cases.
We can bum the thicket-scrap our political system in its entirety and start
over, perhaps with proportional representation and cumulative voting. Or, we
can try to map the thicket-to produce concrete, manageable guidelines for
298. Id. at 188.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 18, 188.
301. Id. at 18.
302. Polsby & Popper, supra note 20, at 672.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. A few recent claims have been dismissed as nonjusticiable by virtue of their political
nature. See Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993) (regarding the impeachment of a federal
district judge); see also Dalton v. Specter, 114 S. Ct. 1719, 1720-21 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(involving a claim concerning closure of military base).
[Vol. 73:1
LOST IN THE WOODS
legislatures engaged in the redistricting process. The "mapping" could take the
form of generating random printout districts-nothing but names taken from
voter registration lists-which would be grouped into theoretical districts with
no reference to race or political affiliation. We could leave the current system
in place but draft strict guidelines for what legislatures could and could not
take into account when drawing district lines; that is, we could attempt to
make race a non-issue." ' Finally, we could attempt to institute some sort of
representational cause of action-a claim, perhaps based on the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, that would be available to minorities in a district (whether "white"
or not) when they felt that their group interest needs were not being addressed
by their representative. The possibilities for accommodation are there, but to
acknowledge them we must examine our comfortable, safe, and familiar politi-
cal system critically. The one option not available to us is a continued disre-
gard for and dismissal of the true meaning of ethnicity in our culture.
CONCLUSION
The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act extended the Act for a
period of twenty-five years. By the year 2007, when it will again come up for
congressional consideration, 307 will we as a society have moved past the con-
cept that race is the single most important factor in adequate representation?
The answer depends largely upon the attitude with which we as individuals
engage in the debate. If we are able to set aside our prejudices and self-serv-
ing attitudes and work towards meaningful change, creative and innovate solu-
tions may present themselves. If not, we may be forced to re-examine the very
fabric of our political system in an effort to see other points of view, through
eyes different than our own. Whether compromise can be achieved-whether
the Court can disentangle itself from the political thicket without abandoning
the principles of equality to which it committed itself years ago-remains a
question which will be answered in the coming months and years as we chart
the course for future generations of voters.
Lynett Henderson
306. The recent Adarand decision may be an indication that the Supreme Court is moving to-
ward a more race-neutral interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 29 and ac-
companying text. For a discussion of the dangers of "colorblind" jurisprudence, see Chase, supra
note 251, at 49-53.




UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ:
THE SUPREME COURT GUNS DOWN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION
When Alfonso Lopez arrived at school on March 12, 1992, he may have
been packing a pistol, but he was not packing a copy of the United States
Constitution.' He carried a concealed weapon, not a concealed copy of the
Federalist Papers, or the famous case of Gibbons v. Ogden.' But Lopez armed
himself with these weapons when he recently carried his case all the way to
the United States Supreme Court.
When federal authorities learned that Lopez entered school grounds with a
.38 caliber pistol, they charged him with violating the Gun-Free School Zone
Act of 1990.3 This federal law, enacted under the Commerce Clause,'
criminalized gun possession in or near a school.5 Lopez challenged the consti-
tutionality of the law in the Texas district court, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit,6 and the United States Supreme Court. In a shocking deci-
sion,' the Supreme Court struck down the law and held that Congress had
exceeded its commerce power.'
This decision sent shockwaves, since the Court had previously allowed
Congress free reign over interstate commerce. Since the late 1930s, the Court
upheld all congressional decisions to regulate activities in the name of "inter-
state commerce."'" Under the guise of regulating commerce, Congress
1. George F. Will, Commerce Clause Misuse Takes Power from the States, BUFF. NEWS,
Nov. 23, 1994 (Viewpoints), at B3.
2. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Supp. I1 1988); see infra note 218 for the text of the statute.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For text of the Commerce Clause, see infra text accom-
panying note 28.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).
6. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993).
7. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
8. One writer for the Washington Post Editorials said of the Lopez decision, "If you thought
Congress has been chopping away at Big Government this year, this week the Supreme Court
landed a punch square on the kisser of federal power." A Commentary, Editorials, THE WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 1995, at A14 (Editorial). And as Jeffrey Rosen, a legal affairs writer for the New
Republic, said, "We are ... on the threshold of a constitutional moment." Jeffrey Rosen, Fed Up,
Editorial, Ptrr, POST GAZETTE, May 7, 1995 at El (Editorial).
9. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on an Indian Commerce
Clause case this year (the power to regulate commerce with the Indian Tribes). Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 115 S. Ct. 932 (1995) (granting certiorari on Seminole Indian Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 11
F.3d 1016 (11 th Cir. 1995)). This case offers the Court the opportunity to limit the Indian Com-
merce Clause in the same manner as they attempted to limit the interstate Commerce Clause in
Lopez.
10. E.g., Robert H. Freilich, The Supreme Court and State and Local Government: Small
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legislated on an array of diverse topics-arguably with tenuous relations to
commerce-such as pollution, racial discrimination, labor strife, sales practic-
es, and fraud." Additionally, Congress used its interstate commerce power to
impose hundreds of criminal laws. 2
All of this was possible because the Court used an extremely broad test,
the "substantial affects" test, to review congressional commerce decisions. 3
This test measured how much the activity Congress chose to regulate affected
interstate commerce; if the activity imposed a "substantial" influence on inter-
state commerce, then the Court upheld the regulation as within Congress's
commerce power. This test required only that the Court speculate as to the
effect, and the "substantialness" of that effect to interstate commerce, Con-
gress sought to manage. This test did not require Congress to explain its deci-
sions, the effect Congress perceived, through legislative findings. 4 This test
left the subjective determinations of what activities "substantially affect" inter-
state commerce to Congress, and the courts simply reviewed the rationality of
that determination. Using this test, the Court continually upheld, even expand-
Change for a Changing Court, 26 URB. LAW 623, 629 (1994) (analyzing the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion and its implications for federal gun laws).
11. For congressional authority to enact environmental laws, see e.g., United States v. River-
side-Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (upholding congressional commerce authority to regu-
late water pollution and the wetlands under the Clean Water Act); see also Dennis J. Priolo, Sec-
tion 404 of the Clean Water Act: The Case for Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction over Isolated
Wetlands, 30 LAND & WATER REV. 91 (1995) (discussing congressional authority to enact some
environmental laws).
For congressional authority to prohibit racial discrimination, see Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S.
298 (1969); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
The Court upheld Congress's ability to regulate labor strife in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). In United States v.
American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975), the Court upheld congressional regu-
lation of sales practices and fraud.
12. See Stephen Chippendale, More Harm Than Good: Assession Federalization of Criminal
Law, 79 MINN. L. REV. 455 (1994). Chippendale discusses federal criminal law, asserting that the
"unchecked" federalization of criminal laws could be bridled by the courts, the executive branch,
Congress, or through a congressionally appointed commission.
13. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634. Regulations under the Commerce Clause trigger the "substan-
tial affects" test. This test measures how much the regulated activity affects, or influences, inter-
state commerce. If the regulated activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the courts
will uphold the regulation of that activity. See infra section III.C. and infra text accompanying
notes 371-415 for an analysis of this test.
This Comment refers to the "substantial affects" test as the "substantial affects" test even in
sentences where the rules of proper grammar would dictate the word "effect." The reason for this
is twofold. First, Chief Justice Rehnquist specifically referred to the proper Commerce Clause
"test" as the "substantial affects" test and this Comment took no liberties to improve or correct the
Chief Justice's grammar. Second, in an earlier era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court
used a different test for review of congressional commerce legislation-the "direct effects" test.
See infra text accompanying notes 101-21. It seemed that the use of the word "effect" in reference
to the "substantial affects" test would further confuse an already nebulous distinction between the
two eras.
14. For a further discussion of the "substantial affects" test, see infra text accompanying
notes 371-415.
The legislative findings requirement, or lack of a requirement, is important. Lopez took a
bold step by insinuating that Congress might protect legislation by including findings. This impli-
cation perhaps changes the judicial review of Commerce Clause legislation. See infra section
III.B. and text accompanying notes 351-70 for a discussion of these implications.
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ed, Congress's commerce power. In Lopez, however, the Supreme Court dis-
agreed with Congress's choice, and for the first time since the 1930s, struck
down legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Analyzing the
Gun-Free School Zone Act, the Court asserted that gun possession in a school
zone does not "substantially affect" interstate commerce. The Court also
noted that Congress failed to include legislative findings articulating the nexus
between interstate commerce and gun possession, a connection invisible to the
Court's unaided eye.' 6
The Lopez decision considerably altered Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence-the extent of congressional power that Congress and the lower courts
understood the Commerce Clause to encompass. First, the case hinders
Congress's previously unfettered freedom to regulate using its commerce pow-
er. Until Lopez, Congress faced no real limit on its Commerce Clause power;
Lopez changed this unlimited power by sending a message to Congress that it
must safeguard future legislation by including explicit findings expressing the
nexus between the regulated activity and interstate commerce. This message is
new to Congress, for the Court previously did not require congressional find-
ings to uphold legislation. 7 In addition, by implying that Congress must in-
clude findings with its legislation, Lopez also altered how the lower courts
approach Commerce Clause cases; the courts will now weigh the merit of
these findings instead of speculating about what Congress can reasonably do,
as was the courts' traditional practice. s This decision also opens the door to
15. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
16. Id. at 1625, 1631-32.
17. Several cases support the notion that the Court does not require findings to uphold legis-
lation. For some examples, see Federal Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 2096, 2100 (1993); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 276 (1981) [hereinafter Hodel]; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
258 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964).
18. Several circuits have addressed the Commerce Clause since Lopez. For example, United
States v. Bishop, Nos. 94-5321 and 94-5387, 1995 WL 524791 (3d Cir. Sept. 7, 1995) (upholding
the rationality of a federal carjacking statute); United States v. Pappadopoulos, No. 93-10577,
1995 WL 502907 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 1995) (rejecting the federal arson statute because it lacked the
necessary nexus to interstate commerce); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 234, 236-37 (8th Cir.
1995) (discussing a federal carjacking statute in light of Lopez); United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d
1379, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1995) (validating the federal regulation of gun possession by a felon);
United States v. Carolina, 61 F.3d 917 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding a federal carjacking statute);
United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 549-50 (9th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing the Gun-Free School
Zone of 1990 from a carjacking statute); United States v. Mosby, 60 F.3d 454, 454-57 (8th Cir.
1995) (dealing with second category of commerce, "things" in interstate commerce); United States
v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1522 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that machine guns connote interstate com-
merce); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 n.2 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing to Lopez in a foot-
note and noting the absence of a jurisdictional element [findings] in section 922(q) of the Gun-
Free School Zone Act).
The notion that Congress legislates and the Supreme Court adjudicates reflects one of the
important principles of our government, separation of powers. The Framers established this system
to prevent the potential for the tyranny they feared under alternative systems. James Madison
wrote, "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (James Madison)
(J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Separation of powers ensures that each branch of government performs only the functions
of that branch. This notion plays an especially important role when the Court reviews acts of
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inconsistent judicial decisions by requiring courts to make the delicate and
subjective determination of whether a challenged regulated activity affects
commerce as much as past valid regulations or as little as gun possession. The
Lopez decision forces courts to assess the validity of legislation according to
their own perceptions of "substantial." By forcing the courts to make these
factual, empirical decisions and by requiring congressional findings, or expla-
nations, the Lopez Court effectively resuscitated an era of judicial
policymaking and arbitrary decisions.
Despite these obstacles that Congress now faces, it may be that Lopez
actually changes little. Lopez really only limits Congress by the facts of
Lopez-all other legislation could still pass constitutional muster. If the Court
wanted to actually halt Congress's commerce power, it should have done so
by altering the expansive "substantial affects" test, not by arbitrarily distin-
guishing the facts of one case. The Court should have qualified the test by its
terms. This would have provided lower courts and Congress the necessary
guidance for the future, deterred judicial policymaking, eliminated confusion,
and still reached the desired end of limiting Congress.
This Comment explains how Lopez considerably changed how Congress
and the courts will react to Commerce Clause issues. Yet the Comment also
asserts that despite the Court's intent to circumscribe congressional action
under the Commerce Clause, Lopez only limits the power in very specific
factual circumstances. Lopez set an arbitrary limit which will only prevent
future legislation that closely mirrors the Gun-Free School Zone Act. The
result is still a nearly unbridled power.
Part I of this Comment discusses the history of the Commerce Clause,
including the Framers' intent and early interpretations of the Commerce
Clause. Part II summarizes the Lopez decision-the majority opinion, concur-
rences, and dissents. Part III then analyzes the implications of the decision. It
explains how the decision opened the door to judicial policymaking, overruling
a history of deference to Congress, and explains the significance of congres-
sional findings for future legislation. Part III further discusses the "substantial
affects" test, asserting that this test remains absurdly broad and effectively
imposes no limits on congressional action. Part III concludes by suggesting
how the Court could place tangible limits on Congress by adding a new prong
to the existing "substantial affects" test. Under this proposed version of the
substantial affects test, courts would first examine whether the activity sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce, and then whether the federal regulation
of that activity is appropriate. This second prong would ensure that Congress
does not trample state authority, by forcing Congress to enact only those laws
Congress. In reviewing and perhaps striking legislation, the Court might slip across the line of
"adjudication" and into the legislative branch's territory of "legislating" by second guessing the
judgment of Congress and replacing that judgment for the Court's judgment. This Comment does
not directly address the doctrine of separation of powers. While the Comment asserts that one of
the implications of United States v. Lopez is that courts might overstep their roles as adjudicators
and begin legislating, see infra text accompanying notes 351-70, it does not directly discuss this
as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
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necessary to promote the vitality and growth of our nation's interstate com-
merce.
I. HISTORY OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause suffers from a somewhat tortured history. General-
ly, the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate "interstate com-
merce." 9 The United States Supreme Court first understood this to mean the
power over interstate commerce, 20 and the Court used "definitions" to inter-
pret the scope of the power. However, time soon revealed to the Court that
interpreting the Commerce Clause using definitions produced inconsistent
precedent. 2' This realization led the Court to apply several different
tests-creating test upon test-as the Court attempted to properly define the
reach of the Commerce Clause.22 With the creation of the "substantial af-
fects" test,21 it seemed the "tortured" history of the Commerce Clause came
to rest. For over fifty years, the Court used the same test, upheld all of
Congress's commercial regulations, and Congress saw nearly unbounded pow-
er.24 In United States v. Lopez, the Court again "tortured" Congress and the
Commerce Clause by striking a federal regulation enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.
A. The Constitution and the Framers' Intent
Through the Constitution, our nation's Framers created a government of
enumerated powers.2" Congress may only act in accordance with its enumer-
ated powers.26 The powers the Constitution did not enumerate, the states
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 65-73 for a discussion of the semantics era, in which
the Court used the "definition" of the regulated activity-whether or not this was "commerce"-to
determine if Congress had the power over that activity.
21. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1636 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see infra text accompanying
notes 259-64.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 35-52 for a discussion of the Supreme Court's at-
tempts to interpret the Commerce Clause. The Court went from defining commerce as a stream,
see infra text accompanying notes 75-85, to using a "direct/indirect effects test," see infra text
accompanying notes 101-21, and then finally creating the "substantial affects" test, see infra text
accompanying notes 122-212.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 101-38.
24. Lopez was the first time since the creation of the "substantial affects" test, in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1941), that the Supreme Court struck down a congres-
sional regulation under the Commerce Clause.
25. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187 (1824).
26. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195. Chief Justice Marshall explained:
The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we
regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal com-
merce of a State. The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its
action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal
concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within
a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to
interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government.
The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for
the State itself.
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reserved.2 7 Among these enumerated powers, the Constitution granted Con-
gress the power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes."28 Foreseeing commerce as a pos-
sible source of dissension, the Framers granted Congress this commerce power
to preserve the unified nation.29 The Framers feared that the states, as the
sole regulators of commerce, would serve self-interested goals, seek to profit
from other states' profits, and discriminate against other states at will.3"
These acts would breed discontent, and lead to "outrages" and "reprisals."'
'3
To secure the people against these dangers, the Framers designed a nation with
unified commercial purposes centered in one government.32 A consolidated
commercial power would also protect the nation from foreign nations' jeal-
ousies and rivalries.
33
Neither the language of the Commerce Clause nor the Framers' intent
behind the Commerce Clause grants Congress power over all commerce. Con-
gress only has power over interstate commerce, that is, the portions of com-
merce necessary to bind and protect the nation. For example, the Commerce
Clause allows Congress to prevent Colorado from usurping Alaskan oil profits,
Virginia's tobacco gain, and Pennsylvania's steel revenue. It ensures that Cali-
fornia trades fairly and evenly with all states, not discriminating between states
of its choosing. But the Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to reach
all the internal activities of the states, only those activities necessary to pro-
mote the nation's unity and prosperity. 34 These goals and interests of the
27. Id. The Tenth Amendment also ensures the states retained powers not enumerated by the
Constitution. The Tenth Amendment states, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 39 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
30. Id. It seems the Framers feared that one state might enact laws counter to the interests of
another state in order to persuade the other state to "share" the benefits and profits of its resourc-
es. Under this reasoning, the interstate Commerce Clause would prevent Kansas from taking mea-
sures against Colorado, perhaps an embargo placed only on Colorado's buffalo meat, unless Colo-
rado forced its tourists to stop at the "Largest Prairie Dog" exit in Kansas. Kansas, according to
the Framers' reasoning, would be placing an extra burden on Colorado unless it shared the profits
of its resources-tourism. This embargo would be counter to a unified commercial nation, and
thus counter to the Framers' goals. See infra note 34.
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 39-40.
32. Id. at 40; THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 308 (James Madison).
33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, at 66 (Alexander Hamilton).
34. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 39 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton stated:
The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention. The
States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantag-
es of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors.
Each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy pecu-
liar to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would
beget discontent.
Id. Unreasonable and inequitable laws of the young states revealed the verity of the Framers'
fears. See id. at 38-39 (discussing particular inequitable measures between some of the early
states). As Justice Johnson later reflected:
For a century the States had submitted, with murmurs, to the commercial restrictions
imposed by the parent State; and now, finding themselves in the unlimited possession of
those powers over their own commerce, which they had so long been deprived of, and
so earnestly coveted, that selfish principle which, well controlled, is so salutary, and
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Framers, in creating the commerce power, set the guidelines for the Supreme
Court in interpreting the scope and extent of the Commerce Clause.
B. .. And Then There Was Gibbons
Gibbons v. Ogden35 was a watershed in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Chief Justice Marshall outlined the scope of Congress's commerce power,
defining the Commerce Clause and its limits. First, Marshall addressed how to
interpret the Commerce Clause. He interpreted the Commerce Clause in terms
of the language and purpose of the Constitution. The Constitution, he wrote,
represents the change the nation underwent as the states surrendered powers to
the federal government.36 It established the extent of those changes by grant-
ing Congress only certain enumerated powers.37 In other words, the Constitu-
tion embodies the extent of the powers the states ceded to the federal gov-
ernment when forming the Republic. The powers not enumerated in the Con-
stitution, therefore, the states reserved.
Marshall instructed the courts, however, to ensure that laws furthered the
purposes of the Framers in designing the Constitution. He also warned courts
against unnecessarily constricting the language of the Constitution. He saw
no part of the Constitution as mandating narrow construction.39 Instead, Mar-
shall asserted that while courts should not exaggerate the meaning of the
words of the Constitution, courts should not unnecessarily limit them." Addi-
tionally, Marshall assumed that people use words that best express their mean-
which, unrestricted, is so unjust and tyrannical, guided by inexperience and jealousy,
began to show itself in impolitic measures, from which grew up a conflict of commer-
cial regulations, destructive to the harmony of the States, and fatal to their commercial
interests abroad.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 224 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring). For a discussion of
Gibbons, see infra section lI.B.; see text accompanying notes 35-61.
35. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Gibbons applied the commerce power to navigation; the
federal government could regulate navigation because all of the nation understood "commerce" to
include navigation. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 193.
36. Id. at 187.
37. Id. at 187, 195. Marshall stated, "No direct general power over these objects [inspection
laws] is granted to Congress, and consequently, they remain subject to State legislation. If the
legislative power of the Union can reach them, it must be for national purposes; it must be where
the power is expressly given ..... Id. at 203-04.
38. Id. at 187-88 (arguing against construing the Constitution narrowly). Chief Justice Mar-
shall urged that so long as the courts do not enlarge the meaning of the words, there is no need to
read them too narrowly. Id.
39. Id. Marshall admitted that some had argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause of the
Constitution called for a narrow construction of the Constitution. Marshall countered this argu-
ment:
[Tlhis limitation [the Necessary and Proper Clause] on the means which may be used, is
not to be extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there one sentence in the
Constitution, which has been pointed out to the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have
been able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not, therefore, think ourselves jus-
tified in adopting it. What do gentlemen mean, by a strict construction? If they contend
only against that enlarged construction, which would extend words beyond their natural
and obvious import, we might question the application of the term.
40. Id.
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ing." He concluded that the Framers explicitly granted-and therefore intend-
ed to grant--Congress the power over commerce among the states. The Fram-
ers used the words, "Congress shall have the power ... over interstate com-
merce."42 Marshall reasoned, then, that this grant of power means that Con-
gress shall have the power over interstate commerce, since the Framers used
the words that best expressed their meaning. 3
Marshall embraced an enormous task in Gibbons. Not only did he explain
how to interpret the Constitution, but he defined "commerce." Commerce is a
unit, he wrote, and the term indicates its parts." Commerce is at least traf-
fic," yet it encompasses more than just traffic. It is commercial inter-
course.' It is that commercial intercourse occurring between nations, parts of
nations, and branches of nations. It is navigation." It is cargo and it is pas-
sengers on carriers." The power to regulate commerce bestows the further
power to create rules and enact laws governing commerce." This power is
plenary,5' complete in itself and qualified only by the Constitution. 2
Yet this power, as plenary and extensive as it is, has limits. The Constitu-
tion states, "Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce ... among
the several States."5 Thus, the Constitution limits the reach of the Commerce
Clause through the word "among." Marshall also defined "among" as used in
the Commerce Clause. "Among" means intermingled with.54 It does not in-
clude commerce that affects only one state and the people within that state.55
The word does not, however, mandate that federal regulations stop at the
border of each state.56 "Among" allows federal, commercial regulations over
activities-even if they occur intrastate-that concern more than one state. 7
Marshall reminded Congress that the states remain the most important part
of the Republic.58 The states may do that which the federal government may
not.59 State regulations may resemble an interstate commercial regulation, or
may either tenuously or considerably affect interstate commerce.' In contrast,
41. Id. at 188.
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
43. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 188.
44. Id. at 194.
45. Id. at 189.
46. Id. at 189-90.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 193.
49. Id. at 215.
50. See id. at 190.
51. Id. at 197.
52. Id. at 196.
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Gibbons 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194-95.
54. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194.
55. Id.
56. Id. Marshall explained, "[l]n regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of
Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several States. It would be a very useless
power, if it could not pass those lines." Id. at 195.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 199.
59. See id. (discussing the power of the states to tax for purposes that the federal govern-
ment cannot).
60. Id. at 203-04. In this portion of Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that the
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federal law may control state law only so far as necessary to effectively ex-
ercise an enumerated power, and it may not otherwise deny the states' authori-
ty to govern in the same area.6' Since the federal commerce power is plenary,
however, this interrelationship between state and federal power poses only a
small obstacle to federal commerce power.
C. After Gibbons
In the first one hundred years or so after Gibbons, the Supreme Court
primarily examined the Commerce Clause as it related to the scope of state
authority. The Court reviewed cases challenging the extent of the states' com-
merce power in light of a federal commerce power. The states had ceded
interstate commerce power to Congress; yet the question remained whether the
states also reserved a commercial power, and if so, to what extent the states
could exercise this power. Using the language of the Commerce Clause, the
Supreme Court upheld Maine's ability to regulate navigation on a river within
her borders.62 The Court also allowed a state to prohibit the manufacture and
production of intoxicating liquors when the manufacturing occurred within the
state.6" By defining the reach of state power, these cases expressed the scope
of federal power.64 If courts allowed states to regulate an activity, then the
activity was intrastate, by virtue of federal power over interstate activity. This
indirectly established the reach of the Commerce Clause. The federal govern-
ment had the power to regulate interstate commerce, and the states reserved
the power to regulate intrastate activities.
federal control over interstate commerce was not exclusive-the states may still act. The states
lacked the power only insofar as they attempted to achieve the same commercial ends. Id. In
Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829), Delaware enacted a law al-
lowing a dam to be constructed on a stream, even though the stream was deep enough to be used
by boats moving in interstate commerce. Chief Justice Marshall upheld the state regulation. Al-
though the state statute reflected a commercial regulation, it also affected the value of property
and the health of Delaware citizens. These measures were valid so long as they did not collide
with the accomplishment of a federal goal. Id. at 249-50.
61. Black Bird, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 241-42. According to the doctrine of preemption, when
federal and state laws collide, the federal regulation wins the contest. Chief Justice Marshall rec-
ognized the doctrine of preemption, but he also knew that until the laws collided-that is, the state
law made impossible or impractical the accomplishment of a federal goal-the Constitution autho-
rized both governments to act. Id. at 210. This Comment does not address the delicate relationship
between federal and state law, albeit an issue that Lopez could have altered. For a very brief dis-
cussion of the state and federal governments' interplay, see infra note 195. For a discussion of
how Lopez affected the relationship between the federal and state governments, see Daniel A.
Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the
Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 615 (1995).
62. Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. 568 (1852).
63. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
64. The Kidd Court, for example, upheld a state prohibition of liquor production within its
borders. Kidd, 128 U.S. at 26. This decision may have implied that the federal government lacked
the power to regulate this area. The Lopez Court discussed this principle of the early cases. See
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1635 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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1. Semantics and Nomenclature
While the first one hundred years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence
centered on the scope of state authority, industrialization began a new era for
the Commerce Clause. Industrialization led to many federal economic regula-
tions65 and a period of Commerce Clause jurisprudence which turned on defi-
nition, semantics, and nomenclature.' United States v. E.C. Knight Co.
6 7
launched this definitional period. The Knight Court held that the federal
Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibited industrial monopolies, did not apply
to American Sugar Refining Co., which had arguably gained a monopoly over
sugar-refining.' American Sugar might have "combined and conspired to
restrain trade"-a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Yet if the activity
was not interstate commerce, then the federal law could not apply to it-the
activity would be outside the purview of the federal government's reach or the
reach of the Commerce Clause. The Knight Court, using a "semantics ap-
proach," '9 questioned whether the regulated activity, sugar refining, met the
Court's definition of commerce. After defining sugar refining as
"manufacturing," the Court readily and easily distinguished manufacturing
from commerce.7" Manufacturing seemed to be a purely local enterprise.7
Allowing Congress the power over manufacturing would give Congress the
power over agriculture, mining, and other traditionally local activities. The
Knight Court feared this result," and refused to transfer state power into the
federal government's hands in this way."
65. E.g., The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1995)); The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 5, 24 Stat.
379 (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11901 (1995)).
66. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1635 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). This era
did not overrule Gibbons, but rather, seemingly tried to apply Gibbons to those activities involv-
ing commerce. The Court sought to find which activities involved commerce by "defining" com-
merce and determining if that definition encompassed the regulated activity.
67. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
68. Knight, 156 U.S. at 18. American Sugar Refining Co., by purchasing stock in four Phila-
delphia sugar refineries, acquired nearly complete control over the manufacture of refined sugar.
Id. at 9. Plaintiffs in Knight complained that by so doing, American Sugar "combined and con-
spired to restrain the trade and commerce in refined sugar," a violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1995)). Id.
69. See text accompanying supra note 66 (discussing the "semantic approach").
70. Knight, 156 U.S. at 12-14.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 16. The Kidd v. Pearson Court, which upheld a state prohibition of liquor produc-
tion, also wanted to protect state autonomy:
[H]ow can it further that object so to interpret the constitutional provision as to place
upon congress [sic] the obligation to exercise the supervisory powers just indicated? The
demands of such supervision would require, not uniform legislation generally applicable
throughout the United States, but a swarm of statutes only locally applicable, and utterly
inconsistent. Any movement towards the establishment of rules of production in this vast
country, with its many different climates and opportunities, could only be at the sacrifice
of their peculiar advantages of a large part of the localities in it, if not every one of
them.... A situation more paralyzing to the state governments, and more provocative
of the conflicts between the general government and the states, and less likely to have
been what the framers of the constitution intended, it would be difficult to imagine.
Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1888).
73. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16. The Court held that manufacturing is production and production
is not commerce. Id. at 20. Other cases also used the semantic approach to define the scope of
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2. Commingling and the Instrumentalities of Commerce
Cases challenging Congress's commerce power continued to reach the
Supreme Court, and the Court repeatedly attempted to define the scope of
congressional power. While some cases relied on semantics and definitions,"
other cases analogized commerce to a "water current."75 For example, in
Swift & Co. v. United States,76 the Court envisioned commerce as a current,
and held that Congress could regulate items moving in that flow." Under this
reasoning, parts within the flow were inseparable from the flow to which those
parts contributed.78 Thus, the Swift Court upheld application of the Sherman
Antitrust Act to the stockyards of meat dealers.79 The meat dealers in Swift
were charged with conspiring to fix the price of meat." The Court decided
that the cattle at the stockyards contributed to the movement of com-
merce-the cattle became inseparable from the "flow of commerce" to which
the cattle contributed.8' The cattle, moving through this flow of commerce,
became "commerce." Later, in Stafford v. Wallace, 2 the Court used a similar
analysis, again comparing "commerce" to a stream. Items in the "throat of
commerce" were inseparable from the rest of the flow of commerce to which
they contributed." Stockyards, 4 in Stafford, were the "throat" of commerce,
the first step of a continuing process.85 Congress could regulate the throat as
well as the river of commerce.
legislative power. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (discussing how manufacturing is not
commerce); Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. 568 (1852) (explaining that a regulation that applied only
intrastate was not interstate commerce). Even Gibbons noted that the interstate commerce power
included navigation because all the nation understood that "commerce" included "navigation."
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824). This reasoning resonated throughout the
"semantics approach" era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 65-72.
75. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905) (holding that cattle moving
in and out of different transactions created a "current" of commerce).
76. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
77. Swift, 196 U.S. at 398-99.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 398..
80. Id. at 395.
81. The Swift Court stated:
[Clommerce among the states is not a technical legal conception, but a practicalone,
drawn from the course of business. When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one
state, with the expectation that they will end their transit, after purchase, in another, and
when in effect they do so, with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the
stock yards, and when this is a typical, constantly recurring course, the current thus
existing is a current of commerce.
Id. at 398-99.
82. 258 U.S. 495 (1922). The Court observed that cattle stockyards, the place where meat
dealers hold cattle awaiting sale or shipment in interstate commerce, resembled the "throat"
through which commerce flows; the Court held that transactions at the "throat" are inseparable
from the "flow" to which they contributed. Stafford, 258 U.S. at 516.
83. Id. In Stafford, the Court upheld the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, an act autho-
rizing the Secretary of Commerce to regulate the rates and set standards of the operation of stock-
yards. Congress passed the Act in order to prevent the meat dealers from fixing the prices of meat
at outrageous prices.
84. The stockyards held the cattle that waited for sale and shipment in interstate commerce.
85. See id.
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During this same period, the Court knew that some intrastate activities
were so commingled with interstate commerce that they effectively eluded an
interstate-intrastate distinction. 6 The Railroad Rates Cases7 exemplify this
recognition. These cases reviewed Congress's ability to set-or delegate the
power to the Interstate Commerce Commission to set-the maximum rates the
railyards or states could place on items moving along their lines. When the
federal government sought to standardize the rates, the states challenged Con-
gress; the states argued that the interstate commerce power did not permit
regulation of intrastate rates. The Court, however, reasoned otherwise. Mer-
chants often shipped intrastate items on the same carriers as products that
moved interstate.s8 The Court would have liked to distinguish, for Commerce
Clause purposes, between intrastate items and interstate items, thereby estab-
lishing which items and railroad rates the federal government had the power to
regulate and which items and railroad rates the state government had the pow-
er to regulate. Yet forcing a distinction between items leaving the state and
those remaining within the borders imposed an impractical, if not impossible,
burden on the railroads, its employees, and shippers. Intrastate rates commin-
gled with interstate rates to an imperceptible degree.89 Thus, the Court al-
lowed federal regulation of the railroads. 9 The Railroad Rates Cases pre-
sented little difficultly for the Court, which could easily envision the intimate
connection between railroads and interstate commerce. The free flow of com-
merce, as the Framers' designed,9' clearly depended on the railroads,9" and
equitable rates ensured that the railroads ran freely and that commerce among
the states remained unobstructed.
The Railroad Rates Cases represented regulation of an instrumentality of
commerce.93 An instrumentality, it seems, is an "arm" of commerce-it is a
86. This distinction is derived from the very language of the Commerce Clause. The Clause
allows regulation over interstate commerce, thereby excepting intrastate commerce.
87. See, e.g., Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 312 (1914) (allowing
federal regulation of intrastate rates insofar as they affected interstate rates) [hereinafter Shreveport
Rates Case]; Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352 (1913) (holding that the Interstate Commerce
Commission could regulate intrastate rates so far as they affect interstate rates) [hereinafter Minne-
sota Rates Case].
88. See Shreveport Rates Case, 234 U.S. 312 (1914); Minnesota Rates Case, 230 U.S. 352
(1913).
89. See Shreveport Rates Case, 234 U.S. at 351-52; Minnesota Rates Case, 230 U.S. at 432-
33.
90. Shreveport Rates Case, 234 U.S. at 360; Minnesota Rates Case, 230 U.S. at 432-33.
91. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
92. These cases also represented an instance where the connection of an activity to com-
merce embodied the Framers' vision of the Commerce Clause. See supra notes 25-34 and accom-
panying text. The railroads were a primary means of moving goods across state lines. An obstruc-
tion of the railroads, via discriminatory railroad rates for example, obstructed the movement of
interstate commerce. Congress, therefore, needed to regulate the railroad rates in order to protect
the free flow of commerce.
93. It is unclear why the Court commonly refers to a channel of commerce as distinct from
an instrumentality of commerce; the difference between a channel and instrumentality seems dubi-
ous. See WILLIAM C. BURTON, LEGAL THESAURUS 289 (Stephen C. DeCosta et al. eds., 2d ed.
1980) (giving the word "channel" as a synonym for the word "instrument"). It seems that a
channel of commerce is a conduit for commerce-the forum for the movement of items across
state lines-and the Court allows federal regulation over items in that conduit or the conduit itself.
While an instrumentality of commerce may be a conduit for commerce, it seems to encompass
(Vol. 73:1
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branch, agent, or contributing force to commerce. Soon after the Railroad
Rates Cases, the Supreme Court reviewed legislation regulating the channels
of commerce, and the Court allowed Congress to keep the- channels free from
noxious articles. The Court upheld Congress's power to prevent citizens from
using the commercial channels as a means to move the evils of intoxicating
liquors, debauchery of women, white slave traffic, impure foods and drugs,
and lottery tickets.94 Those moving the liquor, women, white slaves, impure
foods or drugs, or lottery tickets relied on the channels of commerce to ac-
complish the harmful acts. The Court, therefore, allowed Congress to police
the channels.
By 1918, Congress's power to regulate under the Commerce Clause con-
sisted of the power to regulate commerce and the instrumentalities of com-
merce, 95 as well as the power to regulate the use of the channels of com-
merce for immoral purposes.96 The Court, however, refused to defer com-
pletely to legislative choices. For example, in Hammer v. Dagenhart,97 the
Court invalidated federal regulation of child labor. The government sought to
diminish the hours worked by children of certain ages through a prohibition of
the transportation of "child-labor products" in interstate commerce. 98 Seem-
ingly using the "semantics approach," the Supreme Court invalidated the
federal regulation. The Court did not perceive "commerce" to include "la-
bor"-child or otherwise. "Labor" contributed to, but was not a part of, inter-
state commerce. Thus, child labor fell outside the purview of congressional power. ""
more. An instrumentality appears to be an appendage of commerce, an arm or tool of commerce
necessary to enable the movement of commerce. The railroads are an example of an instrumental-
ity; a railroad itself is not "commerce," but is necessary to aid the movement of commerce. A
railroad is so closely tied to commerce that Congress must regulate the railroad in order to effec-
tively regulate items moving in interstate commerce. The Lopez Court used the railroads as an
example of an "instrumentality" of commerce and the Darby and the later civil rights cases, supra
notes 139-52, 164-75 and accompanying text, as an example of Congress's ability to prevent the
improper or immoral use of the "channels" of commerce. United States v. Lopez, 115 U.S. 1624,
1629 (1995).
94. See Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R.R. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917) (upholding
the prohibition on production of liquor); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (allow-
ing congressional regulation of transporting women for debauchery); Hoke v. United States, 227
U.S. 308 (1913) (validating congressional regulation of white slave traffic); Hipolite Egg Co. v.
United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (validating the Pure Food and Drug Act); Champion v. Ames,
188 U.S. 321 (1903) (allowing the prohibition of transportation of lottery tickets because they
perpetuate evil).
95. See supra notes 75-93.
96. See supra note 93-94 and accompanying text. Since during this time, the Court allowed
Congress to regulate both the channels of interstate commerce and the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, then it is curious why the Supreme Court bothered to make a distinction between
a "channel" of commerce and an "instrumentality" of commerce. Both appear to be nearly the
same thing, and Congress had authority over both, so it is unclear why the Court decided to mud-
dy some already murky waters with this vague distinction. See supra note 92 for a discussion on
the possible difference between a "channel" of commerce and an "instrumentality" of commerce.
97. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
98. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268-69.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 65-73 for a discussion of the semantics approach.
100. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 271. The Hammer Court stated:
In each of these instances [of congressional regulation of the channels of inter-
state commerce] the use of interstate transportation was necessary to the accomplishment
of harmful results. In other words, although the power over interstate transportation was
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3. The Direct/Indirect Effects Test
When the Court decided Schechter Poultry v. United States... and Cart-
er v. Carter Coal Co.,"2 it realized that a Commerce Clause analysis based
on semantics had produced factually inconsistent precedent. In an attempt to
stabilize Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court devised the "di-
rect/indirect effects" test. Under this test, the Court looked not to the source of
the injury, but to the effect of the regulated activity on commerce." 3 The
Court ignored the "definition" of the regulated activity and focused on the
ultimate impact that activity placed on interstate commerce." 4 If the activity
only had a remote impact on interstate commerce, the Court would strike the
federal regulation.' For example, in the mid-1930s, Congress standardized
poultry-slaughtering conditions through the Live Poultry Code. " ' The Code
included minimum wage and maximum hour requirements; the defendants in
Schechter violated these provisions."7 While these violations may have
clearly affected slaughtering conditions, the Court found that the wage and
hour provisions-or violations of the wage and hour provisions-imposed only
to regulate, that could only be accomplished by prohibiting the use of the facilities of
interstate commerce to effect the evil intended.
This element is wanting in the present case. The thing intended to be accom-
plished by this statute is the denial of the facilities of interstate commerce to those man-
ufacturers in the states who employ children within the prohibited ages. The act in its
effect does not regulate transportation among the states, but aims to standardize the ages
at which children may be employed in mining and manufacturing within the states. The
goods shipped are themselves harmless .... When offered for shipment, and before
transportation begins, the labor of their production is over, and the mere fact that they
were intended for interstate commerce transportation does not make their production
subject to federal control under the commerce power.
Id. at 271-72.
101. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
102. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
103. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 544. Prior to this test, the Court looked to see if the regulated
activity fit the definition of commerce, for example, whether "child labor" met the Court's con-
ception of "commerce." Hammer, 247 U.S. at 272. Under this new direct/indirect effects test, the
Court examined whether the source of the injury imposed a direct effect on interstate commerce or
only a remote relation to interstate commerce. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 545-50. If the regulated
activity only remotely related to interstate commerce, remained distant from interstate commerce,
then the Court would strike federal regulations of that activity. But if the activity directly affected
commerce, contributed an immediate or instant effect on commerce, then the Court would uphold
Congress's regulation of that activity. See id.
104. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 545-50.
105. Id.
106. The Live Poultry Code was promulgated under the National Industrial Recovery Act. Act
of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 196, 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1933). The National Industry Re-
covery Act empowered the President to approve "codes of fair competition" if it would promote
industrial growth, not interfere or compromise other small businesses, and not allow a group to
monopolize a certain industry. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 522-23. The Live Poultry Code was one of
these "codes of fair competition," approved by the President on April 13, 1934. Id. at 523. The
Code included provisions on minimum wages and maximum hours, other general labor provisions,
administration, and trade practice provisions. Id.
107. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 527-28. The defendants were convicted in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of New York on eighteen counts of violations of the Live Poul-
try Code and one count of conspiring to restrain trade. The defendants appealed to the Circuit
Court of Appeals, arguing that Congress unlawfully delegated its legislative power to the President
and that Congress regulated intrastate commerce, which lay outside its commerce power. Id. at
519.
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a remote and indirect effect on interstate commerce."" Once the chickens
reached the slaughterhouse, commerce ceased, and production, a local activity,
began."' Since, under the direct/indirect effects test, the Commerce Clause
enabled Congress to regulate only those activities which placed a direct effect
on interstate commerce, the Court concluded that Congress could not regulate
the slaughterhouse conditions.
The direct/indirect effect test in Schechter implicitly incorporated all of
the Court's prior Commerce Clause tests. The Court's analysis first distin-
guished between labor and commerce,'" a significant distinction in the se-
mantics era.' The Court also noted that slaughtering remained separate
from interstate commerce, resembling the analysis used by the Court in the
Railroad Rates Cases."2 Finally, mirroring the "flow of commerce" analysis
which emerged during the Swift era, the Court noted that once the Schechters
began slaughtering the chickens, the flow of commerce ceased." 3 Because
the Live Poultry Code failed all these tests, the Court found that the
Schechters' violations of the Code were too remote from interstate commerce
to be subject to federal regulation.'"
Carter v. Carter Coal Co."5 followed one year later, embracing the di-
rect/indirect effects test enunciated in Schechter. The plaintiffs in Carter chal-
lenged a federal regulation of coal prices, mining, and labor,"' forcing the
108. Id. at 543.
109. Id. at 542-43. In other words, the Schechter's slaughtering did not so commingle with
interstate commerce to make a distinction between interstate and intrastate commerce impractical.
The slaughtered chickens remained in the state. The flow of interstate commerce ceased. Id.
110. See id. at 543. The case did not turn on the semantics distinction; however, this distinc-
tion could have been one of the factors that prompted the Court to conclude that the slaughter-
house was indirectly related to interstate commerce. See supra text accompanying notes 65-73 for
a discussion of semantics.
111. The Court recognized that "labor" is not a commercial transaction or an action intended
to obstruct a commercial transaction. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 545-46. This led the Court to con-
clude that the Schechter's violations of the Poultry Code had only an indirect effect on commerce.
112. Id. at 542-43. See supra text accompanying notes 86-93 for a discussion of the Railroad
Rates Cases. In these cases, the Court decided that intrastate rates so commingled with interstate
rates that the Court found it impractical to force a distinction between the intrastate and interstate
rates.
113. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 543. The Swift era is represented by two cases, Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), and Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922). These cases
analogized commerce to a "flow" or a "digestive tract," and the parts within the flow, or tract,
were inseparable from commerce and therefore Congress could regulate them. See supra notes 76-
85 and accompanying text for a discussion of this era and these cases.
114. The Court did not explicitly state that the direct/indirect test was a "summation" of all
prior tests. This is a conclusion that this Comment draws because of the language of the case. It
seems that the direct/indirect effects test incorporated all the prior tests the Court used. Once find-
ing that poultry slaughtering was not part of the Court's conception of "commerce," and it was not
"so commingled" with commerce that it was indistinct from commerce, and that it was not part of
the "flow of commerce," the Court then concluded that it only indirectly affected interstate com-
merce.
115. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). The Carter Court upheld the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 801-802 (1935), an act attempting to stabilize the coal mining industry and
conserve natural resources. Carter, 298 U.S. at 278-79.
116. Carter, 298 U.S. at 278-80. Stockholders of the Carter Coal Company sued the corpora-
tion to prevent the corporation from complying with the provisions of the Bituminous Coal Con-
servation Act of 1935. The stockholders feared that compliance would result in a decrease in
profits for the corporation, as the Act required a tax levy on the coal, conservation, and other
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Court to consider whether Congress exceeded its commerce power by regulat-
ing mining.'" 7 The Carter Court, using the direct/indirect effects test, focused
on, and further defined, the meaning of "direct." A direct effect, according to
the Court, meant a proximate effect, not "remote" or "collateral. ' " Direct
effects lacked intervening agents.' 9 "Direct" did not measure magnitude, but
rather the manner in which an act brought about a result. 2 ' The Court, there-
fore, invalidated federal regulation of mining because mining, and especially
labor conditions for miners, only indirectly impacted commerce. 2' The
Court, like the Court in Schechter, could separate "labor" from "commerce." It
seems the Court decided that mining, unlike other acts of "commerce," was
production and only related to commerce through the later acts, or intervening
agents, that brought the mined coal into the flow of commerce.
4. The Downfall of the Direct/Indirect Effects Test and the Birth of
Expanded Congressional Power
a. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.'22
The direct/indirect effects test lived a short life. The Court rejected the di-
rect/indirect effects test shortly after its adoption.'23 After Congress enacted
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),2 4 the Supreme Court decided
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., ushering in a new era of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Jones & Laughlin marked an initial murmur which
would eventually set off an avalanche of federal commerce power.
In Jones & Laughlin, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found
that the defendants violated the NLRA by engaging in unlawful labor practic-
es. "'25 The defendants discriminated against members of the union with regard
to hire and tenure, and coerced and intimidated its employees in order to inter-
fere with their self-organization-all actions in violation of the NLRA.'26
The defendants challenged the validity of the NLRA, arguing that Congress
lacked the power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to regulate the labor
conditions in the steel industry. The Jones & Laughlin Court repudiated the
direct/indirect effects test, finding that the test created idle distinctions that
failed to measure remote, yet catastrophic effects. 2 7 According to the Jones
provisions affecting the net profits of Carter Coal. Id.
117. Id. at 297.
118. Id. at 307.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 308.
121. See id. at 304.
122. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
123. Only two years passed between the adoption of the direct/indirect effects test in
Schechter, decided in 1935, and its rejection in Jones & Laughlin, decided in 1937.
124. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1935).
125. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 22.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 41. The Court stated:
[lI]t is idle to say that the effect [of a work stoppage in the steel industry] would be
indirect or remote. It is obvious that it would be immediate and might be catastrophic.
We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life and to deal with
the question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum. Because there may
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& Laughlin Court, strife among workers within a steel plant threatened work
stoppages and therefore output from the plant.' 8 It seems the Court feared
that work stoppages, in turn, threatened the amount of steel produced. Dimin-
ished production threatened more than the particular plant suffering from labor
strife; it affected the entire nation's supply of a vital resource. This would be
an indirect, but catastrophic effect on commerce. The Court upheld federal
regulation of steel-production and labor within the steel plants.' 9 In uphold-
ing the regulation, the Jones & Laughlin Court enunciated a new framework
for Commerce Clause analysis. The Court essentially divided the existing
Commerce Clause power into two subsets-or prongs-and then added a third
subset of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. The first of these
subsets confirmed Congress's authority over commerce and its instrumentali-
ties. "' This prong verified, for instance, Congress's power to regulate rail-
road rates, a power validated nearly twenty years before in the Railroad Rates
Cases.3' Jones & Laughlin did not create this federal power, then, but mere-
ly confirmed the power already acknowledged by the Court. The Jones &
Laughlin Court also affirmed Congress's ability to regulate the "flow" or
"stream" of commerce.32 This second subset validated precedent permitting
Congress to regulate the "channels" of commerce. 3' Jones & Laughlin then
created a new subset of congressional commerce power. The third prong al-
lowed Congress to regulate activities that "substantially affect" interstate com-
merce. 3 ' This included conduct leading or tending to lead to an obstruction
of commerce. This new subset was one of inclusion and exclusion: the Com-
merce Clause reached all, but also only, those activities that affect interstate
commerce.' This third prong also enabled Congress to regulate constant
practices that burden or threaten the free flow of commerce.'36 The Jones &
Laughlin Court reminded the lower courts, and themselves, that the Constitu-
tion empowers Congress, and not the judiciary, to decide what activities
be but indirect and remote effects upon interstate commerce in connection with a host of
local enterprises throughout the country, it does not follow that other industrial activities
do not have such a close and intimate relation to interstate commerce as to make the
presence of industrial strife a matter of the most urgent national concern.
Id.
128. Id. at 41-42. The Court noted that when an industry, such as the steel industry, "orga-
nize[d] itself on a national scale," id., the industry "ma[de] its relation to interstate commerce the
dominant factor" in its activities. Id. Therefore, that industry's labor relations would be subject to
federal oversight. Id.
129. Id. at 43.
130. id. at 38.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 86-93 (discussing the Railroad Rates Cases).
132. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 34-36. The Jones & Laughlin Court con-




136. Id. at 37. Constant practices, while never explicitly defined by the Jones & Laughlin
Court, seems to mean any activity occurring on a consistent basis. This prong opened the door to
later, expansive reading of the Clause. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see infra text
accompanying notes 153-63.
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burden commerce and how to remove those burdens.' Jones & Laughlin
thus emphasized that courts adjudicate and Congress legislates.3
b. The "Substantial Affects" Test After Jones & Laughlin
The Jones & Laughlin decision and the "substantial affects" test opened
the floodgates for legislative power. The subtlety of individual cases using the
test, however, belied the dramatic growth of the Commerce Clause. It was like
hammering a nail into a wall. With each strike, the hole in the wall grew,
although almost imperceptibly. When removing the nail, the hole appeared
much larger than when the hammering began. The "substantial affects" test,
like the nail in the wall, provided the means for the expansion of congressio-
nal commerce power. Each Commerce Clause case decided after Jones &
Laughlin only slightly expanded the Commerce Clause and legislative power.
And in retrospect, viewing the scope of congressional commerce power nearly
thirty years after Jones & Laughlin, the power seems much larger than when
the "hammering" began.
United States v. Darby"39 is only one example of the Court's broad in-
terpretation of Jones & Laughlin and the "substantial affects" test. The defen-
dants in Darby ran a lumber mill; they were charged with violating wage and
hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.' The mill owners
challenged the Act's validity under the Commerce Clause, 4 arguing that
lumber manufacturing was "manufacturing," not "commerce," and therefore
not within the scope of the interstate commerce power.'42 While the Darby
Court determined that manufacturing was neither commerce, an instrumentality
of commerce, nor a channel of commerce,'43 it nevertheless upheld the Act.
Manufacturing, according to the Court, triggered the third prong of Jones &
Laughlin-it was an activity that substantially affected interstate com-
merce.'" If Congress may regulate the transaction itself, the Darby Court
reasoned, it can regulate the initial step of the transaction.' 45 Under this rea-
soning, since "interstate commerce" clearly embodied the transportation of the
final product-lumber-then Congress may also regulate the initial step of
processing the timber into the lumber. Darby also took the Commerce Clause
power and the "substantial affects" test a step further than Jones & Laughlin.
137. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 38.
138. Id. This notion reflects the separation of powers doctrine, see supra note 18. While this
Comment touches on the principles of this doctrine, it does not address this doctrine directly or
how United States v. Lopez altered or affected the doctrine. However, among other implications,
Lopez perhaps threatens bicameralism-by perhaps allowing the courts to sidestep adjudication
and make the empirical decisions traditionally left for Congress.
139. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
140. Darby, 312 U.S. at 108-09.
141. Id. at I11.
142. Id. at 111-12.
143. See id. at 113. The appellee challenged application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to
lumber manufacturing. Id. at 108.
144. Id. at 117. Darby also overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), which
previously rejected application of the FLSA to manufacturers. Darby, 312 U.S. at 116-17.
145. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 117.
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Darby essentially granted Congress an unchecked power over interstate com-
merce, making the effect of the decision twofold. On the one hand, the Court
acknowledged a police-like power over commerce."4 Darby asserted that
Congress may prohibit activities that violate Congress's sense of public moral-
ity. Thus, the Court allowed federal regulation of labor conditions, not only
because labor conditions substantially affected interstate commerce, but be-
cause Congress found substandard labor conditions "noxious."'47 This con-
cept was not novel to the Court; in the commerce-prohibiting cases"4 the
Court allowed Congress to prohibit the movement of "evil" articles of com-
merce across state lines.'49 However, Darby pushed this concept even fur-
ther. The Court held that its role, in reviewing an act of Congress, was not to
consider Congress's motive-whether to regulate an "evil" or to regulate
"commerce."'25" In other words, not only did Darby uphold a police-like
power, but the decision also ensured that this power would remain relatively
unchecked.
The Darby Court's interpretation of Congress's power to regulate com-
merce pushed the constitutional envelope. First, the Constitution did not enu-
merate a congressional police power. Darby was not the first case to allow
Congress to use the commerce power to accomplish police-power ends. 5'
But Darby ensured that Congress could continue to use the Commerce Clause
to accomplish police-like regulations, and have free reign over the use of the
Commerce Clause in this way, without judicial oversight.' Darby effective-
ly stated that a court's role, while reviewing the congressional use of the Com-
merce Clause, was not to consider whether Congress was actually motivated
by a burden to interstate commerce, or if Congress simply wanted to regulate
the morality of the nation.
Darby, while expanding congressional power, did not mark the most ex-
pansive reading of the Commerce Clause. One year later, the Court held that
one person's home-consumption of wheat substantially affected interstate com-
merce.'53 In Wickard v. Filburn,54 the Court concluded that the Commerce
146. Id. at 113.
147. Seeid. at 113.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96. This Comment refers to these cases as the
commerce -prohibiting cases because the Court allowed Congress to prohibit the movement across
state lines of items Congress perceived as "evil" or "immoral." See e.g., Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Hipolite Egg Co. v.
United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
149. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 491 (stating that the ability of Congress to regulate the use of the
"channels" of commerce has been frequently sustained and "no longer open to question").
150. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
152. At least one scholar, Gerald Gunther, asserts that the judicial noninterference advocated
by Darby gave Congress a "superbootstrap." GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITuTIONAL LAW 135 (12th
ed. 1991). Gunther noted that the "superbootstrap" of "judicial noninterference is at its greatest
when Congress prohibits the crossing of state lines." Id.
153. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942). The Court upheld application of the Agri-
culture Adjustment Act of 1938 to Filburn's noncommercial, purely local consumption of wheat
because of the ultimate effect of local consumption on interstate commerce when considered in the
aggregate. Id. at 128-29.
154. 317 U.S. 11I (1942).
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Clause reaches noncommercial, intrastate activities that impose only a trivial
impact on commerce when isolated, yet have a profound impact when aggre-
gated.' In Wickard, the Court reviewed the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938.56 The Act was Congress's response to an overproduction of wheat.
Because the farmers produced more than the country bought or exported, Con-
gress passed the Agriculture Adjustment Act to regulate-and prevent-this
surplus. t'17 The Act specified the maximum amount of wheat a farmer could
produce." 8 It prohibited a person from growing more than the allotted
amount of wheat, even if the farmer intended to use this excess for home-con-
sumption. The Act allotted Filbum, a wheat farmer, 11.1 acres and a yield of
20.1 bushels. 59 Filbum exceeded this allotment by harvesting 23 acres and
239 bushels of wheat, subjecting him to a penalty of twenty-nine cents a bush-
el."6 Filburn challenged the Agricultural Adjustment Act as beyond
Congress's commerce power. He argued that the Act reached his individual
consumption, and that individual consumption does not substantially affect
interstate commerce.'' The Supreme Court disagreed. While the Act in ef-
fect reached into individual homes and regulated individual consumption, this
individual consumption does substantially affect interstate commerce.' 62 In
the aggregate, if every farmer produced the allotted maximum plus an amount
of wheat to consume in the home, then none of these farmers would buy the
wheat produced and sold on the market. Thus, there would still be an
overproduction of wheat, the condition addressed by the Act. The Court reiter-
ated that Congress could regulate activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce, and held that home-consumption of wheat substantially affects the
interstate commerce of wheat. The Court upheld the Agriculture Adjustment
Act.
163
Jones & Laughlin, Darby, and Wickard expansively interpreted the scope
of the Commerce Clause and allowed Congress broad reach under the com-
merce power. Jones & Laughlin created the "substantial affects" test. Darby
applied the "substantial affects" test, and in the process, invented a congressio-
nal police power. The Wickard Court permitted federal regulation of trivial,
intrastate activities, that when considered in the aggregate, substantially affect-
ed interstate commerce. Combined, these interpretations allowed Congress to
use its commerce power to police even trivial, noncommercial acts that in the
aggregate substantially affected interstate commerce--either by their nature or
simply because Congress found the activity morally offensive. Congressional
use of the Commerce Clause seemed unlimited.
155. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124-25. The Court analyzed the Agriculture Adjustment Act under
the third prong of Congress's interstate commerce power, activities substantially affecting inter-
state commerce. Id.
156. 52 Stat. 31, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1281 (1938).
157. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115.
158. Id. at 114-15.
159. Id. at 114.
160. Id. at 114-15.
161. Id. at 118-19.
162. Id. at 115-16.
163. Id.
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c. The Later Cases-The Modern Era
The modem era of Commerce Clause cases built on the principles estab-
lished in Jones & Laughlin, Darby, and Wickard. Yet the expansion of federal
power remained subtle. Although the Court simply applied valid precedent,
each time it applied the "substantial affects" test Congress's commerce power
grew. In the mid-to-late 1960s, the Court upheld the Civil Rights Act under
the Commerce Clause."M It seems the Court wanted to allow Congress to
regulate racial discrimination, and the Commerce Clause provided Congress
the necessary reach of power to do so;165 the Court admitted that Congress
was legislating against the "moral wrong" of discrimination rather than a com-
mercial activity." 6 The Court, in these later civil rights cases, acknowledged
that racial discrimination was not a commercial activity and by its nature
164. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (finding an amusement park a place of public ac-
commodation and within the ambit of the Civil Rights Act and the interstate commerce power
because food served at the park moved in interstate commerce and the park served interstate trav-
elers); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding the applica-
tion of the Civil Rights Act to hotels since racial discrimination adversely affects interstate travel
which in turn affects interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (uphold-
ing the application of the Civil Rights Act to restaurants near interstate highways because of the
adverse affect of racial discrimination on interstate travel and therefore on interstate commerce).
165. Gerald Gunther, a noted constitutional law scholar, wrote a letter to the Department of
Justice in the summer of 1963. His letter stressed that the Supreme Court should not rely on the
Commerce Clause as a source of power for Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act. For an excerpt
of this letter, see GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 148 (12th ed. 1991). Gunther wrote,
I was happy to see that the Administration has put off for a few days the submission of
its new civil rights proposals to Congress. I hope that the additional time will permit the
Justice Department to reexamine its reported decision to rely exclusively on the com-
merce clause .... [T]he substantive content of the commerce clause would have to be
drained beyond any point yet reached to justify the simplistic argument that all intrastate
activity may be subjected to any kind of national regulation merely because some formal
crossing of an interstate boundary once took place, without regard to the relationship
between the aim of the regulation and interstate trade. The aim of the proposed anti-dis-
crimination legislation, I take it, is quite unrelated to any concern with national com-
merce in any substantive sense.
Id. at 148-49.
166. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). The Court stat-
ed:
That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs ... rendered its enactments no less
valid. In framing Title I1 of [the Civil Rights] Act Congress was also dealing with what
it considered a moral problem. But that fact does not detract from the overwhelming
evidence of the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on commercial inter-
course.
Id.
In upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court had to overcome the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in which the Court held that the public accommodation statute of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, 336, was unconstitutional because it hindered private activ-
ity, rather than limiting itself to state action. Mark E. Herrmann, Looking Down From the Hill:
Factors Determining the Success of Congressional Efforts to Reverse Supreme Court Interpreta-
tions of the Constitution, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 543, 568-69 (1992). The Court distinguished
these cases from Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), because
Congress used the Commerce Clause, not the 14th Amendment, to enact Title II. The Act of 1875
did not limit its jurisdiction to places involving or affecting interstate commerce. Thus, the Court
in the later civil rights act cases only had to determine if the Commerce Clause empowered Con-
gress to regulate racial discrimination.
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occurred on the local level.' 67 But the Court found that racial discrimination
in hotels, inns, and restaurants deterred interstate travel.'68 The decrease in
travel directly correlated to a diminished need for supplies moving in interstate
commerce.'69 This diminished need, in turn, substantially affected interstate
commerce. 170
In these later civil rights cases, the Court noted the connection between
the regulated activity and the use of goods moving in interstate commerce.
The Court allowed Congress to regulate activities that adversely impacted the
supply and demand of interstate goods. Generally, the "commercial enter-
prise"-the amusement park, the restaurant, or the hotel-adversely affected
the need for supplies by discriminating against customers, thereby reducing the
number of patrons, or amount of interstate supplies used. For example, in
Daniel v. Paul,'' the Court applied the Civil Rights Act to Lake Nixon
Club, an amusement park in Little Rock, Arkansas, which denied admission to
African-Americans. Because the park included a snack bar which served food
and drinks obtained from out-of-state sources, the entire park fell within the
ambit of the Commerce Clause.' The Daniel v. Paul decision followed the
principles established in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States'73 and
Katzenbach v. McClung."4 Both cases upheld the Civil Rights Act as falling
within Congress's commerce power, since hotels, inns, and restaurants ser-
viced interstate travelers.'
167. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258. The Court said, "If it is interstate commerce that feels
the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze." Id. (citing United
States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)).
168. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 251 (1964) In Heart of
Atlanta, the Court noted that because of the current mobility of the nation's populace, and the
increase in travel of citizens, discriminatory practices that inhibit travel have a larger impact on
interstate commerce than ever before. Id. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964),
reiterated this point. The Court stated that "refusals to service Negroes have imposed burdens both
upon the interstate flow of food and upon the movement of products generally." Id. Another of
these later civil rights cases, Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969), did not decide the case based
on the travel of citizens or the movement of foods. There, the Court determined that the amuse-
ment park fell within Title It's description of a "public accommodation," as an area selling foods
obtained from out of state sources, and therefore within the ambit of Title II. Id. at 301.
169. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 305; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 251; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at
304.
170. Daniel. 395 U.S. at 305; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at
304.
171. 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
172. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 305-06.
173. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
174. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
175. See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 251. In justifying the application of the Act by virtue
of service to interstate travelers, the Court explained that,
the fact that certain kinds of businesses may not in 1875 have been sufficiently involved
in interstate commerce to warrant bringing them within the ambit of the commerce pow-
er is not necessarily dispositive of the same question today. Our populace had not
reached its present mobility, nor were facilities, goods and services circulating as readily
in interstate commerce as they are today. Although the principles which we apply today
are those first formulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden ... the condi-
tions of transportation and commerce have changed dramatically, and we must apply
those principles to the present state of commerce.
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Later, in 1968, the Court used these principles to uphold the application of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 7 6 to noncommercial enterprises.'77 In
Maryland v. Wirtz,' the Court allowed the federal government to impose
the provisions of the FLSA on hospitals and schools.'79 Hospitals and
schools, although not commercial enterprises, used goods moving in interstate
commerce, just as the hotels, inns, and amusement parks involved in the civil
rights cases of the late 1960s."" The Court reasoned that poor working con-
ditions led to labor strife in all enterprises, commercial and noncommercial
alike. Labor strife, which led to work stoppages, substantially affected inter-
state commerce because it reduced the need to purchase goods moving in
interstate commerce.' 8'
The "substantial affects" test continually validated federal regulations-it
seems the Supreme Court never met a federal regulation that it didn't like. In
the 1970s, the Court upheld a congressional criminal law. Perez v. United
States'82 allowed Congress to criminalize loan sharking because organized
crime profited from loan sharking." 3 The heads of organized crime, the
Court reasoned, "victimized" business persons by giving them extraordinarily
large loans at extraordinarily high interest rates, making the loan nearly impos-
sible to repay. 4 Once the owner defaulted on the loan, the head of the orga-
nized crime group took over the legitimate business.'85 The organized crime
head then used this legitimate business as a lawful front for illegal activi-
ties. 86 This process affected business, and business affected interstate com-
merce. 7 Therefore, Congress could regulate--criminalize-loan sharking,
since loan sharking substantially affected interstate commerce. 88
176. Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (cunent version at 29
U.S.C. § 201 (1988)).
177. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
178. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
179. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 194.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
183. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 155.
184. Id. at 156-57. The Court believed that the loan shark racket "provides organized crime
with its second most lucrative source of revenue, extracts millions from the pockets of people,
coerces its victims into the commission of crimes against property, and causes the takeover by
racketeers of legitimate businesses. Id. at 156.
185. Id. at 156-57.
186. Id. at 155-57.
187. Id.
188. Perez upheld the federal criminal act since the crime was "commercial" in nature. But
Justice Stewart's dissent in that case warned that the Perez rationale might be applied to other
crimes, even those lacking the "interstate" connection obvious in Perez. Id. at 157-58 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stewart noted that all crimes are "a national problem," so the fact that loan
sharking is a national problem should not justify congressional criminalization of loan sharking.
He stated that it is also not enough to label loan sharking as a crime with interstate characteristics,
for all crimes have these interstate characteristics. He then stated that to assert that Congress may
enact this criminal law since loan sharking adversely affects interstate business does not distin-
guish loan sharking from any other crime, since all crimes will affect businesses one way or an-
other. Id. For a thorough discussion of federal criminal laws, and the effect of Lopez on these
laws, see James M. Maloney, Shooting for an Omnipotent Congress: The Constitutionality of
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The Supreme Court continued to allow the Commerce Clause to reach far
into individual and local activities. A decade after Perez, the Court validated
congressional regulation of pollution. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Coal Reclamation Ass'n, s9 the Court upheld the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act (SMCRA),"9" which forces strip miners to reclaim, or repair
the damage wreaked upon, the land once the miner finishes mining. In the late
1970s, an association of coal producers engaged in strip mining sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of SMCRA, 9' challeng-
ing that the Act violated the Commerce Clause. The Court held that SMCRA
was a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power because coal mining
adversely affected the value and utility of the land.'92 Mining severely affect-
ed the value of the land and the possible uses of that land. This substantially
affected interstate commerce, by altering where certain activities could take
place and what activities could be done on the land.'93
5. Limits on Congressional Power
Although the Jones & Laughlin era and the modem era cases acknowl-
edged some limits on congressional commerce power, the Court seemingly
paid only lip-service to those limits. The Court never actually used the limits
to strike down congressional regulations. The Jones & Laughlin Court warned
against expunging the distinction between local and national affairs,'94 in the
hopes that Congress, of its own volition, would tread lightly in areas of state
authority.'95 The Jones & Laughlin Court stated that Congress's use of the
Federal Regulation of Intrastate Firearms Possession, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1795 (1994).
While criminal law is traditionally left to the states, federal criminal laws have intersected
with the states authority in these areas. Since 1980, the case load for federal criminal cases has
grown by over fifty percent. Deborah J. Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 706 (1995).
189. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
190. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1976).
191. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 273.
192. Id. at 277-81.
193. Nearly all environmental laws are enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. With the
use of the "substantial affects" test, Congress can regulate virtually all aspects of the environment,
including prohibitions on certain actions, standards for air, water, and land quality, and environ-
mental clean-ups. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Environmental Law in Australia and the United
Staies: A Comparative Overview, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 503 (1995).
194. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30, 37 (1937). The Court warned
that,
the scope of this power must be considered in the light of our dual system of govem-
ment and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so
indirect and remote that to embrace them ... would effectually obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local.
Id.
195. See id. at 30. As New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) verifies, state authori-
ty over an area places a very narrow limit on the Clause and congressional power. New York held
that our dual system only prevents the federal government from commandeering the states to enact
federal policy. Id. at 175, 179.
The Tenth Amendment, the issue addressed in New York, suffers from a tumultuous history
which this Comment does not address. This Comment focuses on United States v. Lopez as it
affects Congress's interstate commerce power and its previously unlimited authority. This Com-
ment does not address how the Lopez decision affects the Tenth Amendment and state and federal
power. Yet when one speaks of congressional Commerce Clause power, one also speaks of the
sovereign powers retained by the states through the Tenth Amendment. For a glimpse of the Tenth
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Commerce Clause should not "obliterate" the distinction between national and
local affairs."' However, that said, the Court then proceeded to develop a
framework for Commerce Clause cases that paved the road for Congress's
expansive commerce power.
Other cases acknowledged different "limits" on Congress's commerce
power, albeit never using those limits to actually stop a congressional action.
In Darby and Wickard, the Court "limited" congressional authority by remind-
ing Congress to respect the natural boundaries of the "substantial affects" test,
and regulate only activities that have a substantial affect on interstate com-
merce.'97 The word "substantial," modifying "affect," limits congressional
regulations to those activities with a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
not just any effect.
In another set of cases, the Court emphasized that rational basis review
limits congressional action under the Commerce Clause.'98 "Rational basis
review" signifies the standard of review, or the strictness of scrutiny, the Court
uses when reviewing legislation; "rational basis" means Congress must have
acted reasonably, or rationally. McCulloch v. Maryland'9 established rational
basis review as a threshold requirement for all legislation. Under this standard
of review, the Court considers first whether the legislative goal is reasonable
and legitimate. If the ends are legiiimate, then the Court determines if the
means Congress chose to accomplish that goal are rational, or reasonable."
Congressional actions must always be rational.2"'
While each era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence brought a different
perspective on the proper Commerce Clause analysis, one aspect of the analy-
sis remained consistent: the Court continually applied "rational basis" review.
This means that the Court, while applying the "semantics" approach," 2 the
Amendment's history, see Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (holding state schools and
hospitals subject to the FLSA); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overrul-
ing Wirtz in part by holding that state employers are not subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act);
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League of
Cities and subjecting state employers, once again, to the FLSA). The Supreme Court further ad-
dressed the Tenth Amendment in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988); EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); and United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678
(1982).
196. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 30.
197. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill, 125 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
119-20 (1941). Wickard exemplifies how the word "substantial" is really an insubstantial limit. If
one person's home consumption of wheat is substantial, it is hard to imagine what is not substan-
tial.
198. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Coal and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-80
(1981); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964) (stat-
ing that rational review limits Congress); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 264, 299-301 (1964)
(asserting that Congress must act rationally); see infra text accompanying notes 351-70 (revealing
how rational basis review rarely actually limits Congress).
199. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall stated, "Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appro-
priate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
200. Id.; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-80.
201. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-80.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 65-73.
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direct/indirect effects test,"3 or the "substantial affects" test,20 4 consistently
applied these tests with the minimal scrutiny of "rational basis review." The
Court determined whether Congress could reasonably conclude that the action
in question fell within the definition of "commerce, 20 5 imposed a direct ef
fect on interstate commerce,2 °6  or substantially affected interstate
commerce" 7 As a limit on Congress, rational basis review posed a minor
obstacle for Congress, but the Court recognized it as a limit on Congress
nonetheless."' °
This tradition of relaxed judicial scrutiny when reviewing legislation
passed under the Commerce Clause is vital, whether viewed as a limit on
Congress or the Court. The tradition, which began with McCulloch v. Mary-
land, plays an important role in the background of Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. While the Court changed its approach to the "proper" Commerce
Clause analysis several times, it continually, almost unquestionably, applied
the lightest judicial scrutiny, rational basis review.
6. A Summary of Congress's Commerce Clause Power Prior to Lopez
By 1995, the United States Supreme Court established that Congress may
regulate three areas of commerce: the use of the channels of commerce,"°
203. See supra text accompanying notes 101-21.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 122-214.
205. See supra text accompanying note 65.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-80.
208. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-80; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964) (stating that rational review limits Congress); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 264, 299-301 (1964) (asserting that Congress must act rationally).
In effect, rational basis review actually poses more of a limit on the courts than on Con-
gress. In McCulloch, the Supreme Court, in establishing the threshold of rational basis review,
also warned courts that judicial attempts to question the necessity of a law passes the line circum-
scribing the judiciary and treads on legislative ground. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423. The
dissent in E.C. Knight repeated this warning, and the Court has consistently upheld this principle.
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 39 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421, for the proposition that sound construction of the Constitu-
tion allows legislative discretion regarding the means by which it exercises its powers). Minimum
rationale review narrows the scope of judicial inquiry. If a rational basis exists for the law, then
the only question left for the courts is whether Congress chose a means reasonably adapted to the
ends. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 262; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 304;
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941). This review questions not the merit of those
ends, but the reasonableness of the relationship between the ends and the chosen means.
While in theory "rational basis" review poses an obstacle for Congress, courts hesitate to
enter the prohibited territory of second-guessing legislation. When faced with a choice, courts
often choose statutory interpretations which save-rather than destroy-the legislation. NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 3 (1937) (stating that the NLRA can be construed as
"operating within a sphere of constitutional authority and is therefore constitutional). Minimum
rationale, or rational basis, review is a search for any conceivable rational basis for an act. Courts
may speculate as to what Congress could reasonably have thought; they are not limited to factors
that actually motivated Congress. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 115. Rational basis does not require
legislatures to create a record for judicial review. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 478
(1980).
This tradition of relaxed judicial scrutiny is important, and the Lopez decision perhaps
altered this tradition. See infra text accompanying notes 199-208 for a discussion of rational basis
review, the limits on the courts and Congress, and Lopez.
209. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917).
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the instrumentalities of commerce--or the things or persons in interstate com-
merce, 2 1 and those activities that have a substantial relation to interstate
commerce-those that substantially affect interstate commerce. 2 ' Courts ana-
lyze these three bases as distinct areas of congressional authority.2 2 While
earlier, precedents define the activities that substantially affect interstate com-
merce, the cases left unanswered what activities do not substantially affect
interstate commerce. In United States v. Lopez, the Court finally acknowledged
that the Commerce Clause does have boundaries.
II. UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ2 3
On March 12, 1992, Alfonso Lopez brought a .38 caliber handgun to
school." 4 He planned to sell the gun to a fellow student, who wanted the
gun for a gang fight.21 5 School authorities received an anonymous tip and
confronted Lopez about the gun.2"' Lopez confessed, and the police arrested
and charged him under Texas law. 2 7 The following day, federal agents
charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990,28
210. See Shreveport Rates Case, 234 U.S. 342, 351-53 (1914).
211. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
212. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (treating the three areas of the Clause,
the instrumentalities and persons and things in commerce, the channels of commerce, and activi-
ties substantially affecting interstate commerce, as analytically distinct).
213. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
214. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
215. Debra L. Farmer, United States v. Lopez: The Fifth Circuit Declares the Gun-Free
School Zone Act of 1990 an Unconstitutional Extension of Congressional Power Under the Com-
merce Clause, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1674, 1674 (1994) (citing Lopez v. United States, 2 F.3d 1342,
1345 (5th Cir. 1993)).
216. Id.
217. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626. State authorities charged Lopez under Texas Penal Code §
46.03(a)(1). Id. The Texas Code provides in relevant part:
(a) A person commits an offense if, with a firearm, . . . he intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly goes:
(1) on the physical premises of a school, an educational institution, or a pas-
senger transportation vehicle of a school or an educational institution, whether
the school or educational institution is public or private, unless pursuant to
written regulations or written authorization of the institution.
TEX. PENAL ANN. § 46.03(a)(1) (Supp. 1994).
218. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. 11 1988). The Gun-Free School Zone Act provides in relevant
part, "It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A).
Section (q)(1)(B) of the Act sets forth exceptions:
Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the possession of a firearm-
(i) on private property not part of school grounds;.
(ii) if the individual possessing the firearm is licensed to do so by the State in which the
school zone is located or a political subdivision of the State, and the law of the State or
political subdivision requires that, before an individual obtain such a license, the law
enforcement authorities of the State or political subdivision verify that the individual is
qualified under the law to receive the license;
(iii) which is
(I) not loaded and;
(II) in a locked container, or a locked firearms rack which is on a motor
vehicle;
(iv) by an individual for use in a program approved by a school in the school zone;
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which prohibited the possession of a firearm within a school zone. State au-
thorities then dropped the charges brought under Texas law.2 9
A federal grand jury indicted Lopez on one count of knowing possession
of a firearm in a school zone.22" Lopez moved for dismissal, alleging that the
Act exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.2 ' The district
court denied the motion and convicted Lopez of violating section 922(q) of the
Gun-Free School Zone Act.222 The district court then sentenced Lopez to six
months imprisonment and two years supervised release.2  Lopez appealed to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, again asserting that Congress exceeded its
power under the Commerce Clause in enacting the Gun-Free School Zone Act
of 1990.224
The Fifth Circuit agreed with Lopez. 225 The court found that Congress
failed to show, through legislative findings or legislative history, how gun
possession in a school zone affects interstate commerce. 226 Absent such find-
ings, the court could see no relation between commerce and gun possession in
a school zone.227 Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Act exceeded
Congress's interstate commerce power. The government appealed to the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court.228 The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's
(v) by an individual in accordance with a contract entered into between a school in a
school zone and the individual or an employer of the individual;
(vi) by a law enforcement officer acting in his or her official capacity; or
(vii) that is unloaded and is possessed by an individual while traversing school premises
for the purpose of gaining access to public or private lands open to hunting, if the entry
on school premises is authorized by school authorities.
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(B).
Congress later revised the Act to include findings articulating the nexus between gun pos-
session in a school zone and interstate commerce. For these findings, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)
(1994). Briefly stated, these revised findings showed that Congress considered crimes, particularly
crimes involving guns and drugs, to be a nationwide problem. Congress then, in these findings,
stated that firearms move in interstate commerce, and have been found in increasing numbers in
and around schools. Id. Presumably, this was a response to the Fifth Circuit's reliance on legisla-
tive findings, invalidating the statute because of the absence of findings, that prompted this revi-
sion. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993). In Lopez, however, the Supreme Court
dealt with the portions of the Gun-Free School Zone Act valid when Alfonso Lopez brought the
gun to school. Thus, the Court decided Lopez before the addition of the legislative findings assert-
ing the nexus between interstate commerce and gun possession in a school zone.





224. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345, 1346 (5th Cir. 1993).
On November 29, 1990, Congress enacted the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 as §
1702 of the Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-647, 101st Cong. 2d Sess., 104 Stat. 4789,
4844-45. It became effective sixty days later. Pub. L. 101-647, § 1702(b)(4). The Act was passed
in response to the "devastating tide of firearm violence in our Nation's schools." Petitioner's Brief
at 3, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260) (quoting Representative
Feighan). Senator Kohl stated that the Act was a continuation of congressional concern for the
nation's classrooms. The Senator felt that gun free school zones were an "important step in fight-
ing gun violence and keeping our teachers and children safe." Petitioner's Brief at 3-4.
225. Petitioner's Brief at 3-4; Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1352.
226. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1359-60.
227. Id.
228. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
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result: Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause when
enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.229
A. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia: The Majority
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, differed from
the decision issued by the Fifth Circuit. For the Fifth Circuit, the absence of
findings alone rendered the Act invalid.23° While the Chief Justice implied
that findings would have been helpful,23" ' this omission was secondary to the
majority's decision that gun possession in a school zone does not substantially
affect interstate commerce.232 The Court's failure to affirmatively repudiate
the Fifth Circuit's reliance on findings implies that findings may be required.
The Lopez Court first summarized the reach of the Commerce Clause. The
Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and the activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce.233 Gun possession, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote,
is neither a channel nor an instrumentality of commerce.234 This dismissal of
the first two categories of interstate commerce, the instruments and channels
of commerce, would seemingly be because section 922(q) concerned "posses-
sion" of a gun rather than the "sale" of guns or the "movement" or "trans-
portation" of guns across state lines. "Possession" does not neatly fit into one
of these more obvious categories.235 The rest of the majority opinion focused
on the effect of gun possession on interstate commerce. 236 The Court con-
cluded that the effect on commerce is not substantial.237
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Gun-Free School Zone Act func-
tioned outside the Commerce Clause. 238 He argued that gun possession was
not an economic enterprise,239 and that it was not a necessary part of a
229. Id.
230. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1352.
231. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
232. Id. at 1634. Chief Justice Rehnquist used Lopez to "settle some uncertainty" about the
Commerce Clause. He said that while some precedent might suggest that Congress can regulate
activities that affect interstate commerce, the regulated activity must substantially affect interstate
commerce. Id. at 1628-30.
233. Id. at 1629-30. See supra text accompanying notes 122-272.
234. Id. at 1630. Chief Justice Rehnquist does not explain why commerce is not an instrumen-
tality nor a channel of commerce. He simply stated:
The first two categories of authority may be quickly disposed of: § 922(q) is not a regu-
lation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, nor is it an attempt to prohibit
the interstate transportation of a commodity through the channels of commerce; nor can
§ 922 be justified as a regulation by which Congress has sought to protect an instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce or a thing in interstate commerce. This, if § 922(q) is to be
sustained, it must be under the third category as a regulation of an activity that substan-
tially affects interstate commerce.
Id.
235. Chief Justice Rehnquist did not explain this "dismissal" of the Act as regulating neither a
channel nor an instrumentality. This Comment presumes, however, that this is perhaps why the
Chief Justice did so.
236. Id. at 1630-34.
237. Id. at 1634.
238. See id. at 1630-31. For the text of the Gun-Free School Zone Act, see supra note 218.
239. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1631. This is not the first time Congress has sought to regulate
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larger, valid "regulatory scheme." 2" While Lopez did not explicitly require a
congressional articulation of a nexus to commerce, Chief Justice Rehnquist
indicated that such a showing may have provided the Court the explanation it
wanted, or needed, to uphold the Act."'
Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected all of the government's justifications for
regulating gun possession under the Commerce Clause. First, the government
argued that gun possession in school zones deterred travel.242 The govern-
ment contended that citizens would be reluctant to move if relocation would
result in sending their children to schools in areas that did not penalize gun
possession.243 These deterrents on travel, therefore, diminish the economic
productivity of these areas and ultimately affect interstate commerce.24
The government also argued that guns lead to crime, and crime imposes
higher insurance costs on the community.2 45 These higher prices affect com-
merce by artificially increasing the cost of living.2' The government's argu-
ments failed to persuade the Court. Despite the arguable effect on travel, in-
creased costs, and ultimately on interstate commerce, the Court believed that
this nexus unduly tread on the states' power to regulate criminal activities.247
"possession" of an item, or possession of a firearm for that matter. For example, Congress regulat-
ed the possession of a firearm by a felon-making it unlawful for a felon to receive, possess, or
transport a firearm in commerce-in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1) (1968). Interestingly, the Supreme Court reviewed this law in United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971). The Court, because of the jurisdictional element of § 1202, only had
to determine if Congress could regulate the possession of a firearm when it "affects" commerce.
Bass, 404 U.S. at 339 n.4. The Court postponed the decision of whether Congress can regulate
"pure possession" to another case when the facts demand that the Court make that decision. Id.
The Fifth Circuit dismissed the government's argument that Congress repeatedly regulates
firearms as well as firearm possession. The Fifth Circuit decided that those statutes lacking a
jurisdictional element-findings stating the nexus to interstate commerce-regulated commercial
actions involving the firearms business, not simple possession by an individual. United States v.
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1348 (1993). The Fifth Circuit considered the following statutes: 18 U.S.C. §
922(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1992) (governing false statements in the purchase of a firearm); § 922(b)(1)
& (2) (regulating the sale of a firearm to a minor); § 922(b)(4) (governing the sale of certain
firearms, such as machine guns, rifles, and automatic weapons); § 922(m) (requiring dealers to
keep certain records).
240. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. The Chief Justice did not explain this point. Presumably,
though, if the Gun-Free School Zone Act had been "part of a larger regulatory scheme," clearly
governing interstate commerce, then perhaps the Court would have imported the connection be-
tween the larger regulation and interstate commerce onto the Gun-Free School Zone Act, as it was
simply the smaller portion of the regulatory scheme.
241. Id. at 1631-32.
242. Id. at 1632. This argument reflects the principles used in the later civil rights cases, see
supra notes 164-75. In those cases, the Court allowed Congress to regulate discrimination because
of the adverse affect of discrimination on travel.
243. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632; Petitioners Brief at 9, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995) (No. 93-1260).
244. See Brief for the United States at 18, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (No. 93-
1260).
245. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632; Brief for the United States at 9, Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (No.
93-1260). The government made this argument as separate from the "deterred travel" argument,
see supra text accompanying notes 242-43.
246. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
247. Id. If Congress can regulate gun possession in a school zone because it leads to crime
and crime imposes both economic and social costs on the community, then it may also regulate
burglary, for example, because burglary imposes these same costs.
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The Constitution did not grant authority to the federal government over crimi-
nal law; this power was reserved for the states.2"
The government additionally argued that gun possession in school zones
adversely affects education and consequently affects commerce because of the
intimate ties between education, national productivity, and commerce.249
Chief Justice Rehnquist also rejected this argument. He believed that acknowl-
edging such a tenuous connection would grant Congress unlimited power to
regulate under the Commerce Clause.25 He used family and domestic laws
to illustrate his point. Familial relations directly affect a child's school-
work."' For example, when a mother and father divorce, their children's
schoolwork may suffer, since divorce causes psychological and physical
trauma for many children." 2 Yet despite the detrimental effect of divorce on
children's schoolwork-and hence, on education and commerce-Congress
does not have the authority to regulate domestic law.253 But if the Court al-
lowed Congress to regulate gun possession simply because it affects school-
work, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned, it may also have the power to reg-
ulate divorce.2"4
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion stated that finding the connection be-
tween gun possession in a school zone and commerce required "piling infer-
ence on inference,"'25 and would give Congress a broad police power. Refer-
ring to Gibbons,"6 Chief Justice Rehnquist warned that the powers enumer-
ated in the Constitution did "not presuppose something not enumerated.""2 7
This reasoning, however, reflects not that gun possession has too tenuous an effect on
commerce, but that the "substantial affects" test is too broad. The test encompasses effects that,
although substantial, are best left to the states to regulate. It allows Congress to exercise authority
over activities that Congress was never intended for Congress to regulate. See infra text accom-
panying notes 371-416.
248. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 n.3. The Court does not explain how it distinguishes the
Constitution's "omission" to grant the federal government authority over criminal laws with feder-
al laws that criminalize other conduct, such as the loan-sharking law discussed and validated in
Perez. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. Presumably, the difference depends on the
"concrete" connection between the criminalized conduct and interstate commerce, which the Court
found in Perez. This, however, might be distinction without a difference. For a discussion of fed-
eral criminal laws in relation to the Commerce Clause, see Chippendale, supra note 12.
249. Brief for the United States at 19-25, Lopez, (No. 93-1260).
250. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-33.
251. Id.
252. Id. This Comment assumes this point as a logical inference from Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion. He did not expand on this point.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1634.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9, 17-40 for a discussion of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
257. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195). Chief Justice
Rehnquist quoted then Chief Justice Marshall, who stated:
It is not intended to say that these words [of the Commerce Clause] comprehend that
commerce which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a
State ... and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be
inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary. Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it
may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than
one.... The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.
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In other words, the Court could not accept an argument that assumed the exis-
tence of authority the Framers did not enumerate for Congress.
B. Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor Concur
Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor concurred in the result of
Lopez.25 According to Kennedy, the nebulous history of Commerce Clause
precedent left Congress with imprecise definitional boundaries of its commerce
power.259 Kennedy and O'Connor cautioned, however, against returning to
the early conceptions of "commerce"2" and a judiciary that second-guessed
congressional judgments."' Justice Kennedy emphasized the importance of
maintaining the "stability" of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it had
evolved to that point;262 he argued that judicial restraint was necessary to
protect stare decisis.263 That restraint, Justice Kennedy asserted, prevented
the Court from returning to an understanding of commerce "that would serve
only an 18th-century economy. '264 Justice Kennedy also argued that judicial
restraint would prevent the Court from returning to the time when the Court
undermined congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce with the
Court's own subjective determinations of the "sufficiency" of the interstate nexus.
265
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194-95. Chief Justice Rehnquist then stated that to uphold the Gun-Free
School Zone Act would require the Court "to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of
powers does not presuppose something not enumerated." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634. He meant that
to allow Congress the authority over gun possession within school zones would be to presume
Congress has more authority than the Framers granted, and the states ceded, when forming the
Republic.
258. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring, with O'Connor joining). Justice
Kennedy wrote the concurring opinion.
259. Id. at 1636. Justice Kennedy referred to the era in which the Court determined the reach
of congressional power according to its definition of commerce and whether the regulated activity
fell within that definition without using any other standards for valid congressional commerce
regulations. For example, see United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (distinguishing
"manufacturing" from "commerce").
260. See supra text accompanying notes 35-73 for the early, narrow conceptions of com-
merce.
261. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637. Justice Kennedy referred to a time in the early 1930s when
the Court dismissed Congress's judgments and replaced them with the Court's own judgments.
See infra note 265 for an explanation of the Lockner era.
262. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637.
263. Id. Justice Kennedy stated, "Stare decisis operates with great force in counseling us not
to call in question the essential principles now in place respecting the congressional power to
regulate transactions of a commercial nature." Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. Presumably, Justice Kennedy was referring to the Lochner era, although the Justice
never explicitly cited Lochner. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Court
reviewed a New York law governing the maximum hours a bakery employee could work and
labor conditions for that employee. Id. at 46. The issue was whether the law violated the bakers'
substantive due process right to contract. Id. at 51-53. The Court held that the law interfered with
the right to contract, id. at 53, but the decision did not end there. The Court stated, "It must be
conceded that there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power by the state." Id. at 56. The
Court then continued,
In every case that comes before this court, therefore, where legislation of this character
is concerned, and where the protection of the Federal Constitution is sought, the ques-
tion necessarily arises: Is this [law] a fair, reasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary inter-
ference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty, or to enter into those
contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the
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Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor felt that the Gun-Free School Zone
Act upset the sensitive federal-state balance.2" The Justices argued that al-
most all conduct originates, concludes, or at least intertwines with commerce
at some point.26' Congress must therefore tread lightly when regulating areas
of state concern. The Gun-Free School Zone Act only criminalizes gun posses-
sion near a school,268 and traditionally, the states regulate education.269
While the states ceded many powers to the federal government when forming
the Republic, the states reserved the general police power. This police power
enables the states to fashion remedies that reflect local needs.27 Under this
argument, the states have sufficient power to enact their own measures against
guns in schools.27' Thus, the Gun-Free School Zone Act tramples on this ar-
ea of state concern and unnecessarily displaces state authority."2
support of himself and his family.
Id.
The Lochner decision led the Court for the next thirty years to invalidate several economic
and social laws. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 444 (12th ed. 1991). In other words,
the judiciary, instead of practicing its usual restraint, became more active when reviewing legisla-
tion. Modem justices reject the Lockner era of judicial intervention. Id. at 445. Gunther stated,
"Rejection of the Lochner heritage is a common starting point for modem Justices: reaction
against the excessive intervention of the 'Old Men' of the pre-1937 Court strongly influenced the
judicial philosophies of their successors." Id.
266. Justice Kennedy stated, "This case requires us to consider our place in the design of the
Government and to appreciate the significance of federalism in the whole structure of the Consti-




270. Id. at 1641. The Courts especially seek to protect the federal-state balance in areas where
the states have the ability to govern effectively. E.g., Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504 (1992); Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). Both these cases highlight the
rules of preemption. Preemption maintains that when a state law collides with the accomplishment
of a federal goal, the federal law preempts the state law; the law is void. Pacific Gas & Electric v.
State Energy Resource Conservation Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); see Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032 (1983); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1875). These cases analyze the
doctrine of independent state grounds. This doctrine establishes that the Supreme Court will de-
cline to decide a case if the state supreme court could adequately decide the issue by applying
state law. For a discussion of this doctrine, see Thomas E. Baker, 1994 Invitational Conference on
Courts and Jurisdiction in Federal States: The United States, Canada and Australia: A Catalogue
of Judicial Federalism in the United States, 46 S.C. L. REV. 835, 856 (1995).
271. For example, states with a large problem of guns in schools might choose to enact a
more strict law, imposing tougher penalties on violators. On the other hand, states or localities
with a small problem might enact a less strict law with more lax penalties. In addition, the states
and localities can fashion laws according to the "type of gun" problem that the locality faces. If
the problem is with handguns in an urban, populated area rather than hunting rifles in the rural
county, for example, the remedy might be different. The localities or states can also fashion their
needs according to the size of the school zone-in some areas, the school zone drawn by Con-
gress in the Gun-Free School Zone Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) (Supp. II. 1988), might be as large
as some towns.
272. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1641. The Act does not explicitly displace state authority. The Act
does, however, partly foreclose state policy choices, especially in states where the legislature
would choose not to criminalize gun possession as harshly as the Gun-Free School Zone Act. Id.
Justice Kennedy states, "it [displaces state authority] by regulating an activity beyond the realm of
commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of the term." Id.
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C. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Justice Thomas also concurred in the Court's result.273 He agreed that
the judiciary needed to halt legislative power.274 Nevertheless, Justice Thom-
as noted that the "substantial affects" test gives Congress a police power over
almost all activities.275 He called for a test more faithful to the original un-
derstanding of the Commerce Clause, yet reflective of the modem economic
reality of an interdependent, commercial nation.276
Justice Thomas advanced a unique view of the issue by juxtaposing the
Commerce Clause's precedent with the Necessary and Proper Clause.277 Un-
der its commerce power, Congress may regulate all activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce.278 The Constitution also empowered Congress to
take the necessary steps to exercise its enumerated powers.279 This Clause,
read in conjunction with the Court's interpretations of the Commerce Clause,
means that Congress may use necessary means to regulate activities substan-
tially affecting interstate commerce.28 ° Justice Thomas concluded that the
"substantial affects" test is superfluous because it "obliterates" the need for the
other enumerated powers. 8 Justice Thomas illustrated this idea in the con-
text of Congress's enumerated power to raise and support a Navy. 82 He ex-
plained that the Navy also substantially affects interstate commerce 283 by en-
couraging exportation of goods, since it arms the country with the ability to
protect those exports from pirating.284 Without that protection, citizens would
not export goods; these citizens would produce less and thereby diminish the
vitality of interstate commerce. If the Navy does not substantially affect inter-
state-or foreign--commerce, it at least is a necessary means by which Con-
gress can exercise its power to regulate activities that substantially affect inter-
state commerce. Regardless, the "substantial affects" test renders the enumerat-
ed power to raise a Navy unnecessary. Justice Thomas used this example to
show that the "substantial affects" test has the same result on the rest of
Congress's enumerated powers, rendering these powers superfluous and un-
necessary.
Justice Thomas also rejected the "substantial affects" test because it elimi-
nates the utility of the Tenth Amendment as a check on Congress.285 The
273. Id. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1642-43.
277. Id. at 1644. The Necessary and Proper Clause states, "[Congress shall have the power] to
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any other Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
278. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1644.
279. Id. For the text of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see supra note 277.
280. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring).
281. Id.
282. Id. The Constitution gives Congress the power to raise and support a Navy. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
283. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1644.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1645. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) greatly diminished the
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test, according to Justice Thomas, enables Congress to encroach upon state
powers in areas of state concern. Further, it extends legislative power beyond
the Framers' intent. Justice Thomas emphasized the Framers' awareness of
activities intimately tied to, but not a part of, commerce."' The Framers and
other early Americans, for example, understood that activities like manufactur-
ing and agriculture substantially affected commerce, yet they did not cede
power over these activities to the federal government." 7 They limited the
federal government's power to "interstate commerce.""28
Justice Thomas felt that the modern era case law, which established, af-
firmed, even expanded, the "substantial affects" test, misinterpreted Gib-
bons.89 Justice Thomas argued that when Chief Justice Marshall asserted
that Congress's commerce power does not reach activities that do not affect
more than one state,29" the Chief Justice meant to limit the reach of Con-
gress, not create the power over all activities that affect more than one state.
Under Justice Thomas's reasoning, the activity must affect more than one state
before Congress can regulate that activity. Justice Thomas's reading of the
Chief Justice's statement in Gibbons views the definition of "among" as the
ceiling, rather than the floor, of Congress's commerce power.' While Jus-
tice Thomas did not call for wholesale abandonment of recent precedent, he
called for a more tempered jurisprudence faithful to the Constitution.2
D. The Dissents
Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice Breyer, and Justice Ginsberg dis-
sented from the majority of the Lopez Court. Justice Stevens's dissent focused
on the tie between education and America's future economic vitality.293 He
believed that this nexus sufficiently satisfied Congress's "rational basis" bur-
den.294 Additionally, Justice Stevens believed that the judicial activism the
utility of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on Congress. The Tenth Amendment only prevents
Congress from forcing the states to enact federal policy. Id. at 161. Justice Thomas felt that the
"substantial affects" test further diminished what was left of the utility of the Tenth Amendment.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1645.
286. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1645.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). When interpreting the Commerce
Clause in Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall defined "among" by stating that Congress may not
reach activities that do not affect more than one state. Id. at 194. See supra text accompanying
notes 53-57. Justice Thomas felt that the Court and the dissent misconstrued this part of Gibbons.
He felt that Chief Justice Marshall never meant this "definition of among" to mean that Congress
could reach any activity that affects more than one state. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1646-50.
290. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194.
291. Quite possibly, this is a distinction without a difference. Justice Thomas viewed the
statement as a limit on Congress rather than the minimum reach of the commerce power. Read
either way, however, it seems that Congress still has the power over activities that "affect more
than one state."
292. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1650.
293. Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Breyer's dissent
that the Constitution empowers Congress to protect the school environment. Id.; see infra text
accompanying notes 310-22.
294. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651 (Souter, I., dissenting); see supra note 208 and infra text ac-
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Lopez majority advocated recalled the abhorred Lockner era of judicial
policymaking. 2" He did not analyze this comparison, but stated that he
agreed with the position taken by Justice Souter.296
Justice Souter criticized Justice Kennedy and O'Connor's "traditional state
function" analysis.297 Justice Souter argued that state authority over a particu-
lar area neither weakens nor displaces congressional authority,29 and that the
Constitution never promised that the federal government and the states would
act completely independently.299 According to Justice Souter, then, the Gun-
Free School Zone Act posed no federalism problem. The Constitution does not
mandate that the government cannot act in areas where the states are empow-
ered to act and the ability of the states to regulate gun possession in a school
zone does not weaken the federal government's ability to also regulate.3"
Justice Souter also focused on judicial deference to legislative decisions.
He called for judicial restraint,"0 reminding the Court of the frightening
Lockner era.3"2 Justice Souter believed that the Lopez decision advocates for
courts in the future to "defer" in Commerce Clause cases only when the courts
determine that the activity affects commerce "enough" to satisfy that particular
court. In Justice Souter's view, a court that accords legislative deference only
after the court's determination of "how much" an act affects commerce verges
on judicial policymaking." 3 Justice Souter also addressed the implications of
forcing Congress to include findings when legislating." 4 He argued that re-
quiring Congress to include findings meant that Congress would have to justi-
fy its policy choices.3 5 The result of this requirement is an implication that
the courts should review these policy choices, and hence, the wisdom of those
policy choices."a Justice Souter pointed out that under traditional "rational
companying notes 351-70 for a discussion of the rational basis standard of review.
295. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1645. Justice Stevens, cited his own dissent in Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2326-29 (1994), in which he referred to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905). In Lochner, the Court substituted judicial policy for legislative determinations. See
supra note 265. The Court oversteps judicial boundaries and performs a legislative function when
the Court begins second-guessing legislative decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 351-70
(discussing judicial policymaking and Lopez).
296. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651. Justice Souter dissented in part because of the effect of Lopez
on judicial deference and judicial boundaries. See infra text accompanying notes 351-70.
297. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor
concurred in Lopez, focusing on the sensitive balance between state and federal government au-
thority. See supra text accompanying notes 266-72.
298. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654-55.
299. Id. at 1654.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See supra note 265 (explaining the Lochner era).
303. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654.
304. Id. at 1656.
305. Id.
306. Id. Justice Souter stated:
The resulting congressional obligation to justify its policy choices on the merits would
imply either a judicial authority to review the justification (and, hence, the wisdom) of
those choices, or authority to require Congress to act with some high degree of deliber-
ateness, of which express findings would be evidence. But review for congressional
wisdom would just be the old judicial pretension discredited and abandoned in 1937.
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basis" review, however, the courts do not question whether Congress acted
correctly, wisely, or deliberately." 7 "Rational basis" requires only that Con-
gress acted within the realm of reason."'8 Justice Souter argued that requiring
legislative findings, then, is inconsistent with the level of review applied to
Commerce Clause cases.3"9
Justice Breyer also dissented, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
and Justice Ginsberg.' Justice Breyer criticized the Court for considering
gun possession's effect on commerce in isolation rather than on its cumulative
effect.3 ' He then demonstrated how, in the aggregate, gun possession sub-
stantially affects commerce. First, he explained that education and commerce
are largely and intimately linked.3 2 Commercial enterprises seek educated
workers.3"3 High-skilled workers replace low-skilled workers.3 4 Enterprises
educate workers, hoping to upgrade employees and thereby increase productiv-
ity.3 ' Global competition depends on maintaining a well-educated popu-
lace.3 6 A serious threat to education, therefore, seriously threatens our econ-
omy,3 17 and in turn substantially affects interstate commerce.
3 18
Further, Justice Breyer demonstrated that guns pose a serious detriment to
education because more and more children bring guns to schools.3t 9 Children
in these schools suffer threats and witness violence and crime.320 Congress,
therefore, could reasonably conclude that guns deteriorate the learning environ-
ment and cripple commerce.32 ' Under Justice Breyer's theory that guns affect
education, and therefore, substantially affect commerce, Congress does have
the power to enact the Gun-Free School Zone Act and regulate gun posses-
sion. In Justice Breyer's opinion, this is exactly the type of authority with
which the Constitution-through the Commerce Clause-arms Congress.322
Justice Breyer also believed that the Lopez opinion contravened estab-
lished Supreme Court precedent.323 Gun possession in a school zone affects
commerce at least as much as loan sharking,324 homegrown wheat consump-
Justice Souter's fear presumably stems from the Lockner era, see supra note 265, an era in
the in which the courts replaced congressional wisdom with the courts' own beliefs. The Supreme
Court later discredited this period. Justice Souter warned against a return to this period in Lopez.




310. Id. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 1658. Cumulative effects are important, as evidenced by Wickard, see supra text
accompanying notes 153-63.










322. Id. at 1661-62.
323. Id. at 1662.
324. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). See supra text accompanying notes 182-88
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tion,325 and racial discrimination.326 Also, the Lopez Court denied Congress
the benefit of the doubt that courts usually grant Congress.327 Justice Breyer
pointed out that courts historically allowed Congress great deference when
determining a nexus between a regulated activity and interstate commerce.328
The Lopez Court withheld this deference by disregarding legislative expertise
in making these empirical judgments. 29
Justice Breyer further criticized the Court for, on the one hand, rejecting
early case law giving controlling force to nomenclature, and on the other hand,
invalidating the Gun-Free School Zone Act in part because it regulates what
the Court identified as a noncommercial activity.33° Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion noted that "section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its
terms has nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic enter-
prise. ' 33' Justice Breyer criticized this portion of the opinion. To Justice
Breyer, the majority decided that gun possession did not meet a definition of
"commerce" nor a definition of an "economic enterprise. 332 Justice Breyer
reasoned that this mode of analysis revives a discredited era of reliance on
nomenclature and semantics, 33  mirroring the Court's refusal in E.C. Knight
to apply the Sherman Antitrust Act to sugar refining because "manufacturing"
was not "commerce. 334
III. ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
Briefly stated, the Lopez Court held that Congress may regulate the chan-
nels and instrumentalities of commerce and the activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce. 335 Gun possession is neither a channel nor an in-
strumentality, 3 6 and gun possession in a school zone does not substantially
(discussing Perez).
325. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see supra text accompanying notes 153-63.
326. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1662-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referring to the later civil rights
cases of Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969), Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964),
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)).
327. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1663 (referring to the deference usually accorded Congress, as illus-
trated in United States v. Womens Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949) and Mandeville
Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948)).
328. See supra text accompanying notes 351-70 for a discussion of judicial deference.
329. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657.
330. Making this distinction threatens the holdings of the later civil rights cases and other
legislation that regulates activities that are noncommercial in nature but otherwise substantially
affect interstate commerce.
331. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
332. Id. at 1663.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 67-73.
334. United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see supra text accompanying notes 67-
73.
335. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
336. The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate the things or persons in commerce.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. The Lopez Court did not analyze whether this category of valid regula-
tions encompasses "guns" and "gun possession." Nor did the concurring opinion or the dissent
opine that Congress might regulate guns and gun possession under this category of regulations.
However, several circuit court cases since Lopez have allowed federal regulation of items because
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affect interstate commerce.337 As a consequence, courts must "pile inference
on inference" to establish a link between interstate commerce and gun posses-
sion within a school zone. Congressional legislation based on such a link
exceeds Congress's commerce power.
The Lopez Court acknowledged that the Commerce Clause both empowers
and limits Congress, a concept disregarded for nearly half a century."' The
Constitution gives Congress a plenary power, but that power extends only to
interstate commerce.3" Lopez correctly recognized that not all activities fall
within the domain of interstate commerce.
While adherence to the intent of the Constitution requires this limit, the
Lopez Court used a poor analysis to impose the limit. The Court, knowing that
precedent paved the road for Congress's increasingly expansive power, abrupt-
ly declined to continue down that road.' The Court sent a message that it
would no longer defer to congressional commercial decisions absent the
Court's belief that the regulated activity, in fact, substantially affected inter-
state commerce.
Refusing to invent a congressional police power,34 the Court told Con-
gress to safeguard legislation by including findings342 in the legislation.
Lopez suggested that the Court, when confronting a regulation with a question-
able effect on commerce, will not speculate as to what Congress could ratio-
nally conclude. Rather, the Court wants to know what Congress actually con-
cluded. This implies that the judiciary is equipped with the authority to weigh
the merit of the legislative findings, and is not limited to the rationality
the items moved in interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir.
1995) (stating that machine guns connote interstate commerce); United States v. Robinson, 62
F.3d 234 (8th Cir. 1995) (observing that Congress did not exceed its authority in enacting a
carjacking statute).
337. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
338. Freilich, supra note 10. This Comment also asserts this point.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
340. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (stating that prior cases gave great
deference to Congress, nearly converting the commerce power to a police power).
341. Id.
342. Legislative findings aid courts when interpreting legislation to understand that legislation
and Congress's intent. The findings, sometimes, appear as a separate section to a statute, often
called the Purpose Clause. The Purpose Clause typically introduces the legislation. For a brief
explanation of the Purpose Clause, see JACK DAVIES, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 175-76 (2d
ed. 1986). In the case of legislation passed pursuant to the interstate Commerce Clause, Congress
might have an introductory section specifying the connection between the regulated activity and
interstate commerce. For example, in the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 891 (1968)
(the Act the Supreme Court reviewed in Perez, supra text accompanying notes 182-88), Congress
made findings suggesting the nexus that Congress saw between interstate commerce and organized
crime. Section 201(a) of Pub. L. 90-321 provided these findings, stating that Congress found that
organized crime is an interstate problem, involving "billions of dollars" each year. § 201(a)(1).
"Extortionate credit transactions are carried on to a substantial extent in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the means and instrumentalities of such commerce." § 201(a)(3). Congress
also modified the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 to include findings. For these findings, see
supra note 218.
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standard of review. 43 When a court assesses legislation according to its own
perceptions, it is legislating.
In addition to these troublesome implications, some questions arise out of
the analysis the Lopez Court applied in determining that gun possession does
not substantially affect interstate commerce. First, the Court misapplied the
"substantial affects" test and its modem-era precedent. Under the principles of
Jones & Laughlin,3 44  Darby,3 45  and Wickard,34  and applying the
methodology of the Civil Rights Cases,347 Hodel,314  and Perez,3 49 gun
possession in a school zone does substantially affect interstate commerce.
The problem the Court faced was not gun possession and its obscure
effect on commerce. The real problem was the expansive "substantial affects"
test. The test sees no limits. Most activities in our interdependent, commercial
society intertwine at some point with interstate commerce.35 Neither the
Framers' conception of commerce, the Constitution, nor Gibbons support the
test. The test must be limited, and not by the facts of one case but by its own
terms. The Court should have altered the "substantial affects" test. This does
not mean the Court needed to abandon the modem case law, or the entire test.
Adding a qualifying prong to the existing test would have allowed the test to
reach activities substantially affecting interstate commerce while preventing
federal regulation of activities beyond the Framers' vision of interstate com-
merce.
B. The Standard of Review and Judicial Policymaking
The Lopez Court did not explicitly raise the standard of review; the Court
did not even mention the standard of review when deciding that the Gun-Free
School Zone Act did not substantially affect interstate commerce. The
majority's analysis, however, raised the question of what level of review the
courts should apply in future Commerce Clause cases. Furthermore, the Court
"mentioned" that legislative findings would be helpful for the courts in the
future; as discussed below, this requirement of findings opens the door to
inappropriate judicial policymaking.
343. The Court said that findings would have helped the Court see the nexus between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce, Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. The presence or absence of
the legislative findings was itself not determinative. Id. Yet the Court never needs findings to
weigh the rationality of an act. See infra text accompanying notes 355-65. By implying a need for
findings, the Court implies the ability to review the merits, not just the rationality, of these find-
ings.
344. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
345. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
346. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
347. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
348. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Coal and Reclamation Ass'n, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
349. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
350. This is especially true in light of the Court's prior decisions. If racial discrimination,
recreational trails, and pollution substantially affect interstate commerce, so too does gun posses-
sion in a school zone.
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The Lopez Court quickly dismissed the first two categories of the
Congress's interstate commerce power; the Court noted that gun possession is
neither a channel nor an instrumentality of interstate commerce.' Thus, for
Congress to constitutionally regulate gun possession, gun possession must
"substantially affect" interstate commerce. 52 The Court refused to "pile in-
ference on inference" '353 to establish the connection between gun possession
in a school zone and interstate commerce, and consequently the Court struck
down the Act.354
The Court admitted, in its analysis, that it traditionally evaluates legisla-
tive findings independent of an activity's affect on commerce. 35 Yet the
Court indicated that findings could have saved the Act by pointing out the
connection between gun possession and interstate commerce.356 The Gun-
Free School Zone Act of 1990 contained no findings,357 and the Court re-
fused to import the findings from previous similar but distinct acts.3"8 While
the Court did not expand on the notion of legislative findings, it sent a clear
message to Congress: include findings. The Court did not mandate these find-
ings, and the validity of the Gun-Free School Zone Act did not turn on the
presence or absence of findings, but the Lopez Court certainly educated Con-
gress on what role findings play.
Traditionally, under "rational basis" review, if the court perceives any
plausible reason for congressional action, the inquiry ends.359 Legislation co-
mes to the courts with a presumption of constitutionality.3" Rational basis
review ensures that those attacking the rationality of an act negate every con-
ceivable basis that might support the act's rationality.36" ' This deference
351. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995). The Court concluded that gun
possession in a school zone is neither a channel nor an instrumentality of interstate commerce. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 1634.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1631. The Court did not explain what it meant by this admission of an independent
evaluation for legislative findings. It seems impossible for a court to evaluate the findings without
also evaluating the rationality, and thus validity, of an act. The Court probably meant that the
existence or nonexistence of findings will not render an act invalid since the court weighs the
rationality of legislation based on what it speculates Congress reasonably thought, not what the
legislative findings articulate Congress thought.
356. Id.
357. Id. Congress amended the Act in 1994 to include findings articulating the nexus between
commerce and gun possession in a school zone. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(1)(A)-(1) (Supp. 1995).
Since authorities charged Lopez under the 1990 Act, the government did not rely on these subse-
quent findings to argue for the validity of the 1990 Act. Oral Arguments at 25, United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260). Subsequent findings do not reveal the motivations
and intent of the prior Congress.
358. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 (affirming the Fifth Circuit's refusal to import findings since §
922(q) represents a sharp break from previous firearm legislation).
359. See supra text accompanying notes 198-208, supra note 208. Federal Communications
Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2100 (1993); United States R.R. Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-79 (1980); see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981);
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981); Heart of At-
lanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 303-04 (1964).
360. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323 (1981) (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,
428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
361. Id.
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allows Congress to legislate, the judiciary to adjudicate, and the democratic
process to rectify improvident laws. 62 The Court understands that legislating
involves compromises and incongruent laws. The judiciary's ability to imagine
a better, more perfect solution does not render a law irrational. 63 Instead, the
Court gives deference to Congress so that Congress may perform the duties
that the Constitution charges3" and preserve congressional independence.
This traditional deference to Congress and presumption of rationality
played an important role in Lopez. Since findings bear no significance under
typical rational basis review, and since the Lopez Court suggested that Con-
gress include findings, it seems the Court raised the standard of review to
something more than rational basis. Lopez allows courts to review not only the
legislation's rationality, but also the merits, need, and wisdom of the legisla-
tion. Applying rational basis review, a court would review an act and specu-
late as to what Congress might rationally have reasoned in deciding to regulate
that activity: what connection to interstate commerce there might be for that
activity. Now, under the reasoning of Lopez, the Court will look not to what
Congress might have thought, but demand findings expressing what Congress
did reason. The result will be that a court, in reviewing for those findings, will
then review the merits of those findings. The courts will decide the validity of
an act based on the court's understanding and acceptance of Congress's "rea-
sons." This is not a court applying "rational basis" review, but a court apply-
ing a standard of review more strict than rational basis.
In addition to raising the standard of review, the Lopez Court did not
thoroughly explain why the Gun-Free School Zone Act failed the "substantial
affects" test while other, seemingly similar regulations, passed the same test.
The Court noted that reaching the connection between gun possession and
interstate commerce required too many inferences.365 The Court did not ex-
plain whether the Act required more inferences than racial discrimination, for
example, or home consumption of wheat."6 In other words, it is hard to see
the distinction between gun possession and other activities that the Court up-
held as an activity Congress can validly regulate.
Since the Lopez Court offered lower courts little guidance or standards,
the decision leaves future courts to decide whether an activity affects com-
merce as much as the activities regulated in other, valid regulations, or if the
activity affects commerce as little as gun possession in a school zone. The
courts must assess whether the challenged regulation reflects the invalid regu-
lation of gun possession or if the challenged regulation reflects valid regula-
tions such as those concerning labor strife, racial discrimination, or surface
362. Beach, 113 S. Ct. at 2100; Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); see also Hodel,
452 U.S. at 276; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 294.
363. Presault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 19 (1990).
364. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980).
365. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995).
366. Compare Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (the later civil rights
cases) and supra text accompanying notes 164-75 with Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(upholding congressional regulation of one person's consumption of wheat at home) and supra
text accompanying notes 153-63.
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mining pollution.36' Arguably, the Court gave some guidance by stating that
gun possession was not an interstate activity, that it did not substantially affect
interstate commerce, and that gun possession had no concrete tie to com-
merce.3" Racial discrimination and surface mining pollution, however, are
not commercial activities and exist independently of economic activities as
well. Yet the Court upheld the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Ace' and the Civil Rights Act.7 " The effect is that the lower courts have
no guidance as to why the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act and
the Civil Rights Act passed the "substantial affects" test and the Gun-Free
School Zone Act failed the same test; the lower courts must compare the
"concreteness" of the tie to commerce and the "substantiality" of the effect on
commerce of the challenged regulation to the "concreteness" and "substantial-
ity" of valid regulations. Courts must weigh the effect of the regulated activity
against activities previously upheld as having a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
This leaves lower courts with no standards other than its own perceptions,
biases, and beliefs. Perhaps this is a decision courts always faced under the
"substantial affects" test. If the Lopez decision stopped here, the decision
would not be so troublesome. Unfortunately, the Court also possibly raised the
standard of review to something more than minimum rationale. When the
Court makes factual decisions, assessing the constitutionality of legislation
according to the Court's perceptions of the legislation's necessity, and review
is less than deferential, then the result is a judiciary second-guessing the wis-
dom and workability of legislation. It is more than a judiciary properly adju-
dicating; it is a judiciary that legislates. In other words, it is not a court acting
in its proper functions. The courts adjudicate, according to the Constitution,
and the legislative branch legislates. But Lopez advocates judicial activism
when reviewing legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause-the
decision encourages courts to zealously review the legislation, to strike that
legislation that does not match a court's perceptions of "interstate commerce"
and "substantial" effects. The decision allows courts to demand Congress to
explain itself when legislating, and if a court dislikes that explanation, the
court may strike the law. Lopez allows these courts to replace Congress's
policy decisions with the court's policy. The court no longer reviews laws for
"rationality," but for "wisdom." The courts no longer maintain their adjudica-
tive role, but take on the function charged Congress by the Constitution.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 164-93; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recla-
mation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding SMCRA); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969)
(applying the Civil Rights Act to amusement parks); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964) (applying the Civil Rights Act to hotels and inns because of the effect of
racial discrimination on commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding
application of the Civil Rights Act to restaurants); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the NLRA because of the effect of labor strife on commerce). These
cases represent only a few of the countless federal commerce regulations.
368. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
369. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Coal & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
370. See e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
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C. The Flaws with the "Substantial Affects" Test
Even if the decision does not impose a heightened standard of review, the
Court applied a test which suffers from several flaws. Neither the Framers'
intent, the Constitution's language, nor Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Gibbons v. Ogden37" ' support the use of the "substantial affects" test. The test
is too broad, and grants Congress more power than those creating the power
ever envisioned.
First, the Framers never envisioned a power as broad as that under the
"substantial affects" test. They only meant to give Congress the power over
interstate activities, not all activities. This original purpose establishes the
reach of the Commerce Clause; the Commerce Clause must be viewed in light
of its purpose. This means that when courts review an action taken under the
Commerce Clause, they should ensure that the action does not exceed this
limited purpose envisioned by the Framers.
The states ceded to the federal government the power "to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.""' 2 The Framers created this unified power to protect the nation from
foreign powers,3" to direct the states' general interests into a common in-
terest of national strength,374 and to protect the nation from states' conten-
tions.375 The Constitution gives Congress the power to ensure that commerce
moves freely and remains unobstructed across the nation. Congress may also
govern commerce in the best interests of the nation overseas. If a law is nec-
essary to ensure that commerce moves freely, equitably, and productively, then
the law is a valid regulation of commerce.
Although the Framers' vision of "commerce" differed from "commerce"
today, they designed the Commerce Clause in broad enough terms which
allowed for these changes. Commerce, despite technological advances and
other changes, still encompasses those activities described by Chief Justice
Marshall in Gibbons.376 The activities affecting commerce in 1824 still affect
commerce today. The Framers understood commerce to encompass exchanges
of goods, trade, merchanting, and movement. Production was an entirely sepa-
rate enterprise.377 The Framers knew that the activities of commerce and
manufacturing had shared interests and that the vitality of one depended on the
371. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
372. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 3, cl. 8.
373. THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 66 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
374. Id. at 69.
375. THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 39-41 (Alexander Hamilton); see supra text accompanying
notes 27-33. The Framers feared that states would pursue selfish interests, enact discriminatory
laws, and grant preferences and exclusions. The unfair treatment would lead to wars among the
states, but if unified, the states would be protected from each other for each other. See supra text
accompanying notes 27-33.
376. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
377. The Federalist Papers often treated commerce as a distinct unit, separate from agricul-
ture, industry, or the arts. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1643 (1995) (Thomas, J., con-
curring); see e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 223 (Alexander Hamilton) (referring to manufactur-
ers as distinct from merchants); THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 133 (Alexander Hamilton) (referring
to commerce as a different unit than the arts and industry).
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vitality of the other. They understood that items produced became items
shipped.378 As Thomas's concurrence37 9 illustrated, early Americans knew
that commerce linked the states' agriculture and production."8 They were all
well aware that agriculture, production, and other local activities substantially
affected interstate commerce.
Despite this awareness, the Framers did not intend Congress to have pow-
er to regulate all local activities substantially affecting interstate com-
merce. 8' They expressly gave Congress the power to regulate only interstate
commerce-those activities that would unify and protect the nation and direct
the states' separate interests into a common goal. The Framers used the words
that best expressed their meaning.382 Had the Framers intended Congress to
have regulatory power over activities that "substantially affected" interstate
commerce, they would have either said, "Congress has the power over activi-
ties substantially affecting interstate commerce," or the Framers would have
enumerated those activities that they felt substantially affected interstate com-
merce, like agriculture, production, and mining. The modem "substantial af-
fects" test grew out of subtle, but nonetheless expansive, readings of the
Framers' ideas of commerce.383
In addition to the lack of support for the "substantial affects" test in light
of the intent of the Framers, the language of the Constitution and its enumera-
tion of powers also fails to support the test. The Constitution grants Congress
power to regulate interstate commerce, not power to regulate actions that
"substantially affect interstate commerce." A close reading of the Constitution
reveals that the "substantial affects" test makes the remaining legislative pow-
ers superfluous. Justice Thomas's concurrence also illustrated this point."'
He analyzed the "substantial affects" test in light of the Necessary and Proper
Clause.8 This Clause allows Congress to enact laws that are necessary, that
is, appropriate, to execute its enumerated functions, 86 and allows Congress
to pursue appropriate means to execute legitimate ends.387 Under Thomas's
378. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1645 (Thomas, J., concurring).
379. See supra text accompanying notes 273-92 for a discussion of Thomas's concurrence.
380. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1645 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas cited several sources
revealing the early American's awareness of this link: Oliver Ellsworth, A Landholder No. 1,
CONNECTICUT COURANT, Nov. 5, 1787, in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION 399 (M. Jensen ed., 1978) (telling farmers and producers that their prosperity
depended on the free flow of commerce); A Jerseyman: To the Citizens of New Jersey, TRENTON
MERCURY, Nov. 6, 1787, in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION, supra, at 147 (pointing to the connection between agriculture and commerce); William
Davie, 4 DEBATES 20 (a North Carolina Convention Delegate noting that commerce cannot flour-
ish without agriculture and agriculture cannot flourish without commerce).
381. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 105-06 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961) (rein-
forcing that agricultural and local activities belong to the states).
382. As Chief Justice Marshall stated in Gibbons, "men use the words that best express their
meaning." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824).
383. See supra notes 124-93 (explaining the emergence and growth of the new "substantial
affects" test).
384. See supra notes 277-84 and accompanying text.
385. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18. For an analysis of Justice Thomas's concurrence, see
supra text accompanying notes 273-92.
386. See supra note 277 for text of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
387. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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analysis, the Court's reading of the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause renders redundant the rest of the enumerated powers.388 For
example, there would be no need for Congress's enumerated power to coin
money since money is necessary to execute its Commerce Clause power.389
Money "substantially affects" commerce, and coining money is an appropriate
means to execute the power over an activity substantially affecting com-
merce.39 Likewise, the power to raise an Army39' would also fall within
Congress's commerce power; it is "necessary and proper" to execute the legiti-
mate power over activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce. The
Framers, under this analysis, never needed to enumerate the additional power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations and Indian Tribes.39 Certainly
these two types of commerce substantially affect commerce among the states.
The Lopez Court's analysis of the Commerce Clause, then, negates the need
for other enumerated powers. An analysis abolishing the utility of the rest of
the Constitution cannot be consistent with the intent behind the document.
Nor does the watershed case of Gibbons v. Ogden393 support the "sub-
stantial affects" test. In Gibbons, Justice Marshall established the scope of the
Commerce Clause in an analysis consistent with the Framers' intent. Com-
merce, he wrote, is "a unit" incorporating all types of commercial intercourse
among the states.394 The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to
prescribe rules governing and protecting the flow of commerce and all its
parts.395 The Constitution limits the reach of the power by its terms; Con-
gress may only regulate interstate commerce.396 It may only reach activities
that affect the several states.397 The Commerce Clause allows the federal
government to protect the states from each other and from foreign powers. It
prevents obstructions to the free flow of commerce but does not permit regula-
tions that are unnecessary to accomplish these purposes. The holding of Gib-
bons, that "commerce" included navigation, was neither surprising nor expan-
sive. Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation mirrored the Framers' vision.
Gibbons interpreted the Clause narrowly, never describing the Commerce
Clause to encompass a power over all activities that "substantially affect" in-
terstate commerce. Furthermore, Chief Justice Marshall clearly delineated
several activities Congress could not regulate even though they arguably had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.398
388. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring).
389. This assumes that the "substantial affects" test accurately characterizes Congress's com-
merce power.
390. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring).
391. Congress has the power to raise and support and Army. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 12.
392. The power for these categories of commerce fall within the Commerce Clause.
393. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); see supra text accompanying notes 35-61.
394. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194.
395. Id. at 190.
396. Id. at 194.
397. Id. at 195.
398. Id. at 203 (noting that the Commerce Clause did not give Congress control over numer-
ous state inspection laws or health and quarantine laws regardless of the effect of these activities
(low grade food, for example) on interstate commerce); see also United States v. Lopez, 115 S.
Ct. 1642, 1647 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating this same point by reinterpreting Justice
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Throughout the "substantial affects" test era, the Supreme Court probably
relied on a statement that Chief Justice Marshall made in Gibbons to explain
or justify its use of the "substantial affects" test. 99 Chief Justice Marshall
stated that federal power does not extend to activities that "do not affect other
states."'9 The Supreme Court later interpreted this statement to mean that
federal power must extend to activities that affect more than one state.40
However, this interpretation of Chief Justice Marshall's words is not neces-
sarily consistent with the Chief Justice's intent in Gibbons. Instead of inferring
the inverse, the Court could have interpreted Chief Justice Marshall to mean
that although the line between interstate and intrastate activities would be
difficult to draw, the federal, interstate power does not extend to the internal
activities of the state.4 2 In other words, the words of Chief Justice Marshall
place a limit on, or mark the ceiling of, congressional commerce power rather
than draw the floor, or the minimum, of the Commerce Clause. It does not
follow that since congressional power fails to reach activities not affecting
other states, then Congress may regulate all activities substantially affecting
other states. Because the "substantial affects" test stretches the language of
Gibbons and very likely Chief Justice Marshall's intent behind those words in
Gibbons, Gibbons does not support the "substantial affects" test.
D. The "Substantial Affects" Test Sees No Limits
The "substantial affects" test suffers from one major insufficiency: it is
too broad. The reason it is unsupported by the Framers' original intent, the
language of the Constitution, and the watershed opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden
is because the "substantial affects" test ultimately allows congressional regula-
tion of virtually all human endeavors. The test surpasses the purpose of the
Commerce Clause, to ensure national prosperity by unifying the nation into
one commercial nation. It exceeds the language of the Commerce Clause,
especially when read in light of the rest of the Constitution's enumerated
powers. And it extends the language of Gibbons by inferring a conclusion
Chief Justice Marshall never stated. The "substantial affects" test grants Con-
gress a very expansive power; nearly all activity in our interdependent, com-
mercial society has some ultimate tie to commerce. Moreover, the Supreme
Court never employed a limit that effectively bridled the power this test al-
lows. Although the Supreme Court tried to impose boundaries, these limits
added no bite to court review of congressional actions under the Commerce
Clause.
Early cases alluded to limits on Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce." 3 Some restricted Congress through the concept of dual
Marshall's analysis in Gibbons).
399. E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
400. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194.
401. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124 (reading Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation in Gibbons to
mean that Congress can regulate intrastate activities that so affect interstate activities).
402. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1647 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
403. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1888) (acknowledging that the cases all discuss the
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federalism."'4 Dual federalism posits that the federal government and state
governments are each sovereign governments in many areas; the two act to-
gether rather than allow federal preemption of a state action. Instead of pre-
emption, the federal government respects the states' authority over particular
areas, treading carefully in areas over which the states have authority. These
cases applying the concept of dual federalism warned the courts and Congress
against paralyzing the ability of the states to act. 5 Yet these cases also ac-
cepted that, in application, federal power preempted state law or at least oper-
ated in conjunction with state laws." Dual federalism, then, rarely deprives
Congress of power."
The Supreme Court attempted to impose other limits, besides dual federal-
ism, on Congress. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, the Court boldly asserted that rational basis review served as a limit
on congressional power.' But as the Supreme Court admitted in the oral
arguments of the Lopez case, if rational basis is the limit, then there is no limit
on congressional power.4 One can always find a rational basis. Other cases
alluded to the word "substantial" itself as a limit on Congress's use of the
Commerce Clause.4 Yet the facts of these cases reveal that the word "sub-
stantial" rarely limits legislative reach. If the word "substantial" encompasses
even trivial, noncommercial, intrastate activities, "2 it is hard to imagine an
activity that does not have a "substantial affect" on interstate commerce. 4'
Many acts affect commerce only trivially when considered in isolation. When
multiplied or aggregated, this trivial impact becomes substantial. For example,
one person boycotting a particular product almost imperceptibly impacts the
scope of the Commerce Clause, but none attempt to define the absolute extent of the power).
404. Baker, supra note 270, at 858. Dual Federalism posits that the two separate governments,
the federal level and the state level, are mutually exclusive systems, each respecting the others'
ability to govern certain areas and neither intruding upon the others' sovereignty. Id.
405. See Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. 568, 574 (1852); Kidd, 128 U.S. at 21; see generally Unit-
ed States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895) (stating that the states did not surrender their
power to protect the lives, health, and property of its citizens even if the regulated activity is
carried out by a private party with public interest).
406. Kidd, 128 U.S. at 18; see also Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968), overruled
by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 328 (1985) (asserting that there is no promise in the Constitution
that the federal and state governments will act free of each other); see Shreveport Rates Case, 234
U.S. 342, 351-52 (1914) (stating that the effect of the regulation of commerce is neither dimin-
ished by nor qualified by the fact that a state police power regulation may govern the same activi-
ty).
407. Dual Federalism also reflects the incorporation of the Tenth Amendment. The Tenth
Amendment provides, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X. See supra note 195 for a discussion of the effect of the Tenth Amendment on congres-
sional commerce regulations.
408. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
409. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 264.
410. Oral Argument at 19, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260).
411. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
119-20 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
412. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28; see supra text accompanying notes 153-63.
413. The Lopez Court obviously thought gun possession in a school zone does not sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). This Com-
ment, however, focuses on the fallacy of the Court's reasoning in reaching that conclusion.
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movement of that product. That boycott places a minute burden on commerce.
Multiply that boycotter by one hundred, however, and the boycott's impact on
commerce becomes substantial.
A federal prohibition on all individual, commercial boycotts seems absurd,
and surely beyond the commerce power. Yet compare the boycott example to
Wickard v. Filburn,"4 where the federal government prohibited anyone from
growing wheat in excess of the federal specified amount. Congress hoped to
force people to buy wheat on the market-thus compensating for an
overproduction of wheat. But Filburn chose to eat his own wheat rather than
buy it on the market, just as the boycotter decided not to buy a particular
product any longer. The boycott affects commerce the same way Filburn's
homegrown wheat consumption affected commerce; if all potential buyers of
that product decided not to buy it any longer, those decisions would substan-
tially affect interstate commerce." 5 Under Wickard, the federal government
could regulate a person's ability to boycott a product. In the aggregate, they
both substantially affect interstate commerce. Thus, the word "substantial"
hardly limits congressional reach under the Commerce Clause.
The Supreme Court in Lopez finally set a limit on congressional power
under the Commerce Clause. The decision tells Congress that it may still
regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, but that gun
possession is not one of those activities. However, Lopez acts as an insuffi-
cient limit on Congress for one simple reason: it only limits Congress in situa-
tions that parallel the facts of Lopez. Lopez added no new limits to the expan-
sive test, except that in one set of facts, gun possession in a school zone, the
regulated activity did not substantially affect interstate commerce. Lopez did
not limit the Commerce Clause or congressional power under that Clause; it
only limited Congress's ability to regulate gun possession in a school zone.
Congress must now, when legislating, distinguish between the permissible
regulations of the prior cases and the impermissible regulations of gun posses-
sion in a school zone. The only real limit, then, is on Congress's ability to
predict the validity of a regulation.
E. An Additional Flaw in the Court's Analysis: Gun Possession
Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce
Several arguments reveal that gun possession in a school zone does in fact
substantially affect interstate commerce. For example, Justice Stevens used an
article-of-commerce4 6 analysis in his dissent.4 7 Guns are articles of com-
414. 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see supra text accompanying notes 153-63. Briefly stated, the
Court upheld a federal prohibition of Filbum's home consumption of his own wheat instead of
buying it on the market. Filburn grew a surplus amount for his home use. The federal government
used the Commerce Clause to prohibit all growing of wheat for home use.
415. This is not an argument about the ability of the boycotter to speak about his boycott or
persuade others to boycott with him. It is about the effect of the boycott on the market. For the
purposes of argument, this Comment assumes there would be no speech limitations on the
government's ability to prevent the boycott.
416. Justice Stevens did not call his argument an "article-of-commerce" analysis.
417. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1651 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
merce,15 and people use guns to restrain commerce." 9 Possession, in or
out of a school zone, necessarily takes place after the gun's possession in
commerce. According to Stevens, possessing guns in school zones affects
commerce. The guns moved in commerce to reach the person carrying the gun
in the school zone, and the gun in the school zone might be used to restrain
commerce. 4"0 Justice Stevens also argued that Congress's ability to govern
commerce includes the power to oversee certain areas of the commercial mar-
ket.42' School-age children constitute one of these regulable markets. 2
Children buy guns.423
The articles-of-commerce argument is consistent with the Civil Rights
Cases.424 The Civil Rights Act applied to discrimination in private restau-
rants and amusement parks in part because both of these markets used items
moving in commerce.425 Just as Congress may regulate discrimination be-
cause of the effect of discrimination on the movement of goods in commerce,
so too may it regulate gun possession because of the effect of gun possession
on the movement of goods moving in interstate commerce.426
Justice Stevens also argued that Congress may regulate "the market" of
school age children.427 This argument compares to the arguments validated in
several cases. The Civil Rights Cases substantiate this principle. In Katzenbach
418. This assumes that at one time, the guns were bought, sold, or exchanged on the market.
Courts often consider items bought or sold as an article of commerce. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at
1643 (Thomas, J., concurring). Webster's defines commerce as, "the exchange or buying and
selling of commodities esp. [sic] on a large scale and involving transportation from place to
place-compare trade, traffic." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 456 (1986).
419. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
420. See supra text accompanying notes 312-26 for the Lopez dissent's analysis of how gun
possession affects commerce.
421. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
422. Id. However, Congress did not limit the Gun-Free School Zone Act to the "sale" of guns
to children in a school zone. This "regulable market" argument requires only that the Act reach
those activities involving the sale of guns to individuals in that market.
On the other hand, legislation can be overinclusive. See Presault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 18-19
(1990). Presault held that under "rational basis" review, the Court is not at liberty to hold a law
invalid merely because more Draconian measures might advance the purpose more completely. Id.
"[Liegislating involves tradeoffs, compromises, and imperfect solutions, and [the Court's ability to
imagine designing] the state to advance one of Congress's ends does not render it irrational." Id.
(citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469 (1981)).
423. Alfonso Lopez brought the gun to school to sell to another student. Farmer, supra note
215, at 1674. This is only one example of a child buying a gun. More and more children carry
guns. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Like "Nike" shoes or video games, chil-
dren will buy the items that interest them. The possession of guns by children is the consequence
of commercial activity. Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
424. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
425. Daniel, 395 U.S. 298 (regulating racial discrimination in amusement parks); Katzenbach,
379 U.S. 294 (applying the Civil Rights Act to private restaurants since restaurants use items
moving in interstate commerce).
426. This argument relies on the assumption that possession of an item requires that the item
at one time was bought or sold. This was not an unreasonably or illogical inference, assuming the
firearm was not built by the possessor. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 186-87 (1968), over-
ruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding the application of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to employees of any enterprise engaged in commerce).
427. See supra text accompanying notes 293-94, referring to this argument.
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v. McClung,"" for example, the Court upheld the application of the Civil
Rights Act in certain markets of discrimination."9 If Congress can regulate
certain markets, and if school age children form a market for guns, then Con-
gress can regulate gun possession in a school zone. The market is merely an
"instrument" of commerce,4 30 and Congress may regulate the instruments of
interstate commerce.43" ' It is at least reasonable that Congress sought to regu-
late this market, and the Court only requires that legislation enacted pursuant
to the Commerce Clause be reasonable.432
Justice Breyer, likewise contended that gun possession in school zones
substantially affects interstate commerce. He argued, however, that guns affect
commerce through their effect on education. Each day, more and more chil-
dren arrive at school carrying concealed weapons. 33 This creates an atmo-
sphere of fear, violence, and crime."4 Children cannot learn in such an envi-
ronment. 35 If a child is focusing on getting to and from school safely, the
child is not focusing on learning basic academic skills. This atmosphere causes
children to sleep poorly, eat poorly, and produce lower quality work.436
Guns, leading to violence and crime, significantly affect the drop-out rate. 3'
Due to the inherently dangerous nature of guns, Congress could reason-
ably conclude that crime, fear, and violence increase in areas where individu-
als carry and use concealed weapons. 38 Guns also discourage some well-
qualified teachers from teaching in those areas.4 39 Guns inhibit parents from
moving into areas where guns are present in the schools."' Guns place chil-
dren in perpetual fear of violence. Guns, therefore, threaten the educational
process. Since education intimately, tangibly, and substantially affects the
economy, impediments to education impede the vitality of commerce."'
Perhaps the effect of gun possession on commerce seems too far removed
to allow congressional regulation of gun possession. Some might say that gun
possession imposes only an indirect effect on commerce. But the Supreme
Court long ago rejected the direct/indirect standard for the "substantial affects"
428. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
429. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 294 (upholding congressional regulation of racial discrimination
in restaurants).
430. See supra text accompanying notes 87-93.
431. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1627 (1995).
432. Presault, 494 U.S. at 18-19.
433. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659.
434. Brief for the United States at 19-20, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No.
93-1260).
435. Justice Breyer asserted that children, quality education, and guns are "mutually exclu-
sive." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
436. Brief for the United States at 20-21, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No.
93-1260).
437. Id. at 20.
438. Id. at 18 (citing United States v. Trioli, 308 F. Supp. 358, 360 (D. Mass. 1970) (distin-
guishing between guns and drugs but stating that because of the dangerous nature of both, Con-




441. Id. at 22; see supra text accompanying notes 319-22.
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test." 2 Even activities with an indirect effect may substantially affect inter-
state commerce." 3
Gun possession affects commerce as much as activities the Supreme Court
previously upheld as regulable. The Jones & Laughlin and Darby Courts al-
lowed congressional regulation of labor strife because of the adverse impact of
labor strife on national productivity.4" Activities that injure national produc-
tivity substantially affect interstate commerce because of the intimate tie be-
tween national productivity and commerce. Under this reasoning, gun
possession's effect on national productivity renders it an activity within con-
gressional reach.
The "substantial affects" test allowed Congress to regulate racial discrimi-
nation in a restaurant because discrimination deterred travel, which diminished
the amount of supplies bought."5 Gun possession in a school zone requires
no more inferences than racial discrimination. Racial discrimination, like pos-
session of a gun, is not an article of commerce, and both occur at a local
level. Other precedents further reveal the inconsistent nature of the Lopez deci-
sion. Labor strife in hospitals and schools, mining reclamation and mining
waste, are all subject to regulation under Congress's commerce power. How-
ever, labor strife in hospitals and schools-noncommercial arenas-require
several inferences to see the effect on interstate commerce. Mining reclama-
tion certainly occurs locally, and mining waste is not an article of commerce.
When compared to the regulations previously upheld, and not overruled by
Lopez, it is clear that the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 governs an activ-
ity that substantially affects interstate commerce.
F. What the Court Could Have Done
Even though, arguably, gun possession in a school zone substantially
affects interstate commerce, allowing federal regulation of gun possession in a
school zone seems troubling. The Act resembles a police regulation, not a
commercial regulation. It seems Congress regulated gun possession because
guns pose physical, psychological, and moral dangers, rather than a "substan-
tial" danger to interstate commerce through its effect on the economy. If the
Court sought to limit congressional power, however, it could have done so
more effectively and clearly through an alteration of the "substantial affects"
442. See supra text accompanying note 123. It is interesting that the Lopez Court rejected the
Gun-Free School Zone Act because it required to pile "inference on inference." Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
at 1624. Yet the Court long ago rejected the direct/indirect effects test, replacing it with the "sub-
stantial affects" test, seemingly to allow Congress to regulate those activities that pose catastroph-
ic, albeit indirect, effects on commerce. This would mean that the Court hoped Congress could
regulate activities that required the courts to make inferences to see this "catastrophic" effect.
443. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
444. Darby upheld the FLSA because substandard labor conditions lead to labor strife and
labor strife interferes with the orderly, free market and national productivity. Darby, 312 U.S. at
110. The Jones & Laughlin Court upheld the NLRA because labor strife could cripple the entire
movement of commerce, negatively impacting national productivity. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S.
at 47.
445. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 299.
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test. The arbitrary holding of Lopez restricts the case's precedential value to its
facts.
The "substantial affects" test measures how much an act affects interstate
commerce, not the degree of the relationship. If it were possible to scale the
nexus, the "substantial affects" test asks: if the activity occurs one hundred
times, how many times will interstate commerce feel the effect? If it is
enough, the effect is substantial and the activity is regulable. Imagine a com-
pany having a monopoly over the car trade in this nation. If this monopoly
sold one hundred cars, pricing each at an outrageous cost to the consumer, one
hundred of those one hundred times the company sold the car, or one hundred
percent of the time, the consumers would pay too much or be deterred from
buying the car. Since commerce feels the effect one hundred percent of the
time, it is fair to say that the car monopoly imposes a "substantial affect" on
interstate commerce. The "substantial affects" test attempts to measure the
effects like the car-monopoly, those that impose an effect on commerce a
substantial amount of the time.'
The "substantial affects" test seems to measure the effects Justice Cardozo
spoke of in United States v. Schechter Poultry: 7
There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local in the activities of com-
merce. Motion at the outer rim is communicated perceptibly, though
minutely, to recording instruments at the center. A society such as
ours "is an elastic medium which transmits all tremors throughout its
territory; the only question is of their size.'"
The Lopez Court seemingly wanted to halt federal regulation of the motions at
the outer rim that only imperceptibly affected the inner recording instrument;
gun possession in a school zone is an outer rim motion, too small to create "a
tremor throughout its territory." However, the Court should have halted con-
gressional regulation of outer-rim motions by altering or qualifying the sub-
stantial affects test, by adding a limiting or qualifying prong to the test.
First, the Court could consider whether the regulated activity "substantial-
ly affects" interstate commerce in isolation or in the aggregate. This prong
would be the same method as the "substantial affects" test used in Lopez,
Darby, Wickard, Jones & Laughlin, and the other modem era cases. If the
Court determined that the activity substantially affects interstate commerce,
then the Court would consider whether federal regulation of the activity is
"appropriate." This additional prong is a small alteration to the current test,
allowing the Court to ensure that the regulated activity falls within the intent
and purpose of the Commerce Clause.
This additional prong asks whether the activity is one that the states al-
ready regulate effectively or adequately," 9 and whether the federal regulation
446. This is not to imply that the effect must be felt one hundred percent of the time to be
"substantial." Rather, this was only an example of an effect that would be clearly substantial.
447. Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
448. Id. at 554 (quoting United States v. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617, 624 (2d Cir.
1935) (L. Hand, J., concurring) (Cardozo, J., concurring)).
449. It would be, no doubt, difficult for the courts to determine if the states "effectively or
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removes an actual obstruction to commerce or if it is a police power "in dis-
guise." A court would determine if the regulation's relation to commerce is
too tenuous to be proper. If the regulated activity is an "outer-rim ripple,""45
only "negligibly reflected through tremors at the center, ' '451 the act is too
attenuated to be a proper congressional regulation. Using this analysis, courts
would determine if there are intervening acts that supersede the activity's
effect on commerce. If the analysis requires too many inferences, assumptions,
and speculations to identify the nexus to interstate commerce, the regulation is
inappropriate.
This additional analytical prong-the "appropriateness" prong-would
limit the "substantial affects" test and clarify the distinction between the facts
of the Civil Rights Cases, Wickard, Jones & Laughlin, Darby, and the facts of
Lopez and the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990. Without this additional
prong, courts are left to speculate the distinction between the valid regulations
and the Gun-Free School Zone Act. This revised "substantial affects" test
would acknowledge that gun possession's effect on commerce is as substantial
as that of racial discrimination and labor strife within hospitals and schools.
Under this standard, however, upholding the Gun-Free School Zone Act would
be inappropriate because unlike labor strife in a hospital or school, upholding
the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 requires too many inferences, and
treads too heavily on state concerns. It was, in effect, an "outer-rim ripple"
only negligibly communicated to "recording instruments at the center." Acts
with tenuous relations to interstate commerce, like some environmental laws
and the Civil Rights Act, could withstand this additional prong, but not all
legislation would pass the test. For example, the Civil Rights Act could be
challenged as having too nebulous a connection to interstate commerce to be
valid. Upon review, the Court would first determine if racial discrimination
has a substantial affect on interstate commerce. The Court would conclude that
racial discrimination substantially affects interstate commerce through its dele-
terious effect on interstate travel and the movement of goods across state
lines.452 The Court would then consider whether federal regulation of racial
adequately" regulate an area of commerce. Perhaps this also calls for too much judicial activism.
However, using gun possession in a school zone as an example, the Court could have considered
whether the states were in the better position to be the governing body over that activity. In other
words, perhaps under this prong the Court would balance which government, state or federal,
would better regulate. In the case of gun possession in a school zone, the Court might have decid-
ed that the states are in the better position considering the diversity of the problem and the diver-
sity of school zones.
Several states already regulated gun possession or imposed some type of gun control before
or while the Gun-Free School Zone Act was in place. This calls into question the necessity of the
federal act. For example, Texas authorities charged Lopez under Texas law before federal authori-
ties stepped in. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626. Other state laws prohibiting gun possession in a school
zone, for example: ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 11.61.195(a)(2)(A), 11.61.220(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1994);
CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 626.9 (West Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 269, § 10(j) (1992);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-5(e) (West Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1 (1988); Wis.
STAT. § 948.605 (1991-1992).
450. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 554.
451. Id.
452. See supra text accompanying notes 164-75 for a discussion of the later civil rights cases,
upholding the Act as a valid exercise of congressional commerce power.
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discrimination is "appropriate." The Court would ask whether the states ade-
quately regulate racial discrimination. Arguably, the answer to this would be
no. While the states do enact legislation prohibiting discrimination, some states
leave certain types of discrimination out of their statutes. This would provide
inconsistent statutes, as well as inadequate laws.4" The Court would then ask
whether the Civil Rights Act actually removes an obstruction to commerce;
and the answer to this is, arguably, yes. If the Court determined that racial
discrimination imposes a deleterious effect on interstate commerce, then the
best means to remove that obstruction would be to prohibit the activity causing
the burden. The regulated activity, in this case, racial discrimination, would
not have to pass every category mentioned under this last prong. The prong
would simply be an added balance, so the Court would weigh the validity of
the legislation. Thus, the Civil Rights Act withstands rational basis scrutiny
under this revised "substantial affects" test. However, not all legislation would
pass this new test. For example, the Gun-Free School Zone Act might fail the
test; unlike racial discrimination, the states might regulate gun possession in a
school zone better than the federal government. The Court need not abandon
the "substantial affects" test, only limit it to its own terms and not by the facts
of a single case. This would provide guidance to lower courts and afford the
traditional, appropriate deference to Congress.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court undoubtedly granted certiorari on Lopez with the
intention of halting Congress's previously unfettered power under the Com-
merce Clause.4"4 A limit was necessary. Neither the Framers' intent, the
Constitution, nor early Commerce Clause interpretations supported an unlimit-
ed power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. Yet the Lopez Court im-
posed a limit based solely on the facts of the one case, and thus, the limit
applies in factually limited circumstances. The Court should have altered the
"substantial affects" test to reflect the Framers' intent behind granting Con-
gress the power to regulate interstate commerce, for as it stands, the power
sweeps beyond this intent. The power also reaches beyond the language of the
Constitution and the watershed interpretation of the power in Gibbons v.
Ogden.55 By its terms, and according to valid precedent, the test is nearly
boundless. In practice, the Lopez decision did not "substantially affect" the
future of congressional power to regulate under the guise of the Commerce
Clause; the case only affects the method by which Congress regulates and the
method by which courts review those regulations.
The Lopez decision also raises some more serious implications. The Court
raised the standard of review, allowing-if not forcing-the courts to scale
deference to Congress according to the courts' perceptions of how much an
act affects interstate commerce. The Lopez decision forces courts to weigh
453. At least inadequate in comparison to the federal Civil Rights Act.
454. Or perhaps the Court granted certiorari on the case simply because they did not want
Congress to regulate gun possession in a school zone.
455. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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empirical findings and make legislative judgments. The courts must second-
guess the empirical decisions already made by Congress, and best left to Con-
gress. It tells the courts to examine not only the plausible rationality of legisla-
tion but the substance and merit of congressional findings. It empowers courts
with the authority and ability to not only adjudicate but to legislate. Lopez
may have disarmed congressional commerce power and armed the courts with
the very power it stole from Congress.456
Molly E. Homan
456. The Bureau of National Affairs compiled an interesting article on the Commerce Clause
since Lopez, stating that a new, good defense for many criminal charges will be "Congress ex-
ceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause." For a discussion of this defense, and a helpful
chart in indicating the statutes that Lopez threatens, see Exciting New Defense Hinges on (Yes) the
Commerce Clause, 9 Criminal Practice Manual (BNA) No. 18, at 417 (Aug. 30, 1995).
Finally, the Michigan Law Review dedicated a symposium issue to United States v. Lopez.
The symposium notes effects not discussed in this Comment. See Symposium, Reflections on
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554 (1995).
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In war as in love, to bring matters to a close, you must get close together.
Napoleon'
1. EvAN ESAR, 20,000 QuiPs AND QUOTES 309 (1968).

